

Seneca's Heraclitus DK 22 B 49a and Parmenides*

DOI: 10.14746/PEA.2024.1.19

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...nomina nuda tenemus

Introduction

Several studies have explored the potential relationship between Heraclitus and Parmenides, since the chronology derived from the sources does not exclude this scenario.¹

* The first time I met Professor Livio Rossetti (to whom this paper is dedicated), I had just begun to take my first, inexperienced steps into the world of ancient philosophy. Despite (then as now) having little to say and too much to learn, he showed genuine interest in my studies and was very encouraging. Over the years, I have experienced his inclusive attitude towards younger and less well-known scholars on several occasions: his critical energy in considering their positions is always counterbalanced by his encouragement to believe in research and to persevere despite difficulties. It was as if the study of ancient philosophy were a banquet to which everyone who has dedicated effort to it has a right to participate: our mistakes might require us to proceed with greater caution, but they do not exclude us from participation. His capacity to include others – and to inspire them to do their best – is one of the reasons why I am honored to celebrate him with this contribution. I would also like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Mikołaj Domaradzki, Professor Stefania Giombini, and Professor Marian Wesoly: their altruism is not a surprise, yet it remains extraordinary.

¹ According to Diogenes Laërtius, *Vitae philosophorum* IX 1–17 (= DK 22 A 1); IX. 21 (= DK 28 A 1) – whose chronologies most likely depend on Apollodorus' information (cf. Diels [1876] and Diels [1902]) – both

However, for the most part there are two main scholarly arguments on this point, with no consensus:² first, that Heraclitus and Parmenides were probably unknown to one another, or at least that there is no evidence that they knew each other;³ second, that Parmenides knew and argued against Heraclitus.⁴ This paper, within its modest scope, focuses on Heraclitus DK 22 B 49a, aiming both to provide additional support for the second argument and to offer a possible interpretation of the origins of Parmenides' κρίσις between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι.

As is well known, in DK 28 B 6.5–9, Parmenides criticizes what he calls two-headed mortals (B 6.5: δίκρανοι), who think that being and not being are both the same and not the same (B 6.8–9: οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται/κοῦ ταῦτόν), since this assumption contradicts his very κρίσις – stated in B 8.14–16 – between ἔστι and οὐκ ἔστι.⁵ By no coincidence, in Parmenides B 6.7, this horde (φῦλα) of mortals is said to be ἄκριτα, that is, devoid of κρίσις.

Several scholars believed that these δίκρανοι were Heraclitus and his close followers and pointed to several textual parallels between Heraclitus' and Parmenides' fragments⁶ to demonstrate that Parmenides targeted Heraclitus in particular in his polemics in B 6.5–9 and, more generally, throughout the draft of his poem. These parallels include a possible reference in Parmenides B 6.8–9 to Heraclitus DK 22 B 49a (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν) – one of Heraclitus' fragments that contains the famous image of the river – as this fragment ends by claiming that “we are and are not” (εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν), that is, by combining εἶναι and μὴ

Heraclitus' and Parmenides' ἀκμή was during the 69th Olympiad: thus, they were contemporaries. The other source for Parmenides' dating is Plato's *Parmenides* (*Prm.* 127 a), according to which the thinker of Elea cannot be older than Heraclitus but must necessarily be younger (cf. Bicknell [1966]). Since Plato and Diogenes/Apolodorus are not in agreement, Gomperz (1924) deserves particular mention for his efforts to reconcile them. Historical details and insights into the life and thought of Heraclitus are also offered in the valuable research by Galeotti (2021).

² Reinhardt (1916: 69–72; 208–211) represents an exception since he makes Parmenides older than Heraclitus, so that it is the latter who polemicalized against the former.

³ Among others, this position has been supported, with some nuance in their argument, by Zeller (1892), resumed in Reale, (Zeller, Mondolfo, 2011: 182–183); Gadamer (1952: 60); Unstersteiner (1958: CXII, n. 35); Mansfeld (1964: 8–10); Cordero (2004: 8); Nehamas (2002: 45–64); Fronterotta (2013: XXI–XXII) and, more recently, Berruecos Frank (2020).

⁴ Among others, cf. Bernays (1850); Patin, (1899); De Marchi (1905: 44–46); Levi (1927: 271–273); Loew (1930); Überweg (1953²: 83–85); Covotti (1934); Calogero (1932: 41); Cherniss (1935: 82–83); Albertelli (1939: 41); Vlastos (1946: 66–77); Ramnoux (1959: 261); Loenen (1959: 92); Mondolfo (1961: 399–424); Tarán (1965: 61–71); Giannatoni, (1988: 218–221); G. Cerri (1999: 205–209); and Graham (2002).

⁵ Parmenides DK 28 B 8.15–16: ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ δ' ἔστιν/ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

⁶ A very comprehensive comparison between Heraclitus' and Parmenides' texts, despite its shortness, is provided Giannatoni, (1988: 219–220). More recently, Graham (2005) and Berruecos Frank (2020) have conducted insightful and detailed analyses in this regard. Graham's work aims to reaffirm the presence of an anti-Heraclitean polemic in Parmenides, while Berruecos Frank's work challenges this interpretation. It is worth recalling, as still useful and insightful for understanding the reception of Heraclitus, Mondolfo's investigation into the testimonies on Heraclitus prior to Plato, now included in Marcovich, Mondolfo, Tarán (2007: XLI–CXCXVIII).

εἶναι, whereas Parmenides B. 6.8–9 (πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται) clearly criticizes such a combination.

Nevertheless, since several scholars have argued that Heraclitus B 49a is spurious,⁷ further problems arise: if this fragment were, in fact, spurious, the argument in favor of Parmenides' reference to Heraclitus would, of course, be weakened. Thus, it is worthy to further investigate the authenticity of Heraclitus B 49a, since such a question has implications beyond Heraclitus' own doctrine.

Stepping into the rivers (Heraclitus DK 22 B 12 and B 49a)

It is worth beginning with Fronterotta's insightful studies on Heraclitus' fragments, which have suggested that Heraclitus B 49a seems to belong to the later Heraclitean tradition rather than to Heraclitus himself.⁸ Like several scholars before him,⁹ Fronterotta takes another river fragment, Heraclitus B 12 (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ) – handed down from Cleanthes from Arius Didymus from Eusebius¹⁰ – as somehow authentic.¹¹ On the other hand, he argues that the other two river fragments, Heraclitus B 91¹² (ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ) and Heraclitus B 49a, are spurious. Regarding Heraclitus B 49a, Fronterotta's argument seems to rely on doxography: he first – and rightly – examines Plato's and Aristotle's accounts on Heraclitus' doctrine, as well as its later followers, to illustrate how the later Heraclitean tradition stressed Heraclitus' flux,¹³ and then the scholar also highlights the significant role that Plato and Aristotle played in this emphasis.¹⁴ On this matter, a very paradigmatic account is the one provided by Aristotle, according to which Cratylus criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice (δῖς) into the same river, by

⁷ Cf. Kirk (1954: 373–74); Marcovich (1967: 142). But G. Calogero (2012²: 72–77); Bollack, Wismann (1972: 173–174), Diano, Serra (1980: 12, 121–123); Conche, (1986: 455–458); Robinson (1987: 112–113); Mouraviev (2006: 124–125), have argued in favour of its authenticity, whereas Kahn (1979: 288–289) considers it dubious.

