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
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Commentarius PEITHO / Examina Antiqua in Instituto Philosophiae Universitatis Studiorum Mickiewiczianae Posnaniensis conditus id spectat, ut in notissimis toto orbe linguis, lingua quoque Latina et nostra lingua Polona minime exclusa, antiquorum philosophorum opera atque cogitationes nec non earum apud posteros memoria longe lateque propagentur. Non exstitit adhuc in Polonia commentarius, quem docta societas internationalis legeret; at nostra magnopere interest gravissimas philosophiae antiquae quaestiones, cultui atque humanitati totius Europae fundamentales, communiter considerari, solvi divulgarique posse. Namque philosophia, Graecorum et Romanorum maximi momenti hereditas, hodie novis scientiarum rationibus et viis adhibitibus ab integro est nobis omni ex parte meditanda et disputanda.

Itaque characterem internationali commentarius hic variarum terrarum et gentium hominibus doctis permittet, ut credimus, cogitationes, investigationes, laborum effectus magno cum fructu commutare et instrumentum doctorum fiet utilissimum ad se invicem persuadendum, ut antiquus id suggerit titulus (Latine Suada), quem scripto nostro dedimus. Sed commentarius hic late patefactus est quoque omnibus rebus, quae philosophiae sunt propinquae et affines, quae ad temporum antiquorum atque Byzantinorum culturam lato sensu pertinent, quae eiusdem denique philosophiae fortunam aetate renascentium litterarum tractant. In nostra PEITHO praeter commentationes scientificas doctae disputationes quoque et controversiae atque novorum librorum censurae locum suum invenient. Itaque omnes, qui philosophiae favent, toto exhortamur animo et invitamus, ut nostri propositi participes esse dignentur.

MARIAN WESOŁY



MIKOŁAJ DOMARADZKI



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André Motte (1936-2021) ami belge des
philologues classiques et des spécialistes de
la philosophie antique à Poznań

201-208

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DISCUSSIONS

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ARTYKUŁY

Les deux manières d'expliquer la réalité proposées par Parménide

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NESTOR LUIS CORDERO / *Université de Rennes I* /

Parménide, comme tous les philosophes – au moins les premiers philosophes – a essayé de comprendre la réalité des choses. Cela va de soi que la phrase que nous venons d'écrire ne reproduit pas ni la richesse ni la portée de la formule grecque dont elle serait la « traduction »: ἡ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων. En effet, ni dans le mot « réalité » ni dans le mot « choses » il y a une allusion à ce que les premiers philosophes vont essayer de découvrir: le fait d'être. En Grec, en revanche, déjà la recherche sur les «choses», en général (qui ne sont ni πράγματα ni χρήματα), est une recherche sur «les étants» (τῶν ὄντων), qui possèdent une οὐσία (mot dérivé aussi du participe présent du verbe εἶναι, οὔσα¹). Dans cette recherche, comme on le sait, Parménide occupe une place de choix.

Dans la constitution de l'ensemble de connaissances qui recevra après le nom de « philosophie », Parménide introduira au moins deux éléments originaux qui vont le distinguer de ses collègues: (a) il va s'occuper en premier lieu du fondement conceptuel de toute recherche sur « les étants », qui est le *fait* ou *état* d'être qu'ils possèdent, et (b) il montrera aussi l'erreur de ceux qui avaient décidé d'expliquer la réalité des

¹ Le mot ne se trouve pas dans les citations récupérées des premiers philosophes. En revanche, il est utilisé abondamment quand Aristote s'occupe de ceux qui se sont intéressés à la φύσις.

choses sans se soucier du fondement conceptuel sans lequel elles n'existeraient pas. Nous nous sommes occupés du paragraphe (a) dans des nombreux travaux; nous consacrerons cet article notamment au paragraphe (b).

Avant de nous occuper directement de notre sujet, une très brève introduction s'impose. Notre connaissance de la philosophie de Parménide est et sera, hélas, très partiel, car *tout* ce qu'il a écrit s'est perdu (ce qui est arrivé aussi à ses collègues Présocratiques). Heureusement, tant que sus écrits étaient encore trouvables, d'autres écrivains (historiens, médecins, philosophes, etc.) ont décidé, pour des raisons très diverses, de *citer* quelques passages du *Poème* qu'il avait écrit (qui ne sont pas des « fragments » de l'original, mais des « citations », ce qui suppose quelqu'un qui lit le texte original et le cite après), et grâce à ces citations nous pouvons connaître – partiellement, nous l'avons déjà dit – la pensée du philosophe.

Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, des chercheurs – on pourrait dire, des « proto-philologues » – (depuis H. Estienne (1573) jusqu'à A. Peyron (1810)) ont trouvé dix-neuf citations du texte perdu (dont l'une traduite au Latin), qui correspondent à cent-soixante vers. Toutes ces citations appartenaient au seul ouvrage que Parménide aurait écrit, un *Poème*, mais, mis à part un texte qui sera notre point de départ, nous ne saurons jamais dans quel ordre ces citations se trouvaient dans l'original. Il est certain, cependant, que le premier essai de « reconstitution » mené à bien en 1795 par Georg G. Fülleborn (1795) est à abandonner, car il introduit des contradictions évidentes dans la pensée du philosophe.

Notre étude commencera par quelques vers du « fragment »² 1. Parmi les dix-neuf citations récupérées, ce texte est le seul qui justifie le chiffre « 1 » qu'on lui a attribué, car son citeur, Sextus Empiricus, avait précédé sa citation par ces mots: « Ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ Περὶ φύσεως γράφει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον » (*M.* 7.111). Le caractère éminemment didactique du *Poème*³ – qui justifie que Parménide ait décidé d'exposer aussi une théorie erronée, afin de l'éviter – est manifeste dans ce fragment, où l'on trouve des images hésiodiques et homériques, ainsi que l'équivalent des invocations qui ouvrent les travaux de ces deux auteurs⁴, représenté, chez Parménide, par un voyage vers le domaine d'une divinité.

² Par habitude, nous conserverons le mot « fragment », appliqué à tort à des « citations ».

³ W. Jaeger (1947 : 92) utilise la formule « didactic epic ».

⁴ Voir Hom. *Il.* 1.1; *Od.* 1.1; Hes. *Th.* 22; *Op.* 2.

Les derniers vers de ce fragment 1⁵ ont été l'objet d'innombrables interprétations – parmi lesquelles il faut mentionner le très subtil analyse de S. Mouraviev (2018 : 61–86), sur lequel nous reviendrons, ainsi que le commentaire minutieux de L. Tarán (1965 : 210–216) –, car ils présentent une sorte de « programme d'études » à suivre par celui qui voudrait devenir un « homme qui sait » (fr. 1.3), mais nous croyons qu'ils n'ont pas encore dévoilé la totalité de leur signification. Nous avançons d'ores et déjà notre interprétation: ce passage résume avec précision les deux manières d'expliquer la réalité, dont l'une doit être retenue et l'autre abandonnée. Mais, à notre avis, on n'a pas jusqu'ici remarqué que chaque mot – ou presque – de ce programme d'études trouve sa justification dans d'autres passages conservés du *Poème*. Il y a notamment un rapport très étroit entre ces derniers vers du fragment 1 et les fragments 4 et 19, ce qui n'a pas été saisi dans les travaux consacrés à Parménide, et qui invite à modifier l'ordre traditionnel des citations. Regardons ces textes en détail.

En ce qui concerne les derniers vers du fragment 1, il ne suffit pas de dire, tout simplement, qu'il affirme qu'il faut être au courant de la vérité et des opinions; il est beaucoup plus explicite. Disons d'abord que le texte ne soutient pas qu'il faut s'informer (πυθέσται) de la vérité, mais du « cœur » (ἦτορ) de la vérité. Or, ce cœur a une propriété: il est inébranlable, ferme, fixe, stable, intrépide (ἀτρεμές). La vérité (fidèle à l'étymologie du mot), est la dé-couverte de quelque chose de ferme et de solide capable de résister aux attaques des opinions. La suite du *Poème*⁶ montre que la vérité est la découverte du fait d'être, que Parménide expose à partir du début du fragment 8, et qui, jusqu'au vers 49, est considéré un raisonnement convaincant (πιστὸν λόγον – 8.50) et une pensée qui tourne – on pourrait dire, nécessairement – « autour de la vérité » (ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης – 8.51)

En réalité, tous les σήματα de l'ἔόν énumérés au fr. 8 confirment le caractère de fermeté du cœur de la vérité. Cette section du *Poème* – la seule qui, d'ailleurs, a émerveillé les commentateurs Néoplatoniciens – est le fondement théorique qui permettra proposer une *diakosmesis* – de laquelle nous n'avons conservé que des bribes –; comme l'a remarqué F. Santoro à propos de Parménide: « Suas posições ontológicas e epistê-

⁵ 28 χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσται

Il faut que tu sois au courant de tout:

ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλῆος ἀτρεμῆς ἦτορ

d'une part, du cœur inébranlable de la vérité bien arrondie

30 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθείης·

d'autre part, des opinions des mortels, d'où toute vraie conviction est absente.

ἀλλ' ἔμμησ' αἰεὶ ταῦτα μαθήσῃ, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα

Mais, cependant, tu dois apprendre aussi cela: comment ce que l'on opine

32 χρὴν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

aurait dû être réellement, en embrassant tout incessamment

⁶ Au vers 1.29 nous avons retenu la lecture « bien arrondie » car le fragment 5 (« Il est commun pour moi où je commence, car j'y reviendrai à nouveau ») laisse supposer que la recherche peut commencer soit par la démonstration de la réalité du fait être, qui est la vérité, soit par l'exposé de l'erreur des opinions, qui ne sont pas crédibles. Il s'agit, donc, d'un raisonnement circulaire.

micas servem efetivamente de método para acercar-se do conhecimento do mundo e sua natureza » (Santoro 2018 : 158).

La fermeté et solidité du fondement du réel exposé dans les σήματα de l'έόν – qui peuvent se réduire à la formule « il est possible d'être, car le néant n'existe pas » (έστι γάρ εἶναι, μεδὴν δ'οὐκ έστιν – 6.1b–2a) – réapparaît dans la notion de βεβαίως du fragment 4.1. Opposé à la dichotomie des principes prônée par les opinions (nous reviendrons sur ce sujet), la pensée (νόος) saisit la solidité et la fermeté de tout ce qui est, car « tu ne pourras pas obliger ce qui est a ne pas se tenir à ce qui est » (οὐ γὰρ άποτιμήξει τὸ έόν τοῦ έόντος έχεσθαι – fr. 4.2). En effet, « ce qui est touche ce qui est » (έόν γὰρ έόντι πελάζει – fr. 8. 25). Les opinions, en revanche, découpent ce qui est en pièces et placent sur ces débris des όνόματα particuliers (« distinctifs »: έπίσημον – fr. 9.3), qui, comme les objets qui les reçoivent, se dégradent et périssent: ils ne sont pas fermes, solides et stables, comme l'έόν. Cette omniprésence de l'έόν justifie le « monisme » parménidien, qui n'est pas ontologique mais syntaxique⁷: ce qui fait que tous les étants soient est la possession de *la même* « propriété »: le fait d'être. C'est ainsi d'ailleurs que Platon caractérise la « race » éléatique dans le *Sophiste*, si le texte est traduit d'une manière littérale: « Ils affirmaient dans ses récits (ou, directement, dans ses mythes: μύθοι) que ce *qu'on appelle* (καλουμένων) toutes choses (τῶν πάντων) est une seule chose (ένός όντος) » (*Sph.* 2442d6). La traduction habituelle de la phrase par « ils disent que tout est un » n'est donc pas valable (d'ailleurs, le seul philosophe qui a écrit « πάντα – έν » est...Héraclite).

Voyons maintenant comment Parménide lui-même, et non les commentateurs ou doxographes – et ceci à partir déjà d'Aristote⁸ – caractérise les « opinions ». Une question préalable pourrait s'imposer: ce que Parménide appelle « opinions » (δόξαι) concerne n'importe quelles opinions ou seulement certaines opinions? Étant donné la précision de la description des opinions dans les citations récupérées, nous pensons qu'il s'agit des théories appartenants à une école philosophique qui état à la mode à Élée à l'époque de Parménide. Nous avons soutenu dans un travail précédent (Cordero 2021) qu'il pourrait s'agir d'une branche du Pythagorisme qui au lieu de privilégier les nombres aurait assimilé la réalité à des noms, car la notion de « nomination » est toujours associée aux opinions quand Parménide les présente. Mais la question n'est pas décisive pour notre étude de la question, car ce qui est important c'est l'antithèse que Parménide établira entre la vérité et les opinions dont il s'occupe.

Cette antithèse est avancé déjà au vers 30 du fragment 1, où l'on dit que « toute vraie (άληθής) conviction est absente des opinions. Or, comme la conviction, ainsi comme la persuasion (πειθω – fr. 2.4), accompagnent toujours la vérité, on peut déduire que les opinions ne sont pas vraies »⁹. Mais comme le *Poème* est éminemment didactique – nous

⁷ Notre position se rapproche beaucoup de celle de Patricia Curd (2004 : 64–94).

⁸ Les « opinions », attribuées explicitement par Parménide aux « mortels » (qui ne savent rien) (fr. 1.30, 8.51, 19.3) ont été attribuées à Parménide lui-même, à tort, par Aristote (*Metaph.* 986b31). Sur ce sujet, voir notre travail Cordero (2016 : 1–25).

⁹ Elles sont donc « fausses », mais le mot « faux » (ψευδής) n'est pas attesté dans les citations récupérées.

l'avons déjà dit – Parménide met au futur philosophe au courant de la non-vérité des opinions, afin qu'il puisse les reconnaître et, ainsi les éviter: « Je t'exprime cet arrangement cosmique (διάκοσμον – fr. 8.60) semblable <au vrai> afin d'empêcher que n'importe quel point de vue (γνώμη) humain puisse s'imposer <à toi> » (fr. 8.61). Le texte est explicite et l'on comprend mal les nombreuses discussions à propos de la présentation de la part de Parménide d'une théorie fautive. Il suffit de lire le vers 8.61.

Avant de nous occuper des vers 1.31–2, qui justifient l'exposé d'une théorie non-vraie, voyons qu'est que cela veut dire, « δόξαι », pour Parménide.

La description détaillée des δόξαι des mortels, tel que nous la trouvons chez Parménide lui-même, et non chez les doxographes, se développe (1) du vers 53 au vers 59 du fr. 8, et elle semble continuer (2) par la présentation d'exemples concrets dans le fr. 9, et, enfin, (3) dans le fr. 12. A ces trois endroits on peut ajouter (4) les vers 38 à 41 du fr. 8, où la déesse fait allusion à l'activité des « mortels », même si le mot δόξα y est absent. (5) Le fr. 19, enfin, tire un bilan de l'état « actuel » des choses tel que l'on déduit de la δόξα. Vouloir trouver dans d'autres citations littérales du *Poème* des références ou allusions à ce que *Parménide lui-même* appelle « δόξα » relève de la philosophie-fiction¹⁰. Regardons ces cinq passages.

(1) Après avoir décrit les σήματα de l'ἔόν, dont l'ensemble constituent le chemin convaincant (il est un πειθοῦς κέλευθος, fr. 2.4, il est un chemin qui existe et qui est authentique, πέλειν καὶ ἐτήθημον εἶναι – fr. 8.18) qu'il faut suivre pour atteindre la vérité, la déesse dit: « Apprends <maintenant> les opinions des mortels, en écoutant la trompeuse série de mes paroles. Ils (!) ont établi deux points de vue (γνώμας) pour donner des noms aux formes, dont ils (!) n'ont pas fait une unité – en quoi ils (!) se sont trompés –; ils (!) ont jugé l'existence de deux corps (δέμας) opposés et ont posé des preuves éloignées les unes des autres; d'une part, le feu éthéré de la flamme, doux et très léger, absolument le même que lui-même, mais pas le même que l'autre; d'autre part, ce qui est en soi son contraire, la sombre nuit, forme épaisse et lourde » (fr. 8.51–9). (Évidemment, c'est nous qui avons ajouté les « !!! » pour souligner que les véritables auteurs de ces δόξαι sont les mortels).

(2) Voyons le fr. 9. Simplicius cite plusieurs fois le fr. 8, mais, dans l'une des citations, à la page 180 de son *Commentaire à la «Physique» d'Aristote*, son texte finit au vers 59 du fr., au mot « lourde » (ils manquent les vers 60 et 61). Et ensuite il ajoute la formule « καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα πάλιν » (équivalente à « et juste après »), et cite le fr. 9, où l'on voit le « mode d'emploi » des notions opposées, énumérées dans le fr. 8.51–59: « Mais comme tout a été nommé (δνόμασται) lumière et nuit, et selon leurs propres puissances (δυνάμεις) <on a nommé> telles choses ou telles autres, le tout est plein en même temps (όμοῦ) de lumière et de nuit obscure, égales l'une à l'autre, car en dehors d'elles il n'y

¹⁰ En s'appuyant surtout sur Simplicius, qui, sans aucun doute, applique à Parménide des paramètres platoniciens (hérités peut-être de Plutarque, qui présente « una esplicita platonizzazione dell'Eleate », Licciardi (2016 : 31). Fülleborn avait réuni onze (!) citations doxiques (!) dans une partie de son livre de 1795 sous le titre *Tὰ Πρὸς Δόξαν*. Au moins sept de ces citations n'ont rien à voir avec des δόξαι.

a rien ». La *tout* est, par conséquence, un ensemble de noms dérivés des puissances (c'est-à-dire, des possibilités) propres à la lumière et à l'obscurité, et appliqués à toutes choses.

(3) Concernant le fr. 12, le texte reprend les deux notions, la lumière et l'obscurité, ce qui nous autorise à le mettre en rapport avec les *δόξαι*. On trouve ce fr. 12 après une autre citation du fr. 8, qui, cette fois-ci, arrive jusqu'au vers 61 (Simp. *in Ph.* 39). Simplicius écrit tout de suite, encore une fois: « Peu après (μετ' ὀλίγα δὲ πάλιν) », et il continue: « il <Parménide> parle encore des deux éléments (στοιχείων) et il explique la cause productrice (τὸ ποιητικόν) de cette manière: « Les anneaux (?) les plus étroits sont pleins de feu pur; ceux qui suivent, de nuit; mais entre eux s'échappe une portion de flamme. Au milieu d'eux (les anneaux?) se trouve la déesse qui gouverne tout' (fr. 12.1-3) ». Et dans un passage précédent, à la page 31 de même ouvrage, Simplicius avait cité le même texte, mais de manière complète, en ajoutant les deux derniers vers et demi qui manquaient: « Elle [la déesse] commande complètement l'odieux enfantement et l'union, poussant la femelle à s'unir au mâle, et, à son tour, et inversement, le mâle à la femelle » (fr. 12.4-6a).

(4) Avant de définir les *δόξαι* aux vers 51-59, toujours au fr. 8, la déesse avait fait, au vers 38-41, une allusion (encore une fois, critique) concernant l'activité des *βροτοί*, qui comme elle dira après, consiste à « placer des noms »: « les mortels n'ont établi que des noms, persuadés qu'ils étaient vrais: s'engendrer et mourir, être et non-être¹¹, changer de place et altérer la surface extérieure » (fr. 8.38-41).

(5) Le fr. 19, enfin, qui semble clore l'ensemble des vers consacrés à la *δόξα*, reprend la notion de « nomination », propre aux hommes: « Ainsi sont nées ces choses, selon la *δόξα*, et elles sont présentes maintenant. Et après, une fois développées, elles mourront. Pour chacune les hommes ont établi un nom distinctif » (fr. 19).

Quel bilan pouvons nous tirer de la présentation parménidienne des *δόξαι* des mortels? Il faut dire d'abord qu'il s'agit d'une manière d'expliquer la réalité en fonction de deux éléments ou propriétés essentielles (lumière/nuit, chaud/froid, etc.) qu'Aristote appellera « des *ἀρχαί* » (notion que Simplicius utilise très souvent dans le cas de Parménide) en fonction desquelles ils ont appliqué des noms aux choses. Or, comme dit le fr. 19, étant donné leur « origine », les choses (le « *τάδε* » du vers 19.1 semble avoir une signification générale) existent aujourd'hui, mais mourront demain.

La solution que Parménide propose afin que la réalité, au lieu de disparaître, puisse exister toujours, se trouve dans le fr. 4, qui occupe une place de choix parmi les citations récupérées, ce qui n'a pas été perçu par les nombreux travaux consacrés à l'étude de Parménide. Ce texte soutient que ce qui est absent (*ἀπεόντα*) se trouve solidement présent (*παρεόντα βεβαίως*) pour l'intellect (*νόω*). En effet, être et penser s'appuient mutuellement (voir le fr. 3). Le vers 4.3, comme nous l'avons déjà vu, interdit d'éparpiller la réalité, même d'une manière ordonnée (*κατὰ κόσμον*) mais aussi de faire une unité

¹¹ Il est surprenant que dans la plupart des travaux consacrés à Parménide ce couple n'ait pas reçu l'importance qu'il mérité. Coordonner « être » à son contraire, « ne pas être », c'est le noyau du défaut des *δόξαι*, et c'est la théorie prônée par les hommes qui ne savent rien au vers 6.8-9!

(συνιστάμενον) avec des éléments ou propriétés contraires. La seule « chose » qui peut s'ajouter à ce qui est, est ce qui est.

Les deux derniers vers du fr. 1 avancent didactiquement ce que l'on trouvera au fr. 19, que nous avons déjà mentionné. Nous sommes partisans de trouver dans les vers 1.31–32 l'apocalypse hypothétique¹² qui se produirait *si* le cœur inébranlable de la vérité était ignoré. Dans ce cas, les principes prônés par les δόξαι, c'est à dire, ce que l'on opine, τὰ δοκοῦντα, auraient le monopole du réel, car, en dehors, il n'y aurait rien, comme le dit le fr 9: « Mais, comme *tout* a été nommé lumière et nuit [...] tout est plein en même temps de lumière et de nuit obscure, égales l'une à l'autre, car hors d'elles il n'y a rien ». Le vers 1.32 l'avait déjà dit: « Ce que l'on opine [...], embrassant *tout* incessamment (τὰ δοκοῦντα [...]) δια παντός πάντα περῶντα ». Hélas, le fr. 19 montre le résultat de cette cohabitation contre nature, conséquence de l'habitude humaine de s'appuyer sur la conjonction d'éléments (A *et* Non-A) au lieu de préférer, comme Parménide, la disjonction (A *ou* Non-A).

Nous avons dit au début de ce travail que presque chaque mot du programme d'études proposé dans le passage 1.28–32 trouverait son développement dans d'autres citations, qui montrent le rôle positif de la saisie du cœur de la vérité (car le philosophe a besoin de connaissances inébranlables, au moins jusqu'à la Sophistique), et l'auto contradiction du fondement des δόξαι, victimes de la conjonction. Nous pouvons ajouter maintenant que, heureusement, dans le fragment 4 il y a une sorte d'antidote contre le nihilisme auquel, certainement à leur insu, sont condamnés les mortels qui ne savent rien, car le νόος bien dirigé (non le πλακτὸν νόον des mortels, vers 6.6) fait que le réel soit présent (παρέοντα) (donc, qu'il existe), et que puisse être dé-couvert (donc, qu'il abandonne son absence, ἀπεόντα), devenant ainsi, même étymologiquement, « vrai ».

S'appuyer sur le νόος pour dévoiler ce que, en fonction des principes instaurés par les δόξαι était condamné à demeurer absent est la seule manière qui reste d'expliquer la réalité. Le chemin¹³ qui s'appuyait sur « ce que l'on opine » (τὰ δοκοῦντα), a été clairement écarté au vers 7.2: « Éloigne ta pensée de ce chemin (ὁδός) de la recherche »¹⁴. Il ne reste que le chemin qui va exposer le fondement de la pensée, « ce que l'on pense », car, « sans ce qui est, grâce¹⁵ auquel il est énoncé, tu ne trouveras pas le penser » (fr. 8.35–36). Sans l'έόν il serait impossible d'énoncer la pensée, et la pensée et son énoncé (le λέγειν) ont un seul objet, l'έόν: « il est nécessaire de dire et de penser que l'έόν existe

¹² Nous avons traduit « aurait du être réellement » (χρῆν δοκίμως – fr. 1.32) car il s'agit d'un « casus irrealis », comme l'ont proposé W. Kranz (1916 : 1170), et R. Falus (1960 : 286). Voir, *contra*, S. Mouraviev (2018 : 71).

¹³ Nous utilisons « manière » et « chemin » comme traductions du grec ὁδός, qui, déjà au temps de Parménide, avait, entre autres, ces deux significés. Cf. Pi. O. 8.13: « Avec l'aide des dieux, il y plusieurs manières (ὁδοί) de gagner ». Le mot anglais « way » hérite de cette nuance.

¹⁴ Les vers 17 et 18 du fr. 8 reprennent cette idée et justifient la réalité d'un seul chemin de recherche: « Il a été jugé nécessaire de faire que l'un soit impensable et innommable (car il n'est pas le vrai chemin) et que l'autre existe et soit authentique ».

¹⁵ Au lieu du locatif ἐν ᾧ retenu par Simplicius nous adoptons la formule ἐφ' ᾧ qui se trouve chez Proclus et qui permet de résoudre l'incohérence de supposer que c'est la pensée qui est « dans » l'έόν. Voir sur ce sujet notre travail Cordero (2004).

(ἐόν ἔμμεναι) » (fr. 6.1). Voilà le fondement de la seule manière d'expliquer la réalité à retenir.

Comme le réel non seulement existe (cette formule serait un pléonasme en Grec) mais est aussi connaissable, les fragments 10 et 11 invitent le futur philosophe à entreprendre, en respectant ce véritable axiome, une recherche sur le cosmos tout entier: « Tu connaîtras la nature (φύσις) éthérée et tous les signes qui sont dans l'éther, et les actions destructrices de la flamme pure du brillant soleil, et d'où tout cela provient; et tu apprendras les actions de la rotation de la lune tournante, et sa nature; et tu connaîtras aussi le ciel englobant, d'où il naquit, et comment la nécessité qui le conduit l'enchaîne pour maintenir les limites des astres » (fr. 9), « comment la terre, le soleil, la lune, et l'éther commun, la Voie Lactée et l'Olympe suprême, et la puissance brûlante des astres, ont repris naissance... » (fr. 11).

Ce n'est que maintenant, une fois trouvé le cœur de la vérité et abandonné une éventuelle διακόσμησις basée sur ce que « l'on opine » (la cohabitation de deux principes opposés qui se répandent partout et qui finissent par périr), qu'une nouvelle recherche peut se mettre en marche. L'état fragmentaire du *Poème* conserve surtout l'invitation à mettre en marche cette enquête, et seulement des bribes des résultats obtenus (voir par exemple les fr. 14, 15 et 18), mais il n'y a aucun doute: c'est le futur philosophe qui doit entamer cette recherche, non les « mortels, qui ne savent rien ». Le fr. 10 est clair et précis: la Déesse s'adresse non aux mortels, mais à son auditeur.

En fonction de ce que nous venons de dire, nous proposons un arrangement différent de celui trouvé jadis chez Fülleborn, au moins en ce qui concerne quatre ou cinq citations. Sans aucun doute, au fr. 8 (ou comme on voudra l'appeler) il y a l'exposé des δόξαι, jusqu'à la fin dudit fragment. Comme nous l'avons dit plus haut, nous avons décidé de placer par la suite les fr. 9 et 12, qui complètent la présentation des δόξαι, ainsi que le fr. 19, qui résume la fragilité d'une διακόσμησις que s'appuie sur τὰ δοκοῦντα. Nous proposons de placer le fr. 4 après les fr. 19, comme lien entre l'absence (donc, la non fermeté) des états qui supposent les δόξαι (qui ont réduit le réel à des noms dérivés d'un couple incompatible, lumière et obscurité) et leur présence, quand ils sont saisis par le νόος. Ce fragment 4 joue un rôle décisif dans le *Poème* car il justifie la possibilité d'un nouveau point de départ de la recherche, basé maintenant sur un fondement ferme, solide et inébranlable, qui aura comme objet d'étude la φύσις toute entière, c'est à dire, l'être des choses¹⁶.

En résumé, Parménide propose au futur philosophe deux méthodes ou chemins qui seraient, *a priori*, valables pour expliquer la réalité (dont l'un sera rejeté), mais, cela va de soi, l'objet de deux recherches est *le même*. En fonction de la platonisation

¹⁶ Selon la tradition doxographique (voir D.L. 8.55 et aussi Sextus Empiricus 7.111), le *Poème* aurait eu comme titre *Περὶ Φύσεως*. Dans le cas de Méliossos, en revanche, il semble évident que le titre de son traité était *Περὶ Φύσεως ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος*, étant donné le titre anti-méliossien du traité de Gorgias. Selon Simplicius, « si Méliossos utilisa ce titre [...] il est évident qu'il pensait que la φύσις était τὸ ὄν » (*in Cael.* 557.10). On pourrait dire autant de Parménide.

de Parménide consacrée par Simplicius (dont le point de départ était déjà Aristote) et « justifié » par le découpage du *Poème* par Fülleborn, on a cru trouver que pour le philosophe il y avait deux objets de recherche, l'Être-Un et les « apparences »¹⁷. Or, déjà Platon, qui n'a pas platonisé Parménide, avait affirmé dans le *Sophiste* que pour justifier l'existence des « apparences » (φαίνεσθαι, δοκεῖν – *Sph.* 236e1) (et pouvoir ainsi définir le sophiste comme un illusionniste) il fallait d'abord réfuter Parménide, qui avait nié son existence.

Notre interprétation ne prétend pas présenter « un Parménide nuovo », comme avait proclamé G. Reale¹⁸, et, moins encore « un altro Parmenide », comme vient d'annoncer plus récemment L. Rossetti¹⁹. Nous avons eu le désir d'offrir, en revanche, un Parménide « parménidisé », libéré des schémas platoniciens et aristotéliens qui ont voulu qu'il soutienne ce que les doxographes voulaient qu'il dise. C'est à l'éventuel lecteur de juger si nous avons réussi ou échoué.

¹⁷ Dans la plupart des travaux anglo-saxons on a collé sur un ensemble de citations l'étiquette « Way of Seeming ».

¹⁸ La formule ouvre la « Presentazione » du *Poème* de son édition (1991 : 7).

¹⁹ L. Rossetti (2017).

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Parmenides' Two Ways of Explaining Reality

Towards the end of fragment 1 of his *Poem*, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that *a priori* explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the *Poem*, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the *Poem* that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has "Platonised" the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the "opinions" (which are only points of view) to the "appearances" (in the Platonic sense of the term).

KEY WORDS

Truth, Opinions, Doxography, Fülleborn, Simplicius, Plato, Being, Parmenides

Filolaos z Krotony, *O naturze* (*Περὶ φύσεως*) doksografia i fragmenty

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/ *Akademia im. Jakuba z Paradyża w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim* /

*Φιλόλαος δὲ ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι περὶ
τὸ πῦρ κατὰ κύκλον λοξὸν ὁμοιοτρόπως ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ.
(A 21 DK, zob. poniżej tekst 24)*

Artykuł niniejszy składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej tytule wstępu podajemy ogólne dane o życiu i poglądach Filolaosa; stanowi to ma wprowadzenie do drugiej części, czyli do lektury w nowym polskim przekładzie ważniejszych o nim antycznych świadectw oraz zachowanych *verbatim* fragmentów z księgi *O naturze* (*Περὶ φύσεως*), które dla pewnego posmaku cytujemy wraz z greckim oryginałem. Uznawane są one w myśl nowszych badań za autentyczne i stanowią doniosłe resztki pitagorejskiej i wczesnej greckiej filozofii. Układ i kolejność doboru tych świadectw i fragmentów Filolaosa

przedstawiamy zwięźle według własnej koncepcji, podając przy tym ich oznaczenia we wzorcowej edycji Dielsa-Kranza (44) oraz Laksa-Mosta (12).

Filolaos (ok. 470–385) pochodził z miasta Kroton w południowej Italii, zwanej podówczas Wielką Helladą (Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς, *Magna Graecia*) i rozslawioną szczególnie dzięki działalności pitagorejczyków. W poprzednim stuleciu (ok. 530 roku) przybył tam z wyspy Samos Pitagoras, i zyskał niebywały wpływ na życie publiczne, organizując pewne ideowe bractwo (*hetaireia*), przeciwko któremu zawiązano potem (ok. 500 roku) krwawy spisek. Samemu Pitagorasowi udało się zbiec do Metapontu, gdzie zakończył żywot ok. 490 roku p.n.e.

Podobny los spotkał sto lat później (ok. 440 roku) Filolaosa, który zdołał wydostać się z pożaru wzniesionego przeciwko pitagorejczykom i schronił się u przyjaciół w Lukanii. Udał się później do Teb, gdzie mieli go słuchać Simmias i Kebes, współrozmówcy Sokratesa w *Fedonie* Platona. Niewiele zatem wiemy o życiu i dziele Filolaosa (zob. świadectwa 1–8).


Tak samo skąpe są dane o jego jednej czy trzech księgach pitagorejskich, które Platon za pokazną sumę miał nabyć na Sycylii i na tej podstawie napisać dialog *Timajos*. Dotąd nauki głoszone przez Pitagorasa przekazywane były ustnie i strzeżone przez jego licznych uczniów. Filolaos był pierwszym pitagorejczykiem, który ogłosił swe pismo o tradycyjnym tytule *Peri physeos* (*O naturze*). Platon w *Timajosie* podjął taką opowieść „od powstania świata do natury ludzkiej oraz chorób ciała i duszy” (zob. Wesoły 2004). Jak zobaczymy, ocalałe świadectwa i fragmenty Filolaosa świadczą o takiej właśnie wykładni natury wszechrzeczy.

Hermann Diels w *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (1903) wydobyl z antycznych autorów 29 świadectw o życiu i nauce Filolaosa, a także 23 fragmenty, autentyczność których długo pozostawała nierozstrzygnięta. Dzięki nowszym studiom (Burkert 1972; Huffman 1993, 2020) ustalono, że 10 z tych fragmentów pochodzi zapewne od samego Filolaosa (B 1–7; 13; 17). Także niektóre ze świadectw (A 7a; 9–10; 16–24; 27–29) zasługują na wiarygodność. Tym samym uzyskał Filolaos należyte miejsce nie tylko we wczesnej tradycji pitagorejskiej, ale i w wykładni problemowej *peri physeos historia* (zob. Naddaf 2005; Graham 2014). Księga Filolaosa posiadała typową wykładnię: założenie pryncypiów, na podstawie których wywodzi się genezę i rozwój świata oraz naturę istot żywych i człowieka. Znamy sam jej początek podług określeń natury, kosmosu, bezkresów – ograniczników oraz ich zharmonizowania (zob. tekst 9). Stanowiło to nowatorskie i konkurencyjne względem poprzednich ujęcie pryncypiów i kosmogonii. Filolaos rozwinął pitagorejską orientację o naturze wszechrzeczy, ale jego wywody zdają się być krytycznym nawiązaniem z jednej strony do monistycznego bezkresu (*apeiron*) Anaksymandra, jak i pluralistycznego bezkresu Anaksagorasa i atomistów, a – z drugiej – do kresu (*peras*) jako zasady doskonałości bytu według Parmenidesa (B 8, 30 i 42). Tym samym Filolaos łączy odpowiednio tradycję jońską i eleacką, także w pojęciu harmonii, o której wzmiankował Heraklit (B 51; B 54) i Empedokles (B 27; B 96).

Wykluczona jest poznawalność czegokolwiek, gdyby dominowały elementy neogracjonistyczne, takie jak powietrze, woda, ogień i ziemia, w ich masie nieskończonej. Możli-

wość poznania wymaga bowiem numerycznego kresu. Ważne jest to, że wszelkie rzeczy poznawalne zawierają liczbę, bez której nie można niczego pomyśleć i pojąć (tekst 12). Mogło to być odpowiedzią na sceptycyzm Ksenofanesa w kwestii poznania natury wszechrzeczy (B 34), jak i na wymóg poznawalności Parmenidesa (B 3), że wiedza ujmuje spójnie swój przedmiot bytu i myślenia.

Według Filolaosa kosmos i wszystko, co w nim zawarte, powstał przez zharmonizowanie bezkresów i ograniczników, co ujawnia się w samym porządku świata i w jego wytworach. Filolaos przyjął numeryczną spójnię kresu wytwarzającego wielość, liczby i figury. Harmonia jako zestrojenie przeciwstawnych zasad wprowadzała pewien złożony system numeryczny. Nader oryginalne jest to, że te bezkresy i ograniczniki spojone są harmonicznie skalą stałych proporcji. W literaturze przedmiotu powtarza się pogląd, że Filolaos zakładał skalę diatoniczną i harmonię wyrażał w interwałach oktawy (1:2), kwinty (2:3) i kwarty (3:4). Wszelako Filolaos wyraził owo pierwotne pojęcie harmonii w nieco innych terminach, proporcjach liczbowych i interwałach jako heptachord enharmoniczny, którego diagram przedstawiamy następująco:




Chodzi o układ łączny dwóch tetrachordów według czterech strun (*hypate, mese, trite, neate*) oraz stałych między nimi interwałów (*syllaba, dioxeia, diapason, epogdoon*). I tak siedem strun liry greckiej wyraża skalę tonów wysokich, średnich i niskich, w trzech stałych konsonancjach: *diapason* (12 : 6), *syllabe* (= *diatettaron* 12 : 9; 8 : 6) i *di'oxeion* (= *diapente* 12 : 8; 8 : 6). Te dawne nazwy zastąpione zostały nowymi wraz z przyjęciem kanonu oktachordu, czyli oktawy, kwarty i kwinty. W przypisywanych Arystotelesowi *Problemata* (19.7; 25; 32; 47) mowa jest o tym dawnym pojęciu harmonii. Także w piśmie hippokratejskim *O diecie* (I 8) w tych terminach ujmuje się harmoniczny wzrost jestestw (fr. 908 Gigon)

Arystoksenos w *Elementach harmonii* (36, 30) podaje, że jego poprzednicy ograniczyli się do „badania heptachordów, które nazywali harmoniami”. Arystoteles, nawiązując do pitagorejczyków, podaje, że „siedem strun to harmonia”, a przy tym stwierdza, że

„są dwie średnie: jedna dziewiątka, druga ósemka” (*Metaph.* 1093a14; 1093a30). Posługiwano się diagramami, które przedstawiły systemy interwałów za pomocą linii i liczb (cf. *Metaph.* 1078a14).

Tak jak inni wcześnie filozofowie greccy, Filolaos zakładał też powstawanie i giniecie kosmosu (zob. teksty 18–23. Najpierw zostało zharmonizowane jedno (*to hen*) w centrum sfery zwane zarzewiem (*hestia*), czyli ogniem wciągającym z bezkresu ograniczenie powietrza (wyziewu), próżni i czasu. Kosmos zaczął powstawać od środka regularnie ku górze i dołowi kształtując od centralnego ognia układ krążących wokół niego planet, czyli kolejno Przeciw-ziemi, Ziemi, Księżycy, Słońca, Merkurego, Wenus, Marsa, Jowisza, Saturna, a na skraju Gwiazd stałych (zob. dokładniej wraz z wykresami: Graham 2015). Nie Ziemi, ale Ogniovi przypadła zatem szacowna środkowa pozycja. Oryginalne jest to że Filolaos ujmuje po raz pierwszy ziemię jako planetę, co było też pewnym argumentem dla Konernika. Dla nowej nęgladowości rzecz przedstawiamv na wykresie:



Filolaos zakładał analogię pomiędzy kosmogenezą a narodzinami człowieka. Kosmos bierze się z wyziewu nieograniczonego oddechu, czasu i próżni, jak płód jest pierwotnie gorący przed wejściem w chłodzące powietrze. Cztery zaczyny (*archai*) konieczne do wyjaśniania natury człowieka, zwierzęcia i rośliny, stanowią odpowiednio mózg, serce, pępek i genitalia (tekst 28). W wyjaśnianiu przyczyn chorób przyjmuje Filolaos zasady specjalne: żółć, krew i flegmę jako nieograniczone, oraz gorąco i zimno – jako czynniki ograniczające (tekst 29). Wpisuje się w kwestie analogicznie stawiane w medycynie

hipokratejskiej (zob. Manetti 2011). Niewiele mamy świadectw o naturze duszy jako harmonii oraz jej dyspozycjach myślenia i poznania (tekst 30–33).

Myśl Filolaosa – nie wymienionego z imienia – podjęta została i wykorzystana nie tylko w *Timajosie* Platona, lecz także w *Filebie* z nawiązaniem do jego metodologii w zakresie pryncypiów, teorii harmonii i liczby (zob. tekst 34; Huffman 2001). Co więcej, równie bezimiennie Filolaos znany był Arystotelesowi, który traktował ogólnie o „tak nazywanych Pitagorejczykach z Italii” (zob. teksty 34–39). Ocalałe fragmenty Filolaosa odzwierciedlają właściwie taką wizję *peri physeos*, jaką Arystoteles i doksografia perypatetycka przypisywała wczesnym pitagorejczykom. Stagiryta przy tym odróżniał wyraźnie pitagoreizm od platonizmu w teorii pryncypiów, liczb i obiektów matematycznych. Utrwalił on pogląd pitagorejski, że rzeczy są liczbami, choć za Filolaosem trzeba by raczej stwierdzić, że wszystko jest poprzez liczby właściwie poznawane. W tym względzie Arystoteles przyznawał racje pitagorejczykom, a nie Platonowi, który błędnie eksponował idee i liczby oderwane od rzeczy zmysłowych (zob. przekład odnośnych tekstów źródłowych: Wesoły 2015).

Oddzielną i trudną kwestią, której tutaj nie podejmujemy, jest dociekanie, co Filolaos – uznawany za pitagorejczyka – przejął był właściwie od samego Pitagorasa. Według Platona w *Politei* (R. 600a), Pitagoras uchodził, tak jak Homer, za mistrza w kształceniu, przekazując pewien wzorzec życia, natomiast według Arystotelesa (fr. 171 Gigon) był on sławny jako taumaturg (czyniący cuda). Tych znamion jednak we fragmentach Filolaosa nie odnajdujemy.

W ostatnich latach powstało kilka oryginalnych opracowań i monografii o Pitagorasie i wczesnym pitagoreizmie (tytuły podajemy w Bibliografii). Ich Autorzy różnią się jednak w rozpoznaniu samego Pitagorasa czy to jako taumaturga i mistagoga (wprowadzającego w misteria), czy to jako wielostronnego mędrca także w badaniu natury wszechrzeczy i w matematyce.

Kontrowersje wokół autentyczności fragmentów Filolaosa zaciemniły przyznanie mu należytego miejsca w tradycji wczesnogreckiej filozofii. Ostatnie badania uznają go za twórczego myśliciela, który przedłożył oryginalną wykładnię o naturze wszechrzeczy, a ocalałe jego resztki w dialekcie doryckim, cytowane głównie przez Stobajosa (V wiek n.e.), dotyczą pierwszych zasad, kosmogonii, astronomii, medycyny i psychologii. Po tych ogólnych uwagach wstępnych proponujemy lekturę tych cennych fragmentów w oryginale i możliwie wiernym przekładzie. Wyrażam tutaj podziękowanie Panu dr Pawłowi Blei za pomoc w grafice wykresów.

ŻYWOT I PISMO

1. DIOGENES LAERTIOS VIII 84–85 (A 1 DK)

Filolaos z Krotony, pitagorejczyk. Aby nabyć od niego księgi pitagorejskie, Platon pisze do Diona. Zmarł podejrzany o dążenie do tyranii. [...]

Według jego poglądu, wszystkie rzeczy powstają z konieczności i harmonii. A że ziemia porusza się po okręgu, pierwszy to powiedział; inni zaś twierdzą, że Hiketas z Syrakuz.

Napisał jedną księgę, którą – jak podaje Hermippos, powołując się na jakiegoś autora – filozof Platon, gdy udał się na Sycylię do Dionizjosa, nabył od krewnych Filolaosa za czterdzieści min aleksandryjskich, i na tej podstawie miał napisać *Timajosa*. Inni zaś podają, że Platon miał ją otrzymać za obietnicę uwolnienia przez Dionizjosa jakiegoś ucznia Filolaosa.

2. PLATON, *PHAEDO* 61D–E (B 15 DK)

[Sokrates] No cóż, Kebesie, czyż nie słyszeliście, ty i Simias, o tych [okropnościach samobójstwa], przebywając razem z Filolaosem?

[Kebes] Niczego jasnego, Sokratesie. [...] Podług czego tedy powiadają, że niegodnie jest samego siebie zabić, Sokratesie? – Ja już to bowiem, o co teraz spytałeś, słyszałem od Filolaosa, gdy u nas mieszkał, i od niektórych innych, że tego nie należy czynić.

3. *SCHOL. AD LOC.* (A 1a DK)

Filolaos: był to pitagorejczyk, zbiegły z Italii wskutek pożaru wznieconego przez Kylona, gdy został wydalony ze szkoły jako nieodpowiedni dla filozofii. Nauczał on też w postaci zagadek, jak było w ich zwyczaju. Przybył do Teb na pogrzeb swego nauczyciela Lyzysa, tam właśnie zmarłego. Hipparch i Filolaos to jedyni pitagorejczycy, którzy ocaleli ze wspomnianego nieszczęścia.

4. PLUTARCH, *DE GEN. SOCR.* 13 (A 4a DK)

Skoro bowiem upadły w miastach bractwa pitagorejskie pokonane w powstaniu, na niektórych jeszcze pozostających w Metaponcie stronnicy Kylona podłożyli w domostwie ogień i zlikwidowali wszystkich zarazem, oprócz Filolaosa i Lysisa, wówczas jeszcze młodych, którzy dzięki sile i zwinności wydostali się z pożaru. Filolaos uciekł stamtąd do Lukanii i schronił się u innych przyjaciół, którzy ponownie się zorganizowali i zapanowali nad stronnikami Kylona.

5. DIOGENES LAERTIOS III 6 (A 5 DK)

Podówczas Platon, mając lat dwadzieścia osiem, jak podaje Hermodoros, przeniósł się do Megary wraz z innymi sokratykami, do Euklidesa. Potem popłynął do Kyreny, do matematyka Teodora, a stamtąd do Italii do pitagorejczyków: Filolaosa i Eurytosa.

6. DIOGENES LAERTIOS III 9 (A 8 DK)

Niektórzy powiadają, a do nich należy Satyros, że Dionowi na Sycylii polecił Platon zakupić trzy księgi pitagorejskie od Filolaosa za sto min.

7. JAMBLICH, VP 199

Zadziwia także ścisłość strzeżenia [tajemnicy]; podobno przez wiele pokoleń nikt nie natknął się na żadne pismo pitagorejczyków, przed epoką Filolaosa, lecz on pierwszy wydał te trzy głośne księgi, które – jak się podaje – nabył Dion z Syrakuz za cenę stu min na zamówienie Platona; taka bieda wielka i straszna spotkała Filolaosa, skoro on sam był z bractwa pitagorejczyków i stąd dysponował tymi księgami.

8. GELLIUSZ III 17, 4 (A 8 DK)

Szyderczy Tymon napisał najbardziej złorzeczącą księgę pod tytułem *Sillos*. W księdze tej strofuje haniebnie filozofa Platona, że za sporą sumę nabył księgę o nauce pitagorejskiej i wydał z niej *Timajosa*, ten słynny dialog wytworzył. Wiersze Timona są następujące:

I ty Platonie? I ciebie chęć wiedzy ogarnęła,
Z srebrników wiele niewielką nabyłeś księgę,
Z której czerpiąc potrafiłeś napisać *Timajosa*.

PRYNCYPIA: BEZKRES – KRES – LICZBA – HARMONIA

9. DIOGENES LAERTIOS VIII 85 (B 1 DK = D2 LM)

Demetrios w *Homonimiach* podaje, że był on pierwszym z Pitagorejczyków, który ogłosił księgę *O naturze* (*Περὶ φύσεως*), a początek jej taki:

Natura w świecie zharmonizowana została z bezkresów i ograniczeń, i cały świat i wszystko co w nim.

ἡ φύσις δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀρμόχθη ἐξ ἀπείρων τε καὶ περαινόντων, καὶ ὅλος <ὁ> κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ πάντα.

10. STOBAJOS I 21, 7A (B 2 DK = D3 LM)

Z konieczności wszystkie byty są ograniczone lub bezkresne albo ograniczone i bezkresne. Bezczesne zaś jedynie nie byłyby. Skoro więc nie okazują się być ani ze wszystkich ograniczonych, ani ze wszystkich bezczesnych, to jasne, że z ograniczonych i bezczesnych i kosmos, i to, co w nim, zostało zharmonizowane. Jawne to jest też w dziełach. Jedne z nich bowiem ograniczają się z ograniczonych, inne zaś z ograniczonych i bezczesnych ograniczają się i nie ograniczają, jeszcze inne z bezczesnych okazują się bezczesne.

ἀνάγκα τὰ ἐόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαίνοντα ἢ ἄπειρα ἢ περαίνοντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ κα εἶη. ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν φαίνεται οὐτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ἐόντα οὐτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δηλον τᾶρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὅ τε κόσμος καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαίνοντί τε καὶ οὐ περαίνοντι, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἄπειρα φανέονται.

11. JAMBlich, *IN NIC.* 7, 24 (B 3 DK = D4 LM)

Na początku bowiem nic poznawalnego nie będzie ze wszystkich bezczesnych bytów.

ἀρχὰν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ γνωσοῦμενον ἐσσεῖται πάντων ἀπείρων ἐόντων.

12. STOBAJOS I 21, 7B (B 4 DK = D7 LM)

Wszystkie rzeczy poznawalne zawierają liczbę; niczego bowiem nie moglibyśmy pomyśleć ani poznać bez niej.

καὶ πάντα γὰ μὲν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὐτε νοηθῆμεν οὐτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου.

13. STOBAJOS I 21, 7C (B 5 DK = D9 LM)

Liczba zaś zawiera dwie właściwe sobie postaci: nieparzystą i parzystą, a trzecia zmieszana z obydwu to parzysto-nieparzysta. W każdej jej postaci jest wiele form, które każda sobą oznacza.

ὁ γὰρ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων μειχθέντων ἀρτιοπέριτον· ἑκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδεος πολλαὶ μορφαί, ἃς ἕκαστον αὐταυτὸ σημαίνει.

14. STOBAJOS I 21, 7D (B 6 DK = D5, D14 LM)

Co do natury i harmonii tak się rzeczy mają. Bytność rzeczy, wieczną będąc i samą naturą, boskie dopuszcza, a nie ludzkie poznanie, gdyż inaczej dla żadnego z bytów i poznawalnych przez nas nie byłoby możliwe powstawanie, gdyby nie występowały te bytności rzeczy, z których składa się świat, i z ograniczonych i bezkresnych. Skoro zaś zasady nie wystąpiły jako podobne ani jako jednorodne, to już nie byłoby dla nich możliwe wytworzenie porządku, jeśliby nie powstała harmonia, na jakikolwiek sposób powstała. Rzeczy podobne i jednorodne nie potrzebowalyby żadnej harmonii, niepodobne zaś i niejednorodne, i nie jednakowo szybkie, takie muszą być spojone w harmonii, jeśli mają być utrzymane w świecie.

περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὧδε ἔχει· ἃ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰδῖος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἃ φύσις θεῖαν γὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνδέχεται γινῶσιν πλέον γὰρ ἢ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἦν οὐθὲν τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γινωσκόμενον ὑφ' ἀμῶν γὰ γενέσθαι μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τὰς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον οὐχ ὁμοῖαι οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαί, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐταῖς κοσμηθῆναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο ὠιτινῶν ἅδε τρόπῳ ἐγένετο. τὰ μὲν ὧν ὁμοῖα καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μηδὲ ὁμόφυλα μηδὲ ἰσοταγῆ ἀνάγκα ταῖ τοιαῦται ἀρμονίαὶ συγκεκλειῆσθαι, οἷα μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

Wielkością harmonii jest syllaba i di'okseian; di'okseian jest wyższa od syllaby o jedną ósmą. Od hypate do mese jest syllaba, od mese zaś do neate jest di'okseian, od neate do trite jest syllaba, od trite di hypate jest di'okseian. Pomiędzy trite i mese jest przewyższanie o jedną ósmą; syllaba zaś to przewyższanie o jedną i jedną trzecią, di'okseian o półtora raza, a dia pason o podwójność. Tak oto harmonia to pięć przewyższeń o jedną ósmą i dwie diezy; di'okseian to trzy przewyższenia o jedną ósmą i dieza; syllaba zaś to dwa przewyższenia o jedną ósmą i dieza.

ἁρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος ἐστὶ συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν μείζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόωι. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐπὶ μέσσαν συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσσας ἐπὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δ' ἐν μέσῳ μέσσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον· ἂ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον. οὕτως ἁρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίσεις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπόγδοα καὶ δίσεις.

15. BOECJUSZ, *INST. MUS.* III 8 (B 6 DK)

Filolaos zatem te i inne, mniejsze od nich interwały (spatia) zawarł w takich definicjach:

Dieza – powiada – jest interwałem, w którym proporcja czterech trzecich większa jest od dwóch tonów. Komma zaś jest interwałem, w którym proporcja dziewięciu ósmym większa jest od dwóch diez, czyli dwóch półtonów mniejszych. Schisma jest połową kommy, a diaschisma połową diezy, czyli półtonu mniejszego.

Diesis, inquit, est spatium quo maior est sesquitertia proportio duobus tonis. comma vero est spatium, quo maior est sesquioctava proportio duabus diesibus, id est duobus semitoniis minoribus. schisma est dimidium commatis, diaschisma vero dimidium dieseos, id est semitonii minoris.

16. BOECJUSZ, *INST. MUS.* III 5 (A 26 DK)

Pitagorejczyk Filolaos próbował w inny sposób podzielić ton, ustanawiając tak podstawę tonu od tej liczby, która jako pierwsza tworzyłaby sześcian od pierwszej liczby nieparzystej [27 = 33], co u pitagorejczyków było w najwyższym poważaniu. Pierwszą liczbą nieparzystą jest trójka: trzy razy trzy, jeśli pomnożysz, z konieczności wyniknie 27,

która to liczba względem 24 odbiega jednym tonem, zachowując tę samą różnicę trzech jednostek. Trójka bowiem jest ósmą częścią sumy 24, która dodana do nich tworzy pierwszy sześcian 27.

Z tego sześcianu stworzył więc Filolaos dwie części: jedną większą od połowy, drugą nazywa apotome, a pozostałą mniejszą od połowy, tę znów nazywa diesis, a później nazywa ją półtonem mniejszym; różnicę ich nazwała zaś komma (B 6 DK).

Sądzi więc najpierw, że diesis składa się z 13 jednostek, dlatego że ujmuje ona różnicę między 256 a 243, a następnie dlatego, że ta liczba 13 składa się z dziewiątki, trójki i jedynki, a jedynka zajmuje miejsce punktu, trójka pierwszej liczby nieparzystej, dziewiątka pierwszego kwadratu nieparzystego.

Z tych zatem powodów, ponieważ 13 składa się z diesis, którą nazywa półtonem, pozostałą zaś część liczby 27, która składa się z 14 jednostek, ustanowił jako apotome. A ponieważ pomiędzy 13 i 14 jedynkę uczynił różnicą, sądzi, że komma założona jest na miejscu jedynki. Całość zaś tonu zawiera w 27 jednostkach, gdyż taka jest różnica między 216 a 243, które odstawia od siebie jednym tonem.

17. NIKOMACHOS, *AR.* II 26, 2 (A 24 DK = D13 LM)

Niektórzy sądzą, że harmoniczną zwie się ta średnia, idąc za Filolaosem, stąd, że towarzyszy każdej średniej geometrycznej, a geometryczną harmonią mówią, że jest sześcian z tego, że według trzech wymiarów zharmonizowany został równo równą ilości razy [3 x 3 x 3]. W każdym bowiem sześcianie taka widnieje średnia: krawędzi w każdym sześcianie jest 12, kątów 8, a ścian 6. Tak więc 8 jest średnią między 6 i 12 na sposób harmoniczny.

KOSMOGONIA I ASTRONOMIA

18. PROKLOS, *IN TL.* I 176, 27–30 (A 9 DK = D16 LM)

Byty pośledniejsze są kierowane przez bardziej boskie i jeden dopełnia się kosmos z przeciwieństw zharmonizowany, utworzony „z ograniczników i bezkresów” (ἐκ περαινότων τε καὶ ἀπείρων) według Filolaosa.

19. STOBAJOS, I 21, 8 (B 7 DK = D15 LM)

To, co w pierw zharmonizowane: jedno [jedynka], w środku sfery zwie się zarzewiem. τὸ πρᾶτον ἀρμοσθέν, τὸ ἓν, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τᾶς σφαιράς ἐστία καλεῖται.

20. STOBAJOS, I 15, 7 (B 17 DK = D 17 LM)

Filolaosa *Bachantki* (*Bάκχαι*):

Świat jest jeden. Zaczął powstawać od środka i od środka ku górze poprzez te same [stopnie] co ku dołowi; są bowiem części wyższe od środka naprzeciw niższych. W najniższych są środkowe jakby najwyższe, a pozostałe podobnie. Względem bowiem środka obydwie strony są identyczne, te co nie odwracają się.

ὁ κόσμος εἷς ἐστίν. Ἦρξατο δὲ γίνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου εἰς τὸ ἄνω διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῖς κάτω. ἔστι <γὰρ> τὰ ἄνω τοῦ μέσου ὑπεναντίως κείμενα τοῖς κάτω. τοῖς γὰρ κατωτάτω τὰ μέσα ἐστὶν ὡσπερ τὰ ἀνωτάτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως. πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέσον κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐστὶν ἑκάτερα, ὅσα μὴ μετενήνεκται.

21. STOBAJOS, I 20, 1F; AETIOS II 5, 3 (A 18 DK = D18 LM)

Filolaos [twierdzi, że] dwojakie jest ginięcie [świata]: jedno od ognia płynącego z nieba, drugie od wody, która się rozlewa od księżycy przez obrót powietrza. Wyziewy ich stanowią pokarm kosmosu.

22. STOBAJOS, I 22, 1D; AETIOS II 7, 7 (A 16 DK = D19 LM)

Filolaos stawia ogień w środku wokół centrum, który nazywa zarzewiem (ἑστία) całości i domostwem Zeusa, matką bogów, ołtarzem, spoiwem i miarą natury. I dalej inny ogień najwyżej jako otoczenie. Pierwszy z natury jest środek, wokół którego krąży dziesięć ciał boskich: niebo, [sfera gwiazd stałych], pięć planet, pod nimi Słońce, pod nim Księżyc, poniżej Ziemia, pod nią Przeciw-ziemia, i pod nimi wszystkimi ogień, wokół centrum dzierżąc ład zarzewia.

23. AETIOS III 11, 3 (A 17 DK = D20 LM)

Filolaos Pitagorejczyk [stawia] ogień pośrodku; tym bowiem jest zarzewie całości; na drugim miejscu przeciw-ziemię, na trzecim zamieszkała ziemię z przeciwnej nam strony i poruszającą się odwrotnie do przeciw-ziemi; przez to nie widzi się na naszej ziemi tych, co mieszkają na tamtej.

24. AETIOS III 13, 1–2 (A 21 DK = D21 LM)

Według innych ziemia jest w spoczynku, natomiast Filolaos Pitagorejczyk sądzi, że krąży wokół ognia po okręgu ekliptycznym, podobnie do Słońca i Księżyca.

25. STOBAJOS I 25, 12; AETIOS II 20, 12 (A 19 DK = D22 LM)

Filolaos Pitagorejczyk [sądzi, że] słońce jest szkliste, przyjmując w kosmosie odbicie ognia, przesyłając ku nam światło i ciepło, toteż w pewien sposób dwa słońca powstają: jedno ogniste na niebie, drugie zaś odbijając się w nim jest doń podobne, a nawet mógłby ktoś nazwać i trzecie, co jako błysk poprzez odbicie od zwierciadła rozchodzi się ku nam. Również to bowiem nazywamy słońcem, niejako obraz obrazu.

26. AETIOS II 30, 1; STOBAJOS, I 26, 1 (A 20 DK = D23 LM)

Niektórzy pitagorejczycy, wśród nich Filolaos, twierdzą, że księżyc zdaje się być ziemski, wskutek czego jest on również, jak ziemia, zamieszkały przez zwierzęta i rośliny, większe jednak i piękniejsze; są bowiem piętnaście razy większe od zwierząt ziemskich i nie wydają żadnych odchodów, a dzień ich jest tyleż samo razy dłuższy.

27. CENSORINUS, 18, 8; 19, 2 (A 22 DK = D24 LM)

Jest też według Filolaosa Pitagorejczyka rok, składający się z pięćdziesięciu dziewięciu lat, który zawiera dwadzieścia jeden miesięcy kalendarzowych [...]

Filolaos oświadczył, że rok naturalny ma 364 i pół dnia.

ZACZYNY ISTOT ŻYWYCH, CIEPŁO I PRZYCZYN CHORÓB

28. JAMBLICH, *THEOL.* 25, 17 (B 13 DK = D26LM)

Cztery są pryncypia istoty rozumnej (ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ζώιου τοῦ λογικοῦ), jak mówi Filolaos w księdze *O naturze* (*Περὶ φύσεως*): mózg, serce, pępek i genitalia (ἐγκέφαλος, καρδία, ὀμφαλός, αἰδοῖον).

Mózg [jest zaczynem] myślenia, serce zaś duszy i percepcji zmysłowej, pępek – korzenia i pierwotnego wzrostu, genitalia – nasienia i zapłodnienia. Mózg zawiera zczyn człowieka, serce – zwierzęcia, pępek – rośliny, a genitalia są zaczynem ich wszystkich. Wszystkie bowiem kielkują i wyrastają z nasienia.

κεφαλὰ μὲν νόου, καρδία δὲ ψυχᾶς καὶ αἰσθήσιος, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ ῥιζώσιος καὶ ἀναφύσιος τοῦ πρώτου, αἰδοῖον δὲ σπέρματος [καὶ] καταβολᾶς τε καὶ γεννήσιος. ἐγκέφαλος δὲ ἔχει τὰν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρχάν, καρδία δὲ τὰν ζώου, ὀμφαλὸς δὲ τὰν φυτοῦ, αἰδοῖον δὲ τὰν ξυναπάντων· πάντα γὰρ ἀπὸ σπέρματος καὶ θάλλοντι καὶ βλαστάνοντι.

29. MENON, *ANON. LOND.* 18–19 (A 27 DK = D25 LM)

Filolaos Krotoniata twierdzi, że nasze ciała utrzymane są z ciepła. Nie mają one bowiem udziału w zimnie; wnioskując to z takich danych: otóż sperma jest ciepła, zdolna do splodzenia istoty żywej. Także miejsce, w które jest wytryskiwana, czyli macica, jest cieplejsze i podobne do tamtej. To zaś, co podobne, ma tę samą zdolność z tym, czym się upodabnia. Skoro zaś zapłodnienie nie uczestniczy w zimnie, a miejsce, w którym następuje wytrysk, też nie ma udziału w zimnie, to jasne, że istota mająca być splodzona, taką też będzie.

Dla potwierdzenia tego posługuje się takim wywodem: zaraz po zrodzeniu zwierzę wdycha zewnętrzne powietrze, które jest chłodne, po czym wydała je jakby z musu. Przez to też pragnienie powietrza zewnętrznego, aby wciągając powietrze z zewnątrz nasze ciała, będąc zbyt ciepłe, oziębiałoby się od niego. I układ naszych ciał – powiada – od tych zależy.

Twierdzi zaś, że choroby powstają wskutek żółci, krwi i flegmy, a pochodzenie chorób jest takie. Krew – powiada – staje się gęsta, przenikając do wnętrza tkanki, a lżejsza po rozwarciu naczyń w tkance. Flegma zaś – powiada – składa się z cieczy. Twierdzi, że żółć jest wydzieliną z tkanki. Coś paradoksalnego głosi ten sam człowiek. Twierdzi bowiem, że żółć nie znajduje się przy wątrobie, a tylko jest wydzieliną tkanki. Podczas gdy wielu twierdzi, że flegma jest chłodna, on sam zakłada, że z natury jest ciepła. Bo od

phlegein (palić) tłumaczy on flegmę; w niej czynniki rozpalające uczestnicząc sprawiają rozpalenie.

Takie to zakłada on zasady chorób; współprzyczynne są tu nadmiar ciepła, pożywienia, oziębienie lub niedobór tych czy do nich podobnych.

DUSZA I MYŚLENIE

30. ARYSTOTELES, *DA* 407b27 (A 23 DK)

Inny też pogląd przekazuje się o duszy [...] powiadają, że jest ona pewną harmonią; harmonia bowiem jest zmieszaniem i złożeniem przeciwieństw, a ciało składa się z przeciwieństw.

31. MAKROBIUSZ, *IN SOMN.* I 14, 19 (A2 3 DK = D27 LM)

Pitagoras i Filolaos [orzekli, że dusza] jest harmonią.

32. SEKSTUS EMPIRYK, *M.* VII 92 (A 29 DK = D8 LM)

Pitagorejczycy powiadają, że [kryterium stanowi] rozum (λόγος), nie ogólnie, lecz wywodzący się z nauk matematycznych, jak [twierdzi] też Filolaos, rozum będący badaniem natury wszechrzeczy, mając z nią pewne pokrewieństwo, jeśli podobne przez podobne poznaje się z natury.

33. ARYSTOTELES, *EE*, B 8, 1225a30–30 (B 16 DK = D28 LM)

Toteż myśli pewne i doznania nie są w naszej mocy, czy też czynności podług tych myśli i rozumowań, bo jak mówił Filolaos: „są pewne raczej silniejsze od nas” (εἶναι τινας λόγους κρείττους ἡμῶν).

DODATEK

ADAPTACJA PRYNCYPIÓW W *FILEBIE* PLATONA:

METODA BADANIA: KRES – BEZKRES, HARMONIA, LICZBA

34. PLATON, *PHLB.* 16C–D; 17C–E

[Sokrates] To boski dar dla ludzi, jak mi się zdaje, gdzieś od bogów za sprawą jakiegoś Prometeusza wydarty wraz z pewnym olśniewającym ogniem. A oni dawni, potężniejsi od nas i bliżej bogów mieszkający, przekazali nam to przesłanie (φήμην), że byty złożone z jednego i wielości (ἕξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν) orzekane są zawsze, a Kres i Bezkres zawierają w sobie wrodzony (πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων). [...]

– Ale dopiero wtedy, przyjacielu, gdy uchwycisz, jaką liczbę mają interwały w obrębie tonu wysokiego i niskiego, jakiego są rodzaju, i granice tych interwałów, oraz ile powstało z nich systemów, które rozpoznając nasi poprzednicy przekazali nam, ich następcom pod nazwą harmonii; ponadto w ruchach ciała takie różne stany, które – jak powiadają – mierzyć też trzeba za pomocą liczb, i jako rytmy i miary określać, i łącznie pojmować.

– Tak oto należy prowadzić badanie w przypadku wszelkiej jedności i wielości. Bo skoro uchwycisz je w ten sposób, wtedy staniesz się mędrce. Wtedy też każdy inny przedmiot biorąc w ten sposób do badania, tak samo staniesz się o nim znawcą. Wszelako bezkres poszczególnych rzeczy i nieskończona mnogość we wszystkim czyni cię każdorazowo niekonkluzywnym w myśleniu i nieściłym, jeśli niczego w niczym nie odnosisz nigdy do liczb.

PITAGOREJCZYCY W KRYTYCZNEJ RELACJI ARYSTOTELESA

35. ARYSTOTELES, *METAPH.* A 5, 985 b 23

Tak zwani Pitagorejczycy zajmowali się pierwsi naukami matematycznymi, rozwijając je i na nich wykształceni sądzili, że zasady ich są zasadami wszystkich rzeczy. Skoro zaś z tych liczby są z natury pierwsze, w nich sądzili dostrzec liczne podobieństwa do rzeczy będących i powstających, więcej niż w ogniu, ziemi i wodzie, jako że taki a taki układ liczb to sprawiedliwość, taki a taki – dusza i umysł, inny znów – stosowna pora, a wszystko inne, można powiedzieć, podobnie.

Ponadto dostrzegając w liczbach stany i proporcje harmonii, skoro ukazali co do innych rzeczy, że cała natura odwzorowana jest w liczbach, a liczby w całej naturze są pierwsze, przyjęli, iż elementy liczb są elementami wszystkich rzeczy, a całe niebo jest harmonią i liczbą. I wszystko, co mieli do wykazania jako zgodne w liczbach i harmoniach ze stanami i częściami nieba i z całym porządkiem świata, zestawiając wszystko to zestrzajali. I jeśli gdzieś czegoś brakowało, wprowadzali uzupełnienia, by całe ich rozważanie było spójne. Wspomnę tu przykładowo o tym, że skoro doskonałą jest dziesiątka i obejmuje całą naturę liczb, to twierdzą, że ciało poruszających się na niebie jest dziesięć, chociaż widocznych jest tylko dziewięć, dlatego jako dziesiąte ciało tworzą przeciwziemię. Rozważone to przez nas zostało dokładniej gdzie indziej. [...]

Zdają się oni uznawać liczbę za zasadę i jako materię bytów oraz jako własności i dyspozycje, a za elementy liczby – parzyste i nieparzyste, z których pierwsze to bezkres,

a drugie kres; z nich zaś obydwu powstaje jedno [jedyńka] (jest bowiem ono parzyste i nieparzyste), liczba zaś wywodzi się z jedynki, a liczbami jest – jak stwierdzone zostało – całe niebo. [...]

Pitagorejczycy orzekli dwie zasady w ten sposób, dodając to, co jest dla nich swoiste, gdyż kresu i bezkresu [i jedna] nie uznali za natury różne, jak np. ogień czy ziemię, czy coś tak różnego, lecz sam bezkres i samo jedno są substancją, o których się orzeka, i stąd liczba jest substancją wszechrzeczy.

36. ARYSTOTELES, *METAPH.* A 8, 990a18

Zresztą, jak trzeba rozumieć, że przyczynami są własności liczby i liczba dla rzeczy pod niebem będących i stających się od początku i teraz, a czy nie ma żadnej innej liczby poza tą liczbą, z której powstał kosmos? Skoro bowiem w tej części jest dla nich 'mniemanie i stosowna pora', niewiele wyżej lub niżej 'niesprawiedliwość, osąd czy zmieszanie', a dowód na to podają, że dla każdej z tych jest pewna liczba, zachodzi zaś w tym miejscu już mnogość powstałych wielkości, dlatego iż takie własności wynikają z poszczególnych rozmieszczeń, to czy jest to ta sama liczba, co jest na niebie, która trzeba wziąć, że jest z nich każda, czy poza nią jakaś inna? Platon bowiem twierdzi, że jest to inna, choć i on sądzi, że liczby są nimi i ich przyczynami, lecz jedne są przyczynami umysłowymi, drugie zaś zmysłowymi.

37. ARYSTOTELES, *METAPH.* N 3. 1091a12 (58 B 26 DK)

Niedorzeczne jest też tworzenie genezy bytów wiecznych, a raczej jest to jedna z niemożliwości. Czy zatem Pitagorejczycy tworzą czy nie tworzą ich genezy, w ogóle nie należy wątpić; wyraźnie bowiem twierdzą, że „z jedna utworzonego, czy to z płaszczyzn, czy z barwy, czy z nasienia, czy też z tego, co trudno orzec, bezpośrednio poblizko bezkresu wciągnięte zostało i ograniczone przez kres” (ὥς τοῦ ἐνὸς συσταθέντος, εἴτ' ἐξ ἐπιπέδων εἴτ' ἐκ χροιάς εἴτ' ἐκ σπέρματος εἴτ' ἐξ ὧν ἀποροῦσιν εἰπεῖν, εὐθὺς τὸ ἔγγιστα τοῦ ἀλείρου ὅτι εἴλκετο καὶ ἐπεραίνετο ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος). Bo skoro tworzą genezę kosmosu i chcą wyrażać się przyrodniczo, słuszne jest przebadanie ich na temat natury, co jednak wykracza poza obecne badanie.

38. ARYSTOTELES, *PH.* III 4, 203 a 1

Wszyscy bowiem ci, którzy zdają się poważnie zajmować tą filozofią natury, czynili wywód o bezkresie (περὶ ἀλείρου), i wszyscy zakładają bezkres jako pewną zasadę bytów; jedni – jak Pitagorejczycy i Platon – jako sam w sobie, nie zaś jako przypadłość czegoś innego, ale jako istność będącą samym bezkresem. Lecz Pitagorejczycy

w rzeczach zmysłowych (bo nie tworzą oderwanej liczby), a na zewnątrz nieba jest bezkres. Platon zaś twierdzi, że na zewnątrz nie ma żadnego ciała, ani też idei, bo one tam nie są; bezkres zaś jest i w tych, i w tamtych. Jedni zaś twierdzą, że bezkres jest tym, co parzyste; ten bowiem obejmujący i przez nieparzystość ograniczony dostarcza rzeczom bezkresu. Świadectwem tego jest to, co przypada liczbom: układając bowiem gnomony wokół jedynki i oddzielnie, powstaje zawsze raz inna forma, raz jedna i ta sama. Platon zaś przyjmuje dwa bezkresy: to, co wielkie, i to, co małe.

39. ARYSTOTELES, *PH.* IV 6, 213b22 (58 B 30 DK)

Także Pitagorejczycy twierdzili, że jest próżnia, i przenika ona niebiosu z bezkresnego oddechu, co odgranicza natury, jakby oddychała, i próżnia, która określa natury, jakby będąc oddzieleniem czegoś próżnego od ciągłości i jej określeniem. I jest to pierwsze w liczbach; próżnia bowiem określa ich naturę.

40. ARYSTOTELES, *CAEL.* II 13, 293 a 17 (58 B 37 DK)

Na temat położenia Ziemi nie wszyscy mają ten sam pogląd, lecz większość głosi, że leży ona w środku – ci którzy twierdzą, że całe niebo jest ograniczone. Przeciwnie do tego głoszą ci z Italii, zwani Pitagorejczycami; powiadają bowiem, że w centrum jest ogień, a Ziemia jest jedną z gwiazd poruszającą się po kole wokół środka, sprawiając noc i dzień. Ponadto naprzeciw niej ustawiają inną Ziemię, którą nazywają Przeciw-ziemią, nie dla zjawisk poszukując wyjaśnień i przyczyn, lecz pod pewne poglądy i wywody podciągają zjawiska oraz starają się je uzgodnić. Wielu też innym mogłoby się zdawać, że Ziemi nie należy przydzielać miejsca środkowego, a przekonanie to czerpią nie ze zjawisk, lecz raczej z wywodów. Sadzą bowiem, że czemuś najbardziej szacownemu należy się najbardziej szacowne miejsce, a ogień od ziemi jest bardziej szacowny, kres od tego co pomiędzy, ostatek zaś i środek to kres. Toteż wychodząc z takich porównań, nie uważają, aby Ziemia leżała w środku sfery, lecz raczej ogień.

Zresztą Pitagorejczycy sadzą tak dlatego, że to, czemu najbardziej przypada być strzeżonym, jest czymś najważniejszym ze wszystkiego. Otóż środek jest czymś takim. To, co nazywają 'strażnicą Zeusa', ma takie miejsce – ogień, jakby to środek określany był jednoznacznie, środek wielkości i rzeczy będąc też środkiem natury. Jak jednak u zwierząt nie jest tym samym środkiem zwierzęcia i ciała, tak też trzeba raczej przyjąć co tyczy się całego nieba.

[Zebrał i przełożył z greki i łaciny Marian A. Wesoły]

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Philolaus of Croton, *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως). Doxography and Fragments

The present article consists of two parts. First, we provide some general information on the life and views of Philolaus. This serves as an introduction to the second part which offers a new Polish translation of the most important ancient testimonies on Philolaus and the preserved fragments from his book *On Nature* (the latter are quoted along with the Greek original). According to the most recent research, these fragments are authentic and give an important insight into the Pythagorean and early Greek philosophy. The present selection of Philolaus’ testimonies and fragments has been arranged in a novel and accessible manner.

KEY WORDS

Philolaus, authentic fragments, *peri physeos* historia, new Polish translation

Alētheia in Gorgias of Leontini. An Excerpt from the History of Truth

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1. Introduction

This article attempts to spell out the concept of *alētheia* in the thought of Gorgias of Leontini. While the Greek word is usually translated as ‘truth’, it is evident that Gorgias must have a different idea in mind than what we refer to as truth today. In the two extant speeches, the *Encomion of Helen* and the *Apology of Palamedes*,¹ *alētheia* is used several times, but hardly ever in clearly epistemological contexts. Instead, the word seems to refer to speech, and more specifically to the way a person speaks. Only once do we hear that someone can “know” the truth (Pal. 24). In the infamous speech *On Non-Being*, on the other hand, despite its ontological and epistemological content, questions of truth play no real role. In the version presented by Sextus Empiricus the word *alētheia* does

¹ For the *Helen* (referred to as ‘Enc.’) and the *Palamedes* (‘Pal.’), section numbers are indicated. All other fragments and testimonies are cited according to Diels/Kranz 1952 and referred to as ‘DK’. For textual issues, see Buchheim (2012: XXXVII–XXXIX). Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

not appear at all, even though Sextus declares that this speech eliminates “the criterion of truth” (*to tēs alētheias kritērion* – DK 82 B 3 [87]). For Gorgias, there are no true beliefs or true claims, nor is there any ‘truth of the matter’. But how then is Gorgias’ concept of *alētheia* to be explained? What did he have in mind when he used that word?

The starting point must be that *alētheia* is consistently used with reference to speech or speaking. First and foremost, it refers to a quality of speech (*logos*), and one might have the impression that, for Gorgias, it is *how* someone speaks that determines if their words are ‘true’. The most conspicuous occurrence of *alētheia* that seems to confirm this suspicion can be found in the opening of the *Encomium of Helen*. To begin with, this passage should be recalled (Enc. 1):

Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων ἄκοσμία.

Order (*kosmos*) of a city is excellence of its men, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom, of an action virtue, of a speech (*logos*) truth (*alētheia*); the opposites of these are an unseemliness (*akosmia*).

While *alētheia* is standardly rendered as ‘truth’, the word *kosmos*, which would indicate the underlying idea of truth, is usually translated in such a way that its *aesthetic* connotation is emphasized. Along these lines it has been rendered as “embellishment” (Van Hook 1913: 122) or “adornment” (Dillon/Gergel 2003: 76). This rendition is also supported by German translations that render *kosmos* as “Zier” (Buchheim 2012: 3) or “Schmuck” (Schirren/Zinsmaier 2003: 79). According to this understanding, Gorgianic *alētheia* is merely “cosmetic”, to borrow an expression from Wardy (1996: 29f.).²

This interpretation has been questioned only to a degree. Where it occurs, scholars have tried to preserve the social or ethical dimension of *kosmos*, which would imply that *alētheia* has a social or ethical connotation too. A case in point would seem to be Kennedy, who translates *kosmos* as “what is becoming” (1972: 50). MacDowell’s translation of *kosmos* as “grace” (2005: 21) also apparently captures both an aesthetic and an ethical dimension. According to this version, ‘true speech’ is not only superficially beautiful but shows a certain inner value. However, scholars do not rank this ethical meaning very highly. Halliwell, who supports MacDowell, takes *kosmos* to refer to “the most beautiful condition” of speech, to “a state both internally ordered and externally attractive” (2011: 267).³ But since Halliwell considers Gorgias’ *logoi* as deceptive by their very nature, he is reluctant to take their ‘truth’ too seriously.⁴ Similarly, Pratt takes “order” as the secondary

² Some scholars even deny that the opening of the *Helen* is of any importance at all: see Cole (1991: 76).

³ Stefania Giombini’s Italian translation, which renders *alētheia* as ‘perfezione’ (2012: 77), supports this reading.

⁴ Only briefly does Halliwell point to an interpretation resembling the one I will offer here: “The start of the work [sc. the *Helen*] might be thought to connect truth with evaluative or normative correctness, i.e. praising

sense of *kosmos*, while explicitly keeping “adornment” as its primary sense (2015: 177 f.). To the extent that the interpretation of *kosmos* affects that of *alētheia* one thus has the impression that a number of scholars tend to deny that Gorgianic truth is merely cosmetic. Nevertheless, there seems to be no clear answer to the question of what this concept specifically implies.

In what follows I will attempt to show that Gorgias entertains a substantial conception of *alētheia* that is by no means restricted to superficial, skin-deep beauty. That the ‘truth’ of speech has to be *assessed* on aesthetic grounds does not mean that this is all there is to say about it. On the contrary, Gorgias has a highly normative idea of *alētheia* as the critical standard of speech. On his view, *alētheia* is essentially *ethical*; i.e. speech is ‘true’ when it exemplifies virtue. In this regard, *alētheia* is the decisive model of discursive practice and thus occupies the same place as later concepts of ‘truth’. Even if we are skeptical that such a ‘sophistic’ notion of *alētheia* can be defended as a viable standard – or even hesitate to translate it as ‘truth’ – it is still worth spelling out, since it will provide some insight into the origins of the philosophical concept of truth in ancient Greece. In fact, if we do *not* understand how *alētheia* could be conceived of in the 5th Century BC, we might miss an essential piece of the worldview from which western philosophy emerged.

A premise of my reading will be that Gorgias’ doctrine of speech, and thereby also the concept of *alētheia*, belongs to a practice of education or, more precisely, ethical formation. His understanding of *logos*, figuring most significantly in the *Encomium of Helen*, has often been described as ‘rhetoric’ but it is in fact an endeavor of *paideia* or, as Hegel would have put it, *Bildung*.⁵ The term *alētheia* has to be understood against this background: since Gorgias’ speech practice puts the *logos* into the service of ethical excellence (*aretē*), speech will find its ideal form where it supports such excellence in the best possible way. For Gorgias, this ideal form of speech has the quality of *alētheia*. Due to the educational purpose of his discursive practice, speech is ‘true’ if it brings virtue to bear.

First, I will briefly discuss this general perspective (2). I will then try to unfold Gorgias’ concept of truth step by step, beginning with his picture of *logos*. According to Gorgias, speech does not represent the world external to language, but establishes a dimension of meaning in its own right. From this perspective the basic mode of speech is ‘demonstrative’, i.e. it is meaningful in a performative way, by means of ‘showing’. Above all, it can show what virtue looks like and thereby be put to the service of ethical formation (3). This account of *logos* paves the way for an explanation of Gorgias’ understanding of truth: *alētheia* serves as a standard that does not apply to speech as representation but to the demonstrative dimension of discourse. Speech is not ‘true’ by correspondencing to facts but by embodying virtue – which does *not* mean that plain facts can be ignored or

and blaming the right things, though Gorgias does not formulate the point as an explicit principle.” (2011: 283, n. 39) Halliwell does not consider the possibility that Gorgias presupposed a concept of truth different from those familiar today. By contrast, I will argue that Gorgias *does not have to* connect truth to normative correctness because he takes the word *alētheia* as *implying* ethical rightness.

⁵ See the treatment of the sophists in Hegel (1833/1986: 406–427).

distorted because the virtuous man would not do this. The logic of this peculiar idea of truth can be elaborated with reference to the law of praising and blaming appropriately, mentioned in the opening passage of the *Helen* (4). On this basis, then, other uses of *alētheia* in Gorgias' extant speeches can be accounted for as well. As I will try to show, the role that truth plays in the *Helen* and the *Palamedes* confirms the ethical interpretation of *alētheia* (5). To conclude, I will briefly comment on how Gorgianic truth relates to more modern concepts of truth (6).

2. Gorgias beyond 'sophistic rhetoric'

Any attempt to reconstruct the meaning of *alētheia* in Gorgias is confronted with at least two obstacles, which are more closely connected than one would expect. The first obstacle is the widespread belief that the concept of truth must be a universal and cannot have a history in any substantial sense. Along these lines, Bernard Williams (2002: 61) writes: "The concept of truth itself – that is to say, the quite basic role that truth plays in relation to language, meaning, and belief – is not culturally various, but always and everywhere the same. We could not understand cultural variation itself without taking that role for granted." In this view, ideas on how to find out *what is true* can change but *what truth is* cannot. Although other studies of the history of *alētheia* – most notably Cole's article on 'Archaic Truth' (1983), which Williams builds on – are more cautious, they still point in the same direction.⁶

But if we follow Williams and accept the claim that we 'could not understand cultural variation' if we allow the concept of truth to have a history, any such history would be excluded *a priori*. The idea that the concept of truth might change over time can indeed be somewhat confusing,⁷ as it seems to affect the very criterion of rational critique. However, if we conceive of truth as ahistorical or timeless we run the risk of presupposing something eternal and unconditioned that enters the human world through direct insight. At any rate, we thereby elide contextual elements of both the concept of truth and intellectual history. More specifically, we cannot understand the transition from 'sophistic' to philosophical thinking if we exclude any possibility of a substantial conception of truth at an earlier stage, which is *further developed* later on.

The second obstacle derives from the poor reputation of the thinkers we have come to call 'the sophists'. Evidently, Plato's judgment that the sophists are not worthy of philo-

⁶ Cole maintains, with reference to Homer's use of the word, that *alētheia* is, "by origin at any rate, sober, methodical, rational truth" (Cole 1983: 27). Many scholars who touch on the issue rely on this account, e.g., Halliwell (2011: 53, n. 34).

⁷ Past attempts of interpreting *alētheia* as something radically unheard of show how easily the case can be overstated. The most obvious example is Heidegger who renders *alētheia* as 'unconcealment' (*Unverborgenheit* – see, e.g., Heidegger 1997). Although Detienne rejects this interpretation strongly (1967: 26–28), he could be suspected to be another example of overinterpretation when he turns early *alētheia* into a matter of magicoreligious speech and mantic knowledge.

sophical esteem continues to have an effect. Many scholars still presuppose, albeit often implicitly, that these figures do not belong to philosophy proper. Although the sophistic movement is now generally included in the history of philosophy,⁸ it is not yet treated on equal footing with non-sophistic presocratic thinking, i.e. as philosophy at an early stage. The main reason for this is the assumption that ‘sophists’ are generally indifferent to truth. However, there are good reasons to modify the traditional narrative: Kerferd (1981) in particular has argued that the emergence of philosophical methodology can hardly be understood without taking the sophists into account. Furthermore, the existence of ‘sophistic rhetoric’ has been questioned in the last decades, one important resource for this critique being the revisions of the history of rhetoric proposed by Cole (1991) and Schiappa (1999). This is why in the following I will avoid relying on preconceived notions of sophistic rhetoric and discuss Gorgias’ understanding of truth as it emerges from his extant texts. From this perspective it will become clear that this 5th Century thinker builds on an elaborated concept of *alētheia* that should not be neglected. We do not know, of course, how intensively truth was discussed in the time of the sophistic movement; but in the light of Gorgias’ writings the assumption that sophists were indifferent to truth seems implausible.⁹ For Gorgias, at least, truth was highly valued – only that we should not expect that pre-Platonic thinkers understood the concept in the way we do today.

Gorgias at first sight seems to be a sophist *par excellence*, and even sympathetic readers often exclude him from philosophy proper.¹⁰ Here, Plato’s representation of Gorgias as the master of *rhētorikē technē*, which provides the earliest extant use of the term (*Grg.* 448d; see Schiappa (1999: 14–23) and recently Luzzatto 2020), has been particularly influential. Yet, on closer inspection, things look slightly more complicated. This is indicated by Plato himself who, in the *Apology*, indicates that Gorgias was said to “educate humans” (*paideuein anthrōpous* – *Ap.* 19e). In recent years, the Hegelian view that Gorgias is engaged in an educational practice directed at *aretē* has regained some currency.¹¹ For present purposes, we need an account of how the educational aims of Gorgias’ teachings can be reconciled with his famous doctrine of *logos*. This will provide a basis for our reconstruction of Gorgianic ‘truth’.

The account of *logos* in the *Helen* is certainly the most remarkable extant treatment of the topic from the 5th Century BC. To be sure, how this speech as a whole should be

⁸ For a brief outline of the history of modern interpretations of the sophistic movement see Kerferd (1981: 6–12); for a more recent account see Leeten 2017.

⁹ Kraus (2012: 35) even writes: “It may seem ironic that probably in no other period was there more written about truth than in the age of the Sophists.”

¹⁰ The belief that there is a sharp separation between philosophy and ‘sophistic rhetoric’ guides readings of Gorgias to this day (Segal 1962; Kennedy 1980: 29–31; Wardy 1996: 6–51; Pfau 2000). Even scholars sympathetic to Gorgias do not question whether he is engaged in rhetoric (Poulakos 1983; Consigny 1992, 2001; McComiskey 1997, 2002). By taking sides with ‘the sophists’ instead of ‘the philosophers’, many such ‘neosophistic’ interpretations reproduce the dichotomy of philosophy and sophistry.

¹¹ See Pratt (2015) or Buchheim (2012: XXVI–XXXI).

interpreted is highly contested.¹² Without going into this question, however, it cannot go unnoticed that the concept of *logos* it implies ascribes enormous power to speech. This is why the traditional view of Gorgianic ‘rhetoric’ cannot be denied a degree of plausibility. Gorgias takes *logos* to have the capacity to influence a person’s actions with irresistible force. The famous passage that introduces the topic of *logos* makes this status explicit (Enc. 8): “Speech is a mighty lord (*dynastēs megas*); by the smallest and most inconspicuous body (*sōma*) it accomplishes the most divine works (*theiotata erga*).” Due to such descriptions, Gorgias’ doctrine has traditionally been read as a persuasive technique that functions through aesthetic tactics. Interpretations have repeatedly suspected Gorgias of being engaged in a ‘psychology of *logos*’, which is, as Segal (1962: 112) claimed, “deliberately opposed to ‘truth’.”

However, it is misleading to read such passages as if Gorgias was trifling with his own rhetorical powers. This comes to the fore when the concept of *technē* is examined. In Gorgias, the idea of *technē* does not have a high status. On the contrary, he appears to find *technē*, particularly in connection to *logos*, contemptible.¹³ The term appears for the first time in section 10 of the *Helen*, exactly at the point where Gorgias passes from the “divine works” of *logos* to its dark side (Enc. 10): For “magic and sorcery two *technai* have been found,” he writes, and these can deceive the soul. The passage where Gorgias says that speeches “artfully written” can at times be more convincing than speeches “truthfully spoken” (Enc. 13) has to be read along these lines: artful writing undermines true speech, and in Gorgias’s view this is a serious problem, because it undermines the very quality constituting the *kosmos* of speech, its most beautiful condition. A speech ought to have the quality of *alētheia*. Any merely ‘technical’ use of *logos*, without regard to *alētheia*, is a clear case of *akosmia*.¹⁴

Thus the word *technē* almost certainly sounded pejorative to Gorgias. This word, which in earlier periods referred to the capacities of a person, had at that time begun to refer to a non-personal system of rules (Kube 1969). But for Gorgias and some of his contemporaries¹⁵ this notion had something disreputable about it, a fact that would be easily explicable if *paideia* was at stake. Through *technē* a person can develop a capacity without having earned it. Earlier, in Pindar, the word *technē* contrasted with *phya*: artificial skills are suspicious whereas inborn excellence sets the standard. Prometheus is punished by the gods because he did not respect this distinction. Although Gorgias, as we

¹² Schiappa writes (1999: 114): “Despite the great interest the text has generated, there is remarkably little agreement even over the most rudimentary interpretative issues concerning the text [...]” In fact, many commentators explain the *Helen* by distilling a hidden meaning from what they regard as allegory, paradox or other artful play (see Poulakos 1983; Consigny 1992; Porter 1993).

¹³ This has only rarely been noticed. For an exception see Ford (2001: 95f.).

¹⁴ The suspicion that Gorgias is opposed to any *technē logōn* is further supported by a connection of “preparations of art” (*technēs paraskeuais*) with “misdoings” (*hamartēma*) in Enc. 19. Furthermore, there are two samples in the *Palamedes*, where Gorgias uses the expression *kakotechnia*, “bad art” (Pal. 3), and poses “artful” (*technēenta*) next to *deinon* and *porimon* (Pal. 25), which are ambiguous in meaning.

¹⁵ This emerges in the writings of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* from the 5th Century: see, e.g., *de Arte* I 1: “Some established an art (*technē*) to denigrate the arts (*tas technas aischroepēin*).”

will see, does not restrict virtue to native nobility, this idea continues to have an influence. The expression *anthrōpinē promēthia* that Gorgias uses when he distinguishes human doings from divine powers (Enc. 6) points in the same direction (McComiskey 1997: 11 f.). For Gorgias, as for his contemporaries Prodicus and Socrates, true value must be hard to attain. A process of education has to take real efforts of self-transformation. Excellence cannot be achieved by simply following an external system of rules.

Against this background, the power of speech that Gorgias emphasises so much can be seen in a new light. Although Gorgias ascribes different kinds of action to *logos* ('stop fear', 'assuage pain', 'produce joy', 'reinforce emotion' – Enc. 8), he clearly has in mind one basic function, namely the working of *logos* on the *soul*. This is what countless commentators took as evidence that Gorgias is pursuing an art of persuasion. This view has been rightly challenged in recent research.¹⁶ After what has been said, we should assume that the working of *logos* on the soul has to be taken as a kind of *paideia*. Gorgias wanted to put the power of *logos* in the service of education, being well aware that speech can be misused for unscrupulous purposes. In this case, his doctrine of *logos* was meant to be an educational 'work on oneself'. It aimed not simply at persuasion but at the ethical transformation of the soul.

3. Gorgias' culture of speech

Gorgias' doctrine of *logos* belongs to an educational endeavour, to a discursive practice of ethical formation. It will be, as one commentator will later call it, a *meletē logōn* (DK 82 A 7), designed to produce virtue. Pratt (2015: 177) emphasizes that the opening clause of the *Helen* – "the *kosmos* of a city is excellence of its men (*euandria*)" – fits perfectly into an educational scenario. The passage, where Gorgias places the "capacity of acquired wisdom" (*sophias epiktētou dynamis*) next to the "noble origin" (*eugeneia*, Enc. 4) could be read in this light too. Gorgias' practice of speech was a *logōn paideia*, as Isocrates will call his discursive practice one generation later.

The educational character of Gorgias' conception can be clarified with regard to the function of *logos*. Usually it is assumed that Gorgias understands speech as 'epideictic', and many commentators accordingly take the *Helen* as a piece of *epideixis*.¹⁷ Of course, this can be questioned: Schiappa offers a number of arguments as to why such labelling is at least misleading (1999: 116–120). Above all, there was not yet a *genus dicendi* of epide-

¹⁶ Along these lines, it has been claimed that Gorgias was not interested in persuasion but rather in "dissuasion" (Porter 1993), that he should be regarded as a pioneer of informal logic (Spatharas 2001) and that he makes his listeners aware of the dangers of rhetoric (Pratt 2015). With reference to Gorgias, Gagarin claims (2001: 290): "For the most part the Sophists treated persuasion as ineffective or harmful, and they distanced themselves and their *logoi* from it."

¹⁷ See e.g., Segal (1962: 100) or Giombini (2012), for ancient evidence DK 82 B 6 and Arist. *Rh.* 1414b.

ictic speech in the 5th Century BC.¹⁸ However, there is of course a reason why it seems justified to call the function of speech in Gorgias ‘epideictic’. The Greek word *deiknymi*, ‘showing’, is indeed apt to describe the basic mode of signification Gorgias has in mind, if it is *not* taken in a *disciplinary* sense. For him, a *logos* signifies by way of ‘showing’; it is essentially demonstrative. In his view, all speech is meaningful because it brings something to light, not because it represents something. And for Gorgias, such demonstrative or ‘epideictic’ speaking is a part of an educational culture in which *alētheia* plays a central role.

To get a grip on the basic function of speech in Gorgias we have to take a glance at his epistemological outlook, which is the subject of *On Non-Being*. Without delving into this notoriously difficult speech – and without going into the question of what portions of the two reports can be taken as authentic – it can be said that a central message the speech must have conveyed was that human beings have no access to the nature of being. While Parmenides seems to make the case for an ontological truth that is strictly distinguished from the “opinions of the mortals” (DK 28 B 1 [37]), Gorgias defends the view that human beings have no insight into Parmenidean being and are cut off from ontology.¹⁹ Unlike gods, humans are essentially limited to opinion, to *doxa*, to things that come to be and cease to be. One consequence is immediately obvious: if we have no access to it, then speech *cannot represent being*. Gorgias is reported to have been explicit on this point in *On Non-Being*: if ‘being’ existed and we were able to know it – and both is *not* the case – then it could not be communicated (DK 82 B 3, 6). If we take this stance seriously then discourse, by its very nature, can never represent what is actually the case.

It is tempting to conclude that Gorgias thereby considers *logos* to be severely deficient. Along these lines, Kerferd (1981: 81 f.) argues that the “radical gulf between *logos* and the things to which it refers” expressed in *On Non-Being* makes all speech “incurably deceptive.” However, such a fundamental deficiency of *logos* could hardly be reconciled with its seemingly unlimited power.²⁰ An interpretation that avoids this discrepancy would have to be preferred. As Mourelatos has shown, such an interpretation emerges when speech is ascribed a different *function*. Gorgias is reported to have claimed that we never speak “a colour or a thing” but only “a speech” (*logos*, DK 82 B 3, 6 [21f.]). He thus appears to make a “categorical” distinction between *logos* and the actual world (Mourelatos 1987: 137 f.). If this is right, then Gorgianic speech is simply *not made for* rendering things as they actually are. But that discourse does not achieve what it is not made to achieve does not make it defective – at least not more defective than a brick that serves poorly as a pillow.

¹⁸ Pratt (2015: 171) argues that the idea of *epideixis* was already developing in the 5th Century BC, although a disciplinary account was not yet available. In his reading of the *Helen*, he suggests that Gorgias wants to “expose the shallowness of *epideixis* as mere technical display” and to this end “lures his audience – above all the aspiring speaker – into what appears (at first) to be a display of just this kind.”

¹⁹ For the relation to Parmenides, cf. Newiger (1973: 19–21 and 29–37).

²⁰ For this discussion see Colagero (1932/1977), Mourelatos (1987: 135 f.) or Porter (1993: 270 f.).

Hence, we have to assume that the *logos* in Gorgias, in whatever way it functions, must be *non-representational*.²¹

On these grounds, the widespread belief that Gorgias regards *logoi* as fundamentally deceptive has to be questioned: of course speeches *can* deceive on occasions, where there is no longer any natural connection between words and things, as Walsh argues (1984: 84 f.). But the belief that speeches are deceptive *by nature* results from a confused idea of what speeches can do. When Gorgias claims that we do not ‘speak perceptibles’ but ‘speeches’, this could be regarded as an attempt to abrogate precisely this confusion: to fully comprehend the nature of speech, one has to keep in mind that its function cannot be to convey being. Speaking does not mean to reproduce something external to speech. Instead, it creates a world in its own right. It opens up a new and autonomous dimension, a social space constituted by meaningful human practice. The function of *logos* has to be interpreted against this background.

This is underscored by a passage in the *Helen*: in the midst of the discussion of *logos*, Gorgias says: if “everyone” had knowledge of “everything” in the past, the present and the future – i.e. if we had access to being, as Parmenides supposes – then “the same *logos* would not be in the same way” (Enc. 11). But we do *not* have such divine wisdom. And this is why, as Gorgias continues, “in most affairs” “most people” adopt *doxa* as the “adviser” (*symbolon*) of their souls. That discourse is significant for us derives from the fact that humans are finite creatures, limited to the world of *doxa*, of which speech itself is a part. The *logos* is what it is because humans, lacking any insight into being, are inevitably *guided* by *logoi*. This “adviser” can, of course, at times be misleading. But this is not due to the fact that it lacks ontological content; it is due to the fact that the basic function of speech has been misrecognised.

If the function of speech is not to represent being, how does it work? Obviously, the significance of speech cannot result from its ‘content’; it is not meaningful by virtue of the fact that it points to something external to speech. Hence its significance must emerge from the appearance of speech itself, its *doxa*, from *how* the speaker speaks. The significance lies in the performative *act* of speaking, and the basic mode of speech is demonstrative. A closer look at the quality of the Gorgianic *logos* supports this view. In the *Helen*, *logoi* obviously have sensuous qualities. Speech is, as Gorgias puts it, a “body” (*sōma* – Enc. 8); it is part of the physical world. Gorgias reportedly said that speech is composed “of what is perceptible” (*tōn aisthētōn*, DK 82 B 3 [85]), that the *logos* is not “transmitter of the external” (*tou ektos parastatikos*) but, conversely, the external is “enunciator of the *logos*” (*tou logou mēnytikon*). This implies that speech appeals to the *senses*.²² More specif-

²¹ Those who rule out this possibility, like Wardy (1996: 22–24), or who mistake the non-representational character of Gorgianic *logos* for a deficiency, like Kerferd, will have great difficulties in giving a coherent account of Gorgias’ concept of *logos*. When Kerferd, for instance, claims that there is a “radical gulf” between speech and the world in Gorgias, he goes on to argue that an acceptable *logos* will nevertheless “get at” the truth (1981: 81 f.). Porter is surely right in criticizing this view as highly implausible (1993: 271, n. 11).

²² See Buchheim (2012: XI–XV) or Worman (1997: 177–180).

ically, *logoi* manifest themselves in audible and visible forms. Speech has musical and poetic qualities in appealing to the ear.²³ And it appeals to the eye: it has erotic qualities. The practice of speech then proceeds as a composition of sounds and pictorial forms. The expression ‘to form a *logos*’ (*logon plattein*) that Gorgias uses in Enc. 11 characterizes this practice quite suitably: a speech is, as it were, a linguistic sculpture, in which the force of music or poetry and the power of pictures are combined.

On this basis, the fundamental mode of signification in Gorgias can be described as follows: it is not *what* is said (‘representation’) that makes a speech significant but *how* it is composed and the whole sensuous appearance that goes along with it. Its meaning emerges from what it shows, from the way the speaker speaks. Of course, such a *logos* cannot be separated from the speaker’s personal appearance, his body, his voice. It belongs to the ‘expressive behavior’ of a person.²⁴ As we will see, this implies that the manifestation of a commendable *ēthos* cannot be achieved through the speaker’s individual performance alone: ‘true speech’ in the required sense cannot simply be feigned, since it requires the speaker to be virtuous. *Logos* and *ēthos* are intertwined. ‘True speech’ is part of a visible pattern of behavior; it can only emerge where morality is provided, and *aretē* is itself a public phenomenon.²⁵ This perspective paves the way for explaining Gorgias’ understanding of *alētheia*.

4. The logic of Gorgianic *alētheia*

From the time of Sextus Empiricus who claims that Gorgias neutralizes the “criterion of truth” (DK 82 B 3 [87]) it has been protested that Gorgias does not offer any *criteria* for what is right or wrong. In a certain regard, this is true, and must be true: if the meaning of speech resides in the very process of speaking, if there is no ‘representation’ implied, then the question of whether or not a speech is ‘right’ has to be settled by reference to speech itself. Speech is right if the speaker speaks in the required way; and we have to learn to *perceive* whether or not he speaks in the right way. Yet it has already become apparent that Gorgias *has* an idea of what it means for a speech to be right. And there is reason to believe that this idea is articulated in the word *alētheia*.

²³ This musical power has been linked to the “magical psychology of language” (Walsh 1984: 81). How closely music is linked to *education*, however, has been shown by Anderson 1966, which Walsh refers to.

²⁴ Gorgias’s Palamedes says at one point of his apology: “I will call my past life as a trustworthy witness that I speak the truth.” (Pal. 15) This ‘rhetorical *ēthos*’ is not yet part of a *technē* in Gorgias. It is simply an implication of the demonstrative mode of signification.

²⁵ Vessela Valiavitcharska (2006) argues that the *alētheia* of speech has to be interpreted with reference to the *orthotēs* of speech, as a form of “correct speech”. This interpretation, in many ways instructive and convincing, seems to underestimate the importance of the social embeddedness of speech. In my view, it is certainly right that Gorgias feels obliged to an *ethical* ideal of speech, but *alētheia* does not emerge where the condition of *orthotēs* is fulfilled; rather, both qualities emerge where a multitude of highly contextual conditions are fulfilled.

If Gorgias too construes *alētheia* as the crucial criterion of speech, as we do today, then this criterion applies to the demonstrative dimension of speech, i.e. to the expressive behavior of the speaker. Gorgias never refers to a factual truth or a ‘truth about things’. It is the particular form of the *logon plattein* in which *alētheia* can become manifest. When speech is primarily demonstrative, ‘truth’ too has to be shown. In fact, this seems to describe how Gorgias understands the term. In the *Helen*, he explicitly says that his speech will “show the truth” (*deixai talethes* – Enc. 2), and apparently this does not express an intention to factual accuracy. It does not mean that factual accuracy is of no importance either; because a speech that distorts the facts will hardly be expressive of moral beauty, it will rather be improper and, thereby, an *akosmia*. Gorgias’ idea must have been that all we need to know will become manifest in the outward appearance of speech. For speech to be ‘true’, however, it will not suffice to simply ‘state the facts’. Rather, for *alētheia* a much *higher* standard is demanded. True speech does not reveal a subject matter beyond *logos* but the highest and most beautiful form of *logos* itself, its *kosmos*.

A second look at the opening passage of the *Helen* will prove clarifying at this point: It provides an understanding of *alētheia* according to which ‘truth’ does not reside in *what* is said, in the ‘content’ of speech, but becomes perceivable in speech itself. For Gorgias, speech is meaningful by being expressive, and this is why speech is ‘true’, in his view, when it is expressive of something in a particular way. But as indicated above, it would be wrong to interpret such ‘demonstrative rightness’ as merely an aesthetic quality. For Gorgias, *alētheia* is the distinguishing mark of excellent speech, but in his educational culture of *logos*, excellence is, at the end of the day, *ethical virtue* or *aretē*. In fact, Gorgias himself appears to establish this connection in the opening passage of the *Helen*. Right after the first sentence, which says that *alētheia* is the *kosmos* of speech, he goes on (Enc. 1):

ἄνδρα δὲ καὶ γυναιῖκα καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔργον καὶ πόλιν καὶ πρᾶγμα χρὴ τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου ἐπαίνῳ τιμᾶν, τῷ δὲ ἀναξίῳ μῶμον ἐπιθεῖναι.

Man and woman, speech and deed, city and action, if worthy of praise (*axion epainou*), should be honoured with praise (*epainō timan*), but to the unworthy (*anaxiō*) one should attach blame (*mōmon epitheina*).

In this second sentence of the *Helen* there is clearly a normative standard of speech, a requirement of how speech *ought* to be, of what it means for a speech to be ‘right’. This standard is: one has to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy. At the end of his speech, Gorgias will call this requirement a ‘law’ (*nomos* – Enc. 21). It can be argued that this is in fact Gorgias’ explanation of *alētheia*.

The law that a *logos* has to praise the praiseworthy and to blame the blameworthy can be traced back to Pindar (Buchheim 2012: XXIII). In Pindar’s 8th *Nemean Ode*, the poet says (or sings) that there have always been “nasty” or “hateful presentations” as well as “flattering tales”; only he, the poet himself, does not want to be of this “disposition”

(*ēthos*) but rather to be someone who travels “on straightforward paths” and thus hopes to “be esteemed by his fellow-citizens, by praising what is praiseworthy (*aineōn ainēta*) and bringing blame to sacrilege (*momphan d’epispeirōn alitrois*)” (N. 8.32–39). Thus the normative requirements on speech, expressed at the beginning of the *Helen*, amount to a reiteration of Pindar’s poetic ideal. This can be taken as further evidence that Gorgias was engaged in a practice of *paideia*. It not only seems natural that praising and blaming has to do with education. Furthermore, Pindar explicitly regards his logic as educational. In the same ode, he explains his principle of praising and blaming as one that will make virtue or excellence flourish: virtue (*areta*) “grows like a tree” among “wise and just men” (N. 8.40 f.).²⁶ If we take *sophoi*, “wise men”, as a synonym for “poets”, we may say that ‘just praise and blame’ is the core of Pindar’s educational culture.²⁷ The first duty of the speaker is to promote what is good and to reject what is bad. If he meets this standard, his speech will *support virtue*, i.e. it will be educationally or ethically effective.

The connection to Pindar clarifies why the criterion of *alētheia* can be explained by the principle to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy: speech is true when it shows the right kind of appraisal – not by ‘saying’ what is good or bad but by exemplifying behavior that is expressive of ethical excellence. Such speech will disclose what is morally good and show the ‘truth’. Right praise and blame, then, turns out to be the essential speech act. By its internal order, its *kosmos*, it can make an exemplary *ēthos* shine in its beauty, thereby making it attractive. In this way, it does not simply show what is right or wrong on a given occasion, by a single verbal ‘gesture’ of approval or disapproval. Rather, it sustainably brings to bear virtue, i.e. it solidifies and amplifies it, and contributes to the development of social order. The objectivity of such *alētheia* resides in its enduring guidance on what is good and right. It is objective in its own way, by providing a lasting ethical orientation.

Praising and blaming then, as Gorgias would have it, is no easy thing to do: it will not suffice to say *that* an action is considered right or wrong, nor that the person to be educated has done something blameworthy and name what would be more appropriate. Since speech, as Gorgias has it, signifies by its very appearance, ‘true speech’, in his view, has to be a living example of what is right. Making ‘true statements’ will not be sufficient. Virtue only arises from virtue or, more precisely, virtuous actions arise from virtuous speech.²⁸ This is why the speaker who knows how to speak the truth, i.e. how to praise and blame appropriately, has to be virtuous himself. Only then can he exemplify virtue. Pindar indicates that he regards himself to be of such an *ēthos*. Similarly, Gorgias, in his funeral eulogy, of which we have a few fragments, mentions the “most divine and most general law (*theiotatos kai koinotatos nomos*)” to “say (*legein*) and to keep silent about (*sigan*) and to do (*poiein*) that what is demanded when it is demanded” (DK 82 B

²⁶ The wording in Pindar is (N. 8.40–42): “αὔξεται δ’ ἀρετά, γλωραῖς ἐέρσαις ὡς ὅτε δένδρεον ἄσσει, ἐν σοφοῖς ἀνδρῶν ἀερθεῖσ’ ἐν δικαίοις τε πρὸς ὑγρὸν αἰθέρα.”

²⁷ In Enc. 20, justice (*dikaion*) is explicitly mentioned as a criterion that applies to praise and blame.

²⁸ Speech (*logos*) is the “beginning (*archē*) of human action” (Pal. 6).

6 [2]).²⁹ Here, Pindar's principle becomes part of a general description of ethical virtue. One ought to *speak* in the right way, and one ought to *act* in the right way, both qualities being of a piece. Ethical virtue implies acting and speaking in the right way, *logos* and *ergon* are not separated (see also Enc. 1). Right speaking consists in the strengthening of virtue, in supporting good action with the means of speech, which is just another way of saying that it is praising and blaming appropriately.

The principle of just praise and blame, then, is in fact part and parcel of Gorgias' concept of *alētheia* or 'truth'. The two themes explain each other and it is no coincidence that they both enter the picture at the beginning of the *Helen*. According to this reading, Gorgias recalls at the outset the most important duty of a speaker: a speech achieves its most beautiful condition or 'perfect form' (*kosmos*) when it is expressive of the right kind of *ēthos* – which is to say that it has the quality of *alētheia* if it praises and blames appropriately. This principle is Gorgias' criterion of *alētheia* and functions as the highest standard in his discursive practice.

5. Uses of *alētheia* in Gorgias

Right praise and blame does not only say what is right or wrong. It rather promotes virtue by embodying virtue. As I hope to have shown, Gorgias' concept of *alētheia* can be explained on this basis. 'True speech', in Gorgias' understanding, is a way of speaking that shows what virtue is like, exemplifies it, thereby making it attractive. It is itself a kind of virtuous behavior. Against this background, the individual uses of *alētheia* can be accounted for.

The Greek word and its cognates appear several times in the two extant speeches, the *Helen* and the *Apology of Palamedes*.³⁰ In the majority of cases, Gorgias uses the noun, while the adjectival or adverbial forms (*alēthēs*, *alēthē*) are less frequent. As mentioned before, the concept is nearly always used with reference to speech or speaking. Interestingly, however, Gorgias also mentions "the truth of the deeds" (*hē alētheia tōn ergōn* – Pal. 35) and, if we trust editions prior to Diels/Kranz, the "truth of the law" (*hē alētheia tou nomou* – Enc. 16). In the following, I will try to show that the account of the meaning of *alētheia* given above will accommodate all these uses.

Generally, we have to assume that both extant speeches claim to be 'true speeches' in the sense described. Gorgias' announcement in the *Helen* that he will "show the truth" (*deixai talethes* – Enc. 2) expresses the intention to manifest and make efficacious an exemplary attitude. The central issue of the *Encomion* would be to demonstrate the appropriate behavior towards Helen: an alternative to the attitude of excessive rejec-

²⁹ The mentioning of *sigan* ('keep silent') might be puzzling at first. However, it can also be explained along the same lines, since in Pindar *sigan* is another way of expressing reproach (see Walsh 1984: 42 f.).

³⁰ The most relevant uses are: Enc. 1, 2, 13, 16 and Pal. 4, 15, 24, 26, 28, 29, 33, 35.

tion that seems to have been commonplace at the time. When he wants to “refute” or “disgrace” (*elengxia*) those who accuse Helen (Enc. 2), the connotation of “bringing shame” is clearly in play. The purpose of the speech is to remind the listener that an excessively ruthless attitude towards Helen is not appropriate, that it is an *akosmia*.

This idea of truth is underlined by another usage where true speech contrasts with manipulative speech based on *technē*. Gorgias describes how an audience can be affected by a speech “composed with *technē*, not spoken with *alētheia*” (Enc. 13). Oddly enough, this passage has traditionally been taken as evidence that Gorgias *himself* is pursuing an art of manipulation (e.g. Segal 1962: 112). In fact, however, it is clear from a closer look that he is here essentially warning against the dangers of any disguised speech not committed to the standard of truth. The usage is entirely consistent with the concept of truth to which Gorgias is committed: speech can be true only when it reveals a virtuous nature openly and undisguisedly.

These findings can be confirmed by another usage in the *Helen*, where Gorgias speaks of “the truth of the law” (Enc. 16). The passage poses serious textual problems, and the wording has been questioned more than once. Diels, for example, rejects *alētheia* and prefers *syntheia* instead (DK 82 B 11 [16]).³¹ However, given the understanding of *alētheia* proposed here, the word can be preserved: just like the ‘truth of speech’ describes a quality that makes speech expressive of virtue, ‘truth of the law’ describes a quality that makes law expressive of virtue. When Gorgias writes “forceful (*ischyra*) is the truth of the law (*hē alētheia tou nomou*), established by fear (*phobos*) and caused by sight (*opsis*),” he refers to a way that just laws can be brought to bear in a forceful manner.³² That this is accomplished by fear, not by praise and blame, as it is in the case of speech, does not change the fact that the basic quality here is the expression of virtue or justice. This is underscored by the reference to that which is “morally beautiful by virtue of the law” and “good by virtue of the right” in the same sentence. Keeping in mind that Gorgias had previously pointed to a formation of character through the work of *opsis* (Enc. 15), the whole passage can be read as revolving around moral education.

From this point of view, the *Apology of Palamedes* has a very similar topic: when Palamedes evokes the notion of *alētheia*, it is because he wants to make his moral integrity apparent once more. The purpose is indicated at the beginning of the speech. Palamedes does *not* want to defend himself against being executed – this would be futile, as his case is prearranged – but against disgrace: the “danger concerns honour and dishonour” (Pal. 1). But since it is precisely his morality that has been called into question, Palamedes can place his hopes only on “*alētheia* itself” (Pal. 4) and “praise himself” (Pal. 32), which under normal circumstances would be inappropriate. The problem, in other words, is not

³¹ This is supported by Schirren and Zinsmaier, who translate “habituation to the custom” (“Gewöhnung an den Brauch” – Schirren, Zinsmaier 2003: 86 f.). Another emendation is suggested by MacDowell, who replaces *alētheia* with *ameleia* (2005: 24; see 38 for a comment).

³² For an interpretation along these lines, see Buchheim (2012: 171 f.). The passage cited above also underlines that power or strength can be closely linked to virtue.

that the truth is “private”, as Buchheim suggests (2012: 175 f.). It consists in the fact that the conditions of *alētheia* are unfavorable where the speaker’s virtue is questioned: the way of speech is “blocked” (Pal. 4). The only option for the speaker is to redeem his honor by demonstrating his immaculate *ēthos* one last time. By praising what is praiseworthy – by showing the right relation to what is virtuous – the speaker will himself *exemplify* a behavior worthy of praise, which implies that he will make such behavior attractive and provide a paradigm of moral beauty.

Palamedes’ intention to make ‘the truth itself’ appear is underlined by his idea that his “whole past life” can testify that he speaks the truth (Pal. 15). The point here is not an empirical probability that a person like Palamedes is incapable of certain misdeeds, but that his apology itself one last time reveals the ethos that has characterised Palamedes’ entire life. It is clear from the context that what is spoken of is an honorable, virtuous way of life: a life not governed by pleasure, but by clear insight into what is right. His virtuous life and his true speech form a unity.³³ This also sheds new light on the passage mentioned at the beginning, in which truth appears as something to be ‘known’: it is the accuser of Palamedes who “does not know the truth” (*alētheian ouk eidōs* – Pal. 24). But it seems unlikely that this is meant in a mere epistemic sense; rather, what is described here is a weak character without moral compass, and ignorance regarding the truth is an essential part of this ethical deficiency. Not knowing the truth here means as much as not knowing how to conduct oneself, be it in words or deeds.

The other uses in the *Palamedes* can serve to confirm these findings. When Palamedes mentions that a speech cannot be true if the speaker regards “wise men” as being “inconsiderate” (*anoētos*), this indicates that a speaker cannot speak the truth if he does not know to whom honour is due (Pal. 26). For Palamedes, true speech forms a contrast with slander and unjust defamation (Pal. 29); speaking the truth goes hand in hand with *justice*, the opposite being deceitful accusations (Pal. 33). When Palamedes calls on his judges to decide his case “according to the truth” (*meta tes alethes* – Pal. 35), he does so after having stated that they *cannot know* what he has really done; and since *alētheia* once again is opposed to injustice (*adikois*), it has an essentially ethical meaning. That Gorgias lets Palamedes speak of “the truth of the deeds” (*hē alētheia tōn ergōn* – Pal. 35) indicates that non-verbal behavior can be ‘true’ in this sense too.³⁴

³³ The same connection can be observed in Pal. 28.

³⁴ For reasons given in the introduction, *On Non-Being* does not have to be discussed here. In the version provided by Sextus Empiricus, the word *alētheia* appears only at the beginning, where it is explained that the speech eliminates “the criterion of truth” (DK 82 B 3 [87]), while the actual account of Gorgias’ speech is devoid of any mention of truth. In the anonymous rendering, *alētheia* is used sporadically, but more in the sense of ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ (MXG 7.1, 6.5, 6.20). The concept of truth does not play a role here.

6. Concluding remarks

For Gorgias, speech is meaningful by being expressive in a certain way; and it ought to be expressive of virtue. Whenever someone speaks, a way of life, an *ēthos* emerges; and, ideally, we should speak in such a way that a commendable *ēthos* emerges. This is achieved by right praise and blame, where the speaker will himself exhibit a behavior worthy of praise, thereby making such behavior attractive and bringing moral beauty to bear. Here speech achieves its highest form, its *kosmos*, and this is what Gorgias calls *alētheia*. Thus the normative requirement of having to ‘praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, spelt out in the second sentence of the *Helen*, explains the conception of *alētheia* implied in the first sentence. Pindar’s principle is Gorgias’ criterion of truth, i.e. his crucial standard of speech.

Plainly, this standard differs significantly from the ones we are used to. In particular, the principle of praise and blame requires one to do what a situation demands or what the *kairos* requires. Being faithful to this standard, then, would mean to know what is appropriate *in each case*, i.e. to possess a trained moral judgment. Although Gorgias’ *alētheia* is essentially ethical, the truth of a *logos* has to be determined on aesthetic grounds. The line between ‘true and false’ would have to be drawn by some kind of moral perception. As an educational programme, Gorgias’ practice of discourse could have been directed at cultivating precisely this capacity, which enables one to ‘speak the truth’ and to recognize ‘true speech’. As soon as such discursive practice has become second nature, Gorgias might have said, *alētheia*, i.e. true moral beauty, can be distinguished from skin-deep beauty or misguiding *doxa*. Acquiring this capacity, of course, requires a transformation of character. The truth of a *logos* can only be determined by the well-trained eyes and ears of a virtuous person.

If this account is correct, one might of course wonder whether translating the word *alētheia* as ‘truth’ is justified. How is such a standard related to what we know as ‘truth’ today? Obviously, this question could be discussed at length. In this article I simply wanted to ask how Gorgias did in fact understand his criterion of *alētheia*, and for this purpose I set aside questions as to whether or not this criterion actually works or how it relates to more modern concepts of truth. However, I hope to have shown that it would be premature to simply reject it as ‘cosmetic’, as the excentric ideal of a rhetorician who is interested in persuasion.³⁵ Given the way Gorgias uses the term, his understanding may have had a basis in the culture that surrounded him. For Gorgias, the standard of *alētheia* played as central a role as our standard of ‘truth’ does for us today. And should it be the case that his contemporaries were familiar with the idea of *alētheia* as an embodiment of how

³⁵ Likewise, it would be mistaken to interpret Gorgias’ *alētheia* as part of the ‘subjective’ conditions of speech, the right translation being ‘sincerity’ or ‘truthfulness’. In the framework of Gorgias’ practice of speech the question of whether or not a piece of discourse has *alētheia* cannot be settled by examining separately the inner attitude of a speaker. Speaking is something public, and its quality cannot be determined with reference to ‘subjective’ attitudes. The *ēthos* of a speaker is not hidden ‘behind’ speech but embodied in speech.

things ought to be, this idea will certainly have played a role in the debates from which the philosophical concept of truth emerged.

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Alētheia in Gorgias of Leontini. An Excerpt from the History of Truth

It is often assumed that the concept of *alētheia*, or 'truth', in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an *aesthetic* concept or even a mere 'adornment' of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic *alētheia* is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral education. While the 'truth' of a *logos* indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of *alētheia* is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is 'true' when it *promotes virtue (aretē)* by being *expressive of virtue*. The principle stated in the opening passage of the *Encomium of Helen*, that a speaker has 'to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy', explains precisely this understanding of *alētheia*.

KEY WORDS

Gorgias of Leontini, sophists, history of truth, *alētheia*, Pindar, *Encomium of Helen*

The (Un)bearable Lightness of Being. The Cyrenaics on Residual Solipsism

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“Mine is the first and only world!”
Wittgenstein, Notebook, 2 Sept. 1916.

“[For the Cyrenaics] One cannot grasp the affection
of the neighbour, nor can his neighbour,
since he cannot feel the affection of that other person,”
Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.196.

1. Introduction

Solipsism is a doctrine that has had very few adherents. Yet, it does have a philosophical appeal that invites us to take it seriously. As Sami Pihlström (2020) has recently argued, there are many kinds of solipsism in philosophy: from metaphysical to epistemological, from logical to semantic (with the further dichotomy ‘strong/mild’ to introduce other

sub-classes to be included in the general taxonomy). At the same time, as far as the actual liveability of solipsism is concerned, we are all debtors to the arguments Rae Langton (2009) has offered to show that, when treating other persons as objects (as e.g., in sexual objectification and pornography), we do live solipsistic lives, however difficult it may be to motivate solipsism theoretically. Even if the theory of solipsism is difficult to be coherently formulated, the practice of solipsism is more widespread than we are inclined to think at a first sight.

To my knowledge, there has been so far no attempt in the scholarship to address the problem of solipsism in ancient philosophy. This is unexpected, given the evident vitality of the scholarship in this area. It is also surprising, since there is a group of ancient philosophers such as the Cyrenaics who seem, at least *prima facie*, to advance philosophical views where solipsism is either implied or easily accommodated into.¹ The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence on Cyrenaic solipsism and show how and why some views endorsed by the Cyrenaics appear to be committing them to solipsism. After evaluating the fascinating case for Cyrenaic solipsism, the paper shall deal with an (often) underestimated argument on language attributed to the Cyrenaics, whose logic – if I reconstruct it well – implies that after all the Cyrenaics cannot have endorsed a radical solipsism. Yet, by drawing an illuminating parallel with Wittgenstein’s argument on private language and inner sensations, a case is to be made for the Cyrenaics to have subscribed to a sort of ‘residual solipsism’, which in turn helps us to understand the notion of Cyrenaic privacy at a fuller extent.

2. Solipsism

One of the main things to be noted when talking of solipsism is that it is a label that covers many different views, with many of us adopting a rather monolithically shaped version of it, such as ‘I alone exist’.² For this reason, I shall be inevitably selective and provide some definitions on solipsism that I think are particularly apt for the Cyrenaics. Here is a quotation from Todd (1968: vii):

The solipsist does not deny that there are reasons for believing in the existence of the external world and the existence of other persons [...]. He is saying that one can admit all this and still not commit oneself ontologically to anything beyond the occurrence of one’s own sensations and certain principle governing them. Thus, while the modern solipsist would never deny the existence of the world, his hypothesis is that we can assert its existence just by talking ultima-

¹ Contra, see Tsouna (1998: 96–104). The Socratic and Hellenistic school of the Cyrenaics has been the object of great scholarly interest in the last twenty years. Tsouna (1998) is a pioneering study on Cyrenaic epistemology, while Lampe (2014) is an exploration into Cyrenaic ethics and its later reception. Zilioli (2014) is a general introduction to the philosophy of the Cyrenaics.

² Again, see Pihlstrom (2020) for a very rich and informed overview of the varieties of solipsism.

tely about our own sensations and making very complex assertions about them. His views is that we never have beliefs which commit us to anything more than this [...]. Instead of denying the existence of an irreducible physical world he tells us that we never believed in it anyway.

Here there is another quotation, from Rollins (Rollins 1967: 488):

[For the solipsist] Every claim concerning the existence or nonexistence of anything is grounded in experience and could not possibly extend beyond it. An existential claim which seemed to reach beyond experience could have no basis or reference; it would apparently be unintelligible and not strictly a claim at all. But experience is essentially immediate; in itself it is never mistaken [...] and it had by one person truly and is private to him. Hence, existential claims can never truly, and perhaps never with full intelligibility, claim more than the existence of the experiencing self and its states, and indeed perhaps never claim more than this as of the moment of experience.³

By relying on these two characterisation of solipsism, which are centred on the epistemological indispensability of one's own affections to make any existential claim about 'the world', I shall assess the plausibility of Cyrenaic solipsism.

3. Cyrenaic solipsism I: Colotes

On the interpretation I shall be sketching in the following sections, a case seems to be made for Cyrenaic solipsism. There are two major sources that point to Cyrenaic solipsism. The first main source is a passage from Plutarch's *Against Colotes*. In his attempt to show that all those philosophers who do not adhere to Epicurus' doctrines make life impossible to live, Colotes targets, among others, the Cyrenaics too. In reporting Colotes' views, Plutarch writes:

He (sc. Colotes) aims, I suspect, to refute the Cyrenaics first, and then the Academy of Arcesilaus. The latter school was of those who suspended judgement on everything; whereas the former, placing all affections and sense-impressions within themselves, thought that the evidence derived from them was not enough, as far as assertions on external objects are concerned. Distancing themselves from external objects, they shut themselves up within their affections as in a siege. In doing so, they adopted the locution 'it appears' but refused to say in addition that 'it is' with regard to external objects. This is the reason why – Colotes says –

³ It is worth noting that the sort of solipsism that is described in the two quotations is a combination of epistemological and existential/metaphysical views. Philstrom (2020: 24) labels this sort of solipsism as 'classical solipsism'. He writes: "If the metaphysical dimension of this doctrine (sc. classical solipsism) is emphasised, classical solipsism claims that my experiences exhaust reality; if the epistemological dimension is taken to be central, the claim is rather that I cannot know (certainly, at last), or even justifiably believes, that they don't."

the Cyrenaics cannot live or cope with things. In addition, he says (making fun of them), that ‘these men do not say that a man or a horse or a wall is, but that they themselves are being walled or horsed or manned (*toichousthai kai hippousthai kai anthrôpousthai*)’ (Plu. 1120c–d = SSR IV A 211).⁴

Plutarch comments on Colotes’ understanding of the Cyrenaics:

In the first place, Colotes uses these expressions maliciously, just as a professional denouncer would do. These consequences among others will follow without any doubt from the teachings of the Cyrenaics. He should however have presented their doctrine in the actual form in which those philosophers taught it. They say we are being sweetened and bittered and chilled and warmed and illuminated and darkened (*glukainesthai gar legousi kai pikrainesthai kai psuchesthai kai thermainesthai kai phôtizesthai kai skotizesthai*). Each of these affections has within itself its own evidence, which is intrinsic to it and unchallenged (*tôn pathôn toutôn hekastou tèn enargeian oikeian en hautôi kai aperispaston echontos*). But whether the honey is sweet or the young olive-shoot bitter or the hail chilly or the unmixed wine warm or the sun luminous or the night air dark is contested by many witnesses (wild and domesticated animals and humans too). Some in fact dislike honey, others like olive-shoots or are burned off by hail or are chilled by the wine or go blind in the sunlight and see well at night. When opinion stays close to the affection it therefore preserves its infallibility (*hothen emmenousa tois pathesin ê doxa diatêrei to anamart êton*). On the contrary, when it oversteps them and mixes up with judgements and statements about external objects, it often disturbs itself and makes a fight against other people, who receive from the same objects contrary affections and different sense-impressions (Plu. 1120e–f = SSR IV A 211).

Colotes accuses the Cyrenaics of making life impossible because of their sceptical epistemology. Plutarch laments that Colotes uses some expressions (that is, ‘to be horsed’, ‘manned’ or ‘walled’) as referred to the Cyrenaics in a malicious way, because (he warns) Colotes should have presented the Cyrenaic doctrine in the actual way they did. Yet, Plutarch highlights that the consequences Colotes emphasises do follow from the teachings of the Cyrenaics. In fact, as other sources tell us, the Cyrenaics used expressions such as ‘to be sweetened’, ‘chilled’, ‘warmed’ and so on to express the absolute, unquestionable legitimacy of one’s own pathê. When I see something as white, or when I taste something as sweet, or when I feel something as warm, instead of reverting to the traditional linguistic usage and saying, ‘This honey is sweet’, ‘The sun is warm’, ‘Your face is white’, by following the Cyrenaic neologism I should say: ‘I am being whitened’, ‘I am being warmed’, ‘I am being sweetened’.⁵

⁴ All translations are my own.

⁵ See e.g. S.E. M. 7.191–192; see below, section 6.

The main philosophical point in these neologisms is that no reference is ever made to those external objects that are supposed to be causing the pathos of ‘whiteness’, ‘sweetness’ and ‘warmth’ in us. This is the case, Colotes warns, because the Cyrenaics think that the sort of evidence we can derive from the way things appear to us is not enough, as far as legitimate assertions on external objects are concerned. In his comments Plutarch gives further explanation about Colotes’ remark by insisting that the second-order judgements we construe on the basis of how things appear to us preserve their infallibility when they stay close to the immediacy of affection. On the contrary, when we move from the immediacy of how things appear to us to judgements and statements about (the material identity of) external objects, we are immediately trapped in a battle of conflicting appearances that gives us no clue whatsoever on how things really are. Both Colotes and Plutarch are thus in agreement and are both right in identifying the kernel of Cyrenaic epistemology as the view that only (our) *pathê* are known to us and are epistemologically infallible, while the things that are supposed to cause those *pathê* in us are not.

If this is the case, the Cyrenaic individual is, indeed, the sort of solipsist that Todd and Rollins describe in the two quotations above. He claims that his experience (his affections, how he is affected) is never mistaken and is, indeed, private to him. The world out there perhaps exists, but it is something the Cyrenaic individual cannot have a real grip on. What can be claimed in the Cyrenaic world is that, as Rollins writes, “existential claims can never truly, and perhaps never with full intelligibility, claim more than the existence of the experiencing self and its states, and indeed perhaps never claim more than this as of the moment of experience.” On the basis of this interpretation, solipsism is thus the main reason for which Colotes thinks the Cyrenaics make life impossible, since it is solipsism that traps them into a sort of privacy, either epistemological or ontological, which prevents them from living a truly real life.

4. Cyrenaic solipsism II: Aristocles of Messene

While the Cyrenaics were fiercely criticised by the Epicurean Colotes, they also got a critical coverage by the peripatetic philosopher Aristocles of Messene. In an extant section of his *On Philosophy*, Aristocles rephrases Colotes’ charge that life is impossible for the Cyrenaics from an Aristotelian standpoint. Again, it is the kind of solipsism inherent to Cyrenaic doctrines that, according to Aristocles, makes life impossible to live. He writes:

Next would be those who say that affections alone are apprehensible (*mona ta pathê katalêpta*). This view was adopted by some of the philosophers from Cyrene. As if oppressed by a kind of torpor, they maintained that they knew nothing at all, unless someone standing beside them struck and pricked them. They said that, when burnt or cut, they knew that they were affected by something (*kaiomenoi gar elegon ê temnomenoi gnôrizein hoti paschoien*). But whether the thing which is burning them is fire, or that which cut them is iron, they could not tell (*pote-*

ron de to kaion eiê pur ê to temnon sidêros, ouk echein eipein (Eus. PE 14.19.1 = SSR IV A 218 = Chiesara F5).

What is striking here is that, after reaffirming the kernel of Cyrenaic epistemology, Aristocles uses an image to describe the approach the Cyrenaic individual has to the external world that is so reminiscent of the sort of detachment Colotes conveys with the image of the Siege. For Aristocles, the Cyrenaics claim to know nothing at all, not even that there are other people and an external world, unless someone struck or pricked them. What they do know is how they are being affected, that is, burnt or cut. But they cannot go beyond the limit of their own affections and tell that what is burning them is fire or that what is cutting them is iron. Again, the radical option about the external world seems to step in: the Cyrenaic individual is unaware of external objects as they are, since what he can know is how he is affected, not what affects him. The Cyrenaic individual lives in the world of his own affections and is thus incapable to escape its ontological limits because he does not have a clue about the actual existence of external objects. Not only is he in the position to elaborate on solipsism, but also lives his own solipsism by being isolated from the outside world in an uninterrupted torpor, until someone else pricks him.⁶

Aristocles brings out what he thinks are the absurdities arising from these Cyrenaic views:

Three things must necessarily exist at the same time: the affection itself (*to te pathos auto*), what causes it (*to poioun*), and what undergoes it (*to paschon*). The person who apprehends an affection must necessarily perceive also what undergoes it. It cannot be the case that, if someone is for example warm, one will know that one is being warmed without knowing whether it is himself or a neighbour, now or last year, in Athens or Egypt, someone alive or dead, a man or a stone. One will therefore know too what one is affected by, for people know one another and the roads, cities, the food they eat. Likewise, craftsmen know their tools, doctors and sailors infer by means of signs what will happen, and dogs discover the tracks of wild animals (Eus. PE 14.19.3–4 = no corresponding testimony in SSR = Chiesara F5).

Aristocles thus believes that if he adheres to his doctrines, the Cyrenaic individual will be unable to get a proper grasp of both poles of the perceptual process: either who is being affected or what is being affected by.⁷ Closed up in his solipsism, the Cyrenaic

⁶ On the Cyrenaics as being unaware of what is actually affecting them, see also *The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus*, col. 65.29–39 (expanding on *Tht.* 152b). For a detailed analysis of the passage, both in historical and philosophical terms, see Chiesara (2001: 136–142).

⁷ As Chiesara points out (Chiesara 2001: 139), Aristocles has surely in mind here a crucial section of Plato's *Theaetetus*, where some unnamed subtler thinkers are made to expound a very original theory of perception where both perceiving subjects and perceived objects are somehow dissolved into the evanescent dynamics of

individual does not have a clue about what is affected by (he is being warmed but he does not know whether it is a wind or a hairdryer that makes him feel warm). Conversely, if we follow closely Aristocles' argument, the Cyrenaic individual does not even know the actual, ontological identity of himself as the perceptual agent. This is the case – Aristocles argues – because not only does the external world become an elusive item in the perceptual process but also because by insisting on the absolute subjectivism of perceptual states, the Cyrenaics end up dissipating the ontological relevance of the subject. The Cyrenaic individual is one of the items of the material world, together with other (external) objects – so Aristocles may have argued. In other words, if solipsism is the view that Aristocles sees as arising from Cyrenaicism, he seems to be construing a case to make that solipsism as refuted by internal grounds.⁸

5. Internal touch

I am not going to discuss the legitimacy of Aristocles' criticism. More in general, I am not going to address how the Cyrenaics may have responded to the charges levelled against them, because the aim of this paper is to understand on what grounds we may think that the Cyrenaics endorsed solipsism, not what counterarguments they would have used to defend their solipsistic views from criticism. What I want to highlight is that both Colotes (with Plutarch) and Aristocles motivate their claims that the Cyrenaics made life impossible by insisting on the fact that their own doctrines confine the Cyrenaic individual into a solipsistic corner, while making the Cyrenaic individual the measure of his own world.

The point about the Cyrenaic individual being the criterion of truth and existence is brought forward by Cicero in two related passages from the *Academica*, which have often been duly underestimated:

What about touch, of that touch philosophers call interior (*interiorem*), of either pleasure or pain, in which the Cyrenaics believe that only there is the criterion of truth (*iudicium*), because it is perceived by means of the senses? (Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 2.7.20 = SSR IV A 209).

What about the Cyrenaics, by no means contemptible philosophers? They deny that anything can be perceived from the outside (*qui negant esse quicquam quod percipi possit extrinsecus*), while they do say to perceive only those things they experience by means of an internal touch (*ea sola percipere quae tactu intumo sentiant*), like pain and pleasure; they cannot know whose

temporary processes (*Th.* 156a–157c). On these thinkers as possibly expounding Cyrenaic views, see Zilioli (2013); contra, Tsouna (1998: 125–129). Rowe (2015) offers a via media between the two opposite positions.

⁸ For the less encompassing charge of apraxia as levelled against the Cyrenaics, see Zilioli (2016).

sound or colour something is, but to sense only to be affected in a certain way (Cic. *Ac. Pr.* 2.24.76 = SSR IV A 209).

Cicero is the only source to mention the interior touch in relation to the Cyrenaics. However elusive the concept of ‘*tactus intumus* or *interior*’ may be, it is clear from Cicero’s passages that the Cyrenaic individual is the ultimate measure of his own world in so long as he knows and acts on the sole basis of his affections. This is the case for both ‘ethical’ affections (of pleasure and pain) and for the larger class of ‘epistemological’ affections (of sounds, colours and so on). Sedley notes: “In Hellenistic philosophy, ‘internal touch’ emerges as a technical term for the sense that makes us *directly aware of changes going inside us*” (my emphasis).⁹ This being the case, each of us has his own internal touch that is responsible for the actual ways we are privately affected. Given the strict subjectivism the Cyrenaics grant to one’s perceptions and sensations, it looks as if we all live in different private worlds shaped by our internal touches, with no access to the inner world of others.

From different historical and philosophical perspectives, all the sources analysed thus far contribute to creating the image of the Cyrenaics as philosophers very much inclined to take solipsism as a view somehow inherent to their philosophy. On the ground of the case I have been constructing so far, the Cyrenaics can thus be taken as the true and real solipsists of the ancient (Western) world.

6. The commonality of language: Sextus on the Cyrenaics

This image is challenged by a long passage of Sextus Empiricus, which I shall give in full considering its importance:

[For the Cyrenaics] No criterion is common to human beings, common names are assigned to objects (*onomata de koina tithesthai tois chrêmasin*). (196) All in common in fact call something white or sweet (*leukon men gar ti kai glukou kalousi koinôs pantes*), but they do not have something common that is white or sweet (*koinon de ti leukon ê glukou ouk echousin*). Each human being is aware of his own private affection (*hekastos gar tou idiou pathous anti-lambanetai*). One cannot say, however, whether this affection occurs in oneself and in one’s neighbour from a white object (*to de ei touto to pathos apo leukou enginetai autôi kai tôi pelas*), since one cannot grasp the affection of the neighbour, nor can his neighbour, since he cannot feel the affection of that other person. (197) And since no affection is common to us all, it is hasty to declare that what appears to me a certain way appears the same way to my neighbour as well. Perhaps I am constituted so as to be whitened by the external object when it comes

⁹ Sedley (2018: 64). On internal touch in Cyrenaic thought, see also Tsouna (1998: 18–20; 44–45 and Zilioli (2014: 125–128).

into contact with my senses, while another person has the senses constructed so as to have been disposed differently. In any case, the phenomenon is absolutely not common to us all (*ou pantôs oun koinon esti to phainomenon hêmin*). (198) That we really are not all affected in the same way because of different dispositions of our senses is clear from the cases of people who suffer from jaundice or ophthalmia and from those who are in a natural condition. Just as the first group of persons are affected yellowly, the second redly and third whitely from the same thing, so it is also probable that those who are in a natural condition are not affected in the same way by the same things because of the different construction of their senses, but rather that the person with grey eyes is affected in one way, the one with blue eyes in another, and the one with black eyes in another yet different way. It follows that the names we assign to things are common (*hôte koina men hêmas onomata tithenai tois pragmasin*), but that we have private affections (*pathê de ge echein idia*) (S.E. M. 7.195–198 = SSR IV A 213).

This passage is important for two main reasons: for what it says and for what it does not say. I shall start from what it says. Sextus confirms the main tenets of Cyrenaic philosophy when he reports the usual Cyrenaic view that each of us is solely and uniquely aware of his own affections, without being able either to have access to the affection of others or to say that the object causing the affection is really as we perceive it. Again, the Cyrenaic individual is aware (in a solipsistic way) of what he feels, with no actual access to the real world out there or to the inner world of others. Yet, the Cyrenaic individual – and this is the main novelty that the passage introduces – shares with others ‘common names’: “common names are assigned to objects;” “names we assign to things are common” (see the beginning and end of Sextus’ passage).¹⁰

The fact that we have common names means that the Cyrenaic individual is not equipped with a private language to name his own affections.¹¹ The actual dichotomy the passage introduces is one between ‘common names’ and ‘private affections’, so that what is being highlighted is that, although we have private affections that are neither relatable to the actual way things are nor to the way other people perceive things, we are in the condition to call our private affections with common names. Remember that the Cyrenaics invented such neologisms as ‘I am being whitened’ or ‘I am being sweetened’. These expressions are “common names” for the Cyrenaics: we all learn to call something

¹⁰ There are some textual problems for the the things to which the onomata are supposed to apply in 7.195: ‘chrêmasin’ is adopted by Natorp and Mannebach, while Kayser has ‘pragmasin’ (thus duplicating 7.198), Bekker ‘krimasin’, Mutschmann and Giannantoni ‘synkrimasin’. As Tsouna has noted (1998: 106–107), all these terms can either refer to ‘external objects’ or to pathê. It is clear from the context of Sextus’ passage however that the main problem for the Cyrenaics is how common names can refer to private affections.

¹¹ As Todd says, the solipsist should coherently maintain that “everything which can ordinarily be said could, in theory, be said in a language which referred to one’s own sensations (i.e. a private language)” (Todd 1968: 24).

as ‘white’ or ‘sweet’ (or to be more accurate, we all learn how to use the expressions ‘to be sweetened or whitened’), although we do refer to different (private) affections.¹²

There is therefore something that is common in the Cyrenaic world: at least a public language exists! The Cyrenaic individual can still be in the position to defend his own solipsistic views because the fact that a common language is spoken does not exclude that the Cyrenaic individual is the only and actual measure of his world. If we refer back to the idea of living a solipsistic life (in contrast with the difficulty to motivate it theoretically) which I briefly introduced at the beginning of the paper, we can say that the Cyrenaic individual may well be in the position to live it, despite being forced to admit that a communal language is spoken.

Is this communal language simply spoken or is it to be spoken? That is, do we need a public language to be able to account for our own private affections? And with this question I turn to the second aspect of Sextus’ passage, that is, what it does not say. Sextus constructs an argument purported to show that despite being centred on an absolute and un-transferrable privacy, Cyrenaic epistemology admits of a public, shared language, to refer and name individual affections. But how is it so? How is it possible that the Cyrenaic individual can name his own private affections by means of a public language? Sextus does not say anything about this, and we are left wondering. Even the probable commitment to conventionalism on the part of the Cyrenaics does not help us on the matter. We may all agree to call something conventionally (as e.g., ‘chair’) but this does not tell us how we manage to do so as far as sensations and perceptions are concerned. For anyone familiar with contemporary philosophy, the need to bring in relevant discussions from Wittgenstein becomes inevitable. He is the philosopher who has so far managed to develop the most influential argument about public languages and inner sensations. What I thus propose at this point is to move onto a more speculative terrain, to assess how Wittgenstein’s treatment of the very same topics that we see as discussed in Sextus’ passage may further illuminate the problem of solipsism, either in itself or in connection with the Cyrenaics.

7. Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument: a Trojan horse for Cyrenaic solipsism?

Wittgenstein is perhaps the contemporary philosopher who flirted with solipsism more than any others, from the *Tractatus*, via *the Blue Book*, to the *Philosophical Investigations*.¹³ More perspicuously, his notorious argument about the impossibility of a private language to name private, inner sensations is to be read not only as his most sophisticated attempt to argue against the sort of solipsistic temptations he had felt so acutely since writing

¹² Tsouna has highlighted that the Cyrenaics could well belong to the lively conventionalist strand in the ancient philosophy of language: Tsouna (1998: 107).

¹³ On Wittgenstein’s solipsism, see Hacker (1972: 58–85; 185–214); Pears (1987: 153–190; 1988: Part III, chapters 11 and 12; 2008: 96–127); Philström (2020: 64–80; Dionigi (2001: 429–475).

the *Tractatus*, but also, and more relevantly here, as a stimulating comparison with the argument about private affections and common names that in the quoted passage Sextus develops in connection with the Cyrenaics.

The philosophical problems that Wittgenstein considers in the sections of the *Philosophical Investigations* devoted to discussing the (im)possibility of a private language are remarkably similar to a problem that the Cyrenaics may have well faced: how can one name his inner, private sensations? How can a person identify, re-identify, and name his sensations? Wittgenstein starts off by imagining a solipsistic case that, once again, can be the actual one the Cyrenaic individual may have well faced. Wittgenstein makes the example of a diarist who wants to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation:

To this end I associate it [the sensation] with the sign ‘S’ and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation [...]. I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – but what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation. – but “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’ (PI, § 258).

The solipsistic diarist cannot name a sensation he has with a private ‘sign’ because this would put him in the condition of not being able to find out a correct criterion to re-identify that sensation. His private ‘sign’ for the sensation ‘S’ would not give it any plausible criterion of correctness. To understand, account for and name our sensations – Wittgenstein argues – we need to rely on objective, publicly shared criteria. Wittgenstein makes the example of a manometer that registers a rise of someone’s blood pressure when one has a particular sensation (PI, § 270). Or he refers to the case of someone who does not know whether he correctly remembers the departure time for a train. If this person recalls to his mind the mental image of the timetable he once looked at, this will not be enough because “the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness” (PI, § 265). That person would need to look at the actual timetable, which is publicly checkable, to be sure of the correct departure time for his train.

While showing that it is impossible to create a private language for inner sensations because there would be no criteria of correctness available for the use of such a language, Wittgenstein also develops a view about the semantics of sensations that Ayer believes to be even more radical than Carnap’s crude verificationism. As Ayer (1966: 254) puts it: “He [Wittgenstein] seems to take the view that someone who attempted to use language in this private way would not merely be unable to communicate his meaning to others but would have no meaning to communicate even to himself; he would not succeed in saying anything at all.” This person would not only be unable to name his own sensa-

tions but also, and more essentially, he would be in the unpleasant position not to understand what kind of sensation he is dealing with. As Wittgenstein writes to make the point, “you learned the concept pain when you learned language” (PI, § 384).¹⁴ He insists that every concept we employ, including those related to sensations, is mediated through the communal language we use and the language-games we all play and share.¹⁵

There is a huge bibliography on Wittgenstein’s private language argument, which is undoubtedly one of the most famous arguments in contemporary philosophy.¹⁶ I do not have any pretence either to deal with the many philosophical issues the private language argument raises or to confront the extensive scholarship on it. Yet, for the purposes of this paper, Wittgenstein offers a powerful argument against solipsism when he argues that we all learn the names of our sensations and perceptions by means of a shared, common language and that it cannot really be otherwise. If we move back to the case of the Cyrenaics, it will have to be noted that Sextus’ passage insists on the commonality of language in relation to the privacy of individual affections, thus arguing that for the Cyrenaics we have private affections but common names (which we all use to refer to private affections).

There is no way for us to understand how the Cyrenaics motivated this view, but it is strikingly like the one Wittgenstein develops in the *Philosophical Investigations* to argue against a private language. For both the Cyrenaics and Wittgenstein, we have common names for our sensations and perceptions.¹⁷ Wittgenstein gives us compelling arguments to defend the view that it is impossible for us to understand and name our sensations privately (or in a solipsistic way). The Cyrenaics do not do that, but the insistence on the commonality of a shared language to name our sensations and perceptions cannot point if not in the same direction of Wittgenstein’s argument. It is only by relying on common names that we can make sense of our internal, private world of affections: this is the view that, I claim, can be ascribed to the Cyrenaics on the basis of Sextus’ passage.¹⁸

If this is the case, the commitment to solipsism on the part of the Cyrenaics will be seriously jeopardised. If all our private affections are mediated and informed by the language we all speak and the conceptual schemes inherent to it, this will entail that the privacy of one’s affections relies on other people having other private affections, equally

¹⁴ See also PI, § 244, 245, and, most meaningfully, § 261 and § 404.

¹⁵ See e.g., PI §§ 261–263.

¹⁶ The first port of call for the private language argument is McGinn (2013: 134–215, with further references). See also Dionigi (2001), chapter 8, which scrutinises a very large portion of secondary literature. A classical reading is, notoriously, Kripke (1984), which has sparked a great deal of debate.

¹⁷ It is worth noting that in his discussion of inner sensations Wittgenstein uses examples such as ‘pain’ and ‘red’ that actually belong to the same class of ethical and epistemological affections that the Cyrenaics themselves most consider see e.g., PI, §§ 244–246, 250–251, § 253, § 263, § 271 (on pain); §§ 273–275; § 278; §§ 284–289 (on perceptions of colours). On Wittgenstein on sensations, see also Wittgenstein (1993).

¹⁸ There are two famous cases allowing for private languages for inner sensations in philosophy: one is Descartes (Adam, Tannery 1897–1910: VII, 71; IV 573–574; Principles, I, LXVIII) and the other is Locke (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II.xxxii.15; III.ii.2–6; III.ix.4–14; III.x.26). Both cases suffer philosophical defeats in light of Wittgenstein’s arguments. This has been shown by Kenny for Descartes (Kenny 1966) and by Hacker for Locke (1972: 224–242). Ayer has tried to rebut Wittgenstein’s arguments on private languages, but he has too failed (Ayer 1966: see Rhees 1966 on Ayer’s argument).

valuable and legitimate. Despite insisting on the privacy of one's affections, the Cyrenaics must have been prepared to admit that the plurality of private affections different people have does pose a quite serious philosophical challenge for those philosophers like them claiming that there is an insuperable gulf between my perceptions and those of others. After all, despite having private affections, we all learn their grammar and how to understand them by relying on a public tool, namely our shared language.

If read along quite plausible interpretative lines as the ones suggested above, Sextus' argument on the commonality of language therefore seems to reduce the Cyrenaic commitment to solipsism in a drastic way. Yet, the case for Cyrenaic solipsism that I have been constructing in the previous sections of this paper still rests on a highly plausible reading of the extant evidence. How can we make sense of this clash? Again, a crucial distinction Wittgenstein introduces between the epistemological privacy and the privacy of the ownership will help to make the clash an apparent one, while also making a case for a sort of residual solipsism in Cyrenaic philosophy by spelling out more clearly what the Cyrenaics may have actually meant when they talked of 'private affections' (*pathê idia*).