⁸ Cf. Fronterotta (2012: 84–85) and (2013: pp. 87–88).

⁹ For instance, Kirk (1954: 367–369); Kahn, (1979: 52–53, 166); Robinson (1987: 16–17, 84).

¹⁰ Eus. *PE* XV 20.2–5.

¹¹ Cf. F. Fronterotta (2013: 83–87), but also (2012: 80–84).

¹² Quoted by Plu. *De E* 392A–B.

¹³ Cf. Pl. *Cra.* 401d–402a, 411b–c, 439c–440d; *Th.* 152d–e, 156a, 160d, 177c, 179d, 180a–183a; but also *Phd.* 90b–c; *Sph.* 249b; *Phlb.* 43a; and Arist. *Top.* 104b21; *DA* 405a28; *Cael.* 298b29; *Ph.* 228a7, 265a2, 253b9; *Metaph.* 987a32, 1012b26, 1078b13. Before considering Aristotle's account on Cratylus, it is interesting to note that Plato already seems to distinguish between Heraclitus' view on becoming and that of his followers. Heraclitus is said to declare that it is impossible to step into the same river twice (*Pl. Cra.* 402a: Ἡράκλειτος λέγει (...) δῖς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης). By this, he admits that it is possible to make a single entry in the same river – that there is a single moment in which reality has some identity of its own. On the other hand, in *Theaetetus* 179e–180c, those of the Ephesus milieu (τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἐφεσον) seem to be depicted as more radical, since their view on becoming seems to be such that reality never has a stable identity. Cf. Hülsz Piccone (2009a); Fronterotta (2012: 75).

¹⁴ Cf. F. Fronterotta (2015).

declaring that it is not possible to do so even once (οὐδ'ἅπαξ): “Cratylus [...] was also critical of Heraclitus for saying that it is not possible to step into the same river twice, for he thought that one could not even do it once” (Κρατύλος [...] Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾔετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ¹⁵). According to Cratylus, the unceasing flux of the water makes it impossible to pin down even a single moment when the river has a stable identity. On the other hand, the becoming as thematized by Heraclitus himself seems to be less intense and radical, inasmuch as it would allow for a single entry into the same river and thus permit identifying a moment in which reality possesses some degree of stability. Thus, Aristotle's account makes the impossibility of stepping into the same river twice Heraclitus' authentic content, at least to the extent that Cratylus' correction would not make sense if it were not.

If this image of stepping into the river twice is authentically Heraclitean, then Fronterotta cautiously argues that Heraclitus B 12 does not necessarily conflict with this Heraclitean trope. Instead, it could suggest the impossibility of stepping into the same river both once and twice. Conversely, Heraclitus B 49a follows, rather, the later tradition, which declares it impossible even once (οὐδ'ἅπαξ). Let's see what arguments support this assumption.

Heraclitus B 12, as mentioned above, declares that “upon those who step into the same rivers different and different waters flow” (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ).¹⁶ This fragment is mostly taken as authentic and in accordance with Heraclitus' claim concerning the impossibility of stepping into the same river twice, even though δις is absent in the Greek text. Summarizing, an argument in favor of its authentic status is that if “upon those who step into the same rivers different and different waters flow,” then “it is impossible to step twice into the same rivers.” In other words, since the waters are changing, the rivers into which we step the first time cannot be the same as those into which we step the second time. Anyway, Fronterotta cautiously underlines that in this fragment it is not clear whether the intensity of the change of the waters is such that we can step into the same river at least once or whether it is such that we cannot step into even once. Therefore, the number of the times we can step into the same river cannot really help to understand whether the fragment is authentically Heraclitus'. Rather, B 12 seems to belong to Heraclitus himself as it involves a distinction between the whole (the rivers) and its parts (the waters) that allows us to grasp the Heraclitean trope of opposition: the changing parts (the flowing waters) are opposed to the whole (the same rivers) that remains the same.¹⁷ Nevertheless, since the fragment does not seem to irrevocably deny the possibility of stepping into the same

¹⁵ Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a7–15.

¹⁶ Cf. Fronterotta (2015: 122–123), who rightly points out that ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν could also be translated as “for the same ones who step into the river” or, even more explicitly, “for those who, remaining the same, step into the river;” but also that these translations would lose the opposition between the river being the same and the changeability of its flowing waters.

¹⁷ e.g. Fronterotta (2013: 84–88); Fronterotta (2015: 119 n. 20, 122–124).

rivers at least once, Heraclitus B 12 can be taken as either authentic or, at the very least, not inconsistent with Heraclitus' teachings regarding the number of entries into the river. On the other hand, a similar reasoning persuades Fronterotta to take Heraclitus B 49a as spurious.

Before examining this position, it is worth noting that B49a is transmitted by Heraclitus the Grammarian,¹⁸ who, in interpreting Homer's use of gods' names as a way of naming natural elements, affirms that there is nothing paradoxical in a poet's use of allegory, since even professed philosophers use this mode of expression (παράδοξον γὰρ οὐδέν, εἰ ποιητῆς τις ὦν ἀλληγορεῖ, καὶ τῶν προηγουμένως φιλοσοφούντων τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ χρωμένων). To demonstrate this point, he mentions Heraclitus the Obscure, who puts forward unclear matters which can be conjectured by means of symbols and presents his doctrine in the way exemplified by the fragments DK 22 B 62 and 49 (ὁ γοῦν σκοτεινὸς Ἡράκλειτος ἀσαφῆ καὶ διὰ συμβόλων εἰκάζεσθαι δυνάμενα θεολογεῖ τὰ φυσικὰ δι' ὧν φησί). Immediately after quoting B 49a, he concludes by declaring that Heraclitus' whole enigmatic account on nature is an allegory (ἄλλο τὸ περὶ φύσεως αἰνιγματῶδες ἀλληγορεῖ). Therefore, there seems to be no doubt that all the words of B 49a transmitted by Heraclitus the Grammarian are intended by him to belong to the fragment he quotes.