8. Residual solipsism: the inalienable privacy of the ownership

When he deals with the privacy of sensations in the context of the private language argument, Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between epistemological privacy and the privacy of the ownership:¹⁹ as Hacker writes, for Wittgenstein "something is epistemologically private for a person if only he can know it; it is private in the second sense [that is, privacy of the ownership] if, in principle only he can have it" (Hacker 1972: 231).²⁰ On the basis of this distinction, we understand that for Wittgenstein epistemological privacy is impossible while the privacy of the ownership is unalienable: I can well know that others are in pain while it does not make sense to say, 'I know I am in pain', since the conditions of knowledge/doubt do not hold for first-person statement about one's inner sensations. I cannot say: 'I have pain and I don't know it' and thus I cannot say: 'I have pain and I know it'. What I can say without any doubt is that I have a pain, namely, that the pain I feel is simply and only my own and cannot be someone else's.²¹

If we apply Wittgenstein's dichotomy about privacy (epistemological vs of the ownership) to the Cyrenaics, at first, we may be thinking that both privacies are legitimate for them. But this would be wrong. As we already know by now, the kernel of Cyrenaic epistemology is that only (private) affections are known to us. When they say that I cannot be mistaken that I am being whitened, the Cyrenaics must admit – one can argue – that I know that I am having an affection of white. Yet, what is being known for the Cyrenaics

¹⁹ See Hacker (1975: 222–226); Dionigi (2001: 435–440, with further references).

²⁰ See also Dionigi (2001: 448–452).

²¹ See, above all, § 246. See also §§ 253, 303, 404, 405, 408. Wittgenstein investigates the topic of knowledge/certainty at a fuller extent in *On Certainty*, on which see Coliva (2010) and Hamilton (2014).

is the actual affection we are having, not that we know that we are affected. To say that we know we are being whitened would be as pleonastic and redundant for the Cyrenaics as it would be senseless for Wittgenstein. The Cyrenaics may have been uninterested in the notion of epistemological privacy, at least in Wittgenstein's sense, but they surely endorsed the privacy of the ownership for affections. The Cyrenaics thought that I surely have and own my sensation of white or pain when I say: "I am being whitened" or "I feel pain." When they insist on the privacy of one's affections, what I claim the Cyrenaics are highlighting is that each of us possesses his own sensation and that we cannot have (any access whatsoever to) the sensations of others: I cannot have/feel your pain. As Sextus remarks: "[for the Cyrenaics] one cannot grasp the affection of the neighbour, nor can his neighbour, since he cannot feel the affection of that other person" (S.E. M. 7.196).

One may retort that there is an epistemological aspect involved in the insistence the Cyrenaics place on the privacy of affections, since they make clear that the actual ownership of a sensation brings with it the inescapable epistemological certainty about the infallibility of that sensation. For the Cyrenaics, I cannot be mistaken that I am being whitened; that is, in modern parlance, I cannot be mistaken that I see that object as white. The inalienability of the ownership of affections does not exclude, however, that an epistemological aspect is involved in the process. Quite the contrary, I suggest. When we claim that a sensation is inalienable, we may well mean that each of us has his own sensation (either of 'red' or 'pain') and that we cannot have the sensation of others. Accordingly, we cannot know whether the actual sensation we have is identical or different from the one someone else has. We cannot know where my sensation of red or pain is identical or different from yours. Following Wittgenstein (and, on the interpretation sketched in this paper, the Cyrenaics too), we can submit that you and I have learned how to name our sensations by means of a communal language, so that we have common names for private affections. Yet, you and I will never know whether the common names we use for our affections name identical or different sensations. As Wittgenstein writes: "The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible – though unverifiable – that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another" (PI, § 272).

There is therefore a residual solipsism about private affections that rests on the inalienability of their ownership and that no communal language or shared semantic criteria can ever get rid of. We may have common names for private affections (as the Cyrenaics maintain, according to Sextus); we may well map our internal world of perceptions and sensations by means of a public language (as Wittgenstein argues). Yet, each of us has his own private sensations and perceptions. There really seems to be no way to assess whether we have different or the same ones, although we have common names to refer to them. Although we use common names and public languages, I cannot have any access to your own sensations, and you cannot feel mine. This fact contributes much to the idea that there is a subjective privacy that is at the core of whom we are. It is this privacy that contributes, in an essential way, to the actual constitution of our inner self. If we pair

such a privacy with the features of epistemological incorrigibility; if we discharge the material world of objects and other people as wholly elusive, we shall start to realize how innovative and original the Cyrenaics could have been. For the first time in Greek philosophy, they highlighted the importance of the subject as the locus of inner life, despite being ready to recognize that, at least on the interpretation I recommend, the subject lacked a deeper identity, ontologically stable over time (Zilioli 2014: ch. 5). They made that subject the fulcrum of their epistemological and ethical life, in contrast with a world of material objects whose essence they thought could never be grasped. They believed that each of us has his own, inalienable inner world, to which others cannot have any access despite common names and public languages. In doing so, the Cyrenaics were the kind of solipsist philosophers who Wittgenstein describes in the Blue Book and for whom I cannot see, hear, or feel what others see, hear, or feel (Wittgenstein 1958: 62–64).

Although they may have not endorsed the sort of encompassing solipsism that I have tried to ascribe to them in the initial sections of this paper, the residual solipsism that I identified in this last section is at the core of the originality that Cyrenaic philosophy has displayed over the centuries. Such residual solipsism is, I claim, what can motivate the main philosophical views around which the Cyrenaics built up their philosophy and their notion of inalienable privacy.²²

²² I first became seriously interested in ancient solipsism when I had an exchange of views with Jan Westerhoff, who is exploring the topic in ancient Indian philosophy. I thank him for having pushed my research into new directions with his insightful remarks. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for the journal for her/his very helpful and encouraging remarks; to Mikolaj Domaradzki, the editor in chief, for his support; to Livio Rossetti for a variety of reasons that it would be too long to report here (I am sure he knows them well already). The research that has made this paper possible was carried out under the auspices of a Leverhulme Research Grant (RPG-2021-204). I thank the Trust for its generous support.

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The (Un)bearable Lightness of Being. The Cyrenaics on Residual Solipsism

The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence on Cyrenaic solipsism and show how and why some views endorsed by the Cyrenaics appear to be committing them to solipsism. After evaluating the fascinating case for Cyrenaic solipsism, the paper shall deal with an (often) underestimated argument on language attributed to the Cyrenaics, whose logic – if I reconstruct it well – implies that after all the Cyrenaics cannot have endorsed a radical solipsism. Yet, by drawing an illuminating parallel with Wittgenstein’s argument on private language and inner sensations, a case is to be made for the Cyrenaics to have subscribed to a sort of ‘residual solipsism’, which in turn helps us to understand the notion of Cyrenaic privacy at a fuller extent.

KEY WORDS

Cyrenaics, solipsism, privacy, Wittgenstein, Colotes, Aristocles, internal touch

Platone, *Prm.* 133b4– c1 / 134e9–135b2. Quali *logoi* nella *gymnasia* per un *tis* refrattario alla persua- sione e sensibile alle contraddizioni come Antistene?

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GIUSEPPE MAZZARA / *Università degli Studi di Palermo* /

Presentazione

In questo studio vorrei mostrare come Platone nel *Parmenide* riprenda, in qualche modo, il confronto con l'Antistene del *Fedone*, che, in Mazzara (2019) e (2020), ho supposto fosse uno dei vari *tis* con i quali egli in questo dialogo polemizzava¹.

¹ Il testo greco di riferimento è quello di Burnet (1901), utilizzato da Ferrari (2019⁸), della cui traduzione mi sono servito con qualche piccola variazione nei passi riportati. Le parentesi quadre e tonde qui inserite sono mie. Per la partizione della *gymnasia* ho utilizzato i simboli adottati da Ferrari (2019⁸): per la parte prima H1.D1,

Adesso, con il *tis* del *Parmenide*, ci si ripresenta una situazione non proprio uguale, ma piuttosto simile, con un Antistene che mi pare possa ben corrispondere – anche qui naturalmente non solo lui – alle caratteristiche indicate da Platone, quali quello di essere: “esperto (*empeiros*) in molti ambiti” – basta dare uno sguardo ai titoli delle opere elencate nel catalogo di Diogene Laerzio (VI, 15–18) –, di “non essere privo di doti naturali” (*aphuēs*) e di “essere in grado di seguire con intelligenza critica” (*dieukrinēsamenon*) *logoi* presi anche da “premesse lontane” (*porrōthen*).

A queste caratteristiche si potrebbe aggiungere quella contestata da Isocrate in *Kata tōn sophistōn*, 7–8, che lo accusa di essere abile a trovare le contraddizioni (*enantiōseis*) nei *logoi*, mentre si fa sfuggire quelle nei fatti, rischiando di farsi prendere per uno che ama le “chiacchiere” (*adoleschian*), piuttosto che la ricerca della verità.

Questa testimonianza mi sembra interessante perché ci permette di avvicinare i due socratici nel tentativo di cercare una verità non contraddittoria e non contestabile, anche a costo di rischiare di essere considerati dalla gente comune dei chiacchieroni, piuttosto che dei veri ricercatori della verità (per Platone vd. *Prm.* 161d3–6).

Tuttavia tra i due dialoghi ci sarebbe una differenza notevole: mentre nel *Fedone* era il *tis*, l’obietto alle idee, a dovere rispondere ad un Socrate che, ormai al sicuro per avere trovato rifugio nelle idee e nei *logoi*, può permettersi di guardarlo di sbieco con aria di sufficienza e quasi accusandolo di non capire (*ou...ennoeis*) (*Phd.* 103a4–c2), qui nel *Parmenide* la situazione si presenta del tutto rovesciata: nessuna sicurezza nelle idee, che anzi vengono messe sotto accusa ed è il Parmenide di Platone che deve darsi da fare (*pragmateuomenou*) per convincere chi eventualmente ha anche avuto qualche motivo per avere dei dubbi sulla solidità della teoria delle idee e sui *logoi* che la sostengono. Penso alle obiezioni del *Satone* (su ciò vd. Mazzara 2020: 57, n. 37, e 58–59). *Logoi* e idee entrano in crisi ed è su questi che Platone sembra che voglia ritornare.

Per queste ragioni vorrei vedere se nella *gymnasia* ci siano dei *logoi* o qualche aspetto di essi – seppure in modo non esplicito e tangenziale – che toccano le teorie di Antistene ed eventualmente come Platone pensi non dico di persuaderlo, certo anche questo, ma quantomeno di fargli capire dove, a suo parere, sta sbagliando (*pseudetai*: *Prm.* 133b7), spingendo alle estreme conseguenze la logica non contraddittoria dei vari *logoi* di volta in volta in esame, logica anche per Antistene tanto cara come risulta da Isocrate (cit.), piuttosto che polemizzare più o meno scopertamente con lui, almeno come mi è parso abbia fatto nel *Fedone*.

A tal proposito vorrei prendere in considerazione quattro *logoi* della *gymnasia* con qualche altro connesso o subalterno, nei quali la presenza di Antistene mi sembra ondeggiare dietro le righe, sebbene in modo ben coperto:

etc., e per la parte seconda H2.D1, etc. Desidero esprimere un sentimento di profonda gratitudine all’amico Valerio Napoli per i suoi preziosi suggerimenti e per la paziente attenzione e l’acribia con la quale ha seguito la stesura di questo studio.

– nel Primo *logos*, in H1.D1, metto in evidenza lo *status quaestionis* relativamente all’“uno” considerato come identico a se stesso secondo la concezione che ne aveva Antistene, che contrasta con l’ipotesi “se (l’uno) è uno”, qui presa in considerazione in senso assoluto. Rispetto a questo, mostro come Platone esponga la sua opinione di un “uno” che non può essere considerato identico a se stesso, che si oppone a quella del suo collega che lo considera, per un verso, come *hen kai pan e*, per un altro, come identico alla sua *diaphora*, dove si potrebbe vedere una chiamata in causa di questa *diaphora* per una critica ad essa a proposito di qualcosa (*ti*) considerato in quanto è o diviene più vecchio e più giovane e coevo di se stesso;

– nel Secondo *logos*, in H1.D2, dopo avere messo in evidenza una forma di autocritica da parte dello stesso Platone per le conseguenze contraddittorie alle quali si andrebbe incontro se si continuasse ad attenersi a certi principi sostenuti nel *Fedone*, come, ad es., quello che «un contrario (*enantion*) non sarà mai il contrario di se stesso» (*Phd.* 103c7–8) e dove verrebbe coinvolto anche Antistene, mostro il superamento di questa aporia, di stile zenoniano, con una definizione unificata della *phusis* espressa dal termine *heteron* in rapporto alla diversità e alterità dei molti (*ta polla*), che Antistene, data la sua concezione dell’*heteron* come *allon* nel senso di *allotrion*, di estraneo, non avrebbe potuto accettare. In tal modo vengono preparati i presupposti per la comunanza dei generi (*koinōnia tōn genōn*) e per il parricidio del *Sofista*;

– nel Terzo *logos*, in H2.D1, metto in evidenza le precondizioni semantiche, grammaticali e linguistiche di conoscibilità dell’ipotesi “se l’uno non è”, avanzando il sospetto che nella insistenza da parte di Platone su certi aspetti “epistemologici” si possa intravedere una velata critica nei confronti proprio di Antistene, che non solo non li teneva nel conto richiesto da lui, ma che anzi, per certi versi, li rigettava;

– nel Quarto *logos*, ancora in H2.D1, mostro, in ambito veritativo, il superamento del doppio senso della “è” (*esti*) predicativo ed esistenziale evidenziato da Gorgia nel suo *peri tou mē ontos e*, indirettamente, il ripristino del criterio vero-falso fondato sulla piena funzionalità del “principio di identità” rimosso da Antistene perché ritenuto incapace di distinguere con il *logos* il vero dal falso, ciò che esiste e ciò che non esiste, e sostituito con il suo criterio *oikeion-allotrion*. A questo scopo metto in evidenza il doppio ruolo del *desmos* e come Platone riprenda la stessa logica e gli stessi termini della *idios apodeixis* (MXG) di Gorgia, ma con intenti contrari.

1) PRIMO LOGOS IN H1.D1: *Prm.* 139b4–e6

Lo *status quaestionis* sull’identità dell’uno di Antistene al tempo della composizione del dialogo e l’atteggiamento di Platone sulla sua presa in considerazione come interpretazione attendibile dell’*eon* di Parmenide

1.1 *Status quaestionis* sull'identità dell'uno di Antistene

La prima serie di deduzioni in H1.D1 parte con l'ipotesi "se (l'uno) è uno" (*ei hen estin*) (*Prm.* 137c4). Qui, a proposito del rapporto dell'uno (*hen*) con l'identico (*tauto*) e con il diverso (*to heteron*), Platone individua quattro possibilità di relazioni: 1) diverso da sé, 2) identico a cosa diversa, 3) diverso da un diverso e 4) identico a se stesso (*Prm.* 139b4–5). Escluse le prime tre (*Prm.* 139b4–d1), egli passa ad escludere anche la quarta con queste parole:

Prm. 139d1–e3

– Ma (l'uno) non sarà neppure identico (*tauton*) a se stesso. – Come no? – La natura (*phusis*), proprio quella dell'uno (*hēper tou henos*), non è certamente (*dēpou*) anche quella dell'identico (*tauton*). – Ma perché? – Perché (l'uno) quando diviene identico a qualcosa non diviene uno. – E quindi? – Divenendo identico ai molti (*tois pollois*) è necessario che divenga molti (*polla*) e non uno (*hen*) [questo va contro la concezione dell'uno di Antistene come *hen kai pan*, come vedremo sotto]. – È vero. – Ma se l'uno (*to hen*) e l'identico (*to tauton*) non differiscono per niente (*mēdamēi diapherei*), quando qualcosa divenisse identico, sempre diverrebbe uno, e quando uno, identico [questa è la concezione dell'uno di Antistene, come vedremo]. – Certamente. – Allora se l'uno sarà identico a se stesso, non sarà uno con se stesso; è così, pur essendo uno, non sarà uno. Ma almeno questo è davvero impossibile.

Non possiamo essere sicuri che quando Platone scriveva queste parole tenesse ben in conto che con ciò si stava opponendo ad Antistene. Abbiamo però diverse testimonianze, compreso la sua, che egli, dicendo ciò, andava a colpire uno dei fondamenti del pensiero di Antistene di cui egli era ben consapevole. Vediamo.

1.2 *La struttura dell'uno di Antistene nel Teeteto*

a) In *Tht.* 201d8–202c5 il Socrate di Platone, nel corso di una ricerca sull'*epistēmē* come *doxa alēthēs meta logou*, che ha udito sostenga un *tis*, porta la testimonianza di questo *tis* che oggi si è perlopiù d'accordo nell'identificarlo con Antistene – (su ciò vd. Brancacci 1993 e Mazzara 2016; per il contrario vd. Narcy 2010: 275–278) – il quale, in base a quel tipo di *epistēmē*, definisce l'*ousia* del *logos* come una *onomatōn sumplokē*, in cui l'identità della cosa oggetto del *logos* (*erōtēthen*) si realizza nella connessione unitaria dei nomi che lo compongono.

Alla base di questa concezione ci sta la teoria degli "elementi" (*stoicheia*) di cui siamo formati noi e le cose. Questi, però, a loro volta, sono considerati come *aloga kai agnōsta*, i quali, in quanto elementi *asuntheta* (e quindi come qualcosa di *simplex*) rispetto alla *sumplokē* della cosa in cui compaiono, restano non ulteriormente divisibili, in modo analogo alle lettere dell'alfabeto che compongono i nomi. Così, ad es., del nome "Socrate" o "Teeteto" possiamo avere conoscenza sicura (*epistēmē* nel senso di "opinione vera

con *logos*”) delle sillabe, ma non delle lettere che li compongono. L’unità dei due nomi si realizza nella connessione di tutte le lettere costitutive messe l’una accanto all’altra, senza tralasciarne nessuna, ma anche senza rapporto dialettico tra di loro.

b) L’argomento si prolunga in *Tht.* 203a1–206a1 con la concezione dell’uno come intero (*holon*) e come insieme (*pan*) di parti (*mērē*) (204b6–205b13), in cui l’uno si identifica con l’insieme come somma (*pan*) di tutte le parti (*ta panta mērē*), in quanto hanno la stessa definizione: al *pan* non deve mancare (*apēi*) nulla e dall’*holon* non può venire separato (*apostatei*) nulla, in modo analogo a come le lettere dell’alfabeto che compongono i nomi, come, ad es., quello di Socrate o di Teeteto, sopra detti. Più avanti, in H2.D1. (*Prm.* 148d1–4), vedremo come Platone intenda, forse, superare questa concezione. L’uno è considerato come *hen kai pan*.

c) A ciò fa eco la definizione del cosiddetto “carro di Esiodo” (*Tht.* 207a3–c3) che sarebbe costituito da cento (*hekatōn*) pezzi, la cui conoscenza precisa (*epistēmē*) può avere soltanto chi è capace di passare in rassegna (*dielthein*) tutti i cento pezzi².

d) Un’altra definizione, che rimodula quella in D.L., si troverebbe in *Tht.* 209a5, in cui il *logos* è definito “interpretazione della differenza” (*diaphorotētōs hermēneia*). Per chiarirla Platone porta due esempi: uno è quello del “sole” descritto come l’astro più luminoso tra quelli che girano nel cielo intorno alla terra (*Tht.* 208d1–3) e l’altro è quello della visione sensibile della persona di Teeteto, il cui ricordo, impresso nella memoria, potrà servire per riconoscerlo e distinguerlo da Socrate che ha anche lui il naso camuso e anche da altri che si trovano nella stessa condizione, se lo si dovesse incontrare un’altra volta (*Tht.* 208e7–209d6).

A questa si possono aggiungere le due definizioni che Aiace e Odisseo nelle omonime operette retoriche di Antistene danno di sé e dell’avversario alla fine delle rispettive richieste per l’assegnazione delle armi di Achille in *Aj.* 9 e *Od.* 14, su cui vd. Mazzara (2014).

1.3 La definizione dell’uno di Antistene come *hen eph’henos nell’oikeios logos* secondo le testimonianze di Aristotele e di Alessandro di Afrodisia

Determinanti per capire il senso che dà Antistene dell’ente-uno di Parmenide mi sembrano le due testimonianze di Aristotele (*Metaph.* 1024b26–1025a1) e di Alessandro di Afrodisia (in *Metaph.*, pp. 434, 25–435, 20), su cui vd. Brancacci (1990: 240–249, e 2010), e Mazzara (2014: 140–251).

² Sul concetto di uno come *holon-pan* nel *Teeteto* e in *Aiace* e *Odisseo* di Antistene vd. Mazzara (2010: 233–257).

Entrambi tirano in campo la concezione che aveva Antistene della definizione intesa come qualcosa di unitario rispetto all'oggetto in esame. Aristotele parla di *hen eph'henos*, "uno per uno"³, che Alessandro rimodula con un genitivo di specificazione, *hen henos*, "uno di uno", intendendo un solo *logos* per ciascuna cosa (*hena hekastou logon*). Dice:

Ma Antistene riteneva che ciascuna delle cose che sono fosse espressa unicamente dal discorso proprio (*tōi oikeiōi logōi monōi*) e che uno solo (*hena*) ve ne fosse per ciascuna cosa: e questo, appunto, è il discorso proprio (*ton gar oikeion*); quel discorso, invece, che significa qualcosa (*ton de ti sēmainonta*), ma non è proprio di quella cosa di cui è detto essere, è estraneo (*allogrion*) ad essa (trad. A. Brancacci)⁴.

Da tutto ciò deriva che per Antistene l'identità di una cosa colta dalla sua definizione si risolve: o nella interpretazione della sua *diaphora* o anche di quelle più determinanti, o nella descrizione ed enumerazione delle sue parti o anche dei suoi attributi considerati tutti positivi ed essenziali all'unità della sua *phusis*, secondo il modello che troviamo nel *Teeteto* dell'uno come un *holon* costituito dalla somma di tutte le sue parti, nessuna delle quali può essere separata o mancante. Tutto ciò che non è essenziale – e tale è ciò che non è *oikeion* – vi resta fuori come "qualcosa di significante" (*ti sēmainonta*), ma di estraneo (*allogrion*), in un certo senso come non essere, di cui, però, si può parlare ed anche avere una opinione, ma più in là non si può andare, di esso non c'è *epistēmē*.

Sarebbe da qui che nascerebbe quello che mi sembra un "semiparricidio", nel senso che Antistene, volendo salvare l'unità dell'ente secondo la logica di Parmenide (DK B 8,26–31), esclude da esso come estraneo tutto ciò che non vi è essenziale e quindi come una specie di non essere e di contrario.

Anche Antistene, infatti, prima di Platone, si sarà trovato di fronte ad una aporia simile a quella che questi ritiene abbia sollevato Zenone e cioè al fatto che, se si ammette che gli enti siano molti, anche per lui non si sarebbe usciti dalla contraddizione, per cui gli enti sarebbero stati contemporaneamente uno e molti, simili e dissimili⁵.

Zenone, in Platone, si vede costretto a rigettare "i molti" per dare un aiuto a salvare l'uno di Parmenide dalla contraddittorietà in cui si sarebbe venuto a trovare a causa della contemporanea presenza di aspetti simili e dissimili. Ma Antistene non la pensa così. Anche lui vuole salvare Parmenide, ma senza mettere in contraddizione in se stessi e tra di loro i fenomeni e le esperienze di essi. Allora "i molti" *sono*, ma dentro l'"uno"

³ Sul senso di *epi* in *Sph.* 237c3, vd. Casertano (2015b: 95), il quale, a proposito della denominazione, indica due livelli: 1) uno è quello del "referente reale" indicato dalla particella *eis* e 2) l'altro è quello del livello del "quale": «quel livello senza il quale la cosa stessa non sarebbe indicata, nonostante la pronuncia del suo nome ed è dato dalla particella *epi* (*kai epi poion*)». Si noti come l'uso che ne fa Platone sia molto simile a quello che ne fa Antistene nella formula *hen eph'henos* sopra visto: entrambi gli usi sarebbero finalizzati alla determinazione del *poion* e dell'*oikeion*.

⁴ Sul concetto di uno in ambito retorico, vd. Rostagni (1955: 1–59) e Brancacci (1990: 45–60).

⁵ Sulla relazione di Zenone con i pluralisti e in particolare con l'atomismo pitagorico vd. Cornford (1939: 53–62).

che li ingloba tutti con uguale somiglianza rispetto all'essere, per cui non c'è spazio per la dissomiglianza e dunque per il non essere dentro la somiglianza, e da qui dentro l'identità dell'uno, come voleva Parmenide. Da ciò per Antistene non è dato contraddire e "quasi" dire il falso, come testimonia Aristotele in *Metaph.* 1024b26–1025a1, cit. (su ciò vd. Brancacci 1990: 249–262).

In tal modo l'ente-uno di Antistene rimane chiuso in se stesso nella sua *diaphora* o nei suoi *panta mērē* considerati tutti *oikeia*, senza perdere la sua absolutezza e identità, come voleva Parmenide, senza finestre con gli altri (*ta alla*), i quali rimangono di "altra natura", *allogria*. In *Aj.* 5 l'eroe esprime bene questa alterità. Per questo motivo non possono essere considerati come diversi (*hetera*), come farà Platone in *Prm.* 146d1–2, come vedremo.

In Antistene, allora, l'*eon* di Parmenide – considerato nei suoi *panta mērē* – sarà *hen kai pan*, in cui l'*hen* e il *tauto* di cui parla Platone in *Prm.* 139d4–5, sopra cit., si identificano interamente con la somma delle sue parti, con *tois pollois*, andando in tal modo incontro – almeno nell'intendimento di Antistene – alle esigenze unitarie e non contraddittorie dell'essere di Parmenide, ma non a quelle di Platone per il quale – in questa prima serie di deduzioni (H1.D1) – è impossibile (*adunaton*) che l'uno, pur essendo uno, non sia uno.

In questo senso quello di Antistene potrebbe essere considerato un parricidio mancato e non servirebbe a salvare Parmenide, credo, almeno, dal punto di vista di Platone. È, comunque, un fatto che di questa concezione dell'uno di Antistene come identico e come molti (*hen kai pan*) mi sembra che non ci sia traccia di critica in questa prima serie di argomenti della *gymnasia*, critica che, invece, ritroveremo nel prossimo *logos* in H1.D2.

Questo aspetto descrittivo ed enumerativo dell'uno in quanto *oikeios logos* verrebbe dunque ignorato, ma forse non quello relativo alla *diaphora*, come adesso vediamo.

1.4 Una critica di Platone al *logos oikeios* di Antistene come *diaphorotētos hermēneia* secondo *Tht.* 208c1–210a9?

Prm. 141a5–d3

– Oppure non è necessario (*ē ouk anagkē*) che qualcosa, se è nel tempo, diventi costantemente più vecchio (*presbuteron*) di se stesso? – È necessario. – Ma ciò che è più vecchio non è tale sempre nei confronti di un più giovane? – E allora? – Allora ciò che diventa più vecchio rispetto a se stesso, contemporaneamente diventa anche più giovane di sé, dal momento che deve avere qualcosa rispetto a cui diventa più vecchio. – Come dici? – Così: nulla che sia differente (*diaphoron*) può diventare diverso da un diverso (*heteron heterou*), perché è già differente (*ēdē ontos diaphorou*); ma rispetto a ciò che è già diverso deve esserlo già, rispetto a ciò che è diventato diverso deve esserlo diventato, rispetto a ciò che diventerà diverso lo diventerà; mentre rispetto a ciò che diviene differente non può esserlo diventato, né essere in procinto di diventarlo e neppure esserlo, ma appunto diventarlo e non può essere altrimenti. – Infatti è necessario. – Ma l'essere più vecchio costituisce appunto differenza rispetto a un essere più giovane

(*to ge presbuteron diaphorotēs neōterou estin*) e a nient'altro. – Infatti ciò che diventa più vecchio rispetto a se stesso, deve diventare contemporaneamente più giovane di sé. – Sembra. – Tuttavia non può certamente trovarsi a diventare per un tempo maggiore di sé, e neppure minore, ma diviene ed è diventato ed è in procinto di diventare per un tempo uguale a sé. – Anche questo, infatti, è necessario. – Allora è necessario, a quanto sembra, che tra le cose che sono nel tempo (*en chronōi estin*) e che partecipano (*kai metechei*) di ciò che lo caratterizza, ciascuna abbia la medesima età rispetto a sé e che diventi contemporaneamente più vecchia e più giovane di se stessa. – C'è il rischio.

Aristotele in *Metaph.* H 3 1043b23–28 dice che per Antistene “non è possibile definire il che cos'è” (*ouk esti to ti estin horisasthai*) di Platone, perché sarebbe un *logos makros* rispetto all'idea che ha una *ousia monoeidēs* e che è quindi qualcosa di *asuntheton* e di *simplex*.

Ho l'impressione che in questo passo Platone voglia riprendersi una certa rivincita con Antistene, sebbene in un modo, per così dire, più “filosofico” di quanto non abbia fatto lui con il *Satone*.

Nel passo precedente (*Prm.* 140e1–141a6) egli ha dimostrato come l'uno in sé non possa essere né più vecchio né più giovane né coevo di sé stesso e dell'altro, in quanto non gli si possono attribuire le qualificazioni di uguaglianza e di somiglianza, né quelle opposte di disuguaglianza e di dissomiglianza, perché non partecipa di esse e quindi neppure del tempo in esse implicato. Che l'uno non partecipi del tempo sarebbe così dimostrato e l'argomento del tempo come attributo dell'uno in sé si potrebbe chiudere qui.

Migliori (2000²: 112), che del passo in oggetto fa una presentazione, a mio avviso, molto puntuale, osserva che questo nuovo argomento sul tempo «sembra inutile, dato che la conclusione è già tratta, in modo semplice e convincente».

Ma Platone – a quanto pare – non è contento e vi ritorna ancora su e questa volta non trattando neppure l'uno, ma il “qualcosa” (*ti*) in generale preso nella autoriflessività della sua differenza: essere cioè più vecchio e più giovane e anche coevo di se stesso. Ciò implica che per cogliere la differenza di qualcosa di questo genere è necessario introdurre una relazione strutturale con qualcosa che funga da termine di paragone delle due qualificazioni opposte. Si avrebbe così una relazione di un diverso (*heteron*) con un diverso (*heterou*) all'interno del “se stesso” del *ti*, come affermato alle righe c1–2 di *Prm.* 141a5–d3.

Non tutti i casi, però, che hanno a che fare con la “differenza” sono di questo tipo, ce ne sono di altri che sono già differenti per conto loro e che non hanno bisogno di entrare in rapporto con un diverso, perché lo sono già.

Ma il motivo per cui Platone ha introdotto questo nuovo discorso sulla “differenza” non riguarda quest'ultimo caso (su ciò vd. Fronterotta 2008⁴: 121, n. 66), ma quello comparativo, perché sarebbe qui che, almeno per quanto riguarda Antistene, potrebbero sorgere delle complicazioni.

Infatti per questi, stando al *Teeteto*, *cit.*, chi fosse in grado di riuscire a interpretare la differenza (*diaphorotētōs hermēneia*) di qualcosa, costui sarà anche capace di cogliere “il *logos* più bello delle cose che riguardano la conoscenza scientifica (*kalliston tōn peri*

epistēmēs logou) (*Tht.* 209a5). Questa differenza sarà anche quella che più si avvicinerà all'*eon* di Parmenide colto nella sua monolitica differenza e unità.

Sarebbe proprio qui che andrebbe a colpire l'obiezione di Platone. Si ricorderà che Antistene – secondo Aristotele, *cit.* – gli aveva fatto notare che l'idea è *alogon* perché, essendo concepita come *monoeidēs* e dunque come qualcosa di *asuntheton* e di *simplex*, il suo *logos* definitorio, in quanto costituito di più nomi, sarebbe comunque risultato *makros* (su ciò vd. Brancacci 1990: 228–240 e Mazzara 2020: 57 e n. 37, e 58–59), e dunque in contraddizione con la semplicità di quella.

Allora se questo è vero – risponderrebbe ora Platone – non è meno vero che sia in contraddizione e che risulti *alogon* anche la *diaphorotēs*, che viene vantata come la più bella forma di conoscenza scientifica, in quanto sarebbe costituita dall'incontro-scontro tra due aspetti non solo diversi (*hetera*), ma addirittura contrari (*enantia*) perché introduce con la contrarietà il non essere dentro la *diaphorotēs*. Il "qualcosa" sarebbe così contemporaneamente più vecchio e più giovane e anche coevo di se stesso. La conseguenza sarebbe che il *logos*, che ne esprime tale differenza, sarebbe anch'esso un *logos makros* rispetto all'assolutezza e semplicità dell'*eon* da essa interpretata ed espressa.

Per uno come Antistene che aveva fatto tanto per mettere il suo *hen eph'henos* al riparo da contraddizioni e dal contatto con il non essere, una obiezione come questa sarebbe risultata, immagino, un colpo davvero molto duro, data la concezione che egli aveva del diverso come *alotrion*, da cui faceva derivare l'esclusione, come non essere e contrario, tutto ciò che non faceva identità con esso, come vedremo meglio nel prossimo Secondo *logos* a proposito dell'uno come *hen kai pan*.

1.5 Una glossa alla "glossa" di Migliori

Prima di andare avanti vorrei soffermarmi un momento su un corsivo di Migliori (2000²: 215) a commento di questo passo.

Lo studioso, dopo avere sottolineato che il «divenire [su cui inerisce il tema del tempo con i suoi annessi] è volutamente paradossale» (2000²: 214) e dopo avere esplicitato il perché di questo suo convincimento, aggiunge:

In realtà, non ci sarebbe neppure bisogno di mettere in contrasto il divenire vecchio-e-giovane rispetto all'essere coevo: non è sufficientemente assurdo affermare che una realtà diviene più vecchia di sé che diviene più giovane? (*ibid.*)

La paradossalità di questa argomentazione tanto insistita, lo spinge alla seguente considerazione:

Mi si consenta una glossa: *la cosa più incredibile di tutti gli studi sul «Parmenide» è che gli interpreti sono talmente convinti di avere a che fare con paradossi che quasi nessuno si scandalizza per questa affermazione, obiettivamente un po' folle. Ma così nessuno nota nemmeno che la follia è posta volutamente in piena luce.*

A questo punto, dopo che ho cercato di mettere in evidenza quanto Platone abbia criticato (o criticherà di lì a poco) nel *Teeteto* il *logos oikeios* in quanto “interpretazione della differenza”, utilizzando fra l'altro anche qui nel *Parmenide* gli stessi termini del *Teeteto*, *diaphora* e *diaphorotēs*, il secondo dei quali Brancacci (1993: 115) ha trovato che è termine tecnico di Antistene, mi chiedo: è immaginabile che egli non si sia reso conto che per sostenere il suo argomento, per quanto assurdo lo abbia pensato, si stava servendo degli stessi termini di Antistene, che egli nell'altro dialogo aveva o avrebbe utilizzato per criticare la definizione di *logos* dello stesso Antistene rivoltandola contro di lui? Non è possibile. Allora, la domanda è obbligata: perché lo ha fatto? La risposta non è sicura, ma ci provo. Qui, però, si conceda anche a me una glossa alla “glossa”:

Lo avrebbe fatto, forse, per mostrare al suo collega refrattario alla persuasione e sensibile alle contraddizioni che egli ha talmente recepito la sua obiezione all'idea *monoeidēs* come *alolon* che ora sta tentando in tutti i modi di porvi rimedio, anche a costo di utilizzare argomenti assurdi come quelli sul tempo, ma, tuttavia, possibili in quanto *logoi*. E lui che farà della sua *diaphorotēs*? Il *logos* che la interpreta non è anch'esso un *logos makros* e non risulta anch'essa un *alolon*, dal momento che non tollera dentro di sé aspetti definitivi che siano contrari tra di loro, come risultano secondo la sua logica, quelli di essere più vecchio e più giovane di sé stessi e dunque anche coetaneo? Con quale *logos oikeios* riuscirà a definirla e ciò non soltanto nei confronti dell'uno rispetto a se stesso, ma anche e soprattutto rispetto agli altri dall'uno, senza prima avere ripristinato la relazione di un diverso con un diverso e ancor prima la riconduzione di un *enantion* a qualcosa di *heteron*, che non sia estraneo, *allogrion*, ma soltanto diverso, *alloion*?

La conclusione della mia glossa potrebbe essere, stando a quanto dice Migliori nella sua, che la “follia” riguarderebbe non tanto l'argomento volutamente assurdo di Platone, quanto piuttosto quello realmente assurdo di Antistene.

Platone, allora, avrebbe accentuato “volutamente” la paradossalità del suo argomento, e così facendo si sarebbe comportato secondo il detto italiano che recita: «parlare alla suocera per farsi sentire dalla nuora», dati i rapporti tradizionalmente conflittuali tra di loro. Nel nostro caso Platone parlerebbe a se stesso ad alta voce, per così dire, per farsi sentire da chi aveva orecchie ben lunghe per ascoltare e per capire bene dove l'argomento poteva e forse anche intenzionalmente doveva andare a parare, e cioè contro la sua *diaphorotēs* come la più bella forma di *epistēmē* rivelatasi anch'essa un *alolon*.

Una risposta in positivo a questo paradosso potrebbe essere vista nel richiamo che Platone fa in *Prm.* 152a, quando con il *memnēmetha* risponde all'argomento dandone una spiegazione non contraddittoria (su cui vd. Ferrari 2019⁸: 306–307, n. 154), che potreb-

be allungarsi sino all'*exaiphnēs* di *Prm.* 156d6. Se, infatti, la logica di Antistene non è in grado di definire la differenza tra più vecchio e più giovane e coetaneo, a maggior ragione non sarà in grado di interpretare e descrivere con un *logos* realmente *oikeios* e non contraddittorio il *nun*, l'“ora” di Parmenide, che già di suo risulta *atopon*, senza luogo nel tempo. Ma questo, naturalmente, rimane sullo sfondo, non detto, pur supponendo che non possa non essere ben presente a Platone.

2) SECONDO LOGOS IN H1.D2: *Prm.* 146a9–148d4

Le aporie di Zenone riportate dal sensibile nelle idee e il loro superamento nei presupposti che preparano il cosiddetto “parricidio” del *Sofista*

A proposito della deduzione in H1.D1 mi sembra ben appropriata la supposizione che fa Franco Ferrari (2019⁸: 252, n. 100 al testo), quando dice: «L'argomento che stabilisce che l'uno non può essere né identico a sé né diverso da cosa diversa rappresenta probabilmente il *focus* di questa prima deduzione». La stessa cosa credo che si potrebbe supporre di questa seconda deduzione o quanto meno della sua prima parte. Mi pare, infatti, che tutti i *logoi* che precedono quello sopra indicato in *Prm.* 146a9–148d4 si potrebbero considerare come una lunga ed elaborata introduzione ad esso. Vediamo in concreto di che si tratta.

Questo l'inizio della seconda serie di deduzioni in H1.D2:

Prm. 142b1–c7

– Vuoi allora che riprendiamo dall'inizio tornando all'ipotesi iniziale, nel caso in cui ritornandoci sopra ci risulti qualcosa d'altra natura (*alloion*)? – Certo che lo voglio. – Dunque, se l'uno è (*hen ei estin*), diciamo, occorre trovarsi d'accordo sulle conseguenze che lo riguardano, quali esse siano, o no? – Sì. – Esamina allora dall'inizio. Se l'uno è (*hen ei estin*), è possibile che esso sia senza partecipare dell'essere (*ousias*)? – Non è possibile. – Ma in questo modo anche (*kai*) l'essere dell'uno sarebbe (*hē ousia tou henos eiē*), pur non identificandosi con l'uno (*ou tauton ousa tōi henī*). In caso contrario, infatti, il primo non sarebbe essere dell'uno, mentre l'altro, cioè l'uno, non parteciperebbe dell'essere, e finirebbe con il risultare equivalente (*homoion*) affermare “l'uno è” (*hen te einai*) e “uno-uno” (*kai hen hen*) [che sarebbe la concezione di Antistene sopra vista in *Prm.* 139d1–e3]. Tuttavia l'ipotesi in questione ora non chiede che cosa consegua se l'uno [è] uno (*ei hen hen*), bensì se l'uno è (*ei hen estin*), non è così? – Certamente. – Dunque l'“è” significa qualcos'altro rispetto all'“uno” (*allo ti sēmainon to esti tou hen*)? – Per forza. – Quando, con una formula sintetica, si afferma che l'uno è (*hen estin*), questa espressione (*to legomenon*) non vuole dunque significare altro se non che l'uno partecipa dell'essere (*ousias metechei*)? – Certamente.

Platone, per spiegare il senso della nuova ipotesi espressa dalla proposizione “se l'uno è”, entra in argomento chiamando in causa la teoria della partecipazione e distinguendo-

do subito in essa tra il soggetto dell'indagine, l'"uno", e la sua predicazione, "è"⁶. Non c'è identità tra l'essere dell'uno conferitogli dal predicato "è" e l'"uno" stesso, ciascuno di essi ha una sua *phusis* che è "qualcosa d'altro" (*allo ti*) da quella dell'altro.

Platone riprende la stessa nozione dell'uno e dell'identico che ha sostenuto nell'argomento di H1.D1, ma mentre lì – data l'assolutezza dell'uno considerato in se stesso – metteva in evidenza la perdita dell'unità dell'uno con se stesso se non si fosse distinto in niente dall'identico considerato come qualcosa d'altro (l'uno pur essendo uno diventerebbe molti), qui si tratta della distinzione fra termini già previsti per ipotesi in relazione reciproca, che, quindi, sono distinti in partenza tra loro e che non fanno identità, almeno inizialmente.

Questo fa la differenza fra la prima serie di deduzioni e la seconda anche rispetto alla presenza di Antistene in questi *logoi*. Platone, infatti, anche qui sapeva bene che a proposito di questi argomenti Antistene non la pensava come lui e che – come abbiamo visto – assegnava al *logos*, in quanto *oikeios*, la funzione di "chiarire il che cosa era o è" (*ho to ti ên ē esti dēlōn*), secondo cui ogni soggetto della predicazione, compreso l'uno, andava a identificarsi per intero o con la sua *diaphora* principale o con i suoi *panta mērē* come attributi necessari e senza residui esterni.

Rispetto a questo, egli ora starebbe proprio dicendo una cosa diversa, che cioè il residuo tra l'uno e ciò che non è uno, compreso la "è" dell'ipotesi "se l'uno è", c'è ed è dato dallo scarto tra l'idea di *tauto* che si partecipa e l'oggetto che la riceve, il quale scarto implica per lui una concezione dell'uno come un *holon* non risolvibile soltanto nei suoi attributi essenziali o nei suoi *panta mērē* – come ritiene Antistene –, come è detto chiaramente in *Prm.* 145c7–e3, ma che rimane come qualcosa d'altro (*allo ti*), di diverso (*heteron*) rispetto a questo suo essere un *holon*, ma non di *alotrion*.

Ora Platone tenta di convincere il suo collega dimostrandogli che il *logos* della sua *gymnasia*, dal momento che passa per ogni dove (*Prm.* 136e1–3), passa certamente anche per il suo *logos oikeios*, ma che passa pure per il suo *Fedone*, dove aveva sostenuto certe nozioni che egli – grazie anche ad alcune sue critiche del *Satone* – riconosce che non sono più accettabili, almeno nella loro assolutezza (su ciò vd. Mazzara 2020: 37–44).

Tutto questo intreccio sotterraneo tra le diverse concezioni dell'uno tra i due Socratici, già presente nelle battute iniziali della deduzione, si prolunga, a mio avviso, fino a *Prm.* 146b2–6, dove ritorna il tema dell'identico e del diverso con l'aggiunta di altre tre modalità diverse di relazione. Vediamo:

Prm. 146b2–6

– Ogni cosa, credo, si comporta nei confronti di ogni altra così: o è identica o è diversa; e se non è identica né diversa, sarà parte di ciò nei cui confronti è così, oppure sarà come un intero in rapporto alla parte.

⁶ Sulla differenza tra l'essenza del soggetto e quella del predicato vd. Berti (1970–71: 502–503).

2.1 *Prm.* 146d1–147b6: *Le ambiguità ontologiche e gnoseologiche che conseguono per l'“uno” e per gli “altri” a causa di una concezione dell'enantion come quella del Fedone e dell'oikeios logos*

Dopo alcuni passaggi, tra i quali quello particolarmente interessante relativo all'uno che è diverso da sé e che è altrove da sé (*heterōthi*) (*Prm.* 145c7–146d1), Platone passa a trattare una nozione di diverso (*to heteron*) che Antistene rigettava, perché per lui, come abbiamo visto, l'*heteron* restava “estraneo” in quanto *alotrion* e non *alloion*, nel senso detto in *Prm.* 142b2, cioè di un'altra natura, nel senso di soltanto diversa e non opposta.

Questo il testo:

Prm. 146d1–5

– Se qualcosa è diverso da qualcosa (*ei tou ti heteron estin*), non sarà diverso (*heterou ontos*) nei confronti di un qualcosa di diverso (*heteron*)? – Per forza. – E così quante cose non sono uno sono tutte quante (*apanta*) diverse dall'uno e l'uno è diverso dalle cose che non sono uno? – Come no? – Dunque l'uno sarà diverso dagli altri.

A questa diversità reciproca tra l'uno e le altre cose che non sono uno, Platone applica la nozione di *enantion* che aveva elaborato nel *Fedone*.⁷

Qui nel *Parmenide*, infatti, Platone tratterebbe due concezioni diverse di contrario: nel primo caso si fa riferimento a qualcosa considerata in se stessa che in quanto tale accoglie il contrario di sé dentro di sé; nel secondo caso il contrario è considerato in quanto esterno e opposto all'identità di ciò a cui si oppone, nel senso più volte ripetuto da Platone secondo cui un contrario è sempre contrario di un contrario e non può accoglierlo.

Il caso che segue è di questo secondo tipo (*enantion* come *alotrion*), mentre quello seguente a questo è del primo tipo (*enantion* come *alloion*, su cui vd. il prossimo § 2.4).

2.2 *L'enantion come alotrion nel Platone del Fedone e in Antistene*

Prm. 146d5–147a3

– Fai attenzione: l'identico in sé (*auto to tauton*) e il diverso in sé (*kai to heteron*) sono contrari tra loro (*enantia allēlois*)? – Come potrebbero non esserlo? – E allora potrà mai l'identico essere nel diverso (*tauton en tōi heterōi*) e il diverso essere nell'identico (*to heteron en tautōi*)? – Non potrà. – Se dunque il diverso non sarà mai nell'identico, non esiste realtà (*ouden esti tōn ontōn*)

⁷ 1) *Phd.* 103c7–8: – Mai un contrario sarà il contrario di se stesso [contro cui vd. *Prm.* 129b1–e4],

2) *Phd.* 104b7–9: – [...] non solo i contrari manifestamente non accolgono gli uni gli altri, ma anche quelle cose che, pur non essendo contrarie fra loro, hanno sempre in sé i contrari. (trad. Casertano 2015a: 219).

nella quale il diverso sia per un tempo qualsiasi, perché se esistesse un tempo qualsiasi nel quale si trova il diverso, per la durata di quel tempo il diverso sarebbe nell'identico. Non è così? – È così. – Dal momento che non è mai nell'identico, il diverso non sarà mai in uno degli enti. – È vero. – Dunque il diverso non può essere presente né in ciò che non è uno, né nell'uno. – No, infatti. – Non sarà perciò in virtù del diverso (*tōi heterōi*) che l'uno sarà diverso da ciò che non è uno, e ciò che non è uno diverso dall'uno. – No, infatti. – E se non partecipano del diverso, non saranno diversi tra loro neppure in virtù di se stessi (*heautois*). – Come potrebbero, infatti? – Se non sono diversi né in virtù di se stessi né in virtù del diverso, non si sottraggono (*an ekpheugoi*) già del tutto alla condizione di essere reciprocamente diversi? – Si sottraggono (*ekpheugoi*).

Questo passo mi sembra particolarmente interessante, perché Platone vi tocca diversi problemi: 1) innanzitutto vi sarebbero implicate le difficoltà che si incontrano se si tiene ferma quella concezione del *Fedone* dei contrari che non si incontrano mai; 2) ma poi anche, e sempre indirettamente, la concezione che aveva Antistene del diverso e dell'altro come estranei e dunque assimilabili al non essere, sebbene a un non essere non assoluto, ma relativo anche per lui e non solo per Platone, e che restano anch'essi fuori dall'uno come contrari intoccabili.

Attenendosi al *Fedone*, e implicitamente anche all'*oikeios logos* di Antistene, le conseguenze per qualunque ente e non solo per l'uno sarebbero disastrose: non partecipando del diverso (*heteron*) né l'uno, né nessuno degli enti può diversificarsi da nulla, neppure per un tempo minimo, né può distinguersi a causa di se stesso – come sosteneva Antistene (su ciò vd. *Phd.* 102b8–d4 e Mazzara 2019: 32–35) – perché, essendo identico a se stesso, questa sua identità non può accogliere il suo contrario. La conclusione – dice Platone – è che l'uno e gli altri che non sono uno si sottraggono del tutto alla condizione di essere reciprocamente diversi. Che cosa sono? Non si sa, restano indeterminati, anzi sarebbero addirittura identici come dice un po' più oltre in *Prm.* 147b3–6.

Questa sarebbe la critica di Platone non solo a se stesso, ma anche implicitamente all'*oikeios logos* e alla concezione che ha Antistene dell'*hen* come *holon-pan* chiuso in se stesso senza rapporti organici con l'esterno. Si prospetterebbe così una situazione di tipo anassagoreo, in cui nulla si distingue da nulla⁸.

Le conseguenze negative, tuttavia, non si fermano qui, ma vanno avanti includendo una mancanza di relazione tra l'uno in quanto numero e ciò che non è uno (*Prm.* 147a3–b8) secondo la nozione “parti-tutto”, che doveva essere un argomento molto discusso nell'Accademia, forse per via della concezione fisica della partecipazione che aveva

⁸ A questo riguardo Ferrari (2019⁸: 282–283, n. 131) richiama Allen (1983: 283) e Cornford (1939: 160 ss.) tra coloro che considerano la “sequenza argomentativa” “di difficile comprensione” e “fallace e assurda”, e lui stesso non esclude che rimanga comunque aperta «la possibilità che si tratti di un sofisma». Se ammettiamo che qui Platone sta facendo un'autocritica rispetto a quanto ha sostenuto nel *Fedone*, tanto più che ad essa segue un'altra serie di argomenti volti, di fatto, a modificare il concetto e il ruolo del diverso (*heteron*), la sequenza argomentativa – a mio avviso – si giustificerebbe perfettamente.

anche Eudosso (su ciò vd. Ferrari 2019⁸: 62). Platone non manca neppure di evidenziare ambiguità presenti anche tra gli accademici⁹.

Platone, dunque, mostrerebbe che si riproduce nelle idee esattamente la stessa aporia che Zenone aveva manifestato per i molti nel sensibile, e cioè che la contraddizione tra simili e dissimili, tra identici e diversi e in generale tra contrari resta insuperabile anche nelle idee.

Come si esce, allora, dall'aporia? Ma prima di questo, dal punto di vista della *gumna-sia* in quanto tale, ha senso una simile domanda? Parrebbe di sì, dato quello che segue, in accordo anche con *Prm.* 128b1–e4.