B 49a asserts that "into the same rivers we step and do not step, we are and are not" (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομεν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν). Since it states that "we step and do not step into the same rivers," Fronterotta thinks that it seems to deny that it is possible to step into the same rivers even once.¹⁹ In other words, the fact that we step into and do not step into the same rivers is interpreted as referring to the situation we are in during our single entry into them. Therefore, since during a single entry into the rivers we do not step into the same rivers more than we do, it is impossible to grasp even a single complete entry into these rivers. Thus, this fragment seems to align with Cratylus' understanding of flux, rather than with Heraclitus', as Heraclitus concedes that stepping into the same rivers the first time is, in fact, possible.

However, concerning the issue of the number of entries into the river – which is the sole focus of this discussion – the fragments at issue can be interpreted differently. Regarding B 12, Fronterotta rightly observes that Heraclitus B 12 never makes explicit how many times one steps into the same rivers: it rather states that different waters continuously flow in these rivers, so that the rivers change. The fact that "upon those who step into the same rivers different and different waters flow" seems to remain valid if one steps into the river just once or multiple times²⁰. Thus, the constant flow of its waters may even make it impossible to pin down even a single moment in time when the

¹⁸ Heraclit. *All.* 24, 2–6.

¹⁹ Fronterotta (2013: 87–88).

²⁰ Fronterotta's translation (2013: 83) "per coloro i quali entrano negli stessi fiumi, sempre diverse scorrono le acque" seems to me to slightly better fit with the denial of the possibility of even a single stepping into the same rivers. This is because the fact that the waters "always" flow and change could imply that we "never" – even the first time we step into the same rivers – experience a moment when the river is not changing.

rivers are the same, and this latter reading could make the text of the fragment more in agreement with the Cratylean view rather than Heraclitus himself. In addition (let it be said here only in passing, and without any demonstrative intent), the phrase ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ seems to be a quite close parallel to Plato's πάντα χωρεῖ and οὐδὲν μένει,²¹ one of the famous *dicta* that illustrates the later tradition's radicalization of Heraclitus' flux, particularly in light of the shared employment of the verb ῥεῖν. By way of hypothesis, on the contrary, we might also observe that the repetition ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα could also refer to the number of times we step into the same rivers, which – according to this reading – would be two: the waters are different (ἕτερα) the first time (compared to the second time) and different (ἕτερα) the second time (compared to the first time).²² This latter reading may be in agreement with Heraclitus' impossibility of stepping twice into the same rivers, but it would not preclude the possibility of stepping once into them, as Cratylus did, since the waters of the rivers are not constantly changing and different: they maintain a certain 'stability' during each of our single entries into the same rivers; however, they do not remain the same across multiple entries, to the extent that we can ascertain their change via comparison between these different entries. Thus, it is possible to interpret Heraclitus B 12 in a way that aligns with either Heraclitus's own view or the later Heraclitean tradition.

Heraclitus B 49a is similarly inexplicit: it does not mention how many times "we step and do not step into the same rivers" either. Thus, against those who believe that this fragment reflects the doctrines of the later Heraclitean tradition, it is possible that the fragment – through the repetition of the same verb, first as an affirmation and then as a negation – describes how one can step into the same rivers once, but not at two separate times: "we step (once) and do not step (twice) into the same rivers." Upon closer inspection, this latter interpretation seems more likely to me: if the fragment aims to declare that it is impossible to step into the same rivers even once, why does it assert "we step and do not step into the same rivers" rather than the more direct "we *do not* step into the same rivers"? Thus, B 49a does not seem to necessarily follow the epigonal – and Cratylean – Heracliteanism: for Cratylus' understanding of flux, the ἐμβαίνομέν ("we step into") is not only unnecessary, but also misleading, as it is sufficient to declare that "we do not step into the same rivers." Therefore, B 49a also can refer to two stepping into in the same rivers and – on these basis – belong to Heraclitus' doctrinal content. We shall revisit this fragment later on, to offer additional reflections on the theme of the same rivers (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς).

As of now, these arguments do not suffice to consider Heraclitus B 12 spurious, but rather to be cautious in denying the authenticity of Heraclitus B 49a. In addition, Heraclitus the Grammarian is not the only source for Heraclitus B 49a: Seneca transmitted

²¹ Pl. *Cra.* 402a. Cf. Buarque (2015).

²² Cf. the useful observation by Fronterotta (2015: 127, n. 21)

another version of this fragment, translated into Latin.²³ Since Seneca's version shows significant variations, it is worth a closer look.

Further insights into Heraclitus B 49a: Seneca's version

Seneca's text asserts: *hoc est, quod ait Heraclitus: "in idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus."* *Manet enim idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est.* Although Seneca's *descendimus et non descendimus* is a word for word translation of Heraclitus the Grammarian's B 49a ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν – which undoubtedly proves that the two authors are quoting the same fragment²⁴ – we can see three differences: 1) Seneca does not mention the 'anti-Parmenidean' part of the fragment (εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν), found only in Heraclitus the Grammarian 2) Heraclitus the Grammarian has ποταμοῖς (plural), whereas Seneca has *flumen* (singular); 3) most importantly, Seneca's text contains a *bis*, which clearly shows that the discussion deals with two different entries into the same river. Given these differences, which version is preferable?

In terms of 2), it is not very clear which fragment we are supposed to prefer: just like Heraclitus the Grammarian B 49a, Heraclitus B 12 deals with "rivers" (ποταμοῖσι); but the third 'river fragment', Heraclitus B 91 from Plutarch's *De E apud Delphos*, aligns with Seneca's version in that it discusses a single river (ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ), as Plato's (Ἡράκλειτος λέγει (...) δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης²⁵) and Aristotle's (Ἡρακλείτω (...) εἰπόντι (...) δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι²⁶) versions. Thus, both singular and plural versions of the river are attested.

However, Aristotle's version leads us back to question 3), for this reference is found in the well-known section of *Metaphysics* where Cratylus corrects Heraclitus by declaring it impossible to step into the same river even just once. Excluding Heraclitus B 12 and Heraclitus the Grammarian's version of Heraclitus B 49a, both of which do not specify how many times one can step into the same rivers, all the fragments and testimonia under discussion refer to two times (δίς). Therefore, if one were to rely solely on the greater or lesser frequency of the trope of the *δίς* in mentions of the Heraclitean river(s), we would have to conclude that its presence is more widely attested and consider it more likely that Heraclitus the Grammarian omitted it rather than that Seneca improperly added it to the text. However, such an approach would not take into account several additional

²³ Sen. *Ep.* 58, 22: *Ego ipse, dum loquor mutari ista, mutatus sum: hoc est, quod ait Heraclitus: "in idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus". Manet enim fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est. Hoc in amne manifestius est quam in homine: sed nos quoque non minus velox cursus praetervehit, et ideo admiror dementiae nostrae, quod tantopere amamus rem fugacissimam, corpus, timemusque, ne quando moriamur, cum omne momentum mors prioris habitus sit: vis tu non timere, ne semel fiat, quod cotidie fit.* For the translation of this passage, cf. *infra*, n. 31.