Sarebbe questo, infatti, il senso che mi pare venga espresso dal *logos* successivo con l'attribuzione contemporanea all'uno delle qualificazioni di simile e dissimile, che coinvolge anche quelle dell'identico e del diverso senza che si contraddicano, superando così la concezione di *enantion* di *Phd.* 103c7–8, e anche quella di Antistene, in quanto accoglie in sé il suo contrario come parte di se stesso.

Prima di andare oltre vorrei ritornare di nuovo a quanto dice Migliori a proposito dell'“uno” in quanto numero e degli “altri” che non sono uno e che in mancanza del “diverso” si respingono del tutto.

2.3 L'opinione di Migliori sul senso del “Non Uno”

Migliori (2000²: 250–254) qui fa delle osservazioni che mi sembra che confermino quanto sto rilevando soprattutto a carico di Antistene. Dice infatti:

Il vero guadagno teoretico di questo stranissimo ragionamento consiste appunto nel parlare di una “polarità” che non si basa sul Diverso, ma che evidentemente, obbedisce ad altre regole, in quanto non si basa nemmeno sulla differenza reciproca (2000²: 254).

Interessante dal mio punto di vista è la giustificazione che subito ne dà:

È significativo il fatto che questa assoluta differenza venga esplicitata soprattutto sul versante del Non Uno: c'è una sorta di inciso in cui, fuori dello schema logico dell'argomentazione, si parla di questo Non Uno, proprio per fare intendere che non può essere confuso con gli Altri: solo partecipando dell'Uno si possono affermare i numeri, questo Non Uno, che non partecipa affatto dell'Uno, non ha dimensione numerica (*ibid.*).

Una ulteriore specificazione di questo “Non Uno” ci viene da quanto dice ancora subito dopo:

⁹ Sulle relazioni di identità e diversità e sul rapporto “parti-tutto” vd. Ferrari (2019⁸: 284–285, n. 132), il quale fornisce una sintesi dettagliata delle relazioni possibili.

Si è in tal modo realizzata una serie di guadagni.

(a) Si è inserita una riflessione su un modo di essere Altro dall'Uno che è opposto all'Uno, non riconducibile al semplice "essere altro" proprio, ad esempio, della molteplicità; [...](*ibid.*).

In questo "Non Uno" che non è riconducibile al semplice "essere altro", mi pare di vedere l'*alotrion* di Antistene piuttosto che l'*alloion* di Platone, il quale *alotrion*, appunto, non aveva relazione reciproca con l'uno, il quale, a sua volta, aveva una sua identità in quanto *hen kai pan* non riconducibile all'*hen kai pan* che dell'uno aveva anche Platone, come vedremo adesso nel prossimo § 2.4.

2.4 L'enantion come *alloion* in Platone. Prm. 147c1–148d1

Superamento dell'aporia di Zenone nelle idee e approdo ai precedenti della contemporanea partecipazione all'identico e al diverso che verrà ripresa e approfondita nel *Sofista*

Per risolvere questa aporia – se di questo si tratta, come a me sembra – Platone prende le mosse da quella che può essere considerata come una vera e propria *epischepsis tōn onomatōn*, di stile antistenico, in funzione di una corretta *chrēsis* logica di tali nomi. Il nome in questione è quello di *heteron*, che – diversamente dall'uso che ne fa Antistene – deve servire per mettere in collegamento, senza contraddizione, l'uno in quanto diverso dagli altri e questi da quello.

2.4.1 Prm. 147c1–e3: L'*epischepsis sul nome (onoma) heteron*

– Dunque esso (l'uno) non è anche sia simile che dissimile, tanto rispetto a sé, quanto agli altri? – Forse. – E dal momento che è risultato diverso dagli altri, anche questi ultimi, credo, saranno diversi dall'uno. – E allora? – L'uno non è dunque diverso dagli altri nella stessa misura (*houtōs*) in cui anche questi ultimi (*hōsper kai*) sono diversi dall'uno, né più né meno (*oute mallon oute hēttōn*)? – E perché dovrebbe esserlo? – Se non lo è né più, né meno, lo sarà in misura simile (*homoiōs*). – Sì. – Dunque, in quanto l'uno si trova ad essere diverso dagli altri e allo stesso modo questi si trovano ad essere diversi da esso, per questa ragione (*tautēi*) l'uno sarà nelle condizioni di essere identico (*tauton*) agli altri e questi all'uno. – Come dici? – Così: non riferisci (*kaleis*) ciascun nome (*hekaston tōn onomatōn*) a qualcosa di determinato (*epi tini*)? – Io sì. – E allora? Lo stesso nome (*to auto onoma*) non lo puoi dire (*eipois*) più volte o una sola volta (*pleonakis hē hapax*)? – Sì. – Se lo dici (*eipēs*) una volta sola (*hapax*), ti appelli (*prosgoreueis*) a ciò al quale il nome propriamente appartiene (*houper esti*), mentre se lo dici più volte (*pollakis*) non ti appelli a quella cosa? Oppure tanto che tu pronunci (*phthenxēi*) lo stesso nome una volta sola, quanto che tu lo faccia più volte, è assolutamente necessario che tu ti stia sempre riferendo alla stessa cosa (*tauton*)? – E allora? – Anche l'espressione "diverso"

(*heteron*) rappresenta un nome (*onoma*) che si riferisce a qualcosa di determinato (*epi tini*)? – Certamente. – Quando lo proferisci (*phthengēi*), sia una volta sola che più volte, non lo riferisci ad altro e non nomini altro se non ciò di cui esso era (*ēn*) il nome? – Per forza.

L'interesse di questo passo sarebbe dato, a mio avviso, dal fatto che qui Platone mette in atto una forma di *epischēpsis* del tutto simile a quella che faceva Antistene, quando, ad es., secondo la testimonianza di Plutarco, assegna al termine *aischron* un significato univoco e non soggetto a modifiche relativistiche:

Il turpe è turpe, sia che sembri, sia che non sembri (*aischron to g'aischron, kan dokei kan mē dokei*)

Questo il commento di Brancacci (1990: 76):

Questo frammento, [...] sottolinea in realtà la necessaria unità di significato di ogni singolo *onoma*: in tal senso, esso conferma come la preoccupazione fondamentale del Socratico fosse quella di mettere in luce il significato proprio (*oikeion*), e perciò uno (*hen*), di ciascun termine, assicurando così un solido fondamento alla riflessione morale.

Sia per Antistene, come qui anche per Platone, il significato di un nome in generale rimane immutato, e ciò vale sia per il presente, come per il passato e si potrebbe aggiungere anche per il futuro per entrambi (per Antistene vd. il suo *Od.* 6,9,14).

Brancacci (1990: 77) ci offre una testimonianza di questo accordo quando per confermare questa concordanza porta l'esempio che si trova alla fine dell'*Eutidemo*: «il quale [esempio] – dice lo studioso – fornisce al testo antistenico un riscontro illuminante». Si tratta della disputa tra Socrate e Dionisodoro sulla domanda posta dal primo a Clinia del perché rida di “cose così serie e belle”, etc. (*Euthd.* 101b6–8).

Fin qui i due Socratici concordano. La differenza tra i due inizia quando si passa a trattare l'*epischēpsis* e la *chrēsis* del nome *heteron*, perché, mentre per Antistene in un rapporto relazionale il nome *heteron* rimane sempre un *oikeion onoma* (con una definizione propria) e non può riferirsi a cose o a stato di cose diverse tra loro¹⁰, per Platone è tutto il contrario: il nome *heteron* è un nome come gli altri, e come gli altri ha sempre il medesimo significato riferibile a qualcosa di determinato secondo un rapporto biunivoco tra nome e cosa o stato di cose, come mi sembra testimoniato ancora dal passo seguente (per altre differenze vd. *ibid.* 119–129):

¹⁰ Nel caso poi di nomi polisemici bisognava determinare “con chiarezza la legittima sfera di applicazione o uso” su cui vd. Brancacci (1990: 60–64).

2.4.2 Prm. 147e3–6: La chrēsis del nome heteron: un heteron per due stati di cose hetera in quanto alloia (diversi) contro due “heteron” per due stati di cose hetera in quanto allotria (estranei)?

– Quando affermiamo che gli altri sono diversi dall’uno e l’uno è diverso dagli altri, pronunciando due volte (*dis*) il termine “diverso” (*to heteron*), non lo riferisci a un’altra natura (*epi allēi tēi phusēi*), ma lo attribuiamo sempre a quella di cui era il nome (*ēn tounoma*). – Certamente. –

Sarebbe qui che cambierebbe l’impiego del nome *heteron*: per Antistene non sarebbe lo stesso dire che l’uno è diverso dagli altri e che gli altri sono diversi dall’uno, perché ogni stato di cose ha il suo nome e la sua definizione, per cui la diversità cambia di stato in stato e non può essere ridotta ad un’unica e identica natura (*phusis*), in quanto questo significherebbe rendere diverso (*heteron*) e altro (*allo*) e cioè semplicemente diverso (*alloion*) ciò che invece è estraneo, *allotrion*, finendo per equiparare ciò che è *oikeion* con ciò che è *koinon* e non *oikeion* e dunque *allotrion*, introducendo così la contraddizione e il non essere nell’identità dell’uno.

Per Platone, invece, sarebbe tutto il contrario: il nome *heteron* non cambierebbe la sua *phusis* referenziale soltanto perché si attribuisce a stati di cose differenti, in quanto resta sempre lo stesso, con lo stesso significato, a qualunque cosa venga riferito e per quante volte venga usato. Il *poion* del nome, una volta stabilito in modo univoco rispetto alla cosa di riferimento, non muta con il variare dei riferimenti e con la quantità, con il *poson*, in quanto sarebbe l’espressione di un *eidōs* e di un *noēma* universali, in cui la corrispondenza biunivoca tra nome e cosa resta ciò che “era” (*ēn*) stato stabilito in origine per tutti i casi possibili, senza eccezione di stato delle cose in relazione di diversità tra di loro.

Potrebbe perfino sembrare che con le parole *dis to heteron eipontes* di Prm. 147e4 Platone abbia voluto superare proprio questa concezione antistenica che duplicava il senso di *heteron* con una espressione critica quasi *ante litteram*: un solo *heteron* per due stati di cose diverse e non due per due, come probabilmente, forse avrebbe voluto Antistene.

Inizia da qui la parte del *logos* riservata al superamento dell’aporia di Zenone e ai rapporti tra diversi e identici che si intersecano senza annullarsi e senza contraddirsi.

2.4.3 Prm. 147e6–148a6: la riduzione dei diversi a simili e il superamento dell’aporia zenoniana riportata nelle idee

– In quanto poi l’uno è diverso dagli altri e gli altri sono diversi dall’uno, proprio in virtù del fatto di essere affetti dal diverso, l’uno sarà affetto non da altra (*ouk allo*), bensì (*alla*) dalla medesima condizione (*to auto*) rispetto agli altri; ma, credo, ciò che è soggetto alla stessa condizione (*tauton*) è simile (*homoion*) o no? – Sì. – Dunque, in quanto si trova ad essere diverso dagli altri, proprio per questo motivo l’uno sarà completamente simile (*hapan hapa-*

sin homoion) a tutti quanti gli altri, perché è completamente diverso da tutti quanti (*hapan hapantōn*). – Sembra.

Iniziano da qui gli effetti dell'uso platonico del termine *heteron* applicato all'uno e agli altri dall'uno. La prima operazione è quella di mostrare come, con l'ausilio di questo termine, è possibile superare quella contraddizione che Zenone aveva scorto nei molti sensibili, allorquando si fossero attribuiti ad essi contemporaneamente gli attributi di simile e dissimile che sono contrari tra di loro.

Adesso ci sarebbe la mediazione di questo termine comune (*koinon*) a tutti i diversi in relazione tra loro, che permetterebbe di superare la loro diversità e contrarietà reciproca e con essa la contraddizione. L'identità comune raggiunta con il termine *heteron* riduce la loro diversità particolare e li rende tutti simili: l'uno, dice Platone, sarebbe affetto non da altra condizione (*ouk allo*) nel senso di *alotrion* – come ho già detto che invece credo che sarebbe per Antistene, (cosa che, però, naturalmente, resta sottintesa) –, ma dalla stessa condizione (*alla to auto*), che lo rende “completamente” (*hapan*) simile (*homoion*) a tutti quanti gli altri (*hapasin*): il nome si adegua pienamente alla cosa.

In questo passo vediamo come Platone insista sul fatto che l'uno che va ad assimilarsi agli altri lo fa portandosi dietro la molteplicità delle parti che lo compongono: *hapan* ripetuto due volte mi sembra che voglia alludere al fatto che l'uno ha una sua unità complessa costituita da tante *diaphorai* tutte simili e che è anche per lui *hen kai pan*, come per Antistene, ma con la differenza che all'uno così concepito corrisponde una identità particolare che non si perde nella identità comune. Ricordiamoci che alla fine di *Prm.* 145b6–e6 Platone aveva affermato che l'uno in quanto *holon* è in altro e in quanto è *ta panta merē* è in sé. Questa complessità l'uno se la porterebbe nella nuova identità comune.

Il motivo di questa sottolineatura lo troverei nel desiderio di evitare che la riduzione della loro iniziale dissomiglianza e contrarietà individuale alla successiva somiglianza e identità comune faccia appiattare su questa le differenze e le contrarietà individuali, che, invece, non devono venire appiattite, perché, in tal caso, ci sarebbe il rischio di perdere di vista il fatto che sono esse che permettono l'identità comune, senza, tuttavia, perdere del tutto la loro identità particolare di partenza in quella comune di arrivo. Una conferma in tal senso ci potrebbe venire da *Prm.* 148a6–c3, che adesso vedremo (§ 2.4.5). Ciò sarebbe pienamente d'accordo con *Prm.* 147c3–6 sopra visto, dove la somiglianza viene distinta dall'identità di cui è affine e da cui dipende.

A fuggire questo rischio provvedono due argomenti entrambi finalizzati a ricondurre i simili ai dissimili di partenza, ma prima vediamo in che cosa consiste il “*gesto riparatore*” di Platone in questo luogo, secondo Migliori.

2.4.4 L'opinione di Migliori sui simili e sui dissimili e il "gesto riparatore" di Platone

A proposito di simili e dissimili, anche per questo caso vorrei riportare l'opinione di Migliori, la quale potrebbe, ancora una volta, confermare quella mia sulla presenza di Antistene in questi luoghi della *gymnasia*.

Migliori (2000²: 255–262), iniziando a trattare dell'uno in quanto simile e dissimile a se stesso e agli altri (*Prm.* 147c–148d), a proposito del significato del termine "diverso" (*heteron*), fa un'altra osservazione che, dal mio punto di vista più storiografico, mi sembra che possa avere una certa importanza. L'osservazione è questa:

Ma il nucleo vero di questa argomentazione [cioè del fatto che l'uno e gli altri partecipando del diverso hanno una identità reciproca e sono simili] non risiede nell'argomento stesso, ma nel *gesto riparatore* che Platone compie (p. 156).

La giustificazione che egli porta mi sembra bene adeguata alla premessa:

Nell'argomento precedente egli ha affermato che il Diverso non può mai stare per qualche tempo in una cosa, perché altrimenti starebbe nell'Identico. Abbiamo sottolineato il valore distruttivo di una simile affermazione. Per questo Platone torna *sul luogo del misfatto*: qui infatti troviamo un lungo e contorto inciso, un procedimento che, come abbiamo già visto, egli utilizza spesso, in questa apparentemente compatta serie di ragionamenti per sviluppare elementi e concetti che gli interessano e che vengono inseriti nel contesto senza apparente necessità (*ibid.*).

Un altro caso simile che chiama in campo ancora la nozione di "inciso" con il suo senso problematico la troviamo nell'argomentazione che ho riportato in precedenza riguardo alla opposizione "Uno–Non Uno" in *Prm.* 147a3–4 (p. 154).

Come si vede, Migliori, in entrambe le argomentazioni, segnala la presenza di un "inciso" che "esce fuori dagli schemi logici propri dell'argomentazione" in corso e talvolta anche "senza apparente necessità". Questo mi conferma nell'opinione che è possibile che la problematicità evidenziata da questi "incisi" sia dovuta al fatto che Platone, oltre a sviluppare le implicazioni teoretiche dei suoi vari *logoi* per gli allievi dell'Accademia, mantenga pur sempre un occhio rivolto ai suoi obiettori esterni con i quali egli era in concorrenza e sui quali vorrebbe prevalere, se proprio non riesca a persuaderli.

L'importanza dell'osservazione di Migliori per me consisterebbe nel fatto che egli segnalerebbe qua e là delle opacità nella "apparentemente compatta serie di ragionamenti" platonici, che mi sembrano lascino intravedere qualcosa che c'è, ma che non si vede a prima vista, e che potrebbe essere proprio quello che sto tentando di portare alla luce, almeno per alcune di esse, rispetto ad Antistene.

2.4.5 *Prm.* 148a6–c3: *Il ritorno dei simili all'originaria dissomiglianza e il cosiddetto "parricidio" platonico di Parmenide*

– Ma il simile (*to ge homoion*) è certamente contrario al dissimile (*tōi anomoiōi enantion*). – Sì.
 – E il diverso (*to heteron*) è contrario (*enantion*) all'identico (*tōi autōi*) [qui l'*enantion* di Antistene come *alotrion* e quello di Platone come *alloion*, in quanto esprime la massima differenza, si sovrapporrebbero, ma senza confondersi]. – Anche questo è vero. – Ma è emerso pure questo risultato, che cioè l'uno è identico agli altri. – Infatti è emerso. – E l'essere identico agli altri è una condizione contraria rispetto all'essere diverso dagli altri. – Certamente [qui l'*enantion* e l'*heteron* sono soltanto quelli di Platone]. – In quanto diverso è simile. – Sì. – Allora, in quanto identico sarà dissimile per l'affezione opposta a quella che la rendeva simile. – Ma il diverso lo rendeva in qualche modo simile? – Sì. – L'identico [a sé stesso in quanto affezione opposta a quella che la rendeva simile] lo renderà dissimile, oppure non sarà contrario al diverso. – Sembra. – L'uno sarà simile e dissimile rispetto agli altri: in quanto diverso sarà simile, in quanto identico sarà dissimile. – Infatti, si verifica, a quanto pare (*hōs eoiken*), anche questa relazione (*kai toiouton logon*).

In questo passo mi sembra che Platone stia tentando di ripristinare l'originaria dissomiglianza. Con quale mezzo lo farà? Qui potrebbe sorgere un problema, perché mentre per la riduzione dei dissimili a simili il mediatore è stato trovato nel termine comune *heteron* ben individuato e circoscritto nella sua *phusis*, per il ritorno alla originaria dissomiglianza non c'è nulla di tutto questo, per cui il testo potrebbe prestarsi a qualche fraintendimento come quello che ha evidenziato Ferrari (2019⁸: 289, n. 134 al testo), quando dice che con questo argomento "Parmenide sembra incorrere in un errore logico"¹¹. Fronterotta (2008⁴: 127, n. 108 al testo) non segnala nessuna anomalia.

Io credo che Ferrari, almeno in parte, abbia ragione, tanto è vero che Platone è costretto a sottolineare che se l'"identico comune" (*to auto*) vuole davvero ritornare a rendere dissimili individualmente i simili, resi tali dalla diversità comune, non può non costituirsi che come *enantion* di *heteron*, e cioè come il contrario di se stesso, cioè come "identico a se stesso", in quanto anch'esso caratteristica comune, per cui, senza di questa, non potrebbe essere considerato contrario di un contrario o per lo meno contrario a pari titolo, cioè sia nei confronti della reversibilità dell'identico, che di quella del diverso.

Ho l'impressione che Platone fosse ben consapevole della difficoltà dell'argomento, se lo chiude con una frase come questa: «Infatti, si verifica, a quanto pare (*hōs eoiken*),

¹¹ Questa la motivazione (*ibid.*): «Egli procede in questo modo: dal momento che l'identità è opposta alla diversità, e che l'uno è identico agli altri in quanto è diverso da essi, dall'identità di uno e altri (prodotta dalla loro diversità) deve conseguire la loro diversità (che invece era il presupposto di partenza)». Si tenga conto, però, che in *Prm.* 147e3–6 la reversibilità tra diversi è stata dichiarata strutturale e quindi speculare, per cui il punto di arrivo presuppone quello di partenza e viceversa con tutti gli annessi coimplicati (identità–diversità, somiglianza–dissomiglianza).

anche una relazione di questo tipo (*kai toiouton logon*)» (*Prm.* 148c2–3), che mi sembra una espressione piuttosto problematica e non così lineare e sicura come di solito. Per questo forse più che di “errore logico” parlerei di una certa “forzatura” del termine *tauto* di *Prm.* 148b4 e di b6 su quello di *heteron*, determinata dall’esigenza di dimostrare la reversibilità dei contrari, che da assoluti che erano e che sono rimasti in quanto *allogria* per Antistene, sono diventati relativi e dunque *alloia*, in grado cioè di accogliersi reciprocamente, in quanto hanno la stessa *phusis*, senza però perdere del tutto la loro originaria diversità e identità, come rilevato sopra al § 2.4.3.

Questo potrebbe essere quello che viene detto in altro modo ancora più chiaramente nel passo seguente:

2.4.6 *Prm.* 148c3–d1: *Dall’identità comune all’identità individuale come comune alterità*

– E pure quest’altro. – Quale? – In quanto (l’uno) è soggetto alla condizione di essere identico (*tauto*) [agli altri], non si trova ad essere di altra natura (*alloion*); in quanto non è di altra natura (*alloion*) [rispetto agli altri], non è dissimile (*anomoion*) [dagli altri], e non essendo dissimile è simile (*homoion*) [ad essa]. Ma in quanto è soggetto alla condizione di essere altro (*allo*) [dagli altri], si trova ad essere di altra natura (*alloion*) [e cioè identico a se stesso] e in quanto tale è dissimile [dagli altri e simile a se stesso]. – Dici il vero. – Allora, in quanto identico (*tauton*) agli altri e per il fatto di essere diverso (*heteron*) [cioè identico a se stesso], in entrambi i casi e in ciascuno di essi preso singolarmente l’uno sarà simile e dissimile rispetto agli altri. – Certo.

Se teniamo presente che Platone nel *Parmenide* non fa differenza tra *allo* ed *heteron* (vd., ad es., *Prm.* 146d4–5 e 161a6–b3), possiamo capire che qui saremmo in presenza della coppia *tauto-heteron* / (*allo*) che verrà chiamata in causa nel *Sofista* e specialmente in 253d1–e2 per superare l’assolutezza dei contrari e del non essere in essi coinvolta. Sarebbe per questo che io parlerei di precedenti della *koinōnia* e del cosiddetto “parricidio” (*Sph.* 241d3), che verranno sviluppati in questo dialogo. Mi pare, infatti, che qui nel *Parmenide* Platone voglia implicitamente anticipare quello che sarà lo sviluppo che prenderà la sua riflessione sull’essere e sul non essere in quel dialogo, sostituendo anche in tal modo quello che, immagino, potrebbe plausibilmente essere considerato come un “parricidio mancato”, quello di Antistene, mentre il suo, mettendo insieme aspetti diversi e comuni (*koina*) e aspetti identici e propri (*oikeia* e *idia*) degli enti in relazione tra loro, raggiungerebbe un “parricidio completo”, se così vogliamo chiamarlo.

In entrambi i “parricidi” non si tratta, comunque, che di una rilettura in parte correttiva della concezione monolitica dell’essere che aveva Parmenide da parte dei due Socra-

tici per contrastare alcune obiezioni dei sofisti, specialmente di Protagora e Gorgia, come ha messo bene in evidenza Casertano (2015b: 45–77 e oltre).

In questo modo io credo che Platone abbia dimostrato come sia possibile riportare nelle idee le contraddizioni rilevate da Zenone nel campo della sensibilità, come desiderato dal giovane Socrate, ma come anche sia possibile risolverle, anticipando quello che dirà in modo più esplicito nel *Sofista* e dissociandosi in questo modo dalla concezione che continuava a tenere Antistene dell'*heteron* come *enantion* e come *allogrion* e dell'uno come *hen kai pan* chiuso in se stesso senza relazioni esterne reversibili¹².

3) TERZO LOGOS IN H2.D1: *Prm.* 160b5–161a5

Precondizioni semantiche, grammaticali e linguistiche di conoscibilità del senso dell'ipotesi: “ma se poi l'uno non è” (*ei de dē mē esti to hen*)

¹² Fronterotta (2015: 156–158) ritiene che nel *Sofista* la *phusis* in sé dell'*heteron* non ci sia e che la sua *phusis* di fatto venga accorpata a quella dell'essere inteso come *dunamis*, ossia come “una sorta di originario essere-diverso” secondo una “ontologia ‘dinamica’”, sempre in movimento e protesa verso l'altro, di cui però egli stesso non manca di porsi il problema se in questo “accostamento di due nozioni fra loro radicalmente eterogenee” non si possa insinuare una certa “contraddittorietà”, cosa che mi sembra possibile, anche alla luce di quanto Platone dice nei passi del *Parmenide*, cit. Mi sembra, infatti, che questi passi preludano proprio allo sviluppo che avranno nel *Sofista*: come l'essere non si identifica con l'identico, così non si identifica neppure con il diverso. Le tre idee di essere, identico e diverso si partecipano tra di loro senza perdere nessuna la propria inseità. Almeno qui nel *Parmenide*, mi sembra che Platone dia una definizione non contraddittoria di *heteron*, considerandolo identico a se stesso, sempre allo stesso modo nei confronti dei vari diversi ai quali di volta in volta si partecipa, su cui vd. *Prm.* 147e3–6 sopra esaminato. L'alterità, ad esempio, non elimina l'inseità dell'uno, in accordo con *Prm.* 142b1–c7. Se l'identità del diverso fosse una “identità non identica” – come dice lo studioso (Fronterotta 2015: 157) – si verificherebbe l'inverso di quello che succede all'uno di Antistene, in cui la *diaphora*, ossia l'essere dell'uno come alterità, si risolve all'interno dell'uno stesso e tutto il resto vi rimane estraneo, mentre qui in Platone si risolvrebbe all'esterno dell'uno, nell'altro dall'altro, lasciando l'uno fuori ed estraneo a se stesso, contraddicendo, mi pare, *Prm.* 142b1–c7, cit.; ma l'uno in quanto altro dall'uno non perde del tutto la sua identità, ma solo in parte. Ciò sarebbe, credo, d'accordo anche con *Sph.* 255d1–e1, dove Platone esclude l'identità di essere e di diverso, dicendo che «se l'essere (*to on*) e il diverso (*to thateron*) non differissero del tutto (*pampoliu*)» e «il diverso partecipasse di entrambe le specie (*toin eidoin*) come l'essere (*to on*), qualche volta (*pote*) qualcuna delle cose che sono diverse sarebbe diversa (*heteron*) senza essere in rapporto con un diverso (*ou pros heteron*)», che sarebbe proprio quello che succede all'essere di Antistene, su cui vd. Mazzara (2018: 294–295). In questo senso condivido quanto dice Casertano (2015: 224) nella sua “replica” allo studioso, quando, a proposito del diverso in quanto idea, dice: «che, pur essendo un'idea ‘relativa’ (il diverso è sempre un diverso da), può essere considerata anche dalla prospettiva dell'identico (identico a se stesso in quanto è una specifica idea). Ma anche l'identico, in effetti, è una idea relativa ‘identico a’». Tuttavia – nonostante questo – la proposta di Fronterotta di accorpare l'*on* a *heteron* nel contesto del *Sofista*, avrebbe comunque, a mio avviso, un notevole interesse, in quanto alla fine finirebbe per mettere in questione la stessa affermazione di *Sph.* 255d1–e1, cit. Potrebbe, infatti, essere visto forse anche come un tentativo da parte di Platone di superare il suo collega sul suo stesso terreno, quello della *diaphora* di cui egli parla in *Tht.* 108d5–d8, di cui ho discusso all'inizio nel Primo *logos* e di quello dell'*hen kai pan* di cui ho discusso nel Secondo *logos*. Accorpare essere e diverso nel concetto di *dunamis* dinamizzerebbe l'*on* immobile nei ceppi della sua *diaphora* e del suo essere (un *holon-pan* del suo collega, ma, per certi versi, anche quello suo del *Sofista* cit.: l'*on* non sarebbe più *heteron pampoliu*, smentendo se stesso).

La seconda parte della *gymnasia* (H2) si apre con la domanda sulle conseguenze necessarie che derivano dall'ipotesi "se l'uno non è" (H2.D1) opposta all'ipotesi "se l'uno è" (H1.D2) della prima parte (H1).

Prima di esaminare il *logos* veritativo in *Prm.* 161e2–162b8, vorrei prendere in considerazione quelle che Platone ritiene che debbano essere le precondizioni semantiche, grammaticali e linguistiche dell'ipotesi "se l'uno non è" come premessa a quel *logos*.

Anche qui Platone va per la sua strada, seguendo la sua logica, ma, trattandosi di un momento, credo, ancora piuttosto caldo del dibattito sull'essere, forse a ridosso della "battaglia di giganti" di cui parla in *Sph.* 246a (su cui vd. Casertano 2015b: 94), mi sembra ben plausibile che possa trattarsi anche di una presa di distanza piuttosto circostanziata da parte sua rispetto al concetto di "uno" coinvolto nel *logos oikeios* del suo collega. Come ho ricordato sopra, per costui, secondo D.L., "*logos* è quello che chiarisce (*ho dēlōn*) il che cosa era (*ēn*) o è (*esti*)". Questo chiarimento abbiamo visto che secondo *Tht.* 202b5 avviene quando lo si consideri nella sua *ousia* una *sumplokē onomatōn*.

Rispetto al *come* essa si articola al suo interno il *Teeteto* – come abbiamo visto – ci fornisce diverse testimonianze, ma per intendere il passo del *Parmenide* in questione la testimonianza di *Tht.* 205b5 mi sembra sufficiente.

3.1 *Prm.* 160b6–c7

– Quale sarebbe (*tis oun an eiē*), dunque, il senso dell'ipotesi che afferma che l'uno non è? Differisce (*diapherei*) in qualcosa rispetto a quella che afferma che il non uno non è? – Certo che differisce. – Sostenere in forma ipotetica che il non-uno non è, è solamente differente, oppure è completamente (*pan*) contrario (*tounantion*) rispetto a sostenere in forma di ipotesi che l'uno non è? – Completamente contrario. – Se qualcuno formulasse l'ipotesi che la grandezza non è, oppure che la piccolezza non è, oppure facesse qualche altra ipotesi del genere, non risulta evidente che dice che "ciò che non è" è in ciascun caso qualcosa di diverso (*heteron ti*)? – Certamente. – Perciò anche ora non risulta evidente che, nell'ipotizzare che l'uno non è, ciò che non è costituisce qualcosa di diverso dalle altre cose, e anche noi sappiamo (*kai ismen*) di cosa parla? – Lo sappiamo (*ismen*).

Platone, in questo passo, mi sembra che si ponga da subito (sebbene, al solito, implicitamente) in posizione critica rispetto a questa definizione: secondo lui – credo – prima ancora di "chiarire" il contenuto ontico del *logos*, il "che cosa era o è" la cosa e quindi il "come" essa era o è, bisogna che sia chiaro innanzitutto (*prōton*) il soggetto logico e grammaticale della *sumplokē* su cui ricade il senso dell'ipotesi, che in questo caso è "l'uno", perché è esso "ciò che è detto non essere" (*to legomenon mē einai* – *Prm.* 160d1–2).

Bisogna identificare il ruolo semantico di questo soggetto, a che cosa si riferisce: che cioè questo "uno" sia proprio "quello" che vogliamo indicare (*ekeino*) e non un altro (*mē*

allo) (*Prm.* 161a1–2) e neppure il suo contrario (*tounantion*), il “non-uno” (*to mē hen*) (*Prm.* 160b7–c2) e, in secondo luogo (*epeita*), che questo “uno”, proprio perché ha una sua identità, seppure non ancora ben precisata, sia diverso (*heteron*) dagli altri, che cioè abbia un suo *poion* che sia *oikeion* di esso, come esigerebbe anche Antistene, almeno per certi aspetti, su cui vd. *supra*, n. 13.

Per questi, infatti, l’*heteron* è soltanto *allotrion* (vd. in Mazzara 2014: 159, *Aj.* 5–7, la differenza tra Aiace e Odisseo) e l’uno non ha rapporti organici e reversibili con gli altri, come per Platone, come subito a seguire vedremo che egli specificherà. In tal caso chi enuncia l’ipotesi si può dire che abbia chiaro ciò che dice e che lo può rendere altrettanto chiaro anche agli altri. Questo mi sembra il senso di *kai ismen ho legei* in *Prm.* 160c6: “e così sappiamo ciò che egli dice”.

Questa la prima ricapitolazione:

Prm. 160c7–d2

– Allora per prima cosa (*prōton*) egli [il qualcuno (il *tis* di *legoi* di 160c2) che enuncia l’analogia con la grandezza e la piccolezza] dice qualcosa di conoscibile (*ti gnōston*) [cioè l’uno in se stesso come qualcosa che già c’è, è lì, che è proprio quello e non un altro e che fa da soggetto della successiva attribuzione] e poi (*epeita*) di diverso (*heteron*) dagli altri (*tōn heterōn*), nel momento in cui dice uno, sia che aggiunga ad esso l’essere o il non essere. Infatti non si conosce (*gignōsketai*) per nulla meno che cosa (è) ciò che è detto non essere (*ti to legomenon mē einai*) e che (è) differente (*diaphoron*) dagli altri.

Sapere distinguere, nella *sumplokē* dell’ipotesi, “prima” il soggetto con una sua identità ben determinata e poi, contestualmente, ma subito “dopo”, il suo predicato che lo relaziona agli altri differenziandolo da questi: è questa la prima condizione che deve sapere chi la enuncia per essere ben consapevole di quello che dice.

Già questo sarebbe sufficiente per sapere che l’aspetto semantico e grammaticale è fondamentale per capire il senso di cosa si sta dicendo, per cui non basterebbe – come crede Antistene – sapere soltanto che l’uno nella *sumplokē* del *logos* è differente dagli altri, nel senso cioè che una volta affermata la sua identità secondo il rapporto *hen eph’ henos*, questo sia sufficiente a differenziarlo dagli altri. Secondo Platone mancherebbe la distinzione grammaticale di base tra soggetto e predicato, che hanno ruoli diversi nella proposizione e non sono interscambiabili. Platone forse vede il rischio di una sovrapposizione nella *sumplokē* tra il suo *heteron* come *alloion* e quello di Antistene come *allotrion* e vi insiste (su questo rischio di sovrapposizione vd. *Prm.* 148a6–c3 nel precedente § 2.4.5).

Egli, infatti, non ancora del tutto contento di questa prima esposizione, sebbene sia abbastanza chiara, vi ritorna una seconda volta riprendendo *ex archēs* con più forza e determinazione ciò che ha detto. Questo il testo della seconda ricapitolazione:

Prm. 160d3–6

– Allora bisogna dire così (*hōde*) da principio (*ex archēs*) che cosa deve accadere se l’uno non è: dunque in primo luogo (*prōton*) per l’uno si deve dare questa condizione, almeno così sembra,

vale a dire di esso deve esserci conoscenza certa (*epistēmēn*), altrimenti quando si ipotizza dell'uno che non è, neppure si saprebbe (*gignōschesthai*) che cosa si dice. – È vero.

Dopo questa prima preconditione Platone passa ad approfondire la diversità dell'uno, dal momento che questa può essere intesa in due modi: 1) sia in senso assoluto, nel senso che viene riferita all'uno a senso unico, cioè, solo alla diversità dell'uno nei confronti degli altri, come ritiene Antistene e come ritiene, ma solo in prima istanza, anche Platone¹³, e 2) non anche all'inverso, in senso relativo, cioè in quanto implica la relazione reciproca dell'uno nei confronti degli altri e viceversa in modo organico e direi anche dialettico, come, invece, ritiene solo Platone.

Questa, infatti, è la posizione di Platone che già abbiamo visto all'opera in H1.D2: un diverso è sempre diverso di un diverso e che adesso viene ripresa per chiarire che nella nuova ipotesi ("se l'uno non è") inizialmente e in prima istanza l'uno è definito diverso dagli altri, ma senza specificare questa diversità. Adesso Platone fa seguire la specificazione che consiste nell'aggiungere a quanto detto che: senza il coinvolgimento degli altri nella definizione della diversità dell'uno neppure questo potrebbe essere definito diverso. Questo mi sembra il senso di *oukoun kai ta alla* di *Prm.* 160d6.

Questo coinvolgimento degli "altri", del predicato, nella definizione dell'uno come soggetto credo che si possa notare anche da ciò che Platone afferma subito dopo: anche se sono coinvolti gli altri dall'uno, non è su questi che si deve fissare l'attenzione, ma sempre sull'uno, sul soggetto dell'ipotesi al quale ora può venire attribuita la diversità (*heteroiotēs*) in tutta la sua estensione semantica, come un'aggiunta a quella precedente (vd. *Prm.* 161a6 ss.). Quest'ultima, infatti, nella sua pur necessaria iniziale conoscibilità (*gnōston*), restava, pur sempre, un po' generica e parziale, come, appunto, accadeva nell'*oikeios logos* come *sumplokē* in Antistene. Questo mi sembra il senso di *pros tēi epistēmēi* in *Prm.* 160d8. Riporto il testo:

Prm. 160d6–160e2

– Non devono, dunque, allora anche gli altri (*oukoun kai ta alla*) essere diversi

¹³ Migliori (2000²: 328 e n. 11) assimila il giovane Aristotele (lo Stagirita) alla posizione che ha Platone dell'"Uno" come "Altro" in un "contesto postparricidio". Questo è vero in generale, ma tenendo conto qui anche del fatto che nel punto esatto del testo in cui compare la sua condivisione con Parmenide (*ismen* di *Prm.* 160c6–7) siamo ancora al livello grammaticale, in cui la distinzione di Platone con l'Antistene del concetto di "Altro" è inteso, per l'"uno", come *alloion* e, per l'"altro", come *allotriion*, cioè prima della chiamata in campo della *heteroiotēs* di *Prm.* 160d9, cioè prima della specificazione del tipo esatto di diversità dell'uno. Questo potrebbe essere ben sintomatico della posizione che Aristotele assumerà "da grande" (vd. *Metaph.* H 3.1043 b 23–28 e Brancacci (1990: 228–240), quando si dimostrerà più vicino all'*oikeion* di Antistene, cioè alla concretezza dei particolari, che agli *eidē* di Platone, nel senso che per Aristotele prima viene l'*hoti* e poi il *dioti*, fra le cui cause troviamo pure quella formale, che Platone assegnava alle idee e Aristotele al *tode ti*, al particolare, rispetto a cui l'*eidōs* della *heteroiotēs* restava estraneo, *allotriion*. Ma qui siamo ancora al livello dell'*hoti*, del "che", che in Platone corrisponde al livello grammaticale e in Antistene a quello pregrammaticale della *onomatōn sumplokē*, e non del "che cos'è", che in Platone corrisponde alla individuazione della specifica alterità e diversità del soggetto "grammaticale" e in Antistene alla interpretazione ed esplicitazione della *diaphora* dell'*erōtēthen*, cioè al soggetto "logico" dell'*oikeios logos*.

da esso (*hetera autou*), altrimenti non si potrebbe dire neppure che quello è diverso dagli altri (*mēde hekeino heteron*)? – Certamente. – Allora, oltre alla conoscenza certa (*pros tēi epistemēi*), per l'uno c'è anche la diversità (*kai heteroiotēs*), perché, quando si afferma che l'uno è diverso dagli altri, non ci si riferisce alla diversità degli altri, bensì a quella dell'uno. – Risulta.

Data questa evidente differenziazione tra la conoscenza precisa (*epistēmē*) dell'aspetto semantico-grammaticale riferito alla identità e all'alterità dell'"uno" in quanto soggetto dell'ipotesi (per due volte è usato il termine *epistēmē* – e sappiamo dal *Teeteto* quanta attenzione fa Platone a questo termine –, due volte *ismen*, una volta *gnōston*, e altre due volte *gignōscō* coniugato) e quello semantico allargato anche all'alterità degli altri e dagli altri, mi chiedo che cosa abbia spinto Platone a sottolineare con tanta enfasi questa differenza. La risposta che mi sono dato è quella a cui accennavo in precedenza.

Immagino che questo sia dipeso dal fatto che Platone, seppure indirettamente, vuole affrontare Antistene sul suo stesso terreno, quello della "differenza" (*diaphora*) dell'uno dentro la sua *sumplokē* – ossia quello dell'*hen eph' henos* di cui si è detto a proposito di H1.D1 – in questo caso quella dell'ipotesi "se l'uno non è": per Antistene, infatti, come ho detto, non esiste una differenza dagli altri strutturale tra diversi, la *diaphora* è un attributo assoluto o forse anche una costellazione di attributi (vd. la "politropia" di Odisseo in *Od.* 14) che si identificano soltanto e *in toto* con ciò a cui viene attribuita. La reversibilità della diversità tra diversi in quanto implica qualcosa di *koinon* tra soggetto e predicato non interesserebbe ad Antistene, perché questo – come abbiamo visto – significherebbe far partecipare ciascun diverso, che è identico solo a se stesso, della identità dell'altro che per essa resta un estraneo, di fatto un contrario e dunque un non essere, andando – credo – secondo lui, contro Parmenide.

Sarebbe, invece, questa concezione assoluta della diversità che Platone di fatto contesterebbe, anche se non lo dice esplicitamente: non c'è diverso senza un diverso da cui differenziarsi, e anche ammesso che ciò sia possibile, che si possa cioè differenziare – come direbbe Antistene – qualcosa da qualcos'altro senza tenerlo in conto e lasciandolo fuori come estraneo, anche così, sembra dire Platone, questo soggetto, già solo per il fatto di ricoprire il ruolo di soggetto, semanticamente e grammaticalmente sarebbe qualcosa di determinato con una sua qualità, con un suo *poion*, e ciò a prescindere dal fatto che vi si attribuisca l'essere che lo confermi in questa sua identità e diversità, oppure il non essere che gli neghi il predicato che gli viene attribuito¹⁴.

Anche qui Migliori, (2000²: 330) ha colto bene, a mio avviso, il nocciolo della questione, sebbene, come al solito, dal punto di vista teoretico:

¹⁴ Sul concetto di *poion* vd. Casertano (2015b: 95), che lo riprende a proposito del riferimento del nome alle determinazioni qualitative della cosa da esso indicata in *Sph.* 237c3.

«Inoltre, si è ribadito, sia pure senza enfasi, un concetto che già conosciamo: questo Uno è diverso per se stesso, non per riflesso della diversità degli Altri».

In sostanza, Platone sembra voler dire che i nomi nella *sumplokē* del *logos* non sono tutti equivalenti, ma hanno ruoli diversi e che di questo si deve tenere conto prima ancora di sapere “il che cosa era o è” la cosa a cui si riferiscono. Ricordiamoci della critica che Platone fa in *Tht.* 203a1–d10 e 207a9–c4, cit., a proposito delle lettere che compongono i nomi di Socrate e di Teeteto: esse debbono avere una conoscibilità più precisa delle sillabe e dei nomi che vanno a comporre. Anche qui i nomi nella *sumplokē* non sono assimilabili agli *stoicheia aloga kai agnōsta*. In *Sph.* 261d1–262d6 Platone dirà che non fanno *logos* solo i nomi e solo i verbi. In questo luogo del *Parmenide* tutto questo mi sembra ben presente nell’atteggiamento di Platone già a proposito dell’*epistēmē* semantico-grammaticale di cui dicevo sopra.

Anzi direi che in questa insistenza semantico-grammaticale mi sembra di vedere prefigurata la distinzione che egli farà in *Sph.* 161d2 ss.: innanzitutto tra *onomazein* e *legein* e poi, a seguire, quando a proposito dei due *logoi*: 1) “Teeteto siede” e 2) “Teeteto con il quale parlo, vola”, egli vi distingue il soggetto a cui appartiene il *logos* (*hotou* – *Sph.* 162e12–15) e quello intorno a cui si parla (*peri hou*) (*Sph.* 263a5), da una parte, e dall’altra, il *poion* del *logos* stesso che riguarda il vero e il falso.

La prima distinzione riguarda la forma espressiva, la seconda il contenuto di verità o di falsità: 1) di verità se ciò che si dice di Teeteto dice di Teeteto “come” (*hōs*) egli è effettivamente, dice cioè l’identico come identico (o anche il diverso come diverso); 2) di falsità se dice il diverso come identico e viceversa, dove il diverso indica il non essere e l’identico l’essere (su ciò vd. la ricostruzione esemplare che ne fa Casertano (2015b: 109–117).

Su questo secondo aspetto qualitativo del *logos* il *Parmenide*, almeno in questo passo, non dice nulla, mentre invece per quanto riguarda il primo aspetto mi sembra che ben si adegui al primo senso della differenza dell’uno come soggetto che aspetta conferma o smentita dal rapporto relazionale con il predicato, che però viene preso in carico in un secondo momento, come quella diversità (*heteroiotēs*) in grado di farci conoscere il “che cos’è” realmente la cosa e come (*hōs*) è.

3.2 *Prm.* 160e2–161a5

Rimane ancora una terza preconditione da sapere con necessità che è quella che riguarda alcune forme linguistiche che servono ad articolare il *logos* stesso e senza i quali non si può parlare di nulla. Sono cose che si devono sapere, ma che non coinvolgono direttamente colui che parla usando, appunto, il linguaggio di cui non può fare a meno e di cui, tuttavia, “è necessario” che abbia contezza. Il *Sofista* riprenderà questo tema in 261d1–262c7.

Si tenga presente che Antistene esclude che espressioni linguistiche come *auto*, *ekaston*, *ekeino*, etc., si possano attribuire agli *stoicheia* (*Tht.* 201d8–202a8) perché *aloga*

kai agnōsta, mentre qui Platone sta trattando i nomi dentro il *logos*, in quanto *sumploke*, come *stoicheia* ben *gnōsta* già in partenza e ognuno con il proprio ruolo distinto. In tal senso questa terza preconditione va a saldarsi con le due precedenti e farebbe corpo unico – a mio avviso – probabilmente contro la concezione che di esse aveva Antistene.

Qui finisce il *logos* introduttivo dell'ipotesi “se l'uno non è” e con esso la trattazione del primo aspetto dell'ipotesi, quello semantico, grammaticale e linguistico che fa da premessa. Segue ora un secondo aspetto, quello “veritativo” e logologico dell'uno che interferisce più direttamente con il “che cosa era o è” o “non era o non è” la cosa e la sua conoscibilità.

4) QUARTO LOGOS IN H2.D1: Prm. 161e3–162b8

Il *logos* veritativo e il principio di identità del non essere: modalità per il ripristino del criterio “vero-falso” rimosso da Antistene e sostituito con il suo “proprio-estraneo” (*oikeion-allotrion*).

4.1 I testi di Gorgia interessati alla questione

Prima di analizzare il *logos* di Platone vorrei presentare i testi di Gorgia che, a mio avviso, sarebbero interessati alla questione. Intanto la parte iniziale del passo di Platone:

Pl. Prm. 161e3–162a4

– Inoltre esso (l'uno che non è) deve partecipare (*metechei*) in qualche modo anche dell'essere (*ousias*). – Ma come? – Esso deve essere così come stiamo dicendo (*houtōs hōs legomen*), perché se non fosse così, noi non diremmo il vero (*alēthē*) quando diciamo (*legontes*) che l'uno non è. Ma se diciamo il vero, è evidente che le diciamo che sono (*onta auta*). Non è così? – Sì, è così. – Ma dal momento che noi affermiamo (*phamen*) di dire il vero, è necessario (*anankē*) per noi affermare anche (*phanai kai*) che diciamo cose che sono. – Necessario. – Allora è, a quanto sembra, l'uno che non è. (*Estin ara, hōs eoike, to hen ouk on*). – Se infatti non fosse non essente (*mē on*), ma abbandonasse (*anēsei*) in qualche modo (*pēi*) l'essere (*tou einai*) verso il non essere (*pros to mē einai*), sarebbe immediatamente essente (*euthus estai on*) [che è proprio quello che gli succede e che bisogna evitare]. – Assolutamente.

SE (M VII 67)

– Ed allora il non ente non è (*to men mē on ouk estin*). Se, infatti, il non ente è (*ei gar to mē on estin*), sarà e contemporaneamente non sarà (*estai te ama kai ouk estai*). In quanto, infatti, viene pensato come non-ente (*ouk on noitai*), non sarà (*ouk estai*); ma in quanto è non ente (*esti mē on*), di nuovo sarà (*palin estai*). Ma è del tutto assurdo che contemporaneamente qualche cosa sia e non sia. – Dunque il non ente non è.

MXG (ed. Untersteiner) 979, 24–28: *idios apodeixis*

– Se infatti il non essere è non essere, per nulla meno sarebbe il non-ente dell'ente (*ei men gar to mē einai esti mē einai, ouden an hētton, to mē on tou ontos eiē*). Infatti il non-ente è non-ente e l'ente (è) ente, cosicché i *pragmata* per nulla sarebbero più di quanto non sarebbero (*ouden mallon einai ē ouk einai*).

MXG (ed. Untersteiner) 980, 8–12

– Se [non c'] è nulla (*Ei men ouden*), le dimostrazioni, dice, ingannano (*apantan*). Bisogna, infatti, che tutte quante (*hapanta*) le rappresentazioni (*ta phronoumena*) siano (*einai*), e il non-ente (*to mē on*), se è vero che non è (*eiper mē esti*), non deve neppure venire rappresentato (*mēde phroniesthai*). Ma se è così, non ci sarebbe nulla di falso (*ouden an einai pseudos*), neppure se, dice, qualcuno affermasse che cocchi corrono a gara sul mare. Infatti, tutte le cose (*panta*) sarebbero identiche (*tauta eiē*).

Che il testo di Platone si possa accostare ai temi trattati da Gorgia nella sua *idios apodeixis* si può notare da alcune interferenze. Mi pare, infatti, che egli, quando all'inizio dice: «Bisogna che esso (l'uno che non è) stia (*echein*) come diciamo (*hōs legomen*) [che cioè rimanga nel suo essere quello che è, un non essere]», riprenda quanto riassume Sesto nella sua versione quando dice: «In quanto, infatti, (il non ente) viene pensato come non ente (*ouk on noeitai*) non sarà», con la sostituzione del “dire” con il “pensare”.

Mi sembra, infatti, che sia proprio quello che viene ripreso da Platone con il termine *phamen*: “afferriamo” di dire cose che sono (*onta*) nella loro identità e diversità così come le diciamo che sono (*hōs legomen*) e dunque vere, in caso contrario rischieremmo di dire cose non vere e implicitamente, dunque, anche false perché inesistenti (questo, però, resta sottinteso, sarà il tema del *Sofista*). Ma noi, invece, dice Platone, affermiamo chiaramente (*dēlon*) di dire cose vere, perché, nel dirle, siamo convinti di pensarle anche così come stanno realmente, cioè: *hōs echein*. In tal modo il “come” del dire, dell'*hōs legomen* (e del pensare) viene trasferito alle cose, al “come esse stanno”, all'*hōs echein* nella loro identità e diversità. Diciamo, allora, e pensiamo cose vere e per questo anche che stanno come stanno (*hōs hechein*) realmente, in modo sia esistitivo, che qualificativo.