²⁴ Nevertheless, we cannot know if one of the two authors depends on the other, as Heraclitus the Grammarian's chronology is uncertain. Cf. Russell, Konstan (2005: XI–XIII).

²⁵ Pl. *Cra.* 402a.

²⁶ Arist. *Metaph.* 1010 a12–15.

elements, more specifically related to the content of the fragment, as well as the context of the citation, which should instead be considered. Thus, at first glance, there are two possibilities: first, that Heraclitus the Grammarian omitted a δῖς; and second, that Seneca added a *bis*. This distinction is crucial, given that, according to the source, and especially Aristotle's account on Cratylus, the word δῖς is Heraclitean. Schleiermacher added a δῖς to Heraclitus the Grammarian's text (ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς <δῖς> ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν), aiming to restore its authenticity. However, other scholars thought differently: for instance, Gigon declared Seneca's version nothing but "eine Übersteigerung von Frg. 49 plus 91,"²⁷ and Tarán, whose argument can be considered typical of those who do not accept Seneca's version, argued that Seneca's *bis* is quite nonsensical. In Tarán's view, summarizing,²⁸ Heraclitus B 49a aims to assert that reality is an unceasing flux, which makes it possible that we both *descendimus et non descendimus* into the same river: thus, it is unnecessary to specify that we are stepping the same river twice, because we simultaneously step and do not step into it the first time already. More precisely, Tarán's argument seems to assume that to make the statement "we step and do not step into the same river" true, Seneca's *bis* is unnecessary. According to Tarán, this point is better demonstrated by asserting it without placing the act of stepping (and not stepping) in two different times. If I understand correctly, this argument seems to me a sort of *petitio principii*, as it assumes as a premise what it should rather demonstrate (i.e., the fact that Seneca's aim is to show that we can never step into the same river).²⁹ In other words, nothing ensures that this is precisely what Seneca is trying to argue. In what follows, I shall attempt to show that a different interpretation is possible and perhaps more plausible.

Furthermore, the arguments presented do not seem to adequately consider other textual elements. First of all, Seneca's *bis* aligns well with his *idem*: the presence of *idem* alongside *flumen* – which, as Marcovich shows, clearly corresponds to ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς,³⁰ making the following argument also applicable to Heraclitus the Grammarian's version, albeit with less evidence due to the absence of δῖς – is more significant if we understand the text as referring to two different occasions of stepping into the river rather than just one. If the discussion pertains to stepping into the river only once, we can take it for granted that this refers to the "same" river, even if its waters are ever-changing. Thus, in the case of a single entry into the river, specifying that it concerns the "same river" seems unnecessary. The fact that we are dealing with only one step into the river is sufficient to indicate that we are referring to a single – and the same – river, rendering

²⁷ Gigon (1945: 107–108).

²⁸ Actually, Tarán (1999: 41–42) offers an intriguing interpretation of B 49a through the lens of Heraclitus's distinction between waking and sleeping, which he believes also pertains to B 12 (with B 49a being an imitation of B 12). However, a detailed examination of this interpretation would exceed the scope of the current discussion.

²⁹ Cf. Tarán (1999: 37–40). Fronterotta (2012: 84) also seems to read Tarán's argument in a similar way, although he reaches conclusions different from mine. On Tarán's arguments, cf. *infra*, n. 39.

³⁰ Cf. Marcovich (1967: 213); here the scholar also shows that Seneca's *aqua transmissa est* corresponds to the ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ of Heraclitus B 12.

the addition of “same” alongside “river” pleonastic and redundant. To sum up, if we are discussing a single instance of stepping into the river, it is not necessary to specify that we are referring to the same (*idem*) river: even if we omit the fact that it is the “same” (*idem*) river into which we are stepping once, the focus on the river’s flux and its ever-changing nature, as well as the contrast with the river’s identity, remain significant. Conversely, the term *idem* becomes significantly more important if we are considering two separate entries into the river (δίς/*bis*). In this case, it clarifies that the difference concerning the river is not merely due to stepping into different rivers, such as the Tigris on the first occasion and the Euphrates on the second, but rather to the fact that the *same* river – into which we step twice – is, *in itself*, also not the same due to the flow of its waters.

Upon closer examination, this observation appears to be valid for all versions of the fragments concerning Heraclitus’ river(s): whenever the text specifies that it is the same river(s) (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν; τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ; τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμόν; ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς; *idem flumen*) this specification seems to make much more sense if the number of entries into the river is two rather than one.

Returning to Seneca’s version, it is now worth noting how Seneca’s *bis* clarifies the antithetical expression *descendimus et non descendimus*, which would be unclear if the text referred to a single step into the river. Even more clear than what we have already seen in reading Heraclitus the Grammarian’s version of Heraclitus B 49a, Seneca’s *descendimus et non descendimus* can refer to the first and second times (*bis*) we step into the river, respectively: (the first time) *descendimus et* (the second time) *non descendimus*. After all, if the fragment aims to declare that it is impossible to step into the same river even once, because its ever-flowing waters make it ever-changing, then Seneca’s *descendimus* – as well as Heraclitus the Grammarian’s ἐμβαίνομεν – seems to be useless and misleading: it would be clearer to say only that we do not step (*non descendimus*; οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν) into the (same) river. Thus, it seems that Seneca’s version, with its *bis*, is more coherent than Heraclitus the Grammarian’s in relation to the textual elements that both versions share, and therefore δίς should be considered as being present in the original text – at least as a concept, and thus at least as implicit. In addition, Seneca’s *bis* leads Heraclitus B 49a directly back to Heraclitus rather than to the later ‘Cratylean’ tradition.

Nevertheless, point 1) remains to be addressed. As mentioned above, Seneca’s text contains nothing corresponding to Heraclitus the Grammarian’s εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν. Now, if Seneca’s version is the more reliable (as I believe), the fact that it is missing the ‘anti-Parmenidean’ “we are and are not” could involve the inauthenticity of a textual element that could explain why Parmenides argued against Heraclitus. The expression εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν, in fact, endorses the combination of εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι, which is clearly at odds with Parmenides’ κρίσις between them. But are we sure that there is no trace in Seneca’s text of this εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν?