A questo *phamen* in forma affermativa diretta segue in forma pure affermativa, ma indiretta, un *anankē phanai* che inverte la relazione: mentre nel *phamen* era l'affermare (e con esso il pensare) che si adeguava allo stato di cose in cui si presentava o si presumeva che si presentasse il non essere dell'“uno che non è”, ora è anche in *phanai* che l'affermare (e il pensare) si costituisce criterio di verità e anche di realtà dell'uno che non è e questo come una implicazione necessaria. I due processi di andata e di ritorno dell'adeguazione veritativa del pensare e del dire verso l'essere e da questo a quelli si corrispondono e si integrano reciprocamente. Allora la prima conclusione di Platone è che l'“uno che non è”, ossia è confermato nella sua identità di non essere, esiste “veramente” e dunque “realmente” in quanto tale e ciò in modo necessario.

Ma questa conferma da parte del *phanai* rispetto a quanto rilevato dal *phamen* quanto è “necessariamente” valida? Il primo a mettere le mani avanti è proprio Platone, il quale subito aggiunge che, perché questo “uno che non è” stia così come diciamo che sta, biso-

gna che esso stia al suo posto così come viene rilevato e che vi rimanga come non essere, ossia come qualcosa a cui viene negato un attributo che non ha (perché magari ne ha un altro diverso: ma questo rimane implicito). Infatti se si spostasse dall'essere (non essere) per andare verso il non essere quello che è, ossia verso "il non essere più se stesso", cioè "non essere" (*tou einai anēsei pros to mē einai*), subito sarebbe quello che non è, cioè "uno che è", ossia sarebbe essere al pari dell'essere dell'"uno che è", mentre deve restare "uno che non è". Ma questo sarebbe proprio quello che gli accade con il *phanai*.

Chi ci assicura, infatti, che l'"uno che non è", partecipando dell'essere dell'"uno che è", non vada ad indentificarsi con questo, perdendo così la propria identità di "essere non essente"? I due sensi dell'essere, quello predicativo ed esistenziale dell'"uno che non è" e quello ugualmente predicativo ed esistenziale dell'"uno che è" si sovrappongono, finendo, di fatto, per costituire l'essere che è proprio di ciascuno di essi la negazione dell'essere che è proprio dell'altro a causa della presenza in entrambi della "è" esistenziale. In tal modo la partecipazione dell'"uno che non è" all'essere dell'"uno che è" rimane a rischio della propria identità: è se stesso e non lo è, è identico a se stesso e non lo è, "non più è di quanto non è".

Con ciò siamo condotti di fronte all'aporia sollevata da Gorgia nel giudizio di identità del non essere "il non essere è non essere", in cui si incontrano e si scontrano i due aspetti del *logos*: quello gnoseologico e quello logologico che gli è proprio.

Questo, a mio avviso, sarebbe esattamente l'equivoco gorgiano riassunto da Sesto, che richiamavo sopra, quando dice: «in quanto, infatti, (il non ente) viene pensato come non ente (*ouk on noitai*) non sarà, ma in quanto è non ente (*esti mē on*) di nuovo sarà», in cui fa valere l'ambiguità predicativa ed esistenziale della copula "è" nel giudizio di identità "l'uno che non è è uno che non è", meglio espressa nella versione di MXG: «Se il non essere è non essere e l'ente è ente, per nulla meno (*ouden an hēton*) sarebbe il non ente dell'ente», in cui si perde l'identità specifica dell'ente e del non ente e con essa la stessa esistenza dei *pragmata*, per cui questi «non più *sarebbero* [esistono] (*ouden mallon*) di quanto non *sarebbero* [non esistono]».

Sarebbe in questo contesto che andrebbe letta quell'affermazione di *Prm.* 162a1–2: «Allora, a quanto pare, l'uno, pur non essendo, è (*Estin... to hen ouk on*)».

Con ciò quell'adeguazione dei *logoi* ai *pragmata* e di questi a quelli espressa distintamente da *phamen* e *phanai* viene meno. La necessità (*anankē*) che regge il *phanai* costringe la logica ontologica degli enti reali espressi dal *phamen* ad adeguarsi alla logica logologica del *logos heteros* di Gorgia (Sex. 84), su cui confluiscono gli enti del mondo reale, quelli del mondo immaginario come la "chimera" e persino quelli della falsità percettiva come i carri che gareggiano sul mare. Le due verità non si corrispondono (sull'ambiguità della corrispondenza tra le due verità vd. Casertano 2015b: 115–117).

Che si fa? Come si esce, se si può uscire, dall'aporia? I due Socratici si trovano entrambi di fronte allo stesso problema, che ognuno risolve a modo proprio (su ciò vd. Mazzara 2018: 292–293).

Antistene ritiene che il pensiero e il *logos* che lo esprime non possono costituire il criterio dell'essere dei *pragmata* anche sulla base del fatto che è impossibile dire ciò

che non è, secondo Parmenide, e che chi dice dice sempre qualche cosa che è, nel senso che esiste, e il non essere, se è vero che non è, non può neppure venir pensato (su ciò vd. Cornford 1939: 33–35). Da ciò Gorgia concludeva (vd. la seconda cit. di MXG) che qualunque cosa pensiamo: la chimera, in ambito immaginativo, e carri che gareggiano sul mare, in ambito percettivo, tutto esiste parimenti, per cui il falso è escluso in partenza e tutto è vero ed esistente (per le implicazioni con Protagora vd. Casertano 2015b: 85 e 117).

4.2 La testimonianza di Proclo a carico di Antistene e analogia con il Platone del Sofista

Da ciò, secondo la testimonianza di Proclo, Antistene tirerebbe questa conseguenza per lui del tutto inaccettabile:

Procl. *in Cra.* 37 (= V A 155 G)

– Ogni *logos*, infatti, dice il vero (*alētheuei*). Infatti colui che dice (*ho legōn*), dice qualcosa (*ti legei*), ma colui che dice qualcosa dice ciò che è (*to on legei*). Colui, poi, che dice ciò che è (*to on*) dice ciò che è vero (*alētheuei*).

Il passo precedente in *Prm.* 161e3–162a4, sopra cit., ci presenta un Platone alle prese con un problema analogo a quello che Proclo ci testimonia per Antistene, che verrà ripreso in *Sph.* 237b1–e7, in cui anche per lui esplicitamente il *legein ti* si identifica con il *legein to on*, ma mentre Antistene non crede di potere recuperare la funzionalità del principio di identità che regge il criterio vero-falso, Platone invece anche qui nel *Parmenide* lo crede possibile e ci prova in questo modo.

4.3 Un *desmos* a doppia uscita per la piena funzionalità del principio di identità del non essere e il superamento dell'aporia gorgiana sulla sovrapposizione dell'essere copulativo/predicativo ed esistenziale.

Prm. 162a4–b8

– Perciò, se (l'uno che non è) vuole non essere, esso (*auto*) deve avere come legame (*desmon*) con il non essere l'essere non-essere, così come ciò che è, per essere a sua volta in modo compiuto (*teleōs*), deve avere come legame il non essere ciò che non-è (*to mē on*). [Da qui inizia la sovrapposizione della terminologia di Platone su quella di Gorgia (*on/mē on*), ma con intenti contrapposti]. In questo modo, infatti, ciò che è (*to on*) sarà in modo pieno (*malista*), mentre ciò che non è (*to mē on*) non sarà: ciò che è (*to on*) in quanto partecipa dell'essere di essere essente e del non essere di essere non essente, se vuole essere in modo compiuto (*teleōs*); ciò che non è, invece (*to de mē on*), in quanto partecipa del non essere di non essere non essente e dell'essere di essere non essente, se anche ciò che non è non sarà a sua volta in modo compiuto. – È veris-

simo. – Così, se ciò che è prende parte (*meteste*) al non essere e ciò che non è all'essere, anche per l'uno (*tōi henī*), dal momento che non è, è necessario che prenda parte (*meteīnai*) all'essere per potere non essere. – Necessario. – E allora l'essere risulta appartenere all'uno, se non è. – Risulta. – E anche il non essere visto che non è. – Come no?

Platone, per risolvere l'aporia gorgiana in cui rischia di restare bloccata l'adeguazione tra pensare, dire ed essere espressa dal *phamen* e dal *phanai*, insieme al concetto di partecipazione adotta quelle che già il gorgiano Alcidamante aveva considerato come funzioni fondamentali del *logos*: l'affermazione (*phasis*) e la negazione (*apophasis*) (D.L. IX 54 – vd. Mazzara 2005), che egli in *Sph.* 263e accoglierà esplicitamente, mentre qui vengono utilizzate senza essere neppure menzionate.

Il principio da cui egli parte è che ogni affermazione o negazione di qualcosa che è o che non è affinché resti quella che è, è necessario che non si muova da questo stato in cui si trova e che vogliamo descrivere proprio così com'è. Affinché si verifichi questo effetto, bisogna che in ciascun caso l'affermazione dell'essere o del non essere escluda la partecipazione alla sua negazione, secondo cui ogni affermazione dell'identità di ciò che è o che non è va a corroborare se stessa con l'esclusione alla partecipazione dell'essere del proprio contrario, ossia dell'essere di ciò che la nega. In questo modo, con l'intreccio di queste due funzioni, che per certi versi si escludono e per altri si includono reciprocamente, il *logos* può sfuggire alle sue stesse ambiguità evidenziate da Gorgia e riprese dai vari sofisti, attraverso l'uso di un principio di identità perfettamente funzionante¹⁵.

Allora se qualche cosa vuole essere e restare ciò che è, sia essa l'essere dell'"uno che è" o l'essere "dell'uno che non è", essa deve avere un *desmos* con funzione relazionale partecipativa doppia, che Platone precisa in questo modo:

1) nel caso dell'"uno che è", esso: a) [primo aspetto del *desmos*] deve partecipare dell'"essere" che è proprio di ciò che è realmente, e b) [secondo aspetto] non deve partecipare dell'essere che è proprio del suo contrario, che è l'essere di ciò che non è;

2) nel caso dell'"uno che non è", se vuole restare anch'esso "ciò che è" (ossia "che non è [questo, ma quest'altro]") in modo pieno, deve essere legato anch'esso: a) [primo aspetto del *desmos*], alla partecipazione dell'"essere" che è proprio di "ciò che non è", e b) [secondo aspetto], anche alla non partecipazione e quindi all'esclusione del suo contrario e cioè dell'"essere" che è proprio di "ciò che è", che per esso sarebbe la negazione della propria identità costituita dal non essere questo, ma quest'altro¹⁶.

Sarebbe questo, a mio avviso, il modo, da parte di Platone, di superare l'aporia predicativa ed esistenziale gorgiana dell'"è" (*esti*) nel giudizio di identità "l'uno che non è è uno che non è". Si tratta di una operazione affidata alle sole regole del semplice funzionamento del *logos* identitario e veritativo per tramite dell'affermazione e della negazione alla

¹⁵ Sul ruolo che ha avuto Gorgia sulla preminenza in Platone dell'uno di Melisso su quello di Parmenide e sulla concezione del procedimento deduttivo vd. Rossetti (2020: 135–148).

¹⁶ Per una chiara esemplificazione della sovrapposizione dei vari sensi dell'essere vd. Fronterotta (2008⁴: 140, n. 192).

partecipazione o alla non partecipazione a ciascuno dei due sensi dell'essere. Il *Sofista* (*Sph.* 262d–263d) svilupperà con esempi concreti come quelli di Teeteto “seduto” o che “vola” l'applicazione pratica di questa funzione logica in cui i due criteri adeguativi espressi dal *phamen* e dal *phanai*, sopra detti, tornano a corrispondersi: il pensare e il dire tornano ad adeguarsi ai *pragmata* e questi a quelli, con verità e senza contraddirsi¹⁷.

4.4 La sovrapposizione del linguaggio di Platone su quello di Gorgia nella idios apodeixis e scopi differenti delle rispettive argomentazioni

¹⁷ Sulla distinzione tra *onomazein* e *legein* a proposito degli esempi su Teeteto seduto e che vola vd. Casertano (2015b: 109–117) e il precedente Terzo *logos* (§ 3.1).

Prima di concludere, però, vorrei attirare l'attenzione su un particolare che mi sembra davvero interessante ai fini di mostrare quanto Platone abbia presente l'aporia gorgiana e in particolare proprio la sua *idios apodeixis*.

Si può, infatti, notare facilmente come subito dopo l'inizio del passo citato, quando egli con *auto* di *Prm.* 162a4 richiama l'"uno che non è" di *Prm.* 162a1–2, il confronto per spiegare il senso del termine *desmos* non viene fatto in modo diretto con l'opposto, ossia con l'"uno che è", come ci si sarebbe aspettati (cosa che verrà spostata e ripresa più sotto con *tōi te heni* in *Prm.* 162b4–5 e, da qui, accorpati nuovamente insieme fino a *Prm.* 162b8 e come io stesso ho cercato di interpretare cercando il senso dell'intero passo), ma con *ton* e *to mē on* a partire da *Prm.* 162a5, che sono esattamente i termini messi in opposizione da Gorgia nella sua *idios apodeixis* (MXG).

Qui la sovrapposizione della dimensione copulativa e di quella esistenziale dell'"è" conduce all'impossibilità di distinguere quali sono i *pragmata* che esistono e quali quelli che non esistono e di conseguenza all'impossibilità di "chiarire" anche quale è la loro specifica identità, che è ciò che mi pare qui interessi di più a Platone.

Adirittura sembra che i termini *malista* e *teleiōs* siano chiamati a sostituire il termine *mallon* usato da Gorgia, per il quale i fatti "non più sono di quanto non sono", mentre per Platone ora i fatti non solo sono (in senso esistenziale) quello che sono, ma lo sono "pienamente" (*teleiōs*) con tutte le loro caratteristiche predicative ben determinate. Sono, infatti, legati a questa loro identità attraverso l'esclusione esplicita della loro negazione per mezzo dell'intreccio partecipativo escludentesi operato dall'affermazione e dalla negazione: è questo e non è quello, partecipa dell'essere di questo e non partecipa dell'essere di quest'altro.

Qui vorrei far notare come tra l'argomento di Gorgia e quello di Platone ci sia una certa differenza: mentre l'argomento di Gorgia mirava a rendere i *pragmata* autocontraddittori e da qui indiscernibili al fine di negarne l'esistenza, spinto dalla polemica anti melissiana e parmenidea in particolare, per cui – egli affermava – che "Nulla esiste", etc., in assoluto, l'argomento di Platone, al contrario, mirava soprattutto a ripristinare l'identità dell'uno a cui, secondo l'ipotesi "se l'uno non è", viene negato qualche attributo che non gli compete e che quindi non fa parte della sua identità, per cui l'uno, ad es., non sarebbe questo, ma piuttosto quest'altro, sarebbe cioè una cosa diversa.

I due aspetti dell'uno, predicativo ed esistenziale, sono presenti entrambi in Platone con una certa preminenza dell'aspetto esistenziale determinata dall'interferenza della dimensione logologico-veritativa nel funzionamento del *logos*, che rendeva parimenti esistente qualunque cosa fosse espressa dal *legein*, e dal desiderio, da parte sua, di superarne l'ambiguità, ristabilendo il valore ontologico e gnoseologico del principio di identità

messo in crisi da Gorgia, come strumento capace di adeguare sia il pensiero e il *logos* alla realtà, che questa a quelli¹⁸.

Ciò mi sembra testimoniato dalla conclusione del passo che richiama per prima l'aspetto esistenziale dell'*ousia* dell'"uno che non è": «E allora l'essere (*ousia*) risulta appartenere (*phainetai*) all'uno», nel senso, cioè, che: 1) "all'uno che non è" appartiene lo stesso essere che appartiene a tutte le altre cose che esistono realmente, e che anche non esistono e dunque anche all'"uno che è" e 2) subito, ma a seguire, risulta appartenere ad esso anche quello predicativo: «E (risulta appartenere ad esso) anche il non essere (*Kai mē ousia*), se proprio non è (*eiper mē estin*)», nel senso, cioè, che l'uno, a cui viene negato l'attributo dell'essere, è proprio quello con la sua identità di uno che non solo c'è ed è qualcosa (*ti*) come tutte le altre (sempre in senso esistenziale), ma che è proprio quello, *to mē on* e non un altro *mē on*, come abbiamo visto nel Terzo *logos*.

Sarebbe questo, a mio avviso, per Platone il modo per superare l'aporia di Gorgia ripresa dalla testimonianza di Proclo al riguardo di Antistene, che però di fatto coinvolgeva anche lui, come è testimoniato dal *Sofista*, cit. Il *legein* può dire la verità (*alētheuein*) perché il qualcosa, (il *ti*) che il *logos* dice, è ora messo in grado di essere separato dalla sua negazione, superando l'autocontraddizione gorgiana. Di conseguenza si può ben dire che: l'*on* è *on* e il *mē on* è "realmente" anch'esso *mē on* e dunque "veramente" *mē on*, e, quindi, che pure l'"uno che non è" è proprio quell'uno che diciamo che "non è", nella sua identità particolare, e che non può essere confuso o identificato direttamente con l'"uno" dell'"uno che è". Possiamo allora dire che è identico a questo per l'aspetto logologico ed esistenziale, ma che è diverso per quello predicativo, cioè l'aspetto determinativo e identificante.

Ripristinata così la determinatezza dell'uno, anche nel caso che gli venga attribuito il non essere, oltre all'essere secondo *Prm.* 160c7–d1, la *gymnasia* riparte come era cominciata, riprendendo, cioè, l'ipotesi dell'"uno che non è" con tutte le caratteristiche assunte fin dall'inizio in *Prm.* 160b5–7 fino alla presente trattazione dei suoi rapporti con l'essere veritativo in *Prm.* 161e3–162b8 e ora anche oltre con quella della *metabolē* come *kinēsis* in *Prm.* 162b9–163b6¹⁹.

Questo, a mio avviso, significherebbe che l'esistenza chiamata in causa nel passo citato, sarebbe funzionale, cioè subordinata alla determinatezza dell'uno, sia che gli venga attribuito l'essere, che il non essere. Sarebbe questa che più interesserebbe a Platone nella *gymnasia*, mentre l'esistenza rimarrebbe presupposta come condizione indispensabile

¹⁸ Sulla sovrapposizione e distinzione del ruolo esistenziale e predicativo della "è" in questo passo vd. l'articolata e approfondita ricostruzione di Casertano (2015b: 83–88).

¹⁹ A questo riguardo Ferrari (2019³: 348–349, n. 198) sospetta che questo argomento «potrebbe prestare il fianco all'accusa di fallacia», con questa motivazione: «L'argomento precedente infatti non aveva dimostrato l'esistenza di un passaggio dell'uno che non è dall'essere al non essere (e *vice versa*) bensì la natura consustanziale di essere e non essere, i quali rappresentano condizioni fondamentali di questo uno, e in quanto tali coesistono in esso, senza succedere l'uno all'altro». Ho mostrato come questo passaggio ci sia effettivamente, almeno come rischio e come sia stato questo motivo che abbia spinto Platone a mobilitarsi per evitarlo.

per potere parlare con verità, senza la quale il *poion* dell'uno, a sua volta, non avrebbe una giustificazione logica pienamente (*teleiōs*) fondata²⁰.

Conclusione

Nei quattro *logoi* della *gymnasia* sopra esaminati ho cercato di mettere in evidenza come Platone, nello sviluppare il suo esercizio, vada per la sua strada senza polemizzare apertamente con nessun *tis*, come invece ha fatto nel *Fedone*, e tuttavia, nonostante questo atteggiamento distaccato, questa sua *hodos*, non di rado, incrociando quella del suo collega Antistene, entri in conflitto con essa.

Ho mostrato, allora, come le due vie, pur avendo un inizio aporetico comune, le obiezioni di Gorgia a Parmenide (H1.D2), lungo il percorso a volte si sovrappongano (su cui vd., nel Secondo *logos*, la definizione dei concetti), altre volte per qualche tratto procedano parallele (su cui vd. nel Primo *logos* la concezione dei contrari e nel Secondo *logos* l'uno come *holon* che si risolve soltanto nelle sue parti) e come talvolta si dissocino del tutto (su cui vd. nel Primo *logos* la definizione dell'uno come *diaphora* e nel Terzo *logos* il ruolo diverso dell'"uno" come soggetto rispetto al suo predicato – "non è" –, e nel Secondo *logos* la concezione del diverso come *alotrion* per Antistene e come *alloion* per Platone, etc.

Se questa descrizione delle due vie che a tratti si incrociano, si avvicinano e si allontanano nel modo che ho detto, può avere qualche plausibilità, da essa discende, a mio avviso, che chi ha scritto il dialogo doveva essere ben consapevole di percorrere una via solo in apparenza lineare e rettilinea, ma in realtà molto accidentata, tortuosa e talvolta persino bisognosa di qualche sottolineatura (penso, ad es. alla *diaphora* di *Prm.* 141a5–d3 nel Primo *logos* in H1.D1 o anche alla funzione del *desmos* in *Prm.* 162a4–b8 nel Quarto *logos* in H2.D1, §§ 4.3 e 4.4), dovendo di volta in volta schivare ostacoli e opporne altri, e tutto ciò senza darlo a vedere chiaramente.

Per questo credo che Franco Ferrari (2019⁸: 129), per certi aspetti, abbia ragione quando esclude che la *gymnasia* possa essere considerata «come la realizzazione di un proget-

²⁰ A proposito dell'aspetto logologico-veritativo del *logos*, è in corso un dissenso nell'interpretazione dell'essere nell'ipotesi "se l'uno non è" tra Franco Ferrari e Giovanni Casertano (vd. Casertano 2015b: 77-88 e per Ferrari 2015: 148–152) esteso oltre che alla prima deduzione della seconda serie (H2.D1) anche alla seconda (H2.D2). Casertano – dice Ferrari – sostiene che, stando a Parmenide «l'esistenza" rappresenta un postulato indispensabile di ogni nostro dire...», mentre egli ritiene che non è "l'esistenza" che qui interessa a Platone, quanto piuttosto «l'esigenza di individuare e di circoscrivere (come qualcosa di determinato) ciò di cui si parla» (p. 151). Io credo che entrambi abbiano una parte di ragione e che i loro punti di vista differenti costituiscano come una specie di doppia faccia della stessa moneta, ma su ciò rinvio ad una prossima pubblicazione, almeno spero. Ma, intanto, mi associo ai ringraziamenti che Ferrari (2015: 152) rivolge a Gianni Casertano, alla fine del suo intervento «per l'intelligenza analitica e la ricchezza delle sue riflessioni e per la passione che egli riesce a suscitare in chi lo legge».

to di rifondazione della teoria delle idee», osservando che «la “lezione” di Parmenide è priva di un significato ontologico immediato».

Tuttavia mi sembra un po' riduttivo considerare questa “lezione” come se avesse «il solo scopo di rafforzare le capacità logiche degli allievi, magari chiarendo meglio le difficoltà emerse nella prima parte del dialogo», perché se è vero che vengono prese in esame le difficoltà emerse nella prima parte del dialogo allo scopo di chiarirle meglio, rimane da sapere come questo chiarimento avviene. C'è un criterio che le gestisce nel particolare e nel loro insieme, o, una volta scelta l'ipotesi da esaminare, procede non dico a caso, ma passando da un *logos* all'altro soltanto perché deduttivamente l'uno richiama l'altro, si oppone o concorda o sviluppa quello precedente o anticipa quello seguente, trasportati dalla corrente fluente della dimostrazione rigorosa? Non credo, Platone non fa niente senza uno scopo. Questo lo sappiamo tutti. Allora il problema sarebbe quello di intercettare questo criterio che ci si presenta ben nascosto (se siamo ancora qui a discutere), ma che ci dovrebbe essere, anzi che sicuramente c'è. Ma qual è?

Le obiezioni alle varie interpretazioni e la proposta di lettura che ne fa Ferrari (2015: 100–108, 124–130), nel complesso, mi sembrano convincenti. Devo, però, ammettere di non essere preparato a rispondere a questo problema, perché l'intento di questo mio intervento è rivolto ad altro. Tuttavia, sulla base delle analisi sopra esposte, mi viene da pensare che Platone per rispondere: 1) alle richieste del giovane Socrate di rivedere le aporie di Zenone anche fra le idee; 2) alla esigenza avanzata dallo stesso Parmenide di ricontrollare le idee, per evitare di non avere punti di riferimento sicuri per la dialettica, e 3) per cercare di convincere, per quanto possibile, quel *tis* refrattario alla persuasione che è soprattutto Antistene, oltre ad altri, o lo stesso Eudosso all'interno della sua scuola, mi viene da pensare, ripeto, che Platone abbia voluto affidare il suo progetto ad un Parmenide che non fosse il suo portavoce diretto, probabilmente, per evitare di apparire tendenzioso fin dal principio a chi non la pensava come lui e in particolare, verosimilmente, proprio ad Antistene.

In questo senso affida a lui di sviluppare una serie di *logoi* che in linea di massima andrebbero nella direzione da lui auspicata, come apparirà chiaro dal *Sofista* composto dopo, ma che al momento rimangono, per così dire, “congelati”, come se fossero semplicemente il frutto di un *logos* che, una volta assunta un'ipotesi, va dove deve andare seguendo le sue regole rigide di deduzione logica, mentre in realtà ubbidirebbero ad un progetto ben preciso, ma volutamente lasciato nascosto e oscuro e probabilmente non ancora ben definito in alcune parti.

Mi chiedo, infatti, se sia solo un caso che diversi aspetti della logica di Antistene, che di tanto in tanto si intravedono qua e là, come ho cercato di mostrare, non trovino apprezzamento e che quando affiorano non vengano tenuti in buon conto o vengano ignorati o del tutto respinti, come nel caso dell'uno e dell'identico in *Prm.* 139b4–e6 a cui ho accennato all'inizio a proposito dello *status quaestionis* relativo all'identità dell'uno

e della sua *diaphora* in H1.D1 o dell’*heteron / allon* come *enantion* e *allotrion* in H1.D2. Non credo.

Questo spiegherebbe anche la scelta di affidare questo progetto ad un Parmenide che si serve di un punto di vista “mereologico-fisicistico”, come opportunamente lo definisce Ferrari (2019⁸: 98), in quanto in grado di farsi capire con il suo linguaggio storicamente fisicista non solo da un frequentatore dell’Accademia come Eudosso, ma anche da un obiettore come Antistene, presentando un maestro che parla la stessa lingua per tutti.

Questo mi fa supporre che la scelta di questo Parmenide possa essere stata fatta oltre che per altri motivi, direttamente o indirettamente, anche per mostrare al suo collega che egli non ha prevenzioni di principio contro nessuno e gli dimostrerebbe ciò mettendo in bocca a Parmenide soprattutto nella prima parte del dialogo, ma anche lungo lo svolgimento dell’esercizio, obiezioni che potrebbero essere fatte anche da uno refrattario alla sua persuasione come lui.

La *gymnasia*, allora, non sarebbe fine a se stessa con “il solo scopo di affinare le capacità logiche-deduttive degli allievi” dell’Accademia, ma includerebbe forse anche quello – come suppongono alcuni – di rifondare la teoria delle idee lasciata incompleta nel *Fedone* e messa a dura prova già da tempo da Antistene nel *Satone*. In tal modo avrebbe evitato di incorrere anche lui nell’accusa che abbiamo visto Isocrate rivolgeva a quest’ultimo, quando lo accusava di essere capace di scoprire le contraddizioni nei *logoi*, ma di non essere in grado di dare consigli utili per il presente, lasciandosi sfuggire la realtà dei fatti. Nel nostro caso la realtà dei fatti sarebbe costituita dalla proposta di *logoi* alternativi migliori da un punto di vista logico di quelli proposti dall’avversario Antistene, in vista di una *paideia* degna del maestro Socrate, di cui Casertano (2015b: 118–120) ha trovato tracce ben visibili anche alla fine del *Sofista*.

In definitiva, la “lezione” di Platone agli allievi dell’Accademia potrebbe costituire una lezione di “logica propedeutica”, a suo modo, “non accademica”, su argomenti in parte preannunziati nella prima parte del dialogo, dentro uno schema che si richiama alla logica dialettica confutatoria di Zenone e potrebbe essere considerata come una specie di “topica” di *logoi*, alcuni dei quali già pronti da essere utilizzati, altri ancora da sviluppare ed adattare agli argomenti più vari, di cui il *Sofista* potrebbe essere considerato solo un esempio tra altri possibili.

In questo senso sarei d’accordo con Sofia Ranzato (2015: 193–194) quando, a proposito della teoria delle forme, messa in bocca «a un Socrate per la prima volta non maestro ma allievo», sottolinea come Platone «intenda non tanto ridimensionare la portata generale della sua teoria, quanto presentarla come una ipotesi di lavoro ancora da vagliare e perfezionare e non come il risultato finale della ricerca», e – aggiungerei io – da confrontare, perché no, con i risultati della ricerca di altri e, in particolare, con quelli del suo collega socratico concorrente Antistene, e specialmente a proposito dell’*epischēpsis* e della *chrēsis tōn onomatōn*, su cui, a più riprese, questi era intervenuto con le sue opere

logiche (D.L. VI 7) e sulle quali ho mostrato qui solo alcune delle interferenze, a mio avviso plausibili.

È per questo che non escluderei che la *gymnasia* possa essere letta anche come la risposta di Platone alla *orthotēs tōn onomatōn* di Prodicò, ripresa e approfondita da Antistene nei modi che ho mostrato, avendo posto come oggetto della sua ricerca *onomata* come quelli di *hen, polla* e le loro relazioni reciproche (*hen kai pan/polla*), quelle possibili e quelle non possibili, potendo costituire l'*episcopsis tōn onomatōn* anche per lui, come per Antistene (secondo Epict. *Diss.* I 17,12 = V A 160 G.), l'*archē paideuseōs*.

Da questo punto di vista l'esigenza avanzata da Ferrari di considerare la *gymnasia* come un esercizio volto ad "affinare le capacità logiche–deduttive degli allievi" e quella della Ranzato di considerare la teoria delle idee come "a work in progress" potrebbero incontrarsi senza contraddirsi e anzi potrebbero rinforzarsi e integrarsi reciprocamente.

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Plato, *Prm.* 133b4–c1 / 134e9–135b2. Which *logoi* in the *gymnasia* for the *tis* unpersuaded and sensitive to contradictions as is Antisthenes?

In this study, I show how Plato in the *Parmenides* reprises the encounter with the *Phaedo's* Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various *tis* that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the *Parmenides' tis*, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the *logoi* taken from “distant premises.” In the four *logoi* of the *gymnasia*, I highlight how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any *tis* and how, despite his detached attitude, his *hodos*, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although apparently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous.

KEY WORDS

Logos oikeios – allotrios – alloios – heteros – enantios, diaphora, sumplokē onomatōn, hen kai pan, holon, gymnasia.

Why Is Plato's Good *Good?*

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...philosophy is often a matter of finding a
suitable context in which to say the obvious.

—Iris Murdoch 'The Idea of Perfection'

It is all too easy for a modern reader to harbour serious reservations about some of Plato's ideas. First and foremost, we may wonder how he could be so dismissive of the contribution of the senses in our quest to understand the world. One obvious way to placate such misgivings is by playing them down, but I would like to try a different approach here. For the fact of the matter is that Plato occupied a rather different world from most of us today. His was a teleological world with an overarching unity. Indeed, anything less would have been a cause for concern. Unlike today's students of nature, Plato sought *certain* knowledge – the kind of knowledge that we feel we can get from mathematics, for instance. Accordingly, if he thought the world was contingent, it could hardly be the object of certain knowledge: to be amenable to such certainty the world would need to exhibit a necessary structure or the like. And this is where teleology comes in. The purpose of this paper, then, is to bring to light a deep connection between Plato's view

of nature and his epistemology; namely, that the desire for certain knowledge based on immutable principles led him up into the realm of metaphysics and teleology. I essay my case for this in reference to Plato's form of the Good in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. As I shall argue, various scholarly attempts to make sense of the Good tend to ignore certain aspects of this all-important form because they fail to register the central role it plays in tying together Plato's metaphysics, epistemology and ultimately his ethics.¹ I do not intend to give a detailed treatment of Plato's metaphysics, the assumptions that underpin it, or even the form of the Good. Rather, I wish to clarify how and why the Good is *good* in light of Plato's broader philosophical project.

1. The Problem with Plato's Good

Plato discusses the Good in the *Phaedo* at 95e8–99c6 and in the famous sun-line-cave analogy of the *Republic* at 504c9–517d2.² But in neither of these passages is it entirely clear why the Good is good. In the *Phaedo* passage we are left with an impression of the Good as a cosmic principle, while in the *Republic* we learn that the Good functions as the principle of knowledge – but in both cases, notwithstanding a general aura of philosophical pre-eminence, it can be difficult to pinpoint what exactly makes the Good good. More generally it seems as if Plato asks far too much of the Good by presenting it as the metaphysical principle and the epistemological principle as well as the ethical principle. The purpose of the present section is to foreground these problems by briefly discussing the two aforementioned passages.

The *Phaedo* passage (*Phd.* 95e8–99c6) attempts to give an account of generation and destruction (περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν – *Phd.* 95e10). By means of an apparently biographical anecdote Socrates lays out a critique of 'what they call the inquiry into nature' (ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν – *Phd.* 96a7–8).³ As becomes apparent, Socrates' inquiry into *phusis* ('nature') leads him directly into the metaphysical realm of the forms (see *Phd.* 100b and following). Indeed, an essential point of Socrates' autobiography is that we should not seek knowledge of nature by examining material things with the senses (*Phd.* 99e). Note, this does not mean he abandons the inquiry into nature. We are still concerned with understanding generation and destruction – and these processes certainly apply to the physical world. But the key point that emerges is that we cannot ground knowledge of nature in the changeable objects of the senses and thus we are

¹ I cite some scholarship on the Good in a more convenient place below. One of the more interesting treatments of Plato's Good is Evans, who endeavours to view Plato's conception within a broad perspective. He claims, for instance, that for Plato and others, 'value forms part of the fabric of reality' (Evans 2000: 116). Cf. Benitez (1995).

² References are to the Oxford Classical Text. One might also look to the *Timaeus*, the *Philebus* and perhaps the *Symposium* (on the Beautiful) regarding the Good.

³ Translations of the Greek are my own.

warned away from appealing to corporeal *aitia* ('causes' or 'explanations').⁴ Instead the physical must be understood through the incorporeal.

Socrates explains that, try as he might, he simply could not understand how a man is thought to grow from *eating food* or how ten is more than eight because *two is added to it* (*Phd.* 96c3–97b7). Socrates is well aware that these claims seem perfectly adequate, but he rejects them all the same. We might surmise that food is not the necessary cause of growth, or that addition is not the necessary cause of being bigger. To anticipate, Socrates needs an *aition* that is immutable, something that holds necessarily; above all, something that can be vouched-safe *by thought alone* without the fallible senses.⁵ Thus he goes on to elaborate the kind of cause that he would like to find. Namely, having heard that Anaxagoras wrote about a special cause called 'Mind' (*nous*), Socrates became excited in the hope that here he had struck upon his objective: an *aition* that explains how the cosmos and everything within it has been arranged for the best (*Phd.* 97c5–6). Although Socrates is quite emphatic about the *goodness* of the *aition* – τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον (*Phd.* 97d3) – it is clear that we are still within the realm of physics, namely how generation and destruction are to be understood (εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι... – *Phd.* 97c6–7). Thus he explicitly mentions that this Mind would reveal the shape and location of the earth and why this is necessary and for the best. And so too with the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies (*Phd.* 97d8–98b3). Ultimately this Mind should account for what is best for everything (*Phd.* 98b2–3). That said, this special goodness is *metaphysical* so it need not apply to the vicissitudes of individual people like the unlucky Candide in Voltaire's satire. In crude terms, it explains general truths, not one-off happenings.

But alas it turned out that Anaxagoras did not use his 'Mind' in the way Socrates had hoped. For he too appealed to material causes. In fine, the problem with Anaxagoras and the other materialists is that they are unable to distinguish an *aition* from its prerequisite conditions (*Phd.* 99b2–4). Socrates illustrates this point with the following example: instead of explaining his incarceration in reference to the decision of the jurors, they would refer to the bones and sinews by which his body is kept upright on his prison bed. Note that even here Socrates is concerned with explanations about the arrangement of the cosmos: for this is said to be the self-same error that leads people to explain the placement of the heavens in reference to physical things like a spinning vortex rather than its true cause (*Phd.* 99b6–8).

In the immediate sequel Socrates goes on to elaborate the 'second sailing' that is the theory of the forms. I will not argue the point here but it is worth mentioning that

⁴ Some scholars doubt that Socrates is still talking about the physical world once he introduces his theory of the forms. For example, Annas (1982: 318) does not hesitate to claim that 'Plato, in fact, has changed the subject.' See also Sharma (2009: 172). Yet it is clear that Socrates thinks his forms can apply to things like snow melting (see *Phd.* 106a) and we should not be surprised to find the ancients understanding nature in reference to metaphysical causes of some kind.

⁵ On the *Phaedo's* account of forms as *aitia* see Sedley (1998) and Bailey (2014). For a review of the scholarship see Wolfsdorf (2005). For causality in Greek philosophy generally see M. Frede (1987).

this second-best attempt seems to lead to the same destination, namely the Good (or Mind).⁶ It is easy enough to understand the forms as part of a broader metaphysical vision. Furthermore, we can note that Socrates returns to his ‘best’ explanations in the myth that closes the dialogue: the earth is said to be a sphere located in the centre of the cosmos because an equiposed thing in the middle of something akin to it (ισόρροπον γὰρ πρᾶγμα ὁμοίου τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθῆν) will not suffer to lean in one direction rather than another, but will remain uniformly still (*Phd.* 109a4–6). However persuasive we find this explanation, it seems sufficiently clear that it attempts to provide a teleological explanation of the earth and that it proceeds on purely intellectual grounds without direct reference to the senses. But to come back to the main point: in the *Phaedo* we encounter a Mind – explicitly identified as the fount of *goodness* – which functions as the cosmic principle; it is supposed to explain the physical cosmos all the way from the location of the earth to the nature of generation and destruction. Here then is one aspect of the Good.

The *Republic* passage (*R.* 504c9–517d2), like most passages in the *Republic*, is difficult to treat in isolation from the rest of the dialogue. Nevertheless, and in light of the deluge of scholarship our passage has generated, it seems prudent to tread lightly (like a cat burglar) taking only what we need and leaving the rest undisturbed. The alternative would surely open a Pandora’s box of issues.

Our passage begins with a provocative allusion to something even greater than the virtues (*R.* 504d). Socrates has broached the topic of how they will educate the future rulers of the beautiful city and he alludes to some object of knowledge that promises to dwarf all others. As Socrates explains, this superlative good is of course the form of the Good which he frequently mentions and by which justice and the other virtues gain their goodness and utility (ἧ δὲ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνεται – *R.* 505a3–4). Here the Good is unambiguously ethical and useful. Socrates continues: there is confusion over what the good actually is, some saying that it is pleasure, others that it is knowledge; and when we ask, ‘knowledge of what?’ they reply, ‘knowledge of the good,’ as if we already knew what ‘good’ meant (*R.* 505b5–506a2). To repeat, we are firmly in the realm of ethics. The good is simply ‘that which every soul pursues and on account of which every soul does everything’ (*R.* 505d11).

Typically, if tragically, Socrates cannot deliver on this tantalizing object and instead of telling his companions what it actually is, he offers them a likeness or ‘offspring’ of the Good (αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν...ὄς δὲ ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοίωτατος ἐκείνῳ, λέγειν ἐθέλω – *R.* 506d8–e4). Thus begins the first analogy in a trilogy of interlocking analogies, the analogy of the sun – but not before Socrates

⁶ For the claim that Socrates abandons the pursuit of Mind, and the relevant scholarship, see Sharma (2009: 142–3). Sharma argues that Socrates abandons teleological explanations *in favour of* metaphysical ones. I do not consider the two as exclusive alternatives. No doubt the *aitia* that Socrates settles for do not explicitly refer to teleology, but it seems unnecessary to insist that Socrates totally abandons this project (or to suppose that forms are incompatible with teleology). In spite of the ingenuity with which scholars argue their case (or perhaps *because of it*), one cannot ignore how myopic it is to claim that Plato has here given up on teleology. Teleology is surely a core Platonic tenant.

reminds us of his metaphysical physics, the theory of the forms (see *R.* 507a7–b10). From here on, the ethical dimension of the Good is displaced by its epistemological one. The sun, Helios, is said to be an offspring or analogy of the Good in that it makes visible things visible just as the Good makes knowable things knowable. That is, light (here identified with the god Helios) allows our eyes to see and visible objects to be seen (*R.* 508a5–6). Helios is the cause of sight (*R.* 508b10–11). By analogy, when the soul ‘looks’ at those objects illuminated by the Good it has knowledge, but when it looks to the manifest world it does not (*R.* 508d4–9). In a word, the Good grants truth to the things that are knowable and gives us the ability to know (τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδόν – *R.* 508e1–3).

The analogy of the sun is focused on establishing a broad ontological distinction between the visible and the intelligible realms with special reference to the epistemological role of the Good. In the next analogy, the image of the line (*R.* 509d6–511e5), Socrates moves away from the Good and works on setting up a series of epistemological ‘stages.’ The line is divided into four segments giving us a kind of hierarchy of epistemological states with pure unmediated knowledge at the top. It is the ascent *up* through these stages that is described in the following analogy, the image of the cave. Here Plato uses a subterranean cave to represent the physical realm and the surface world above the cave to stand in for the intelligible world of the forms. We are said to be like prisoners trapped in this cave, looking at shadows which we mistake for reality rather than the images that they are (*R.* 515c1–2). Socrates rounds off the passage thus:

These things, then, seem to me like this. In the intelligible realm the form of the Good is the last thing to be seen, and not without difficulty. But having been seen, reason must reveal it to be in every case the cause [αἰτία] of all things right and beautiful; in the visible realm it begets light and his dominion, in the intelligible realm, its own dominion, it furnishes truth and knowledge [νοῦν]; and one must see this cause if they are to act rationally [ἐμφρόνως πράξειν] in public or private (*R.* 517b8–c5).

The final line of this passage brings us back to *ethics*. By and large, however, Socrates has elaborated a concept of the Good that functions primarily as an *epistemological* principle. It is that which somehow makes the truth true. To be sure, such an entity is surely not bad, but one cannot help but feel a disconnect with the ethical goodness of the Good. Similarly in the *Phaedo* passage it was hard to see the goodness of the Good, at least in any precise sense. Indeed, we may well wonder why the Good has switched from its metaphysical role in the *Phaedo* to this epistemological one here. These, then, are the problems I wish to address. Namely, how is it that the Good explains the cosmos and knowledge, and above all, what makes it ethically good.⁷ The solution I would like to

⁷ Santas (1983: 257, n.2) discusses some of the older literature on the Good in the *Republic* and notes how often scholars accuse Plato of incoherence. Of the more recent literature, some look only to the *ethical* role of

offer is that the kind of knowledge Plato is after – whether of nature or of ethics – actually requires an overarching metaphysical principle.

2. Knowledge and Necessity

Students of ancient Greek philosophy know well that for Plato knowledge must be *stable* and that the changeable is *ipso facto* unknowable.⁸ But it is rare to find an explication of *why* Plato thinks this or what it means. Marjorie Grene (1963: 24) tells us that ‘knowledge, for Aristotle as for Plato, must be both infallible and real, that is, it must be a grasp of real things.... The flowing world of sense, Plato believed, lacks the stability of the purely knowable; it flits by, dreamlike, taking shape with every man’s illusion.’ Perhaps, then, we can say that Plato thinks that the objects of the sensible world cannot ground knowledge because the qualities they exhibit are transient and impermanent rather than certain and stable. Consider the following example. Simmias is taller than Socrates, but he is shorter than Phaedo. This is not strictly a case of *change*, but it is an example of the kind of impermanence that Plato has in mind. The idea seems to be that the tallness exhibited by Simmias cannot be pure Tallness, because Simmias can also be qualified by shortness, and intuitively Tallness and Shortness exclude each other. In this way the tallness of Simmias is transient; it comes and goes. So if we *can* have certain knowledge about Tallness or about what it means to be tall, this can only be in reference to the form of Tallness; namely, the tallness that is eternally and immutably tall. We can make the point more apparent by contrasting it with two alternatives. If (1) there is no such entity as the form of Tallness and the things which appear to exhibit tallness do not actually exhibit an eternal form, then we cannot have knowledge of tallness. This is nominalism. Or again, if (2) the kind Tallness is no more than an abstraction formed from the many perceptibles, then here too we do not escape the uncertainties of the sense world. The form of Tallness should not be parasitic on particulars in this way. But that is not to say that the many particulars cannot guide our understanding of the incorporeal form of Tallness. Surely they can and do. But *either* they guide our minds to an eternal, immutable form *or* they do

the Good. For example, Penner (2007) and Rowe (2007). Rowe at least attempts to address the epistemological role of the Good but reduces this to its relevance for ethical knowledge (see Rowe 2007: 148–149, 150–151) – which is clearly inadequate. Santas argues that the Good is the form of forms and as such he is more focused on the *epistemological* role of the Good (2007: 235–240). He tries to account for its ethical role by arguing that forms are thought to be perfect exemplars. While there may be truth to this (though I wonder if it applies to the form of Tallness or Oddness), Santas is satisfied to explain away the problems. By contrast, I claim to show how Plato’s treatment is a natural outgrowth of his general philosophical orientation. Some defenders of Plato get bogged down in technicalities, usually from an all-too-modern point of view. This is unfortunate given that Plato’s pronouncements on the Good operate at a broad level of generality and belong to a very different intellectual landscape. See e.g. Seel (2007). He wonders if the Good is ‘the system of the logical relations between the essences itself or the set of the properties of this system’ (Seel 2007: 183). It is hard to overlook the anachronism of this reductive formalism. In general, approaches like that of Santas and Seel must do a considerably amount of rational reconstruction to tidy up Plato’s ideas.

⁸ Which is not to suggest this is without its problems. See Keyt (1969).

not; and if they do *not*, then this is not the kind of thing that can be known with complete certainty. Rather it is something that only holds true for a time. The reason, then, that Plato needs knowledge to sit still is that he wants certain, infallible knowledge. This is the point that Grene is making.

Furthermore, Plato's desire for certain knowledge leads him away from the external world of the senses and towards what we might call introspective reflection. The objects of the senses are evidently prone to change, so if the immutable does exist, it must be the kind of thing we encounter with the mind.⁹ It is 'introspective knowledge' like we find in mathematics that furnishes the kind of certainty Plato is after.¹⁰ Thus *the desire for certainty leads to introspective methods*. And this, in turn, leads us into the realm of *necessity*. If Plato wishes to have certain knowledge of the natural world or the human soul or what have you, he must be able to access this knowledge via introspection; and *this* will be the kind of knowledge that holds necessarily and the negation of which is a logical contradiction. So for example, the Final Argument in the *Phaedo* (*Phd.* 102–106) purports to give a kind of ontological proof for the immortality of the soul. Socrates argues on logical grounds as opposed to empirical ones that life and death are opposites and must preclude each other: what is living cannot be dead and *vice versa*. Then he argues that the soul, by definition, always 'brings with it' life (much as three always 'brings' oddness with it). In this way, soul is said to be necessarily alive. As such it cannot tolerate death (*thanatos*) and is im-mortal (*athantos*). Soul is said to be immortal in virtue of the kind of thing it is. *QED*: the soul cannot die by necessity. This is an example (albite an unpersuasive one¹¹) of an argument that looks to introspective necessity. Thus *certainty leads to introspection which leads to the realm of necessity*. A crucial feature of Plato's approach, then, is the impossibility of knowing what is merely contingent, or what could be otherwise.¹² Knowledge must be grounded in something necessary, or to put it in ontological terms, the objects of knowledge must be immutable and eternal. This obviously contrasts with

⁹ Cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a1–15. The fallibility of sense perception is a perennial issue in Greek philosophy which Plato inherited from the Presocratics and Sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras. On the Presocratics see Long (1986: 78). He says: 'The fallibility of sense perception as a source of knowledge was emphasized in different ways by Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles and Democritus in the Presocratic period. Earlier than all of these Xenophanes...'

¹⁰ I hope this use of the term 'introspection' is not too distracting here; I am thinking of something broadly comparable to the *a priori*. The problem with this term is that it comes paired with *a posteriori* knowledge and I do not think that Plato would have accepted this as a legitimate form of knowledge. In other words, the *a priori* is co-extensive with knowledge for Plato and this is rather different to how *we* use the term where it is but one kind of knowledge. Compare Moss (2019: 79): 'If *epistēmē* is of what is, and it turns out that essences, Forms, or other ultimate realities are the things that *are*, then *epistēmē* is cognition of these ultimate realities.... Like *a priori* knowledge, it will have no truck with the contingent empirical realm. Like Science, it will be especially about ultimate realities... Put concisely, on this view, *epistēmē* will be quite different from knowledge as we nowadays conceive it, for it will be a *deep grasp of ultimate realities*.'

¹¹ On the Final Argument see Cobb (1977).

¹² Aristotle too wants knowledge to be based on necessary first principles. See Arist. *APo.* 71b14–16 where he registers that *epistēmē* or scientific knowledge is concerned with what could not be otherwise (*ἀδύνατον ἄλλως εἶχεν*); cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 1026b27–1027a28. See further Burnyeat (1981: 108–115) and Reeve (2000: 27–42).

the modern scientific view of nature and is unlikely to receive a positive reception today. But that is all the more reason to be on our guard against anachronism. For Plato if something is to be known, it must hold of necessity in the sense that it can be understood in reference to immutable principles. Thus if the cosmos is to be knowable, it must exhibit a fixed, top-down structure. And he thinks it *is* knowable. In this way it was all but inevitable that Plato would grasp after some grand unifying principle.

We are now quite well placed to understand the cosmological and epistemological aspects of the form of the Good. Plato thinks that either nature conforms to a necessary, metaphysical order or it is contingent and unknowable. The ethereal order of the cosmos is just that which makes it intelligible. Thus in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates is casting about for ways to understand and explain generation and destruction, he rejects the material explanations of his predecessors because the causes they identified do not necessitate their effects in the desired way. These are not immutable causes that can be firmly grasped by the mind. From the revolutions of the heavenly bodies to the behaviour of fire and snow, all must be understood in reference to incorporeal, metaphysical causes. Turning to the *Republic* it should also be apparent how this self-same cosmological principle, the Good, is the light of *knowledge*. For if it did not exist – if the metaphysical realm did not prop up the visible realm – we could have no knowledge of planets, people or anything. It is the cause of knowledge in the sense that it is responsible for the order which makes things knowable.¹³ What remains to be seen, however, is why the Good is actually good.

3. Nature and Ethics

So why is the Good *ethically* good? Obviously this keystone of knowledge would be a wonderful thing to possess, but how exactly is it ‘better than the virtues’ as Socrates says in the *Republic*? Indeed, why even call this principle ‘good’ in the first place? The answer is not far to look: ethics for the ancients must be a part of nature. That is to say, the study of ethics was intimately bound up with the study of nature.¹⁴ Certainly the Stoics and the Epicureans ground their ethical theories in their physics. Thus they urge us to ‘live according to nature.’ And Aristotle too thinks humans possess a natural function (e.g.

¹³ On impossibility of knowledge without first principles cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 994b12–28 and 1060a26–27. The latter passage asks the rhetorical question, ‘How will there be order, if there is nothing eternal, separable and enduring?’ (πῶς γὰρ ἔσται τάξις μὴ τινος ὄντος αἰδίου καὶ χωριστοῦ καὶ μένοντος;). Aristotle explicitly discusses and rejects ‘accidental’ causes, e.g., in *Ph.* 2.4–6. Although he acknowledges that things can come about by chance, these are not the causes he is interested in, these are not explanatory in the way he requires. To understand the changing world of nature we need to be able to specify in a determinate fashion *to what end* the change took place (the final cause). Chance occurrences in nature have no final cause and cannot be *known* in the technical philosophy sense. We cannot know the *why* (as Aristotle likes to say) of an accidental phenomenon. See Freeland (1991: 49–72) and D. Frede (1992: 49).

¹⁴ See Annas (1993: 137): ‘the natural life is the life led by humans who have developed in a natural way, this being understood as a way in which the potentialities which for us are given develop without interference from other, external factors.’

EN 1097b23–1098b21). Where modern philosophers tend to think that you cannot derive an ought from an is, the ancients by contrast frequently begin their moralizing from considerations about the nature of man. Thus we see in the *Republic* and the *Phaedo* that Plato's ethical proscriptions cohere tightly with his account of human nature. The *Phaedo* explores the division between the body and the soul, which, in turn, informs our epistemological endeavours and our fate in the afterlife. Here, as usual, his ethics is centred around the need to cultivate the soul (see e.g. *Phd.* 114d). In the *Republic*, charged with showing that justice is intrinsically beneficial, Socrates bases his argument on the idea that the just soul is one that is arranged according to nature, with the ruling element in control (e.g. *R.* 443c4–d4).

But it is not only the soul that has a correct state we must strive to bring about; Socrates' arguments also apply to the body politic. The city too has a correct state. This is quite clear to see in the *Republic*, where the city is a larger version of the soul, or the soul 'writ large'.¹⁵ Thus the Good is 'better than the virtues' because it underpins the virtues, both personal and political, much as it underpins physics and epistemology. It is simply not possible to understand the virtues without a knowledge of nature – and if anything, a sharp distinction between the two should be avoided. In this way the timeless metaphysical causes are also *good*. They explain the meaning of life no less than the cosmos.

Nevertheless, although Plato is concerned with the inquiry into nature, he tends to focus on its *ethical* aspect. We find this metaphysical ethics throughout his corpus.¹⁶ In the *Euthyphro* (*Euthph.* 10a–11b), for instance, Socrates raises the famous question about whether the gods love the pious because it is pious, or whether it is deemed pious because the gods love it. Plato is instinctively drawn to the answer that the gods are constrained by an objective standard: they love the pious because it is pious. What counts as pious is not arbitrarily decided at the whim of a deity. In other words, the nature of the world – including ethical concepts like piety – holds by necessity and is accessible to abstract thought.¹⁷ But what is particularly striking about the *Euthyphro* passage is the argumentation that Socrates employs. He reflects on the nature of *loving something* as opposed to *being loved* in reference to the analogous cases of *carrying* and *seeing*. It is important to

¹⁵ This can be understood in the broader context of (what we may call) the vertical integration of ancient biology, whereby a human is thought to be a miniature of the cosmos (or the cosmos is thought to be a large organism). As Hahn (1977: 63) puts it, 'The analogy between living beings and parts of the cosmos is extremely ancient in Greece and antedates all written records.'

¹⁶ Cf. Benitez (1995: 119): 'The *Philebus* and the *Laws*, which are quite possibly the last of Plato's dialogues, show clearly that Plato tries to the very end of his life to harmonize ethics and metaphysics in a kind of teleological cosmology.' Benitez discusses the *Philebus* on 130–138 and the *Timaeus* on 126–129.

¹⁷ By contrast, Christian thinkers like Descartes and Newton who helped usher in the modern view of nature insisted that because God is radically free the world that he created must be contingent. See Foster (1934: 452–468) and Hooykaas (2000: 7–26). Foster (1934: 453) remarks that, 'The medieval philosopher had of course believed the Christian doctrine that nature is created. But the belief had been efficacious only in his theology. In his science of nature he had continued to seek for final causes, to define essence and to deduce properties... The modern investigators of nature were the first to take seriously *in their science* the Christian doctrine that nature is created, and the main difference between the methods of ancient and the methods of modern natural science may be reduced to this: that these are and those are not methods proper to the investigation of a created nature.'

stress that such seemingly semantic analysis is not merely linguistic. Plato is wondering about the structure of reality: what causes what?¹⁸ We shall not rehearse the rather labyrinthine argument here; the key point is that the argument relies on abstract, introspective reasoning to gain its conclusion.

From an apparently early dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, let us jump to Plato's final dialogue, the *Laws*. In Book 10 of this dialogue the Athenian Stranger, having raised the spectre of atheism, rehearses the abhorrent view that the world is but a product of chance, and that nature and art are fundamentally separate things operating in two separate spheres (*Lg.* 889a4–e1); or in other words that statecraft is 'man-made.' The people who advance this view claim that, 'the good of nature is different from the good of law, and that justice has nothing to do with nature' (*Lg.* 889e5–7). To combat these agitators the Athenian launches into a grand account of the soul, the cosmos and the gods: he demonstrates that the soul *qua* first mover is prior to matter by means of an abstract argument on the nature of movement (*Lg.* 892a ff.); and from this he extrapolates that soul is the cause of all good and that it controls the cosmos (*Lg.* 896c–e), not least because circular motion is the most rational (*Lg.* 898a–b) – all this to vouchsafe the rightness of the laws. Clearly he is operating with a metaphysical view of nature, the city and mankind.



It is my hope that the foregoing has shed some light on the connections between Plato's teleology and his epistemology. The desire for certain knowledge led him away from the fallible senses and towards the necessary truths accessible to thought alone. If nature, mankind and the cosmos are to be knowable in the way that Plato wants them to be, then all these must fall under the purview of necessity. This bundle of ideas, I argue, is at the heart of Plato's Good, which is thus the principle of knowledge, the cosmological principle and, above all, ethically good.

¹⁸ See Allen (1970: 40); cf. Hankinson (1989: 210) and in general Wolfsdorf (2005).

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Why Is Plato's Good *Good*?

The form of the Good in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Republic* seems, by our standards, to do too much: it is presented as the metaphysical principle, the epistemological principle and the principle of ethics. Yet this seemingly chimerical object makes good sense in the broader context of Plato's philosophical project. He sought *certain* knowledge of necessary truths (in sharp contrast to the contingent truth of modern science). Thus, to be knowable the cosmos must be informed by timeless principles; and this leads to teleology and the Good. The form of the Good, it is argued, is what makes the world knowable insofar as it *is* knowable. This interpretation plugs a significant gap in the scholarship on the Good and draws attention to a deep connection between Plato's epistemology and his teleological understanding of the cosmos.

KEY WORDS

Form of the Good, teleology, Plato's epistemology, necessity

Platońska eudajmonia. Autor *Politei* o życiu szczęśliwym

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ZBIGNIEW DANEK / *Uniwersytet Łódzki* /

„Zabił się młody...”

Przytoczone słowa romantycznego bohatera zderzają ze sobą dość wymownie dwa standardy, w których zamyka się cała nasza egzystencja: siłę ludzkiej witalności mającej swe apogeum w latach młodości oraz nieunikniony kres życia każdego człowieka. Przedstawioną w nich jako dysonans decyzję osoby młodej o bezpowrotnym odejściu ze świata można też jednak interpretować nieco bardziej afirmatywnie: jako poszukiwanie przez człowieka nieszczęśliwego w wirze życiowych problemów tak pożądanego niekiedy szczęścia, które tu nazwiemy ukojeniem – jako dążenie do stanu bliskiego epikurejskiemu ideałowi *ataraksji*. Taka nieco szokująca współcześnie ocena sytuacji znajdzie jednak swoje umocowanie w znanej z przekazów antycznej mądrości, chociażby w historii o Kleobisie i Bitonie, których młodość dostąpiła szczęścia najwyższego, jakim okazała się błogosławiona śmierć.

Dyskusja o szczęściu ludzkim, którą niniejszym podejmujemy, staje się, jak wynika z powyższego, dwuaspektowa, a nawet – do czego prowadzą dalsze tej treści przemyślenia – wieloaspektowa. Jeżeli bowiem szczęściu zupełnego uspokojenia przeciwstawimy szczęście ludzkiej aktywności życiowej, nasunie się kolejne pytanie, czy w tym drugim wariantcie błogosławiony stan ducha osiągniemy aktywizując się spontanicznie,

czy jedynie wtedy, gdy nasze działania będą przemyślane i celowe. Warunkiem szczęścia okaże się wtedy postępowanie w pełni racjonalne jako realizacja swoistej recepty na szczęście, modelu życiowej aktywności o odniesieniu już uniwersalnym. Owo szczęście zyska tym samym wymiar *continuum* obejmującego całe dalsze życie człowieka (co też niektórzy starożytni myśliciele uważali za konieczny warunek prawdziwego szczęścia¹), a jego przeciwieństwem będzie doraźne i bodaj niepowtarzalne każdorazowo przeżywanie owej kumulacji życiowego zadowolenia. Pytaniem nie mniej istotnym okaże się wreszcie kwestia uwarunkowania owego stanu pełnej satysfakcji życiowej współobecnością w naszym życiu innych przedstawicieli ludzkiego gatunku, a także oddziaływaniem w tym kierunku różnego rodzaju czynników zewnętrznych, mieszczących się również w kategorii tzw. szczęścia losowego, które można określić greckim terminem εὐτυχία. Czy zatem odczuwane przez nas szczęście życiowe ma w swej istocie charakter indywidualny, a nawet czysto wewnętrzny, czy też dla uzyskania pełnej życiowej satysfakcji konieczne staje się współistnienie społeczne człowieka, a w szerszym aspekcie jego zadowalające relacje z mniej lub bardziej przyjaznym światem zewnętrznym?

Sygnalizowana powyższymi dylematami problematyka jest, jak widać, rozległa oraz wieloaspektowa, i nie leży w zamierzeniu piszącego te słowa, ani też w jego możliwościach, rozpatrywanie jej w całej rozciągłości. Z drugiej strony, jest na tyle istotna, że warto ją podjąć w tym wycinku wielonurtowej i wielopokoleniowej na ów temat refleksji, w którym możemy wykazać się jakimiś ku temu kompetencjami, przybliżając zarazem opinii odnoszące się do kwestii naszego szczęścia życiowego, z jakimi wychodzi ktoś, kogo można uznać za autorytet. Zamiarem piszącego te słowa jest wydobycie z pism Platona wszystkich istotnych myśli bezpośrednio odnoszących się do tego zagadnienia oraz ich uporządkowanie w sposób, który umożliwi określenie stanowiska, jakie prezentuje on we wskazanych kwestiach. Nie znaczy to, że autor słów niniejszych poszukuje w tych pismach rozstrzygających dylematy recept na szczęście. Nastawiony jest głównie na to, by dociec, w jakim zakresie twórca *Politei* świadomy jest owych problemów i jakie dostrzega możliwości ich rozwiązania. Materiał, jakiego dostarczają w tym względzie Platonskie dialogi, jest dość obfity. Tematyka odzywa się bowiem na przestrzeni całego niemal *corpus Platonicum*, aż po zamykające ten zbiór *Prawa*. Pozwoli to na ujęcie zagadnienia również w aspekcie diachronicznym, tak by można było najogólniej określić kierunek, w jakim rozwija się Platonska refleksja na temat szczęścia życiowego człowieka.

1. Testimonia

Jeżeli przystąpimy w sposób metodyczny do wyłączenia z ogromu całego *corpus Platonicum* myśli, w których Platonscy bohaterowie wypowiadają się w kwestii szczę-

¹ Przykładem będzie pouczenie, jakiego Krezusowi udzielił Solon, uznający, że nikogo nie można nazwać szczęśliwym, zanim nie dobiegnie końca swoich dni (Hdt. I 30, 1–33, 5). W obrębie tej relacji mieści się również wspomniana powyżej opowieść o Kleobisie i Bitonie (Hdt. I 31, 4–27).

ścia życiowego, uwaga nasza skupi się głównie na jednym terminie, niejako nadrzędnym w stosunku do pozostałych odnoszących się do tego przedmiotu. Jest to rzeczownik εὐδαιμονία, wywodzący się od słowa εὐδαίμων (szczęśliwy), oraz – analogicznie – czasowniki εὐδαιμονεῖν/εὐδαιμονίζειν. Znaczenie tych określeń w podjętej kwestii potwierdzone jest częstotliwością, w jakiej występują one w Platońskich utworach skupionych na zagadnieniu życia szczęśliwego. Pozostałe dwa – ujmujący szczęście losowe rzeczownik εὐτυχία oraz bardziej może godne uwagi słowo εὐθυμία (pogoda ducha), nie są przez Platona doceniane, co jest zrozumiałe w przypadku pierwszego z nich (wszak filozof powinien być ponad zrządzenia losu), natomiast zasługuje na zastanowienie w odniesieniu do znanego już wtedy dzięki Demokrytowi terminu εὐθυμία. Można domniemywać, że takie wewnętrzne jedynie przeżywanie szczęścia nie w pełni odpowiada Platońskiemu wyobrażeniu życia doskonałego.

Przyjęty wyznacznik terminologiczny nakazuje skupić się przede wszystkim na trzech z czterech utworów pretendujących do grona ważnych w interesującej nas kwestii testimoniów, kolejno na dialogach *Gorgiasz*, *Politeja* oraz *Prawa*², z wyłączeniem dobrze na pozór rokującego w sprawie *Fileba*, jako że całe to rozważanie jest w istocie poszukiwaniem drogi do życia szczęśliwego, czy raczej stanu wewnętrznego, który czyni je takim, nie natomiast próbą określenia, na czym owo błogosławione życie polega. Na pierwsze miejsce wysuwa się z pewnością *Politeja*, którą choćby ze względu na częstotliwość występowania derywatów morfemu εὐδαίμων- można w całości zakwalifikować jako dyskusję o szczęściu życiowym człowieka. Ta bowiem kwestia leży już w podtekście początkowej rozgrywki z Trazymachem, jak też wybija się na czoło w dalszej dyskusji poprzez wyrażane *explicite* wątpliwości, dotyczące możliwości dostąpienia szczęścia przez różnej rangi „funkcjonariuszy” Platońskiego systemu ustrojowego. Ujawniają się zresztą już od początku dwa aspekty zagadnienia: dominująca w tych rozważaniach kwestia szczęścia całej obywatelskiej zbiorowości i problem niezakłóconej życiowej satysfakcji pojedynczych obywateli, coraz wyraźniej odzywający się w dalszej owej dyskusji o państwie szczęśliwym. Z czasem też cała ta dyskusja nad doskonałym ustrojem państwowym staje się swoistą próbą wykazania, jak bliskie wbrew pozorom będzie jedno drugiemu – próbą znalezienia wspólnego mianownika dla pojęć indywidualnego i zbiorowego szczęścia życiowego obywateli Platońskiej *polis*.

Można w tej sytuacji mówić o swoistym tryptyku, w który zamyka Platon swe rozważania o ludzkim szczęściu życiowym, kiedy to *Politeję* – centralny dla całej konstruk-

² Dodajmy, że cenne informacje w interesującej nas kwestii znajdują się ponadto w kilku innych dialogach Platona, by wymienić *Protagorasa* z jego hedonistycznym miejscami przesłaniem (*Prt.* 351b–357e), wobec którego eliminujący takie akcenty *Gorgiasz* stawać się ma rodzajem „antystrofy”, czy *Eutydemą*, gdzie szczęście jako posiadanie dóbr znajduje swoją alternatywę w koncepcji rozumnego dysponowania tymi dobrami (*Euthd.* 280b–282d), czy wreszcie *Fedona*, gdzie standardowym wyobrażeniem życia szczęśliwego przeciwstawione zostaje kontemplatywne szczęście filozofa, mające swoje dopełnienie w doskonałej pośmiertnej ataraksji. Wspomnę też o wizji niczym niezmaconego szczęścia pośmiertnego, która – poza *Gorgiaszem*, *Politeją*, czy *Fedonem* – odzywa się wyraźnym akcentem także w *Timajosie*, gdzie szczęście takie staje się nagrodą za życie cnotliwe, lecz i ukoronowaniem drogi badawczej wyzwolonego z okowów potrzeb cielesnych badacza.

cji element – oskrzydlać będą z jednej strony *Gorgiasz*, a z drugiej *Prawa*, rozciągle w sposób zakłócający symetrię tego układu, lecz wagą wnoszonych w temat rozwiązań dla *Gorgiasza* jak najbardziej ekwiwalentne. Ten bowiem dialog, otwierający ciąg wielkich dokonań autorskich Platona, można w całości kwalifikować jako dyskusję o właściwym pojętym szczęściu życiowym człowieka, z ważnym w tym względzie przesłaniem etycznym³. Dowodem staje się coraz liczniejsza z postępem rozważań obecność derywatów słowa εὐδαιμόνων (w ostatecznym bilansie 44 wystąpienia), związanych od początku z etyczną kwestią postępowania sprawiedliwego, bądź bezwzględnie egoistycznego⁴, czego przykładem stają się niechlubne dokonania macedońskiego jedynowładcy Archelaosa. Już wówczas (*Grg.* 470d8) wybrzmiewa pytanie, czy ktoś idący, jak on, drogą przemierstw oraz wyrządzanych innym krzywd może być człowiekiem szczęśliwym, czy też jest wyłącznie godnym pożałowania nędznikiem (ἄθλιος) i rozpoczęta w taki sposób dyskusja o tym, co daje poczucie szczęścia życiowego, wypełnia niemal całą akcję myślową tego dialogu. Rozciąga się ona tak znacznie, ponieważ rozmówca Sokratesa jako kontrpropozycję dla błogosławionego życia człowieka sprawiedliwego wytacza ideologię bezwzględnego zaspokajania swych ekspansjonistycznych potrzeb życiowych przez jednostkę bezkarną poczuciem własnej siły, swoistą ideologię „nadczołowieka”. Odebranie wiarygodności temu programowi ekspansjonizmu życiowego nie jest łatwym zadaniem i nie do końca przekonuje dowodzenie Sokratesa, iż jest szczęśliwszy ten, kto doznaje krzywd, niż krzywdzący, a ten, kto skrzywdził, szczęśliwszy jest wtedy, gdy poniesie karę, niż wtedy, kiedy pozostanie bezkarny. Nie dziwi, że ostatecznie decyduje on się na to, by słuszności zajmowanego przez siebie stanowiska dowodzić „oparłszy jedną nogę za grób”⁵, to znaczy przywołując wizję pośmiertnego sądu Radamantysa (*Grg.* 524a nn.).

Jeżeli weźmiemy z kolei pod uwagę trzeci element „tryptyku”, czyli Platońskie *Prawa*, zagadnienie szczęścia życiowego – mimo że nie jest tematem dominującym w tych politycznych rozważaniach⁶ – zyskuje w tym utworze nowe akcenty i nowe restrykcyjne niekiedy obwarowania. Pojawiają się zresztą w *Prawach* również akcenty wspólne i to nie tylko z programowymi założeniami *Politei*, co jest w pełni zrozumiałe, lecz także z przesłaniem Platońskiego *Gorgiasza*. Ma to miejsce wtedy, gdy mowa jest o człowieku obdarzonym wszelkimi ogólnie cenionymi dobrami, a jednak pozbawionym etycznej powściągliwości oraz poczucia sprawiedliwości, którego z tego względu uznają uczestnicy tej dyskusji za godnego pożałowania nędznika (*Lg.* 661d6–e4), czy nieco dalej, kiedy

³ Taką interpretację głównego założenia Platońskiego *Gorgiasza* zdaje się potwierdzać Sokrates w finale całej dyskusji, kiedy zachęca rozmówcę do postępowania, które uczyni go szczęśliwym za życia i po śmierci, co ma uzmysławiać cała wcześniejsza argumentacja (*Grg.* 527c4–6); por. Matuszak, (2009: 94): Jeśli więc głównym problemem Platońskiego *Gorgiasza* jest pytanie o εὐδαιμονία, o szczęście osiągalne w sferze życia politycznego, i związane z tym pytanie o to „jak żyć”, aby szczęście osiągnąć, zapytajmy: czym jest πολιτική εὐδαιμονία?

⁴ Por. Piechowiak (2009: 75): W *Gorgiaszu* zagadnienie powiązania sprawiedliwości ze szczęściem powraca wielokrotnie.

⁵ W. Witwicki, *Wstęp tłumacza*, [w:] Platon, *Dialogi*, t. I, Kęty 1999, s. 338.

⁶ Potwierdza to liczba czterdziestu dziewięciu wystąpień form urabianych od morfemu εὐδαιμον- bliska liczebności tych form w *Gorgiaszu*, co przy znacznie większej rozciągłości *Praw* nie jest wielkością imponującą.

ludzie żyjący życiem nieskazitelnie sprawiedliwym okażą się szczęśliwsi niż ci, których życie wypełniają przyjemności. Założeniowa zgodność z pryncypiami obowiązującymi w *Politei* daje o sobie znać w tych miejscach *Praw*, w których dochodzi do głosu idea szczęśliwego państwa jako wartości nadrzędnej we właściwie funkcjonującej zbiorowości obywatelskiej⁸.

Platońska nauka o szczęściu zyskuje – jak wynika z powyższego – zdecydowany wymiar społeczny oraz uwarunkowania etyczne, osadzając jednostkę i jej poczucie zadowolenia życiowego w kontekście należycie prosperującej zbiorowości i różnego typu relacji międzyludzkich. Od początku też podejmuje alternatywę, jaką wyznacza z jednej strony hedonistyczna wizja życia szczęśliwego dzięki zaspokajaniu szeroko pojętych potrzeb konsumpcyjnych, z drugiej natomiast koncepcja szczęścia wiążanego z wartościami etyczno-intelektualnymi składającymi się na ideał ludzkiej ἀρετή. Oczywiście uwaga i aspiracje autora *Politei* skupiają się nie na szczęściu hedonistycznym, lecz na tym, które zyskujemy drogą doskonalenia się wewnętrznego i ciągłego rozwoju intelektualnego – szczęściu najwyższym i jedynym bodaj szczęściu prawdziwym. Czy jednak ludzie żyjący inaczej skazani są przez niego na egzystencję pozbawioną satysfakcji życiowej, a filozof-intelektualista z chwilą, gdy zaczyna pełnić określone zadania społeczne, staje się człowiekiem nieszczęśliwym? Platon odrzucający ze wzdrgadą radości, jakie daje nasza codzienna aktywność i przyjemności życia codziennego, pozostaje jeszcze jednym stereotypem, któremu warto się przyjrzeć.

2. Eudajmonizm Platoński?

Podjmując kwestię szczęścia ludzkiego wchodzę na grunt w perspektywie filozofii Platońskiej dość niebezpieczny, skoro – jak wiemy – myśl autora *Politei* zorientowana była na wartości wykraczające poza wymiar subiektywnych doznań jednostkowych. Człowiek w tej orientacji światopoglądowej występuje jako podmiot poznający, którego zadaniem jest zmierzać ku najwyższej rangi bytowi transcendentnemu. Czy wobec tego kwestia jego osobistego szczęścia jest dla Platona problemem, któremu w ogóle warto poświęcać uwagę?

Odpowiem, że Platon – siłą samych swoich dokonań, „dwugłowy”⁹ – liczy się dla nas nie tylko jako twórca imponującej konstrukcji ontologiczno-gnozeologicznej, lecz również jako humanista – autor pełnych ciepła relacji z rozmów składających się na życie umysłowe i towarzyskie ówczesnych Aten. W tej perspektywie człowiek przestaje być jedynie badaczem prawd niewzruszonych, a pozostaje wrażliwą istotą mającą określo-

⁷ Pl. *Lg.* 662d4–7: „Ποτέρους δὲ εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρὴ λέγειν, τοὺς τὸν δικαιοτάτων ἢ τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον διαβιοῦντας βίον;” εἰ μὲν δὴ φαῖεν τοὺς τὸν ἥδιστον, ἄτοπος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος ἂν γίνοιτο.

⁸ Np. Pl. *Lg.* 742d7–e1, 816c7–d2, 927b6, 945d3–4.

⁹ Por. Tigerstedt (1977: 87): „Janus-headed Plato”.

ne potrzeby, z potrzebą jak najpełniejszej satysfakcji życiowej na czele. O zaspokojenie tego naturalnego pragnienia upomną się zresztą sami bohaterowie Platońskich dyskusji, nawet wbrew zasadniczej myśli rozwijanej w postępującej konfrontacji stanowisk. Na ten głos nie pozostanie Platon obojętny.

Odnosząc się do kwestii zaspokojenia życiowego człowieka, rozgranicza on przede wszystkim te ludzkie potrzeby, których spełnienie jest koniecznością, i te, które poza owo minimum wykraczają, uznawszy, że utrzymując się na poziomie zaspokojenia minimalnego unikniemy wyczerpującego dla naszej psychiki rozchwiania wewnętrznego. Takie w pewnym sensie antyhedonistyczne nastawienie nie sprawia jednak, że przyjemność (ἡδονή) sama w sobie zostaje przez niego odrzucona. Świadczy o tym nie tylko swoista promocja hedonizmu, do jakiej dochodzi w *Protagorasie*, lecz także wyrażana jeszcze w *Prawach* akceptacja dla przyjemności jako wartości istotnej również w życiu człowieka etycznie doskonałego (v.i.). Z tym większym sceptycyzmem należy przyjrzeć się pogładowi, iż zmierza Platon ku temu, by w trakcie swej „pajdei” eliminować z dusz podopiecznych skłonności „eudajmonistyczne”, czyli potrzebę przeżywania osobistego szczęścia, skoro firmujący taką postawę życiową „eudajmonizm” nie musi być eudajmonizmem hedonistycznym. Można wszak wyobrazić sobie człowieka szczęśliwego w toku życiowych poczynań bardzo nawet uciążliwych, a dających satysfakcję, która wynika z poczucia doniosłości i sensowności podejmowanych działań, bądź też z potrzeby służenia szczęściu innych ludzi. Możemy zatem mówić o eudajmonizmie „deontycznym”, bądź ogólniej ideologicznym, czy wreszcie intelektualnym, kiedy szczęściem staje się zaspokajanie naszych potrzeb poznawczych. Tym bardziej wymaga rozpatrzenia kwestia przewyciężenia przez Platona tego naturalnego ludzkiego pragnienia.

Nawiązuję tym samym do ustaleń W. Altmana, który w swej monografii poświęconej wychowawczemu oddziaływaniu nauki Platona, stara się udokumentować pogląd, iż poprzez swe dokonania literacko-dydaktyczne założyciel Akademii zamierza przygotować adresatów jego „pajdeutycznego” przekazu do odstąpienia od „aksjomatu eudajmonistycznego”¹⁰, czyli przekonania o należnym każdemu poczuciu szczęścia życiowego, na rzecz pełnego oddania się idei służby publicznej. Drogę, którą wychowanek Platońskiej Akademii ma przebyć od owej egoistycznej roszczeniowości względem życia ku teźże doskonałości wewnętrznej – tak zwaną „dłuższą drogę” (*the Longer Way*) jego osobniczego rozwoju wytycza, zdaniem W. Altmana, szereg Platońskich dialogów, ułożonych w nieco dziwny dla systematyka cykl określony jako „porządek odczytania” (*reading order*) tych utworów, którego ukoronowanie stanowić ma „posteudajmonistyczny altruizm” znajdujący wyraz w przesłaniu *Politei*¹¹.

Lista zastrzeżeń, jakie wzbudza ów pogląd, jest niemała. Pomijając już niezgodne z przyjętą diachronią rozwoju myśli Platona uszeregowanie jego dialogów, zacząć należy

¹⁰ Tak zwany „the eudaimonist axiom” oddawany skrótem TEA – Altman (2018: passim).

¹¹ Altman (2018: 470): „With respect to ethics, Justice in the light of the Good entails what one might call »a post-eudaemonist altruism«”; por. Altman (2018: 490).

od interpretacji, według której Platońska „dłuższa droga” poznania obejmuje również powrotną drogę badacza bytu ku ludzkiej społeczności¹² i w konsekwencji jego działalność przywódczo-wychowawczą w tych społecznych realiach. Otóż miejsca *Politei* oraz innych Platońskich dialogów, gdzie mowa jest o takim długotrwałym dążeniu ku prawdzie, potwierdzają jedynie pogląd, iż jest to „dialektyczny ruch myśli” polegający na wysuwaniu kolejnych hipotez, „które są jako szczeble pod stopami, jako punkty oparcia i odskoku, aby się wznieść do szczytu i do początku wszystkiego”¹³, a interpretację, w myśl której ten ruch ku górze łączy się z późniejszym zejściem do niedoskonałego ludzkiego świata, sam Platon uznałby zapewne za dziwaczną. „Dłuższa droga” poznania jest dla niego wyłącznie stopniowym wznoszeniem się dialektycznej myśli ponad materialną rzeczywistość.

Silnie zaznacza się w poglądach W. Altmana przeciwstawienie Platońskiej pajdeutyki z jej imperatywem wyzbycia się szczęścia osobistego „eudajmonistycznemu Sokratyzmowi” (*eudaemonist Socratism*)¹⁴, czyli przypisanej Sokratesowi tendencji do stawiania w rzędzie dóbr najcenniejszych tegoż indywidualnego szczęścia – szczęścia o zabarwieniu mocno hedonistycznym. W myśl tej interpretacji ma miejsce „tarcie”, wręcz konflikt, między pełnym poświęcenia powrotem Platońskiego filozofa do „jaskini” ludzkich zwykłych spraw, a owym roszczeniowym „eudajmonizmem” reprezentowanym przez Sokratesa¹⁵, który wręcz „blokuje” dążenie ku najwyższemu dobru i związaną z tym wewnętrzną odnowę Platońskiego badacza bytu¹⁶. Kwestia, na ile Sokrates – który *nota bene* pozostając niezmiennie Sokratesem Platońskim znajdzie się po obu stronach tej sztucznie tworzonej barykady – wyznaje ów eudajmonizm i na ile różni się on od Platona w ocenie najwyższych wartości etycznych, jest pytaniem, na które można odpowiedzieć negując istnienie jakiegokolwiek istotnej rozbieżności między nimi. Sokrates ze swoją gotowością oddania życia za prawdę i programowym dystansowaniem się od zwykłych ludzkich trosk i radości, o ile może nie podzielać Platońskiego poglądu o obiektywnym istnieniu bytów pojęciowych, nie stoi z pewnością w opozycji wobec niego jako zwolennik eudajmonistycznej orientacji aksjologicznej.

Pomijając szereg drobnych, kuriozalnych niekiedy uchybień, które także deprecjują nieco tę interpretację¹⁷, wypada jednak zająć się kwestią najważniejszą, dotyczą-

¹² Por. Altman (2018: 510): „[...] some of us would follow the Longer Way, a harder journey back down to the shadows, and only made possible by our prior Ascent to the Good”.

¹³ Katamay (2006: 74): por. Szlezák (2003: 420): Sokrates konsekwentnie nie dyskutuje też z nim o tym, dokąd prowadzi „dłuższa droga” dialektyki, to znaczy o istocie Idei Dobra; por. R. 435d3, 504b2, 504c9, *Phdr.* 246a4–5, 274a2, *Sph.* 217e4, *Prm.* 136e1–3.

¹⁴ Altman (2018: 42, 49, 52, 274, 275).

¹⁵ Altman (2018: 42): „it is the friction between eudaemonist Socratism and the noble necessity of the Guardian’s self-sacrificing return to the Cave that causes Justice to flash forth”.

¹⁶ Altman (2018: 49): „the participle ἐλθόντα indicates what (or whom) Socrates will block or obstruct on the pathway to that *summum bonum*”.

¹⁷ Przykładem może być uznanie (Altman 2018: 218), że „stanowisko Sokratyczne” (*the Socratist position*) w kwestii wyboru między poświęceniem siebie samego dobru ogólnemu a postawą eudajmonistyczną jest „grzbietem zasłaniającym widok morza” (*a ridge blocking the sight of the sea*), zapewne Platońskiego oceanu

cą szczęścia osobistego, którego Platon pozbawiać ma czynnych politycznie filozofów, czyli przypisanego mu odejścia od orientacji eudajmonistycznej ku idei „samoposwiecenia” na rzecz dobra innych ludzi¹⁸. Łatwiej będzie z pewnością odnieść się do tej kwestii w wymiarze zagadnienia bardziej trywialnym, kiedy przedmiotem uwagi stanie się eudajmonizm hedonistyczny, choć i tu sprawę utrudni to, że Platon nie jest jednoznaczny w swej ocenie przyjemności jako takiej. Dodatkową w świetle interpretacji W. Altmana kwestią staje się pytanie, na ile pogląd Platona na ów temat znajdzie wyraz w ocenie hedonistycznych wartości, z jaką wystąpi sam Sokrates.

Sokrates – jeżeli przyznamy mu w tym względzie jakąś suwerenność – już w *Protagorasie* daje podstawy, by zaszeregować go jako eudajmonistę, i to eudajmonistę hedonistycznego, skoro uznaje tam, że wytyczna „żyć dobrze” (εὖ ζῆν) sprowadza się do słów: „żyć przyjemnie”¹⁹. Niemniej już tam (*Prt.* 355b–357d) poddaje on ostatecznie przyjemność – ἡδονή kontroli rozumu i wiedzy, decydujących o wyborze bądź odrzuceniu określonej przyjemności, które w rezultacie stają się w stosunku do niej wartością nadrzędną. Redukuje się zatem znajduwana rozbieżność między nim a Platonem w kwestii życia szczęśliwego, a traci również na ostrości pytanie: „na ile hedonizm dialogu *Protagoras* pozostaje w zgodzie z próbami obalenia hedonizmu Kalliklesa”²⁰. Pytanie to przenosi już dyskusję w realia Platónskiego *Gorgiasza*, w którym toczy Sokrates z owym sofistą spór wagi pryncypialnej.

Mniej dociekliwa interpretacja dialogu *Gorgiasz* może prowadzić do konkluzji, że tu wreszcie odzywa się odchodząca od eudajmonizmu Sokratesa własna pedagogika Platona, skoro cała ta dyskusja wydaje się w końcowym rezultacie „wyrzyskim zaprzeczeniem tezy stawiającej na równi dobro i przyjemność”²¹. Uważna lektura tego utworu nie potwierdza jednak ani rozbieżności między stanowiskiem jednego i drugiego, ani też antyhedonistycznej wymowy owego pisma Platona. Sokrates w swej konfrontacji ze wspomnianym Kalliklesem, dającym wolność niczym nie krępowanemu zaspokajaniu hedonistycznych potrzeb, nie odchodzi w jakiś radykalny sposób od tego, z czym występował w dyskusji z Protagorasem. Potępienie ówczesnej retoryki jako umiejętności przyjemnego dla odbiorcy schlebienia niewybrednym potrzebom ogółu, nie oznacza apriorycznej negacji ludzkich upodobań hedonistycznych, lecz tylko wystąpienie prze-

Piękna Samego (por. *Smp.* 210d3–4), i zarazem rodzajem „trampoliny” umożliwiającej wzniesienie się ku Idee Dobra (*a springboard to be used on the final ascent to the Idea of the Good*). W tej dość rażącej sprzeczności zaznacza się jednak bardzo istotny w aspekcie omówionej interpretacji dylemat, od którego W. Altman do końca się nie uwolnił – pytanie, na ile przypisany Sokratesowi eudajmonizm przeciwstawia się wymagającej pajdeutyce Platona, a na ile staje się punktem wyjścia dla tej koncepcji wychowawczej.

¹⁸ Altman (2018: 473): „the Guardians outside of Plato’s wondrous text are challenged to sacrifice their personal happiness in the light of the Good, and thus most certainly do „sacrifice themselves altruistically for the others”.

¹⁹ Dokładnie: ἡδέως βιοῦς (w odniesieniu do człowieka, który żyje przyjemnie) – Pl. *Prt.* 351b4–6.

²⁰ Russell (2005: 239): „if the hedonism of the *Protagoras* should be consistent with the refutations of Callikles’ hedonism”.

²¹ Por. Altman (2018: 271): „The most obvious discrepancy between *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* involves the express denial of the GP Equation in the latter”.

ciw każdemu, kto „nie rozgranicza, które z przyjemności są dobre, a które złe”²², czyli w pełni zgodne z przesłaniem *Protagorasa* pouczenie, że dopiero człowiek mądry może właściwie ocenić, których przyjemności winien unikać, a do których dążyć (*Grg.* 507b5–8). Sokrates, niestety, nie podejmie drugiego członu alternatywy, co można tłumaczyć potrzebą dokonania bieżących rozrachunków z groźnymi przeciwnikami ideologicznymi, i tak też – jak sądzę – należy odbierać całe następujące w tym utworze potępienie hedonizmu oraz retorów, którzy mu schlebiają. *Gorgiasz* jest po prostu krytyką ówczesnych realiów i tłumaczy tych, którzy się w nich nie odnajdują, a odprawę dostaje w nim nie hedonizm jako taki, lecz wyłącznie „jako teza broniona przez Kalliklesa”²³.

Podobnie jak nie uznamy dialogu *Gorgiasz* za „kasację” przychylnego dla hedonistycznego eudajmonizmu sądu, jaki zapada w *Protagorasie*, tak i Platońskiego *Fedona* nie zakwalifikujemy jako „ostatni gwóźdź do trumny” owej hołdującej życiu przyjemnemu ideologii²⁴. Taka kwalifikacja tej przedśmiertnej debaty, w trakcie której Sokrates daje jedynie wyraz przekonaniu, że „naprawdę filozoficznie usposobiona dusza powstrzymuje się, jak tylko może, zarówno od przyjemności, jak i pragnień oraz cierpień i lęków”²⁵, nie uwzględnia także kontekstu całej rozmowy oraz intencji dowodzącego, która ma charakter w dużej mierze osobisty. Wykazywanie, jak marne są przyjemności życia doczesnego, można bowiem traktować jako swoistą samoobronę umysłu świadomego tak bliskiego końca swej życiowej aktywności, natomiast przyjęcie, że jest to deklaracja światopoglądowa i zarazem przesłanie samego Platona kierowane do tych, którzy wciąż pozostają przy życiu, chyba – jak sądzę – jego ocenie wartości uznanych dóbr etycznych, która znajdzie wyraz już w *Politei*.

To właśnie pismo Platona ma – według W. Altmana – ostatecznie eliminować szczęście osobiste z kręgu wartości, jakie winien kultywować filozof, skąd wynikałoby, że o żadnym hedonizmie nie może tam w ogóle być mowy. Jest to – jak sądzę – kolejne uproszczenie, spływające naukę tego tak pełnego treści dzieła Platona, w którym także przyjemność – ἡδονή nie zyska jednoznacznej kwalifikacji. Obok bowiem potępienia dla rozkoszy miłosnej, która „rozum odbiera” (*R.* 402e), czy przyjemności, które „wypłukują” męstwo z duszy (*R.* 430a–b), znajdują tu również uznanie „pożądania i rozkosze związane z inteligentną rozmową” (*R.* 328d), a obok „różnorodnych żądz i przyjemności” właściwych ludziom nędznej kondycji wystąpią też „pożądania proste i utrzymane w mierze, o których decyduje rozum i sąd prawdziwy”, cechujące jednostki godne naśladowania (*R.* 431b–c). Ostatecznie „specyfikuje” Platon samo pojęcie przyjemności, która mieć ma charakter troisty, co wiąże się z różnymi upodobaniami i różną w związ-

²² Pl. *Grg.* 495a1–2: μη διορίζεται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποια ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ (tłum. Z.D.).

²³ Por. Kahn (2018: 233): „również i teraz obalony zostaje nie tyle hedonizm jako teza abstrakcyjna, lecz jako teza broniona przez Kalliklesa”.

²⁴ Por. Altman (2018: 308): „if Plato had thought that *Gorgias* had completed the reversal of *Protagoras*, he wouldn't have bothered to use *Phaedo* to put the final nail in the coffin that contains the corpse of a deadpan reading of it”.

²⁵ Pl. *Phd.* 83b5–7: ἡ τοῦ ὅς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆ οὕτως ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ λυπῶν [καὶ φόβων] καθ' ὅσον δύναται (tłum. Z.D.).

ku z tym aktywnością życiową trzech wyróżnionych typów ludzi²⁶. Podczas gdy pogrążony w konsumpcjonizmie ogół upatruje przyjemności w gromadzeniu dóbr materialnych i ich wykorzystywaniu, typ ambicjonalny znajdzie ją w doznawaniu czci zyskanej drogą zasług orężnych, natomiast typ intelektualny uzna tylko tę, którą daje aktywność poznawcza, a maksymalizuje kontemplacja bytu niezmiennego²⁷. Autor *Politei* przyjmuje, że doznawanie tej poznawczej satysfakcji jest stanem najbardziej przyjemnym (ἡδίστη) i najprzyjemniejsze jest też samo życie cieszącego się tymi dobrami badacza bytu²⁸.

Czy jednak – odnieśmy się do poglądu W. Altmana – pogrążony w tym gnostycznym eudajmonizmie filozof nie wyzbędzie się szczęścia osobistego z chwilą, gdy zacznie pełnić służbę publiczną? Dodajmy, że obiekcja tego rodzaju znajdzie swe uzasadnienie wyłącznie w odniesieniu do zarządzających państwem intelektualistów, gdyż pozostałe dwie grupy społeczne bez przeszkód oddając się temu, co przynosi im największą przyjemność, mogą zażywać pełni szczęścia życiowego. Nie dostąpi tej radości filozof, na którym ciąży konieczność (ἀνάγκη) spłacenia długu, jaki zaciągnął wobec państwa umożliwiającego mu kontynuowanie wieloletnich studiów (R. 519e–520c). Platon wychodzi naprzeciw tej obiekcji i spodziewanej niechęci badacza do podjęcia misji społecznej, nie tylko odwołując się do owych zobowiązań, lecz także motywując go pozytywnie wizją przyszłego szczęścia całej pozostającej pod mądrymi rządami społeczności²⁹, co zresztą nie oznacza, że on sam pełniąc uciążliwą służbę będzie szczęścia pozbawiony. Wyłania się model zadowolenia życiowego owego strażnika spraw państwowych, płynącego z satysfakcji, jaką daje mu jego w pełni altruistyczna działalność. Aby tego szczęścia doznawać, konieczne jest wznieść się na taki poziom rozwoju intelektualnego i etycznego, który umożliwia już dystansowanie się od dóbr materialnych i hedonizmu konsumpcyjnego (R. 520e–521a) i dopiero wówczas służba określonego Dobra – w tym przypadku dobru społecznemu – może dać ową kompensującą wszelkie niedostatki iście hedonistyczną satysfakcję życiową. Wyzbyci dóbr osobistych, pełniący rządy filozofowie – stwierdza Platon – „będą mieli życie szczęśliwe w najwyższym stopniu. Będą żyli w szczęściu lepiej niż zwycięzcy na igrzyskach olimpijskich”³⁰.

Autor *Politei*, daleki od hedonizmu w jego trywialnej postaci, nie odbiera prawa do szczęścia osobistego również tym, których wyznacza do zadań wymagających szczególnego poświęcenia. Jest to szczęście inne niż radość docierania do prawdy, niemniej swym wysoce etycznym charakterem znakomicie kompensujące brak satysfakcji poznawczej, tak cennej dla badacza, który dzięki swej misji społecznej staje się animatorem idei Dobra

²⁶ Pl. R. 580d7–581a1: Τῆνδε. τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναὶ μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἰδία.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 582c7–d2: τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θεας, οἷαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλω γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 583a1–3; por. Pacewicz (2016: 225): W hierarchii duchowej przyjemności rozumu przeważają nad przyjemnościami władzy zwanej *thumoeides*, a obie nad *hēdonē* funkcji pożądawczej.

²⁹ Pl. R. 420b5–8; por. 465d7–8; Owa motywacja sprawia, że podejmujący służbę społeczną filozof decyduje się ostatecznie na coś, co można nazwać „dobrowolnym oddaniem się w niewolę temu, co najlepsze w ludzkiej naturze” („self-chosen servitude to the best part of human nature” – Hansen 2010: 27).

³⁰ Pl. R. 465d2–3 (tłum. W. Witwicki).

i najwyższej prawdy. Dodajmy, że tak odczytane przesłanie *Politei* nie odbiega od tego, czego na temat życia przyjemnego dowiadujemy się z *Praw* – swoistego testamentu politycznego Platona.

W *Prawach* do kwestii życia przyjemnego podchodzi Platon z odpowiedzialnością, jaka winna cechować reformatora stosunków społecznych. Nie dziwi więc, że już na początku odzywa się w tym utworze postulat ustawowego ograniczania destruktywnie oddziałujących przyjemności, głównie rozkoszy miłosnych i uciech pijackich (*Lg.* 634a6 nn.), niekiedy nawet realizowany pod hasłem uwolnienia się od tyranii tych i innych ludzkich słabości (*Lg.* 863e6–8). Z uwagi na trudności związane z wcieleniem w życie takiego programu ogranicza się jednak Platon w pierw do zalecenia, by nad potrzebą doznawania przyjemności rozsądnie panować (*Lg.* 647c7–d7)³¹, a następnie przygany dla tych, którzy do takiego opanowania nie są zdolni³², lecz przede wszystkim sugeruje, by jednak dokonywać rozgraniczenia między dwoma rodzajami rozkoszy. Oznacza to już pozytywną kwalifikację dla przyjemności doznawanej z miarą i należytą ostrożnością (εὐλάβεια – *Lg.* 649e2), a nawet uznanie pewnych przyjemności – tych, które wiążą się z poczuciem rytmu i harmonii – za dar bogów (*Lg.* 653e5–654a3). Platońska refleksja nad szczęściem hedonistycznym wkracza tym samym na grunt estetyki i tutaj – mimo dowodzenia, że przyjemność estetyczna nie może być głównym celem sztuki (*Lg.* 667b5 nn.) – autor *Praw* przyznaje, że wywoływanie przyjemnych doznań stanowi cenną wartość wszelkich dokonań artystycznych, chociażby śpiewów kultowych (*Lg.* 665c5–7). Ta aprobatą dla przyjemności o charakterze estetycznym, nie wzbudzających niepokoju w duszy, bliska staje się pogładowi, który znajduje wyraz w nieco wcześniejszym *Filebie*, gdzie tego rodzaju rozkosze, rozkosze czyste (καθαρὰς ἡδονάς), również uznaje Platon za jedyne godne wyboru (*Phlb.* 52b6–d1), mimo że tutaj jest to przeżycie nie tyle estetyczne, co intelektualne.

Autor *Praw* nie pomija milczeniem również pajdeutycznego aspektu zagadnienia. Poświęca mu cały obszerny monolog (*Lg.* 662b1–663c5), w którym w odpowiedzi na pytanie: „czy życie najsprawiedliwsze jest i najprzyjemniejsze”³³, dowodzi, że „ten, który pędzi życie najprzyjemniejsze, jest najszczęśliwszy”³⁴, a za najszczęśliwszy uznać należy jedynie żywot najsprawiedliwszy (δικαιοτάτων – *Lg.* 662e9). Konkluzją staje się stwierdzenie: „stanowisko, które nie oddziela przyjemności od sprawiedliwości i dobra i piękna, jest przekonujące”³⁵ – jednoznacznie wiążące szczęście hedonistyczne, oczywiście dobrej próby hedonistyczne, z najwyższej próby wartościami etycznymi³⁶ – i stanowią-

³¹ Jako że naprawdę szczęśliwie (εὐδαιμόνως) żyć może dopiero ten, kto nad tą potrzebą zapanuje (*Lg.* 840c5–6).

³² Pl. *Lg.* 836d9–e1, 886a8–b2, 908c2–3, 934a3–6.

³³ *Ibidem*, 662d1: Ἐὰν ὁ δικαιοτάτος ἔστιν βίος ἡδιστος (tłum. W. Witwicki).

³⁴ *Ibidem*, 662e3: ὁ ζῶν τὸν ἡδιστον βίον ἔστιν μακαριώτατος (tłum. W. Witwicki).

³⁵ Pl. *Lg.* 663a9–b1: Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ' (tłum. W. Witwicki).

³⁶ Por. Pacewicz (2016: 212): „stan *eunomia* w odniesieniu do czyjejś duszy oznacza, że dusza takiej osoby jest w najwyższym stopniu uporządkowana czyli właściwie wychowana, pobożna, rozumna, zna swoje miejsce

ce wymowną odpowiedź samego Platona na interpretację, według której nakazuje on kultywującemu owe wartości działaczowi społecznemu wyzbyć się myśli o szczęściu osobistym. Autor *Politei* nie kreuje pełniącego społeczną misję filozofa na męczennika i ofiarę sytuacji, w której czyni on coś, co napawa go najwyższą niechęcią. Pozwala mu w trakcie pełnienia owych zadań przeżywać również osobiste szczęście wiążące się nie tylko ze świadomością realizowanego Dobra, lecz także z pewnym wynikającym stąd błogostanem wewnętrznym, co zresztą pozostaje w zgodzie z wyrażaną na przestrzeni lat Platońską akceptacją dla rozsądnie kultywowanej przyjemności (ἡδονή) i eudajmonizmu o charakterze hedonistycznym³⁷. Owo zadowolenie aktywnego politycznie filozofa nie przeszkodzi jednak temu, by z ulgą złożył sprawowaną władzę i z radością powrócił w sferę doznań intelektualnych. Odsłania się druga strona zagadnienia.

3. Poznanie drogą ku szczęściu najwyższemu?

Podjęcie powyższej kwestii oznacza bliższy wgląd w jeszcze jeden punkt interpretacji W. Altmana, który Platońską „dłuższą drogę” poznania czyni – poza dochodzeniem do prawdy najwyższej – drogą pewnego rozwoju etycznego i etycznego samodoskonalenia przyszłego filozofa i zarazem działacza społecznego. Można to rozumieć tak, że filozof osiągając wiedzę najwyższą osiąga zarazem najwyższą etyczną doskonałość, bądź jedno tylko z najwyższych dóbr etycznych. Za takie uznamy bowiem doznanie szczęścia, które wyznacza wariant „słabszy” interpretacji, o jakiej mowa, podczas gdy przeobrażenie wewnętrzne w kierunku gotowości do przyszłych poświęceń wyznaczać będzie bardziej zdecydowaną linię owej interpretacji. Skoro jednak – w myśl powyższych ustaleń – u kresu tej drogi ku poświęceniom znajdzie się także pewne, alternatywne, szczęście, skupmy się na pytaniu, na ile wznoszenie się duszy badacza ku najwyższemu poznaniu jest zarazem drogą ku szczęściu najwyższemu?