Whatever εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν means, the implied subject is “we,” meant as human-kind (other interpretations do not seem to make sense). Although Seneca does not quote the sentence, his *Epistula* still contains a meaningful consideration of human beings and their ever-changing essence (*ego ipse, dum loquor mutari ista, mutatus sum (...)* *Hoc in*

*amne manifestius est quam in homine: sed nos quoque non minus velox cursus praetervehit, et ideo admiror dementiam nostram, quod tantopere amamus rem fugacissimam, corpus, timemusque, ne quando moriamur, cum omne momentum mors prioris habitus sit: vis tu non timere, ne semel fiat, quod cotidie fit*³¹). Furthermore, such a consideration could partially arise from the εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν, which – in this case – presumably was in his source³². If the verb “to be” in “we are and are not” is taken to mean what human beings really are, that is, their way of being, then εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν can be understood as expressing the ever-changing condition of that way of being, which is what Seneca explores in his letter. Just like the river, human beings constantly change: they are a certain way, and then they shift to be a different way. Therefore, just like the river into which they cannot step twice, they cannot be the same on two different occasions. Thus, it is quite possible that Seneca’s source contained εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν, and that in writing his letter, he drew, in part, his inspiration from it, even though he does not mention it explicitly.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that the authors who quote these three ‘Heraclitean’ fragments concerning the river, viz. B 12, B 91 and B 49a, somehow connect them to the human beings or souls and their changing essence. In his discussion of Heraclitus B 12, Cleanthes states that, according to Heraclitus (καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος³³), the constant change of the river is related to that of ψυχαί, which – thorough exhalations – are always new (νεαραί).³⁴ In reference to Heraclitus B 91, Plutarch asserts that it is impossible both to step into the same river twice, and to find a mortal essence in the same condition on two separate occasions (οὐδὲ θνηθῆς οὐσίας δις ἄψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν), due to its constant change (μεταβολή).³⁵ Finally, we have already seen that Seneca draws

³¹ Sen. *Ep.* 58, 22–24: “I myself, while saying that these things are changing, have changed (...) This is more apparent in a river than in a person: but even we are carried away by a current that is no less swift, and therefore I am puzzled by our madness, which makes us so strongly love something as fleeting as the body and fear that we will die one day, whereas every moment is the death of the prior state: you should not fear that what happens daily will happen once.” Cf. Inwood (2007: 128–132),

³² As Capizzi (1990: 75) rightly points out, Seneca’s mention of Heraclitus follows his explanation to Lucilius about Plato’s view that sensible things are everchanging (*quidquid vides, currit cum tempore, nihil ex his quae videmus, manet*). This leads Seneca to mention Heraclitus and the ever-flowing river. In doing so, Seneca changes perspective: from the changing nature of things (on which Seneca’s discussion of Plato’s view primarily focuses) to that of human beings (with which the quotation of Heraclitus’ flowing river has to do). It thus seems that in this passage Seneca indirectly shows (and reads as well) a difference in the interpretation of ontological change, which relates to the distinction between the emphasis on the constant becoming of things (the well-known πάντα ρεῖ, absent in that form in Heraclitus’ genuine fragments) typical of the later Heraclitean tradition (with which Plato himself deals, e.g., *Pl. Cra.* 402a; *Tht.* 160d) and its original meaning in Heraclitus, who at least does not prioritize such an emphasis. On Seneca’s ontology in light of Plato’s, also arising from this *Epistula*, cf. Brunschwig (1994: 110–111); Mansfeld (1992: 84–108) and Rashed (2021: 177–182).

³³ Mansfeld (1967: 14), thinks that this expression means that it was authentic Heraclitus; Viano (2002: 154–155), thinks differently.

³⁴ For more detailed information about Heraclitus B 12 and the context of this reference to it, cf. Marcovich (1967: 137); Tarán, (1999: 21–22); F. Fronterotta (2012: 72–73).

³⁵ For Heraclitus B 91, and for its context in Plutarch’s work, cf. Kirk (1954: 382–384); Robinson (1987: 139–142); Kahn (1979: 168–169); Bollack, Wismann (1972: 268–269); Conche (1986: 459–462); Fronterotta, (2012: 80–84). It is interesting to note, if only briefly, that Plutarch emphasizes the theme of ‘twice in time’ as a means of attesting to the change by applying it twice: once to the river and once to mortal essence. Even here,

a connection between the flowing of the river and the transitory status of human beings in his discussion of Heraclitus B 49a. We cannot be certain how reliable these testimonia are, and further inquiries could even show that they are not as closely related as they might appear; nevertheless, they undeniably draw on (more or less) common ground, and their similarity cannot be simply a coincidence.

Nevertheless, the fact that Seneca could have interpreted εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν in Heraclitus B 49a in this way does not necessarily mean that this was its original meaning. As Calogero has observed, “we are and are not” in Heraclitus the Grammarian’s text could refer to an implied “into the same river,” which is explicitly stated in the first part of the fragment: “(into the same river) we are and are not,” just like “into the same river we step and do not step.” To support his proposal, Calogero pointed to the abrupt change in subject, i.e., moving from the river to human beings, that interpreting the εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν as referring to the transitory nature of human beings would entail. Against the interpretation of εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν as meaning ‘into the same river we are and are not,’ one could point out that an ἐν is missing alongside εἶμεν. However, Calogero notes that the missing ἐν for εἶμεν/οὐκ εἶμεν could be implied by the preceding ἐμβαίνομεν/οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν.³⁶

To sum up, deferring further – and more detailed – analysis of this issue to a later study, Seneca’s *Epistula* contains a thesis about the transient nature of human beings that aligns well with a certain reading of εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν. This could support the presence of εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν in Seneca’s text. On the other hand, the very purpose of Seneca’s *Epistula* would have made the citation of εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν highly pertinent as well: a Heraclitean *sumus et non sumus* would surely have made Heraclitus’ inclusion in the discussion more relevant. Therefore, Seneca’s silence may also lead one to believe that his source did not contain that part of the text; otherwise, Seneca would have mentioned it. Although this latter point has merit, it is equally true that nothing precludes the possibility that Seneca may have employed the direct quotation concerning the figure of the river while using the second part as supplementary material for his discourse on the transitory nature of human beings, without mentioning it directly.

In any case, it is not necessary to decide here what εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν might actually mean in Heraclitus, as it is not essential to our inquiry. The crucial point is that it is quite possible that this combination of being and not being was present in Heraclitus’ work, and that it may have led Parmenides – who drew a clear distinction between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι – to polemicize against this work and its author’s views.

But even if it is not necessary to pass judgment on Calogero’s interpretation of εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν, we can still accept his arguments about the reliability of Seneca as source for Heraclitus. Before examining Calogero’s argument, it is nevertheless impor-

it seems difficult to believe that the motif of the δῖς was not present in his source, since he applies it to these two topics.

³⁶ Cf. Calogero (2012: 84, n. 49).

tant to note how Seneca explains the fragment in question through *enim*: after quoting *in idem flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus*, he immediately adds *manet enim idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est*, “the name of the river remains the same, the water has passed on.” In a concise but highly incisive manner, Inwood remarks that, according to Seneca, the stability of the river is found in its name.³⁷ Seneca’s explanation of the fragment must not be overlooked. First, its emphasis on the fact that the name of the river remains the same can further justify the crucial *bis* in *bis descendimus et non descendimus* in the text: in terms of its name, the river remains the same, and so we step into it twice (*bis descendimus*); but in terms of its waters, the river does not remain the same, and thus we do not step into it twice (*bis non descendimus*). It is worth noting that if we refer to nothing but a single entry into the same river, so that Seneca’s *bis* would be an arbitrary addition, not only (as seen) would the already mentioned *descendimus* lose its relevance, but Seneca’s subsequent explanation concerning the name of the river would also lose its incisiveness and make less sense. In fact, just as we can better understand that the river not only changes but somehow also remains the same by stepping into it twice rather than once, we can similarly grasp the permanent identity of the river through that of its name by experiencing the river twice and noting that its name remains the same each time.

In addition, Calogero observes that Seneca’s explanation of the name of the river is not directly related to his main discussion, and that when part of a quoting author’s argument seems so, it probably derives from the quoted author’s discussion. In fact, it would have been simpler for Seneca to assert that it is the river – and not the name of the river – that remains the same, whereas its waters change. So, why does Seneca write *manet idem fluminis nomen* rather than *idem flumen*? Most likely because the discussion of the name of the river was originally found in none other than Heraclitus himself.³⁸ *De facto*, several of Heraclitus’ surviving fragments involve issues with names (ὀνόματα) and naming (ὀνομάζειν), such as Heraclitus B 32³⁹ and, more obviously, Heraclitus B

³⁷ Inwood (2007: 130).

³⁸ Cf. Calogero (2012²: 72–77).

³⁹ DK 22 B 32: ἐν τῷ σοφῶν μόνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζητῆς ὄνομα. Cf. Kirk (1954: 392–394); Kahn (1979: 267–268); Diano, Serra (1980: 163–164); Conche (1986: 243–244). I would like to briefly observe that B 32 οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει has the same structure as B 49a ἐμβαίνομεν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν (except that it lacks τε and that the negation of the verb precedes its affirmation, whereas in B 49a it is the opposite), and that this could constitute an additional argument in favor of the authenticity of B 49a as Heraclitean. Tarán defines such an affirmation and negation of the same verb as a ‘yes-and-no’ formula and argues that its occurrence in Heraclitus B 49a excludes the possibility of it containing a δίς. He contends that when Heraclitus employs the ‘yes-and-no’ formula, it occurs without any adverbs or qualifying expressions, as its primary function is to simultaneously assert identity and difference. In my view, however, this argument is not entirely conclusive. While Tarán correctly observes that the ‘yes-and-no’ formula always indicates opposition, the reasons for and modalities of such opposition may vary. The difference arising from distinct events over time (in this case, two instances of stepping into the river) could indeed be a significant factor in this opposition. Therefore, the use of the ‘yes-and-no’ formula in B 49a does not necessarily exclude the (explicit or implicit) presence of a qualifying δίς.

48,⁴⁰ where there is a contrast between what the bow is in name, i.e. life (βίος), and what it factually is, i.e. death (θάνατος). Such an opposition between an object's name and its factual identity is not so different from Seneca's *manet idem fluminis nomen, aqua transmissa est*: in terms of its name, the river is the same, but, in terms of facts, the river changes. Both the mentioned fragments of Heraclitus and Seneca's explanation draw the opposition between the mode of being according to name and the mode of being according to factuality. In my view, this correspondence between Heraclitus B 48 and Seneca's explanation of Heraclitus B 49a means that he can most likely be relied upon for an accurate transmission of Heraclitus B 49a: his 'Heraclitean' explanation probably means that he used texts and sources containing statements and explanations – more or less directly – from Heraclitus himself.

In this regard, it is worth recalling that Heraclitus the Grammarian – although he does not explicitly associate Heraclitus with the issue of names but rather with allegorical expression in a broader sense – also quotes fragment B 49a within a context⁴¹ in which he is discussing the allegorical use of names in Homer (“aether is given the name Zeus, while he calls air Hades;” ὁ αἰθήρ προσαγορεύεται Ζεὺς, Αἴδηρ δ' ὀνομάζει τὸν αἴρα). Immediately after mentioning Heraclitus, he quotes Empedocles, directly linking him to the use of names (“and what of Empedocles of Acragas? Does he not imitate Homeric allegory when he wishes to denote the four elements to us? [cit. DK 31 B 6]: ‘Bright Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus / Nestis, who wets with tears a mortal spring;’ τί δ' ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς; οὐχὶ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα βουλόμενος ἡμῖν ὑποσημῆναι τὴν Ὀμηρικὴν ἀλληγορίαν μεμίμηται; [cit. fr. DK 31 B 6] Ζεὺς ἀργῆς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἡδ' Αἰδωνεύς / Νῆστίς θ', ἡ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον). Therefore, the context of the quotation of B 49a by Heraclitus the Grammarian also seems to suggest that it is not unrelated to the theme of naming, although there are no evident connections between the content of the fragment and this theme.

Even more crucially, it should be recalled that Cratylus, in Aristotle's account, not only corrects Heraclitus' position by reducing the number of possible entries into the same river in a way that stresses its becoming, but also believes that nothing is to be said, and merely moves his finger (καὶ οἶαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, “Cratylus also held an opinion of this sort; he ended up thinking that nothing is to be said, and only moved his finger”). Considering that Cratylus supplements the view that nothing is to be said with the use of his finger, it seems one could infer that Cratylus abandons the possibility of linguistic reference to things in favor of referencing them through pointing. If pointing to things with the finger replaces λέγειν, then this λέγειν can also be seen as referring to things by using their names. This could represent a further correction of Heraclitus' doctrine:

⁴⁰ DK 22 B 48: τῶ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος. Cf. Bollack, Wismann (1972: 169–170); Pradeau (2002: 204–206); F. Fronterotta (2013: 264–265).

⁴¹ Heraclit. *All.* 24, 1–7.

whereas in Heraclitus the names of things possess their own ontological status – which, alongside the factual nature of things, establishes one of the oppositions that governs reality – in Cratylus, names lose any ontological significance to the extent that they can be discarded, and pointing to things with the finger emerges as a more appropriate means of revealing reality. Thus, Cratylus, in contrast to Seneca’s explanation, would deny that the river’s name could ever provide proof of its stability and identity: names give deceptive impressions of stability and identity over things, whereas they actually are constantly changing and never the same. Such a difference between Cratylus’ and Seneca’s treatment of names could also provide indirect proof of the central role that names play in Heraclitus. Indeed, Cratylus’ view that it is impossible to refer to things by naming them would make much more sense by assuming as premise the ontological status conversely given by Heraclitus to names, which can show, in turn, that Seneca accurately made use of Heraclitus’ authentic texts.

Therefore, I believe that the following conclusions can be drawn from this brief study, though they may require further investigation in a more comprehensive future inquiry.

There appears to be no substantial reason to question the authenticity of fragment B 49a as genuinely Heraclitean, particularly if a pivotal criterion for its attribution to Heraclitus lies in the alignment of its content with the motif of the two entries into the river. This alignment is not merely inferable through conjecture (as seen in Heraclitus the Grammarian’s version) but is explicitly affirmed in the version of the fragment transmitted by Seneca, which directly references the notion of two entries into the river (*bis*). Seneca appears as a fairly reliable source in the transmission of Heraclitean content, as evidenced by his reference – albeit somewhat cursory – to the Heraclitean theme of names through the mention of the river’s name (*fluminis nomen*).

Furthermore, there is no basis to preclude the possibility that the fragment’s text originally included the motif of “we are and are not,” εἴμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἴμεν, which is present in the version transmitted by Heraclitus the Grammarian but omitted by Seneca. Even Seneca, whose version omits this part, develops an argument starting from the citation of Heraclitus B 49a that makes it more than plausible that he might have read this part in the text.

If the phrase “we are and are not,” i.e., the combination of being and not being, was present in Heraclitus’ work, then there is no basis to exclude the possibility that it was read by Parmenides. Such an encounter could have stimulated – or at least contributed to stimulating – Parmenides’ reflection on being and not being, and his development of the κρίσις between the two, also as a reaction to their declared κῶσις in Heraclitus’ text.

Heraclitus’ κῶσις of being and not being as inspiration (and polemical target) for Parmenides’ κρίσις between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι?

Since this inquiry aims, in part, to reconsider the possibility that Parmenides was familiar with and criticized Heraclitus, it is worth examining Calogero’s observations on what

εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν in Heraclitus B 49a *cannot* mean, rather than what it could mean. In fact, we could understand it as a declaration of the transitory and uncertain status of human beings, or, less drastically, as the statement that we cannot be in the same river twice, as Calogero himself understands it. Certainly, the κρῆσις and the mutual opposition of εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι – both of which are present in εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν – cannot be as relevant as in Parmenides,⁴² whose κρίσις condemns them and the things subject to them to ontological inconsistency and fallacy. According to Parmenides, opposition between being and not being means contradiction and, therefore, ontological inconsistency. In addition, the antithesis between being and not being is the root of every possible opposition: this is one of the reasons why, as known, his way of Truth means dissolving this opposition by affirming ἔστι and, at the same time, excluding μὴ εἶναι⁴³ (Parmenides B 2.3: ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι).

In Heraclitus' view, things are radically different. First, oppositions play a totally different role in his extant texts: they are ontologically positive, being opposed the very nature of reality. Second, the antithesis between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι cannot be the main opposition, implied in all the other contrasts, since the Parmenidean tenet that being and not being are mutually exclusive – which makes the opposition between them the main one – has not yet been established. In Heraclitus, this opposition is just one among many:⁴⁴ it could not be otherwise, as it achieves its central meaning through Parmenides' meditation on εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι.⁴⁵ However, this difference in meaning does not rule out the possibility that Parmenides read Heraclitus' εἶμεν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν in light of his κρίσις (ἔστι or οὐκ ἔστι) and polemicized against this concept expressed by Heraclitus' words. Moreover, we also cannot exclude the possibility that Parmenides' reading of Heraclitus B 49a was one of the reasons that led him to develop his κρίσις, so that he could refute the contradiction he read in the view that something "is and is not."

It is impossible here to explore the ways in which, starting from Heraclitus' combination of being and not being, Parmenides may have developed his ontological framework, which, in contrast, entails the complete affirmation of being and the total exclusion of not being (with the former achieved through the latter⁴⁶). Nevertheless, it is possible to hypothesize some ways in which Parmenides' reception of Heraclitus – and especially his reaction to the antinomies emerging from Heraclitus' work, notably the antinomy of being and not being – may have influenced the epigonal reappropriations of Heraclitus'

⁴² Calogero (2012: 77): "Eracito non può dare speciale rilievo, tra i suoi binomi antinomici, a quello dell'essere e del non essere, perché l'essere, nella sua assolutezza, non è una realtà del suo orizzonte mentale, dovendo ancora essere creato da quella stessa riflessione eleatica a cui le sue formulazioni daranno massimo impulso."

⁴³ Cf. Cordero (2004: 37–57); Palmer (2009: 63–66).

⁴⁴ E.g. fr. DK 22 B 10; B 67.

⁴⁵ In my view, Calogero (2012²: 85–93); Kahn (1968/69: 700–724: 722); Mourelatos (1970) and Aubenque (1987: 102–134) are still among the best inquiries devoted to Parmenides' meditation on being.

⁴⁶ E.g. DK 28 B 8.14–17.

doctrine, particularly the emphasis, as attested, that later Heracliteanism conferred on the concept of becoming and change.

Most likely, Parmenides' reading of Heraclitus in light of his κρίσις between being and not being cast Heraclitus's philosophy not only as oppositional, but also antinomic and self-contradictory. It could even explain why Heraclitus' followers later decided to downplay his thesis on oppositions and to highlight his idea of flux: I am becoming convinced that after Parmenides made opposition a hallmark of ontological inconsistency, defending Heraclitus' doctrine meant weakening its theory of oppositions and, at the same time, starkly underscoring its thesis on becoming.⁴⁷

As mentioned at the outset, one of the fragments in which Parmenides critiques the combination of being and not being is B 6.8–9, where he blames those who have established and consider that being and not being are both the same and not the same. (B 6.8–9: οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτὸν νενόμισται/κοῦ ταῦτόν). Determining the precise meaning of the difficult-to-interpret Parmenides B 6.8–9 is an investigation that cannot be pursued here⁴⁸. Therefore, I shall limit myself to highlighting that Parmenides' text, which unfolds between affirmation and negation (πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι), identity and difference (ταῦτὸν (...) κοῦ ταῦτόν), echoes that of Heraclitus⁴⁹ B 49a, which, in turn,

⁴⁷ It does not mean that the Heraclitean 'theory' of oppositions has been totally neglected by those who drew inspiration from Heraclitus. For instance, according to Diogenes Laërtius, Protagoras – whose references to Heraclitus' assumptions are attested by the main sources of his thought: Plato (*Thet.* 152c–e); Aristotle (*e.g. Metaph.* 1009a6: δ' ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος (...) εἶτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ – πολλοὶ γὰρ τάναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταῦτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι); and finally Sextus Empiricus (*P.* I, 216–219) – claimed that on any matter there are two λόγοι opposed to one another (D.L. IX 51 [= DK 80 B 6a]: δύο λόγοις εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις). Such a position clearly recalls Heraclitus' view that things have an oppositional nature. On this point, which cannot be further addressed here, cf. Brancacci (2011: 100–101); Bárány (2006: 322); Declava Caizzi (1988); Adomenas (2006); V.A. Valenti, (2017: 200–205); Di Lanzo (2015: 270–278).

⁴⁸ I have attempted to provide some details regarding these verses in Franchi (2017: 216–218).

⁴⁹ It is interesting to note that this development of affirmation and negation, identity and difference, persists even if instead of following the classical translation of these verses (*e.g.*, Cordero [2004: 192]: “who consider that being and not being are the same and not the same”), one chooses to translate them following what Reinhardt (1916: 87) suggested, that is, putting a comma after οὐκ εἶναι, in order to make ταῦτὸν and οὐ ταῦτόν two additional elements and no longer as predicates of πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. The resulting translation can be the one found in Cornford (1939: 32): “who have determined to believe that it is and that it is not, the same and not the same” or in Beaufret, Riniéri (1955: 81): “pour qui l' être et aussi bien le non-être, le même et ce qui n'est pas le même, font loi” (explicitly declaring to follow Reinhardt's proposal). For my part, I would like to point out that Simplicius, who is our only source for Parmenides' B 6, in his only full quotation of the fragment (*in Physica*, 116, 25–117, 14) introduces it by stating that it demonstrated how Parmenides asserted that “both members of a contradictory proposition are not simultaneously true” (ἀντίφρασις οὐ συναληθεύει) by condemning “those who combine antinomic elements” (τοῖς εἰς ταῦτόν συνάγουσι τὰ ἀντικείμενα). Such an introduction seems to show that Simplicius himself understands B 6.8–9 in the same way the traditional translation of it does. For instance, Simplicius refers to ἀντίφρασις, which requires two contradictory statements that can easily be found in Parmenides' text by understanding πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν (...) κοῦ ταῦτόν as stating both “being and not being are the same” and “being and not being are not the same,” instead of “being and not being, the same and not the same.”

reflects the structure of several other of his fragments.⁵⁰ These are some of the reasons why, in Parmenides B 6. 8-9, several scholars have seen a criticism against certain aspects of Heraclitus' doctrine. However, from both a historical and theoretical point of view, an aspect can be emphasized: since Heraclitus' philosophy asserted not only the concept of becoming – as Plato's *Theaetetus* shows, by declaring that not only Heraclitus, but also all thinkers except Parmenides (πλήν Παρμενίδου) agreed on becoming⁵¹ – but also (and probably even more) the concept of oppositions,⁵² then the main target of Parmenides' attack on δίκρανοι in B 6.8-9 is not the concept of becoming – against which he nevertheless argued⁵³ – but the concept of opposition. Nor could it maybe be otherwise, as the emphasis on Heraclitus' flux probably took root after Parmenides and, at least in part, because of him. In Parmenides' time, polemicizing against oppositions mainly meant polemicizing against Heraclitus, whereas polemicizing against becoming meant polemicizing against all the ιστορία περὶ φύσεως. Not by coincidence, in Plato's *Phaedo*, this ιστορία takes the ontological becoming for granted, as it aims to know “the causes of each thing” (εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου), that is, “the reason why something comes to be, perishes and is” (διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι⁵⁴).

⁵⁰ E.g. DK 22 B 10; B 32; B 51.

⁵¹ Cf. Pl. *Thl.* 152d9-e5. Aristotle also provides an account on Heraclitus' theory of γένεσις in the *De Caelo*, where he does not portray the Ephesian thinker as the most radical proponent of unceasing becoming. According to Aristotle, Heraclitus is said to believe that while everything else changes and flows, something underlying remains constant (Arist. *Cael.* 298b29-31: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαι (...) καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν (...) ἐν δὲ τί μόνον ὑπομένειν). This suggests that Heraclitus' concept of becoming does not encompass all of reality and that he is not as radical a ‘thinker of becoming’ as sometimes portrayed. For instance, Aristotle describes Hesiod's theory of becoming as more radical than Heraclitus', as Hesiod is said to believe that everything is subject to becoming without exception. Similarly, in Plato's *Sophist* (*Sph.* 242d-e), Heraclitus (referred to as ‘the Ionian Muses’) is depicted as less radical compared to Empedocles (referred to as ‘the Sicilian Muses’) with respect to becoming. Empedocles presents a scenario characterized by alternating opposites over time, whereas Heraclitus claims their simultaneous coexistence. Cf. Hülsz Piccone (2013). Conversely, Parmenides' exceptional position on becoming – denying ontological becoming, as stated by Plato in the *Theaetetus* – is confirmed by Aristotle in *Cael.* 298b14-24, where Parmenides (along with Melissus) is described as the only philosopher who completely denies generation, perishing, and change (ὄλωσ ἀνεῖλον γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν; οὐθέν γάρ οὔτε γίγνεσθαι φασιν οὔτε φθίρεισθαι τῶν ὄντων). To summarize, the testimonies of Plato and Aristotle do not seem to portray Heraclitus as the radical philosopher of becoming, but rather Parmenides as the radical denier of becoming. Indeed, Aristotle also provides differing accounts of Parmenides. For example, in *Metaph.* 986b27-987a2, the Eleatic thinker is also said to admit generation, as he is “compelled to follow the appearances” (ἀναγκαζόμενος δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις) and posits “two causes and two principles” (δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχάς). Nevertheless, in Franchi (2023) I have tried to show how this does not imply that, according to Aristotle, Parmenides also admitted – and elaborated a theory of – generation. On this point, cf. also Clarke (2019: 166-170).

⁵² E.g. DK 22 B 10; B 12; B 41; B 48; B 51; B 53; B 60; B 61; B 62.

⁵³ E.g. DK 28 B 8.3-21.

⁵⁴ Pl. *Phd.* 95e-100a. Cf. Mansfeld (2010a).

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Seneca's Heraclitus DK 22 B B 49a and Parmenides

Several scholarly inquiries have explored the possibility that Parmenides was acquainted with Heraclitus and engaged in polemics against him, in light of the fact that their respective chronologies do not preclude this scenario. However, with few exceptions, the debate remains polarized between two main positions: the first contends that Heraclitus and Parmenides were likely unaware of each other, or at least that no conclusive evidence exists to prove their acquaintance; the second posits that Parmenides was indeed aware of Heraclitus and argued against him. This paper focuses on Heraclitus B 49a DK to offer additional, albeit measured, support for the latter position and to suggest a hypothesis, at least a partial one, concerning the origins of Parmenides' κρίσις between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι.

KEY WORDS

Heraclitus; Parmenides; Heraclitus' becoming; Parmenides' κρίσις; Heraclitus' river fragments; Seneca.