Autor *Politei* w swych wskazówkach na ten temat okazuje się dość oszczędny. Zaznacza tylko, że owo wznoszące się ponad ludzką rzeczywistość poznanie jest „nabytkiem przyjemnym i szczęśliwym” (ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτήμα) dla filozofa (R. 496c6), dla którego szczęściem staje się już samo wyzwolenie z „kajdan” poznania zmysłowego (R. 516c5–6), dodając ponadto, że dusza owego badacza zmierza „do tamtego świata, gdzie mieszka byt najszczęśliwszy, który ona musi zobaczyć na wszelki sposób”³⁸. Mowa tutaj o procesie „wznoszenia się” poznawczego (ἐπάνοδος) ku oglądowi bytu nieprzemijającego.

w strukturze społecznej i związane z nim zadania, a więc jest szczęśliwa”.

³⁷ Por. Goodell (1921: 38–39): „Every kind of pleasure is included under ἡδονή in one place or another, except precisely that which makes Plato’s hedonism an elevated doctrine, wholly consistent with the entire body of his ethical teaching”.

³⁸ Pl. R. 526e2–4: τείνει δέ, φημέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεισθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμόνεστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν (tłum. W. Witwicki).

jącego, znanym również z innych Platońskich opisów owego wzrostu poznawczego³⁹, co pozwala rzucić nieco więcej światła na kwestię osiąganego w trakcie tego procesu szczęścia najwyższego.

Motyw zaznacza się dość wyraźnie w Platońskim *Fedonie*, gdzie owo szczęście dane jest duszy filozofa wznoszącej się w trudzie poznawczym ponad ludzkie żądze i pragnienia, a także nierzadką wśród ludzi bezmyślność⁴⁰, by jak wszyscy, którzy na tę pośmiertną szczęśliwość zasłużyli, dostąpić ostatecznie przeżycia określonego jako „widowisko dla szczęśliwych widzów”⁴¹. Przekonanie, iż najwyższe doznanie kontemplatywne wiąże się z dostąpieniem szczęścia znajdzie też wyraz w wizji, jaka staje się udziałem dusz natchnionych w dialogu *Fajdros*, kiedy to cały „chór istot szczęśliwych”, które wzniosły się na firmament nieba, uczestniczy w niezwykłym spektaklu, celebrując Piękno w samej jego istocie w błogosławionym akcie, czy wręcz obrzędzie, mistycznego wtajemniczenia, a przepełnione szczęściem wizje (εὐδαιμόνα φάσματα), jakich dostępują, sprawiają że one same doznają przeobrażenia i zarazem oczyszczenia, wyzbywając się narosłych przez lata przyzwyczajęń, związanych z konsumpcjonistycznymi potrzebami ciała (*Phdr.* 250b5–c6).

Pewnym komentarzem do tak zarysowanej wizji stać się mogą opisy najwyższego szczęścia związanego z odejściem w sferę bytu doskonałego, jakie wystąpią w dialogu *Timajos*, gdzie jednak sytuacja przedstawia się niejednoznacznie. Mamy tu bowiem do czynienia bądź z odejściem w sferę gwiazdną człowieka etycznie nieskazitelnego, wyzwolonego od „doznań gwałtownych” (βιαιῶν παθημάτων), który znajduje tam swoje „mieszkanie” (οἶκησιν) i „życie szczęśliwe” (βίον εὐδαιμόνα) na miarę swej doskonałości wewnętrznej (*Ti.* 42a1–c1), bądź też z podnoszącą z ziemi „do pokrewieństwa z niebianami” (πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν) niezmordowaną żądzą badacza „w szczególny sposób szczęśliwego” (διαφερόντως εὐδαιμόνα) dzięki studiom wynoszącym go ponad byt śmiertelny i żądze cielesne (*Ti.* 90a5–c6). Ta druga sytuacja, paralelna do wskazanych miejsc *Politei*, również nie przedstawia się jednoznacznie, skoro autor *Timajosa* ukazuje owego badacza jako „pielęgnującego to, co boskie” (θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον), a więc w pewnej otoczce mistycyzmu (*Ti.* 90c4–5), a z drugiej strony jako „mającego dobrze uporządkowane (trzymającego w ryzach porządku) bóstwo, które w nim mieszka” (ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν εὐ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἑαυτῷ), czyli – jak można rozumieć – panującego nad mistyczno-emocjonalnymi skłonnościami swej natury racjonalistę (*Ti.* 90a4–c6). Kompromisowo można przyjąć, że owa „therapeia” nie jest jedynie służebną uległością, lecz również pewną rozumną kontrolą nad irracjonalną stroną poznania, kontrolą rozgraniczającą boski – i zarazem rozumny – porządek bytu i boskość, która wykracza już poza prawa rozumu.

³⁹ Więcej na ten temat: Danek (2020: 179–192).

⁴⁰ Pl. *Phd.* 81a6–8: ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβου καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀπηλλαγμένη.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 111a3: θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν (tłum. W. Witwicki).

Wyobrażenie jakiejś boskości owego najwyższego szczęścia, ku któremu zmierzać ma badacz dążący ku szczytom poznania, daje o sobie znać również w Platońskiej *Politei*, gdzie kolejne sformułowane przez dialektyka „hipotezy” prowadzą jednak ostatecznie ku temu, co okazuje się już „niehipotetyczne” (ἀνυπόθετον) i nie mieści się w granicach racjonalnych uzasadnień⁴². Dowiadujemy się tam, że filozof obcując z tym, co pełne jest boskiego ładu, sam staje się boski i pełen ładu, na ile tylko może to być dane człowiekowi⁴³. Dostępuje tej doskonałości drogą jakiegoś oglądu noetycznego, jako że porównany jest do malarza opierającego się na niezwykle „boskim paradygmacie” (τῷ θεῖῳ παραδείγματι – R. 500e3) i ukazany jako ktoś, kto dostąpiwszy „boskiego widzenia” nie odnajduje się już w codziennej ludzkiej rzeczywistości (R. 517d4–6). Wbrew pozorom okazuje się jednak, że owo wzniesienie się na poziom boskiego szczęścia nie dokonuje się w trybie jednoznacznie indukcyjnym, jako że oddana poszukiwaniu mądrości dusza ludzka ma być już spokrewniona z nieśmiertelną boskością bytu wiecznie istniejącego⁴⁴ i dążąc ku niemu wraca niejako do miejsca swego poczęcia, a warunkiem, by mogła tam powrócić, jest wyzbycie się wszystkiego, co związane jest z bytem doczesnym. Znowu daje o sobie znać reduktywistyczny model drogi filozofa ku szczęściu bezcielesnego życia pośmiertnego, znany z Platońskiego *Fedona*.

W samym *Timajosie* akcent boskości związanej z możliwością dostąpienia owego szczęścia doskonałego odzywa się zresztą również wtedy, gdy mowa jest o oddziałujących na nas czynnikach koniecznych, lecz i boskich, za którymi należy podążać we wszystkich sprawach, aby dostąpić życia szczęśliwego⁴⁵. Mówiący o tym Timajos stawia oczywiście ponad każdą wynikającą z konieczności „przyczynę” tę drugą będącą bezpośrednim warunkiem i kluczem otwierającym drogę do szczęścia na miarę boskiej doskonałości. Owo szczęście nie okazuje się jednak zwykłym darem opatrności, czy też jakąś niespodziewaną eksplozją nagłego zrozumienia prawdy najważniejszej, jako że dostąpienie tej najwyższej doskonałości musi być poprzedzone zmaganiem się umysłu badacza z tym, co konieczne (ἀναγκαῖον), to znaczy – jak rozumiem – obwarowane żelaznymi prawami logiki. Poucza bowiem autor *Timajosa*, że „bez tych nie można tamtych rzeczy, na których nam poważnie zależy, w odosobnieniu pojąć ani też uchwycić, ani w jakis inny sposób wziąć ich w siebie”⁴⁶.

Platońska droga ku szczęściu kontemplacji bytu doskonałego okazuje się zatem drogą analogiczną do wspomnianej już *epanodos*, czyli wznoszenia się umysłu badacza ku ostatecznej wizji noetycznej, kiedy to mimo ponadracjonalnego i mistycznego wręcz

⁴² Por. Halfwassen (2015: 94–95): „Dialektik [...] ihre Suche nach dem Grund solange fortsetzt, bis sie etwas findet, was selbst voraussetzungslos oder unbedingt – ἀνυπόθετος – ist“.

⁴³ Pl. R. 500c9–d1: Θεῖῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὁμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπων γίγνεται.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 611e2–3: ὡς συγγενῆς οὖσα τῷ θεῖῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ αἰεὶ ὄντι.

⁴⁵ Pl. *Ti*. 69a1: ἐν ἅπασιν ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἕνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, 69a3–5: ἀνευ τούτων οὐ δυνατόν αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἐφ’ οἷς σπουδάζομεν μόνα κατανοεῖν οὐδ’ αὐ λαβεῖν οὐδ’ ἄλλως πως μετασχεῖν (tłum. W. Witwicki).

charakteru owej finalnej iluminacji, warunkiem jej dostąpienia staje się respektujący prawa logiki proces myślenia dialektycznego. Interesujący jest jednak postulat etycznej doskonałości, czy też nieskazitelności, występujący równoległe z imperatywem intelektualnego doskonalenia się poprzez długotrwałe ćwiczenia dialektyczne, jako warunku osiągnięcia stanu najwyższej szczęśliwości. Okazuje się, że ów znakomity stan ducha dany jest również tym, którzy żyją zbożnie zapanowawszy nad instynktami, emocjami i zwykłymi ludzkimi słabościami. Czy zatem mamy do czynienia z całkowicie alternatywną możliwością dostąpienia szczęścia najwyższego, czy też z warunkiem jego osiągnięcia, jaki spełnić musi również zmierzający ku tym szczytom doskonałości filozof?

Rozwiązaniem dylematu może być pewna wersja koherencyjna, oparta o znajomość koncepcji etycznej, z jaką wychodzi Sokrates w Platońskich dialogach. Otóż zarysowuje on z jednej strony etos badacza, którego poza kultem wiedzy cechuje właśnie panowanie nad emocjami i własnymi słabościami, a także immanentne poczucie sprawiedliwości⁴⁷, natomiast z drugiej za konieczny warunek, czy też komponent ludzkiej wartości etycznej określanej jako ἀρετή uznaje odpowiedni stan wiedzy, wprowadzając również kryterium intelektualne tejsze wartości; nie do przyjęcia jest, by ktoś, kto ma być jej uosobieniem, wykazywał niedostatki w myśleniu, czy też brak motywacji poznawczej. Zatem można przyjąć, że mamy do czynienia z dość spójnym obrazem warunkującej dostąpienie szczęścia najwyższego wewnętrznej doskonałości, kiedy to osiągamy ten stan ducha w drodze równoległe postępującego doskonalenia się intelektualnego i zarazem etycznego, bez ściśle zastrzeżonej proporcji określającej relację wzajemną owych dwóch czynników. Ostatecznego boskiego szczęścia może dostąpić tylko człowiek, który skupia w sobie wartości jednego i drugiego rodzaju.

Konkluzja ta, przyznająca słuszność W. Altmanowi, nadającemu Platońskiej „dłuższej drodze” poznania również charakter procesu etycznego doskonalenia się, nie rozstrzyga jednak jeszcze jednej kwestii, istotnej dla każdego, kto dąży do szczęścia – kwestii dotyczącej „kumulatywnego”, bądź „reduktywnego” charakteru tego procesu. Jest to pytanie, czy owo szczęście – najwyższe, bądź nawet pośrednie, jakiego na swój sposób dostępować może ogół obywateli państwa Platońskiego – osiągamy poprzez „dodawanie” kolejnych dóbr czy też wartości do tych, które już posiadamy, czy też drogą uwalniania się od ich zakłócającej nasz spokój obecności w naszym życiu. Nieco inaczej rzecz ujmując, możemy zatem mówić o szczęściu „addytywnym”, któremu wszelako badacze zagadnienia przeciwstawiają nie tyle szczęście związane z wyzbywaniem się dóbr, co cenną zdolność rozsądnego dysponowania tymi, które sobie jednak pozostawiamy. Nazywany jest ten stan wewnętrzznego usposobienia, w którym punkt ciężkości przenosi

⁴⁷ Por. Murgier (2014: 68): „la vie du juste, dont le philosophe représente la plus parfaite incarnation, est plus heureuse, c'est-à-dire aussi plus plaisante, que la vie injuste”.

się z obiektywnie wymiernych wartości na podmiot doznający jako konstruktora swojej satysfakcji życiowej, szczęściem „dyrektywnym”⁴⁸.

Czy zatem człowiek, który zmierza ku owemu błogosławionemu stanowi ducha, ma gromadzić wszystko, co dla niego przedstawia jakąś wartość, czy też stopniowo się tego wyzbywać, czy wreszcie postępować drogą selekcji owych dóbr, bądź wymiany jednych na inne? I jak przedstawia się sam ten stan osiągniętego już szczęścia: jako stan posiadania, czy też jako stan uwolnienia? Pytania te wyznaczają kolejny cel niniejszych dociekań.

4. Kumulacja dóbr, czy minimalizacja stanu ich posiadania

Jeżeli kontemplację bytu doskonałego uznamy za finał procesu, w trakcie którego dążymy do osiągnięcia tego stanu szczęścia najwyższego, dostrzeżona sprzeczność między monolityczną postacią owego doznania a strukturalnym charakterem każdego rozumnego ku niemu dążenia odezwie się wyraźniejszym akcentem. Czy bowiem mówimy o dialektycznym procesie osadzonym w werbalnych strukturach logosu, czy też o całej kolekcji uczynków składających się na zasługi życiowe człowieka prawego, ma miejsce jakaś kumulacja, zwielokrotnienie różnego rodzaju treści, którego przeciwieństwem będzie jednolicie spójny charakter eudajmonistycznej kontemplacji bytu najwyższego. Na tym poziomie doskonałości etyczno-intelektualnej dylemat: „kumulować dobra różnego rodzaju, czy też ich się wyzbywać” w zasadzie zanika, jeżeli jednak dopuścimy również to, że jakieś szczęście realizuje się już w naszym życiu doczesnym, problem ten stanie się jednym z podstawowych dylematów życiowych człowieka.

Platon, przynajmniej w przekazie swoich dialogów, nie eliminuje poczucia szczęścia życiowego z naszej doczesnej egzystencji. Tamta wizja szczęścia doskonałego nie przesłania mu bynajmniej wartości tego, co składa się na ludzkie życie codzienne, któremu też należałoby nadać jakość adekwatną do wymogów, jakie postawi przed nami owa rozliczająca nas z doczesnych uczynków rzeczywistość. Błogosławiony stan ducha, zwiastujący tę przyszłą szczęśliwość, możemy osiągnąć już teraz postępując rozumnie, to znaczy mądrze korzystając z tych dóbr, jakie oferuje nam nasza społeczno-ekonomiczna rzeczywistość. Poza różnego rodzaju „imponderabiliami” w grę wchodzi tu również konkretne dobra materialne.

Platon wbrew legendzie czyniącej z niego wyniosłego ascetę niepodatnego na uroki świata, nie gardził też nabytkami, które składają się na hedonistyczną stronę naszego

⁴⁸ Por. Loizides (2013: 181–182): „The simplest way to define the additive conception of happiness is that “the more goods you have, the happier you should be”. Several “ingredients” can then be said to make up happiness [...] In contrast, in the directive conception of happiness, happiness is determined by rational or intelligent agency, which is the source of all proper direction in one’s life... happiness depends on the intelligence of giving goods an appropriate place in one’s life, that is, by formulating attitudes and priorities with respect to such goods”.

życia. Współcześni zarzucali mu zamięłowanie do przepychu, wspaniałych dywanów (D.L. VI 26) i smakowitych oliwek (D.L. III 26), a i samo jego odejście z tego świata – podczas uczty, w błogosławionym stanie ducha (D.L. III 2) – taki właśnie rysuje niekoturnowy jego wizerunek. Przypomnijmy zresztą, że również funkcjonariuszy swego państwa, całkowicie oddanych pełnionym przez siebie zadaniom, nie pozbawił doznań typu hedonistycznego, mimo iż te nie wiązały się z posiadaniem żadnych wymiernych dóbr, którymi wszelako pozwalał cieszyć się bez przeszkód ogółowi obywateli owej *polis*. Można zatem przyjąć, że Platońskie τὰγαθὰ obejmują również dobra i wartości materialne, które wypracowuje ludzka cywilizacja.

Powyższemu stwierdzeniu nie przeczą wbrew pozorom pojawiające się w pismach Platona słowa przygany pod adresem dorobkiewiczów gromadzących z nieposkromioną żądzą niepomierne bogactwa, jako że pozytywną stroną ich obecności w życiu ludzkim dostrzega on nie w samym stanie ich posiadania, lecz w rozumnym dysponowaniu nimi. Kilka passusów z Platońskich dialogów potwierdza to, że ich autor odrzuca „addytywną” koncepcję szczęścia doczesnego na rzecz szczęścia „dyrektywnego”, a w sposób najbardziej znamieny uwidacznia to miejsce z dialogu *Eutydem*, w którym Sokrates wiąże ów błogosławiony stan ducha z obecnością w naszym życiu wielu nieokreślonych bliżej dóbr.

Rozumowanie przebiega etapowo. Krokiem pierwszym jest przyjęcie, że ktoś, w czym posiadaniu są liczne dobra (ἀγαθὰ πολλά), musi doznawać szczęścia i być w dobrej kondycji życiowej (εὐδαιμονεῖν ἂν καὶ εὖ πράττειν), uzupełnione zastrzeżeniem, iż dobra te winny mu przynosić jakąś korzyść (*Euthd.* 280b5–8). Następny ruch polega na wykazaniu, że nie będzie szczęśliwy ten, kto zgromadziłby bogactwa i inne dobra, a nie posługiwałby się nimi (χρῶτο δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ – *Euthd.* 280d3). W konsekwencji pada stwierdzenie, że warunkiem szczęścia jest nie tylko posiadanie dóbr, lecz nade wszystko ich wykorzystywanie (τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς), z ważnym dopowiedzeniem, iż należy korzystać z owych dóbr w sposób właściwy (ὀρθῶς χρῆται), czyli – jak się okazuje – w sposób rozumny⁴⁹. Z dalszego podsumowania całego dowodzenia (*Euthd.* 282a1–6) dowiadujemy się, że warunkiem właściwego wykorzystywania posiadanych dóbr będzie odpowiednia wiedza (ἐπιστήμη), wobec czego każdy, kto chce doznawać szczęścia, winien dokładać starań, by stać się jak najmądrzejszy (ὄπως ὡς σοφώτατος ἔσται). Platon wyraźnie zmierza ku temu, co można określić jako „rozumne dysponowanie” (*rational or intelligent agency* – v.s.) dobrami, jakie są w naszym posiadaniu⁵⁰.

Z dopowiedzeń, jakie znajdziemy w *Politei* oraz w *Prawach* Platona, dowiadujemy się, że człowiek błogosławiony duchem, nie lubując się w samym gromadzeniu bogactw, nawet pozyskawszy je będzie miał na względzie głównie własną równowagę wewnętrzną i rozumnie zarządzając swoim majątkiem (κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ

⁴⁹ Pl. *Euthd.* 280d7–e4; por. Pl. *Lg.* 870b6–c1: διδάσκαλος οὖν ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος γίγνοιτο ὡς οὐ χρὴ πλουτεῖν ζητεῖν τὸν εὐδαιμόνα ἐσόμενον, ἀλλὰ δικαίως πλουτεῖν καὶ σωφρόνως.

⁵⁰ Por. Russell (2005: 20): „Here Plato makes it clear that the key to happiness is found not in the goods or even the projects that form the ‘ingredients’ of a person’s life, but in the agency of the person herself that gives her whole life direction and focus, and which therefore determines her happiness”; por. Russell (2005: 31).

ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας) zadba o to, by harmonia ta pozostała niezakłócona (R. 591d6–e4), a szczęśliwy będzie tylko ktoś czerpiący (ἀρπυόμενος) ze źródła bogactw tego świata mądrze i powściągliwie, natomiast ten, kto czynić to będzie bez odpowiedniej wiedzy (ἀνεπιστημόνως), dozna losu przeciwnego (Lg. 636d7–e3). Nie mniej istotnym dopowiedzeniem w kwestii właściwego wykorzystywania posiadanych dóbr wydaje się rozmowa, jaką Sokrates odbywa z Kefalosem, dysponującym okazałym majątkiem, a zajmującym wobec korzyści, które stąd wynikają, wysoce etyczną postawę rozumnego dystansu (R. 329e–331b). Kefalos, który – jak wynika z jego zwierzeń – nigdy nie dążył do tego, by bogacić się nadmiernie, pozyskawszy dość przyzwoity majątek uznaje, że do szczęścia życiowego przyczynia się on o tyle, że daje możliwość regulowania zobowiązań względem bogów i ludzi, uwalniając tym samym od myśli, że jednym lub drugim jesteśmy coś winni, by pominąć już inne możliwości jego sensownego wykorzystania⁵¹. Mądry starzec – który zdaje się reprezentować stanowisko Platona nieco przeciwne obojętności Sokratesa wobec dóbr materialnych – potwierdza zarazem to, że autor *Politei* eliminuje „addytywne” pojmowanie wartości owych dóbr na rzecz pewnej χρεία – rozumnego ich wykorzystywania w procesie konstruowania własnego szczęścia życiowego⁵².

Ostatnia sytuacja, gdzie gromadzenie nieco paradoksalne przyczynia się do uwolnienia i zbliża nas do stanu kontemplatywnej ataraksji, dobrze włącza się w kontekst nauki Platona o szczęściu, a wraz z przedstawionym rozumowaniem z dialogu *Eutydem* uzmysławia też, że w hierarchii wartości nadrzędną pozycję wobec dóbr materialnych zajmą u Platona wewnętrzne dyspozycje tego, komu owe dobra są dane. W obu przypadkach jest to odpowiedni stan umysłu, czyli pewna wiedza, której adekwatne do sytuacji życiowej zastosowanie czyni nas szczęśliwymi, będąca już dobrem wyższego rzędu – jedną z ἀρεταί, zalet charakteru stanowiących o ludzkiej wewnętrznej doskonałości. Można ich wyliczyć wiele, niemniej w kontekście doznawanego przez nas szczęścia skupia się Platon na dwóch z nich, uznając je za główne warunki dostąpienia tego tak pożądanego dla nas stanu. Zatem nie dostąpi szczęścia ani po śmierci, ani w życiu doczesnym ten, kto nie zadba o swój rozwój intelektualny, a także – po drugie – ten, kto dopuszczać się będzie czynów niesprawiedliwych⁵³.

Pierwsza zaleta, czyli – ogólnie ujmując – mądrość o zabarwieniu mocno praktycznym, jakie zyskuje termin φρόνησις i określenia jemu pokrewne⁵⁴, aby przyczyniała się do naszego szczęścia, nie musi występować w postaci finalnej, może przejawiać się również jako dążenie do mądrości – badawcze zaangażowanie filozofa, napędzające

⁵¹ Pl. R. 331b4–5: μέγα μέρος εις τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἄλλας χρεῖας πολλάς.

⁵² Por. Russell (2005: 106): „Plato rejects the additive conception of happiness, as he focused instead on the intelligence with which one lives one’s life and brings order and harmony to every area of it”.

⁵³ Por. Pl. *Ep.* VII 335d4–e1: οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο εὐδαίμων οὔτε πόλις οὔτ’ ἀνὴρ οὐδέεις, ὅς ἂν μὴ μετὰ φρονήσεως ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνη διαγάγη τὸν βίον.

⁵⁴ Por. Pl. R. 521a3–4: οὗ δὲ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφορον.

szczęściem również ten czas, który spędza on w naszej rzeczywistości⁵⁵. Jeszcze większy nacisk kładzie autor *Politei* na dobro etyczne drugiego rodzaju, jakim jest sprawiedliwość (δικαιοσύνη), będąca w międzyludzkich relacjach zaletą najcenniejszą, a okazująca się także fundamentalnym warunkiem szczęścia⁵⁶, wyraźnie powracając w tym nurcie swoich rozważań do nauk, jakie niesie dialog *Gorgiasz*⁵⁷. O tym, że kwestia relacji między tym właśnie przymiotem człowieka a doznawanym przez niego szczęściem jest bardzo istotnym punktem rozważań platońskiej *Politei*, świadczy to, iż daje ona tu znać o sobie kilkakrotnie⁵⁸, zanim wreszcie owe rozważania przyniosą jednoznaczną w tym przedmiocie konkluzję. Orzeka ona, że człowiek najlepszy i najsprawiedliwszy jest zarazem najszczęśliwszy (εὐδαιμονέστατος), natomiast ktoś zupełnie pozbawiony wartości etycznej i skrajnie niesprawiedliwy jest też w najwyższym stopniu nieszczęśliwy⁵⁹.

Orzeczenie powyższe pozwala rozumieć, że dla autora *Politei* szczęście – skoro okazuje się stopniowalne, tak w jedną jak i w drugą stronę⁶⁰ – nie jest monolitem, czy też atomem, to znaczy czymś, co mamy w całości, bądź zupełnie tego nie mamy, lecz stanowi pewien obszar i zarazem drogę doskonalenia etycznego, którą przemierzając, możemy dojść do najwyższej jego intensyfikacji. Nie mniej istotne wydaje się dopowiedzenie, jakie pada w tym miejscu, określające ów typ człowieka najsprawiedliwszego i zarazem najszczęśliwszego jako „najbardziej królewski i panujący nad sobą”. Można bowiem przyjąć, że dwa te epitety wzbogacają zbiór dóbr wyższego rzędu, które warunkują osiągnięcie maksymalnej danej człowiekowi szczęśliwości o dwie jeszcze zalety z kanonu etycznych wartości ludzkich. Będą to – *implicite* – siła, czy też męstwo ducha (*fortitudo*) stanowiące nieodłączny przymiot natury królewskiej, jako że ktoś zdolny do tego, by panować, nie może odznaczać się słabością, a także opanowanie, czy też samopanowanie (*temperantia*), przejawiające się zdolnością do tego, by trzymać w ryzach własne emocje oraz zachowania impulsywne⁶¹.

Zwróć też uwagę na występującą w przytoczonym orzeczeniu formę przymiotnikową ἄριστος, która niejako syntetyzuje treści zawarte w owych czterech w sumie określaniach człowieka doskonałego i w pełni szczęśliwego, to znaczy treść mądrości, sprawie-

⁵⁵ Por. *ibidem*, 619d8–e5: εἴ τις αἰεί, ὅποτε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κληρὸς αὐτῶ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίῳις πύττοι, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθὲνδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν χθονίαν καὶ τραχείαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν.

⁵⁶ Por. Arruzza (2011: 217): „justice is necessary for the happiness and health of the soul”.

⁵⁷ Por. Pl. *Grg.* 508b1–2: δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήση εὐδαιμονεῖς οἱ εὐδαιμονεῖς.

⁵⁸ Pl. R. 427d4–6, 472c4–8, 545a5–8.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, 580b8–c3: αὐτὸς ἀνεῖπω ὅτι ὁ Ἄριστωνος ὑὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον.

⁶⁰ Stopniowalność ta zaznacza się w kilku innych miejscach Platońskich dialogów (*R.* 619b1; *Phd.* 82a10, b4; *Lg.* 743c6), a jeszcze wymowniej wtedy, gdy mowa jest o kimś najszczęśliwszym pod względem zalet ciała (*Grg.* 478c3: οὕτως ἂν περὶ σώμα εὐδαιμονέστατος), tu bowiem szczęście okazuje się również wieloaspektowe.

⁶¹ Por. Yacobi (2015: 85): „In *The Republic*, Plato relates the good life to such virtues as moderation, justice, courage, wisdom and knowledge, which are necessary for cultivating a good character and a balanced lifestyle”.

dłiwości, siły ducha oraz panowania nad sobą, pozwalając na proste ujęcie całej tej nauki Platona o szczęściu stwierdzeniem, że wyłącznie człowiek etycznie spełniony może być szczęśliwy w stopniu niezakłóconym⁶². Z drugiej strony za owym superlatywem musi jednak postępować wyliczenie czterech powyższych przymiotów, jeżeli mamy mówić o jakiejś recepcie Platona na osiągnięcie szczęścia życiowego. Będzie to zatem – powracając do pytania postawionego w nagłówku niniejszych rozważań – jakaś kumulacja dóbr, spełniająca Platoński warunek κτῆσις ἀγαθῶν⁶³, lecz będzie w tym rozrachunku również rozumna ich redukcja, a raczej selekcja, umożliwiająca „dyrektywne” podejście do zasobów składających się na nasz stan posiadania: czyniąc użytek z owych dóbr, tak duchowych jak i pośledniejszych, siłą rzeczy oddzielamy od pozostałych te z nich, które będą nam użyteczne w realizacji naszego programu życiowego. Można tym samym mówić o jakimś płynnym przechodzeniu tendencji reduktywnej w orientację wzrostową, czy też kumulatywną; w myśl tej dyrektywy malejące zainteresowanie dobrami materialnymi winno iść w parze z wypełnianiem treścią zbioru tych wartości etycznych, które stanowić będą o pełni doznawanej przez nas satysfakcji życiowej.

Nasuwa się pytanie, czy analogiczna płynność ma miejsce również w tym punkcie naszej drogi życiowej, kiedy dzięki zasługom doczesnym dostępujemy ostatecznego szczęścia kontemplacji bytu doskonałego. Owo szczęście u Platona związane jest z reguły z bezcielesną pośmiertną egzystencją ludzkiej duszy, która – pomijając ludzi występnych skazanych na los zgoła przeciwny – dostępuje go bądź na mocy mającego miejsce po śmierci rozliczenia z uprzednich win i czynów chwalebnych⁶⁴, bądź też niekiedy przechodzi na ten poziom kontemplatywnego przeżycia, zanim jeszcze znajdzie się w pozagrobowej rzeczywistości, jako dusza w pełni już oderwana od potrzeb cielesnych i ludzkich codziennych zabiegów⁶⁵. Rozwiązując dylemat można przyjąć, że powyższa alternatywa sprzęgnięta zostaje u Platona z dwiema wyróżnianymi drogami ku ostatecznej szczęśliwości: drogą zasług etycznych oraz drogą aktywności poznawczej. Dochodzący istoty rzeczy filozof, który permanentnie zbliża się do napelniającego szczęściem bytu doskonałego – mimo że niekiedy podlega pośmiertnej jurysdykcji Radamantysa – ów stan pełnego zaspokojenia osiąga już za życia niezmordowaną intelektualną aktywnością. Tutaj przejście ku szczęściu najwyższemu dokona się w sposób płynny, w przeciwieństwie do procedury, która zadecyduje o dalszym losie wszystkich innych śmiertelników. Ona dopiero wyłoni tych, którym w formie nagrody dany zostanie boski stan ostatecznego zaspokojenia. Kryterium intelektualne – jak się okazuje – przeważa u Platona nad wartością pozostałych komponentów ludzkiej etycznej doskonałości.

⁶² Por. Pl. *Lg.*742e5: εὐδαίμονας ἄμα καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι; por. 743c4: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγαθοί, οὐδὲ εὐδαίμονες.

⁶³ Por. Pl. *Smp.* 205a1: Κτῆσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες; por. *ibidem*, 202c10–11.

⁶⁴ Ilustracją będą wizje, jakimi zamyka Platon swojego *Gorgiasza*, a następnie *Politeję*, które mocną cezurą sądu pośmiertnego rozgraniczają dokonania życiowe człowieka i dalszy los przypadający w udziale jego duszy.

⁶⁵ Tę sytuację egzemplifikują filozof z Platońskiego *Fedona* doświadczający bytu transcendentnego już w życiu doczesnym, czy ukazany w dialogu *Teajtet* badacz teoretyk za życia wlatujący w ponadmaterialną rzeczywistość.

5. Jednostka w świecie natury i rzeczywistości społecznej

Platońska refleksja nad życiem szczęśliwym skupiała się dotąd na dylematach, które jednostka ludzka rozstrzyga w ramach swego indywidualnego bilansu życiowego, niemniej jednak dla autora *Politei* ważny jest w tym względzie również kontekst społeczny, w jakim owa jednostka pozostaje. Odnosząc się do pytania, na ile nasze poczucie szczęścia życiowego uwarunkowane jest obecnością w życiu każdego z nas innych istot ludzkich, warto zarazem zapytać, jaki wpływ na ten tak pożądanym dla człowieka stan będzie mieć nasze współistnienie z pozostałą naturą, czyli środowiskiem naturalnym, w którym toczy się nasze życie społeczne.

Platon jako twórca koncepcji idealnego mechanizmu państwowego siłą rzeczy bierze pod uwagę uwarunkowania naturalne decydujące o tym, że mamy do dyspozycji „dobra, które są zarówno konieczne, jak i zbawienne dla naszego dobrego stanu psychofizycznego”⁶⁶ i w tym względzie za najważniejszą dla utrzymania równowagi między nami a środowiskiem naturalnym uznaje cnotę powściągliwości. Ona bowiem pozwala na rozsądne korzystanie z danych nam zasobów naturalnych, oscylujące między dwiema skrajnościami, jakimi są tak niedostatek, jak i nadmiar posiadanych dóbr⁶⁷. Czy jednak poza aspektem ekonomicznym naszych relacji z otaczającą nas naturą, „bazowym” niejako warunkiem życia szczęśliwego⁶⁸, bierze autor *Politei* pod uwagę inne możliwości, jakie w tym względzie stwarza kontakt człowieka z przyrodą?

Niewiele miejsc w pismach Platońskich potwierdza takie przypuszczenie, a – poza opisami sielankowego bytu ukazanej w *Politei* społeczności „przedpaństwowej” (R. 372a5–d3) i uroczych zakątków Krety dających inspirację rozmówcom *Praw* Platona (Lg. 625b1–c2) – nasuwa się jeden wymowny przykład bliższego kontaktu z przyrodą bohaterów dyskusji Platońskich, jakim jest scena początkowa dialogu *Fajdros*. Jest to znany opis spotkania obu rozmówców nad rzeczką Ilissos, kiedy docierając do cienistego miejsca pod rozłożystym platanem ulega Sokrates zachwytowi nad urokami owego zakątka. W jego wypowiedzi (*Phdr.* 230b2–d5) pojawiają się i „śliczny cień” (σύσκιον πάγκαλον) i aromaty czyniące owo miejsce najpiękniej pachnącym (εὐωδέστατον) i „przeurocze źródółko” (πηγὴν χαριεστάτην) i powiew wiatru „miły i bardzo przyjemny” (ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ) i wreszcie pięknie układająca się trawa, która wręcz skłania do tego, by złożyć na niej ciało. Szczęście, jakiego wówczas doznaje, wydaje się bezmierne. Co zatem sprawia, że nie dąży on do tego, by jak najczęściej przeżywać ten

⁶⁶ Stone (2018: 111): „the natural resources that provide the goods that are both necessary and beneficial for our well-being”.

⁶⁷ Stone (2018: 115): „the most relevant in relationship to environmental sustainability was temperance. Cultivating this virtue is essential to keeping the consumption of goods in society between the lower limit of what is necessary and beneficial for the well-being of its members and what exceeds the upper limit of what it can provide”.

⁶⁸ Platon świadomy jest tego, jak ważne staje się usytuowanie państwa w okolicy, która zapewni obywatelom podstawowy komfort ekonomiczny, a więc odpowiedni areal ziemi uprawnej (R. 373d), czy korzystne warunki klimatyczne (Lg. 745b, 747d–e), a zwłaszcza dostatek tak potrzebnej do życia wody (Lg. 761b–c).

stan, zbawienny dla ducha wyczerpanego wielogodzinnymi dociekaniem? To, że Sokrates poza owym jedynym przypadkiem nie opuszcza w ogóle miasta, powodowane jest pewnym etycznym priorytetem, którego realizacja daje mu satysfakcję przewyższającą doznania płynące z kontaktu z przyrodą. „Ja się przecież lubię uczyć” – wyjaśnia młodemu rozmówcy – „A okolice i drzewa niczego mnie nie chcą nauczyć, tylko ludzie na mieście”⁶⁹.

Znamienna ta odpowiedź znajduje potwierdzenie w drugim ekskursie „przyrodniczym”, stanowiącym swoiste „interludium” całej tej rozmowy (*Phdr.* 259a), jakim są uwagi Sokratesa dotyczące dobiegającego rozmówców uwodzicielskiego śpiewu cykad. Zachwycając się harmonijnością tego brzmienia, przestrzega on jednak interlokutora przed tym, by obaj nie zostali zniewoleni czarem rozbrzmiewającego śpiewu i zaniechali aktywności myślowej, tak potrzebnej w rozwiązywaniu problemów, wobec których stanęli. I tu Sokrates – jak zauważa I. Männlein-Robert – „odnosi się do otaczającego nas środowiska naturalnego ze wszystkimi symbolicznymi konotacjami” czynionych przez siebie uwag⁷⁰. Symbolika tkwi w czasowej zbieżności (*Gleichzeitigkeit*) i zarazem przeciwstawieniu wzajemnym (*Gegensätzlichkeit*) jednej i drugiej aktywności⁷¹; śpiew, choćby najpiękniejszy, to coś zgoła przeciwnego bezlitosnej logice Sokratejskiej elenkyki. Można przyjąć, że autor *Fajdrosa* – mimo że dostrzega niekiedy pozytywny wpływ piękna natury na stan psychofizyczny człowieka⁷² – pozostaje intelektualistą znajdującym szczęście i jedyną godną wyboru samorealizację jednostki ludzkiej w aktywności myślowej pozwalającej wznosić się ku dobru najwyższemu.

Wzmianka Sokratesa o „ludziach na mieście” kieruje już uwagę ku społecznemu środowisku człowieka, w którym zawiązują się różne relacje interpersonalne. Na ile dzięki nim stajemy się szczęśliwsi? Nie będą z pewnością takim „eudajmonizującym” czynnikiem relacje destruktywne, jak wrogość, czy nawet niechęć. Uwaga zatem skupi się na wiążących ludzi i – według Platona – nawet ich „energetyzujących” uczuciach miłości i przyjaznego przywiązania. Czy doznania te stanowią dla niego warunek życia szczęśliwego?

Jeżeli chodzi o szczęście człowieka płynące z miłości wzajemnej przyszłych rodziców i późniejszego życia rodzinnego, Platon jest więcej niż powściągliwy w swoim osądzie. Mimo iż nagradza bohaterów możliwością wielokrotnego wchodzenia w związki prokreacyjne, ma tu na względzie nie tyle ich uszczęśliwienie, co będące owocem owych związków zdrowe potomstwo, zwiększające potencjał populacyjny społeczeństwa (*R.* 468c5–8). W swych dalszych wytycznych dotyczących tego zagadnienia decyduje się na rozwiązania wręcz drastyczne, jak eliminowanie wszelkiej spontaniczności życia

⁶⁹ Pl. *Phdr.* 230d3–5 (tłum. W. Witwicki).

⁷⁰ Männlein-Robert (2012: 102): „Sokrates verweist in diesem Dialog mehrfach auf Naturgötter und Zikaden, also auf den umgebenden Naturraum – mit all seinen symbolhaften Konnotationen“.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*: „Gerade in der Gleichzeitigkeit hebt sich die Gegensätzlichkeit ihres Tuns voneinander ab“.

⁷² Przykładu dostarcza w tym względzie passus z *Politei*, w którym podkreśla Platon znaczenie, jakie dla rozwoju etycznego i umysłowego młodych ludzi ma ich kontakt z pięknymi dziełami natury (*R.* 401c4–d3).

erotycznego obywateli (R. 458d8–e1), regulowanie liczby małżeństw i kontrolę przyrostu naturalnego ludności (R. 460a2–5), czy z drugiej strony wprowadzenie kar za bezżenność dla tych obywateli, którzy nie spełnią obowiązku prokreacyjnego (Lg. 774a5–8), to znaczy obowiązku „produkowania dzieci” ujmowanego określeniem παιδοποιία⁷³. Miłość małżeńska i samo małżeństwo stają się w tej wizji politologicznej nie elementem szczęścia jednostki, lecz jej zniewolenia⁷⁴. Można przyjąć, że – jak to ujmuje J. Hittinger – poprzez „ścisły nadzór” nad życiem małżeńskim obywateli dochodzi do czegoś, co nazywa on „ofiarowaniem rodziny na chwałę państwa”⁷⁵.

Powyższe konstatacje nie pozostają w sprzeczności z kultem, jakim darzony jest w Platońskich dialogach Έρως – bóg miłości, gdyż innego rodzaju jest miłość, która bez wątpienia przyczynia się do szczęścia najwyższego, równoznacznego u Platona z ostateczną satysfakcją badawczą. Jest to z reguły relacja wzajemna dwóch osobników płci męskiej, nie sprowadzająca się do aktów cielesnych, lecz stanowiąca szlachetny związek ludzi łączonych dążeniem ku najwyższej prawdzie i najwyższej doskonałości etycznej. Miłość – έρως jest siłą inspirującą ich umysły i zarazem motorem ich aktywności realizującej powyższy ideał. Jakościowo niewiele odbiega od kolejnej „koncyliatywnej” relacji międzyludzkiej, jaką jest przyjaźń (φιλία), której też poświęca Platon sporo uwagi, a różni się natężeniem pobudzenia wewnętrznego oraz gnostycznym ukierunkowaniem owej wewnętrznej aktywności.

Mimo iż przyjaźń (φιλία) stanowi główny przedmiot jednego z dialogów Platona i jest dobrem niewątpliwie przez niego cenionym, nie udaje się znaleźć w jego pismach wyrażonej *explicite* myśli, że jest ona warunkiem, a nawet istotnym komponentem, ludzkiego szczęścia życiowego. We wspomnianym dialogu – mowa o *Lizysie* – znajdziemy jedynie deklarację Sokratesa, dla którego zyskać przyjaciela ma być cenniejsze „niż posiadać skarby Dariusza”⁷⁶, wyrażającą zawarte *implicit*e w treści utworu przekonanie o wielkiej wartości przyjaźni dla naszego poczucia szczęścia. Przekonanie to utwierdza, niejako przez negację, znany z *Politei* obraz despoty, któremu jako – poza wszystkim innym – „niezdolnemu do przyjaźni” (ἀφίλω) nie jest dane, by był szczęśliwy⁷⁷. W realiach powstającej *polis* przyjaźń przestaje być dla Platona relacją „bilateralną” – stanowi czynnik integrujący zbiorowość obywatelską. Wyraża on pogląd, że wyzbywając się zwierzęcej ekspansywności, a w zamian oddając kierownictwu „pierwiastka boskiego i rozumnego” staniemy się wszyscy „podobni i przyjaźnią wspólną związani”⁷⁸. Można więc przyjąć, że taka społeczność ludzi podobnie rozsądnych, opanowanych i sprawiedli-

⁷³ Pl. R. 423e7, 449d2, 459a4, d4, 460d6.

⁷⁴ Nie do końca jasne jest jednak, czy wskazane restrykcje obejmują ogół obywateli, czy tylko strażników porządku państwowego, gdyż w niektórych miejscach Platon ogranicza się wyłącznie do ingerencji w ich życie rodzinne (np. R. 460d6–7: ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναίξιν).

⁷⁵ Hittinger (2013: 8): „There will be strict supervision of the relationships between the sexes who are of the age of fertility; por. Hittinger (2013: 19): „the offering up of families for the glory of the city”.

⁷⁶ Pl. *Ly.* 211e6–7: μάλλον ἢ τὸ Δαρείου χρυσίον κτήσασθαι (tłum. W. Witwicki).

⁷⁷ Pl. R. 580a2–6; por. Pl. R. 576a4–6.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, 590d3–6 (tłum. W. Witwicki).

wych, a także przyjaznych sobie nawzajem, będzie wspólnotą ludzi szczęśliwych⁷⁹. Czy jest to zarazem spełnienie platońskiego ideału państwa szczęśliwego?

Pytanie, czy szczęście zbiorowości społecznej stanowi coś w rodzaju sumy szczęścia poszczególnych obywateli, czy też jako pewna „holistyczna” i nowa jakościowo wartość wyrasta ponad określony stan życiowej satysfakcji jednostek stanowiących ową zbiorowość, staje się przedmiotem uwagi badaczy socjologicznej myśli Platona. Wszystkich uczestników debaty, która rozgorzała w tym temacie, można podzielić na „indywidualistów” uznających, że szczęście państwa jest niczym innym jak szczęściem jego obywateli oraz „holistów”, według których nie jest ono zwykłą sumą satysfakcji życiowej doświadczanej przez poszczególnych obywateli, lecz wylaniającą się z ich relacji wzajemnych nową jakością. Pierwszej grupie patronują G. Vlastos oraz J. Annas⁸⁰, drugiej – K. Popper oraz B. Williams⁸¹, którzy – jedni i drudzy – znajdują kontynuatorów, zwracających również uwagę na możliwe rozwiązania „koherencyjne” powyższego dylematu⁸², jak też na inne jeszcze aspekty zagadnienia⁸³.

Także piszący te słowa dostrzega uproszczenia w ujęciu kwestii, sprowadzającym ją do zwykłej alternatywy, a nawet pewną „niekompatybilność” pojęć „szczęśliwe państwo” oraz „szczęśliwy obywatel”. Jeżeli bowiem mówimy o szczęściu jakiegoś człowieka, mamy na myśli – pomijając zwykłe szczęście losowe – jego odczuwanie szczęścia, stan wewnętrzny i zawsze subiektywny. O takim też szczęściu – nie uzależniając go od przypadłości losu – rozmawiają filozofowie doby Platona i późniejsi. Lecz kiedy mowa jest o szczęśliwym państwie, ten subiektywizm – mimo platońskiej paraleli czyniącej ową formę życia społecznego *quasi* żywym organizmem – musi ustąpić, trudno bowiem przyjąć, że jakaś struktura polityczna doznaje odczuć właściwych człowiekowi. Co zatem kryje się za słowami „państwo szczęśliwe”? Rozumiem, że jest to

⁷⁹ Por. Pl. *Lg.* 743c5–6: Ἡμῖν δὲ ἡ τῶν νόμων ὑπόθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἔβλεπεν, ὅπως ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατοι ἔσονται καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀλλήλοις φίλοι.

⁸⁰ Por. Vlastos (1977: 14–17); Annas (1981: 179): „the city’s happiness is just the happiness of all the citizens”.

⁸¹ Por. Popper (1962: 169): „Plato says frequently that what he is aiming at is neither the happiness of individuals nor that of any particular class in the state, but only the happiness of the whole”; Williams (1973: 197): „Socrates says that a city’s being sublimely happy does not depend on all, the leading part, or perhaps any, of its citizens being sublimely happy, just as a statue’s being beautiful does not depend on its parts being severally beautiful”.

⁸² Przykładem interpretacja D. Morrisona (2001: 23), w myśl której, mimo iż dla Platona państwo jest czymś więcej niż tylko sumą członków tej zbiorowości (*the city is more than just the sum of its members*), a jego szczęście nie sprowadza się do ich szczęścia (*is not reducible to the sum of the happiness of its parts*), jest on jednak zainteresowany tym, by szczęśliwi byli wszyscy obywatele jego państwa (*is concerned to promote the happiness of all of the individual members of the city*); por. Brown (1998: 20): „While I agree with Vlastos that Plato equates the happiness of the whole *polis* with the happiness of the citizens of all the classes, I disagree with his assumption that we understand the first as mere shorthand for the second”; por. Arruzza (2011: 225): „To my mind, Vlastos’ and Annas’ suggestions are helpful, but only if the city and the common good are not meant just as the static sum of all individual citizens and of their desires and interests but as the mobile product of their reciprocal relationships”.

⁸³ Tu przykładem będzie R. Kamtekar, dla którego szczęśliwe państwo to zarazem szczęśliwi obywatele, pod tym jednak warunkiem, że nie pozostaną oni wyłącznie stroną ofiarującą swój wysiłek szczęściu zbiorowości, lecz również państwo będzie dbać o to, by każdy z nich był szczęśliwy; Kamtekar (2001: 215): „the happy city regards its citizens, quite apart from their value as contributors, as subjects whose wellbeing matters”.

państwo dobrze prosperujące, co jednak otwiera kilka przynajmniej aspektów zagadnienia, skoro w zależności od uwarunkowań i priorytetów może to być państwo: a) bogate, silne ekonomicznie, b) bezpieczne – silne potęgą militarną, c) sprawne organizacyjnie, d) sprawiedliwe – właściwie dzielące świadczenia i obowiązki, a tym samym e) harmonijnie funkcjonujące – wolne od tarć wewnętrznych. Mimo tego, iż dokonując takiej egzegezy treści określenia wkraczamy jednak na grunt etyczny, gdyż za powyższymi interpretacjami kryją się w istocie poszczególne wartości, które stanowią pełnię ludzkiej ἀρετή, owo równoznaczne z doskonałością szczęście państwa wciąż pozostaje kategorią obiektywną, biegunowo różną od szczęścia będącego wewnętrznym przeżyciem człowieka.

Pomijając już tę dość istotną rozbieżność zastanówmy się wszelako nad alternatywą: „państwo jako nowa całość – państwo jako obywatele”, która – przynajmniej w aspekcie jednego i drugiego szczęścia – dla autora *Politei* alternatywą w istocie nie jest, skoro ma tu miejsce wyraźna dyferencjacja przedstawionej struktury społecznej. Pojawia się mianowicie, i to w rozważaniach o szczęściu tej obywatelskiej zbiorowości, pojęcie ἔθνος oznaczające określoną „podgrupę” obywateli, które odbiera ostrość owej alternatywie. Kiedy pisze Platon: „myśmy nie to mieli na oku zakładając państwo, żeby u nas jakaś jedna grupa ludzi była osobliwie szczęśliwa, tylko żeby szczęśliwe było, ile możności, całe państwo”⁸⁴, dodając: „pozwolimy, żeby każdą grupę obywateli natura dopuszczała do udziału w szczęściu”⁸⁵, otwiera drogę do bardziej płynnego ujęcia owej dystrybucji szczęścia w obrębie społeczności obywatelskiej. Jakimś „tertium” i zarazem kategorią łączącą całość organizmu państwowego z pojedynczym obywatelem staje się owo ἔθνος – określona grupa, czy też klasa obywateli.

Pojęciu ἔθνος, wtedy już ujmującemu zbiorowość w naszym rozumieniu „etniczną”, przywraca autor *Politei* dawny sens grupy ludzi łączonej podobnym zajęciem, czy też trybem życia, odnosząc je – z niezupełną konsekwencją – bądź do określonej klasy społecznej, jaką w Platońskiej *polis* stanowili chociażby będący u steru władzy filozofowie (R. 428e7), bądź do określonej grupy „profesjonalistów”, jak chociażby trudniący się swym „rzemiosłem” złodzieje (R. 351c8). Tym samym możemy mówić o strukturze populacyjnej państwa Platońskiego trzy- czy nawet czterostopniowej i w bilans dotyczący szczęścia państwa oraz poszczególnych obywateli włączyć wyróżniane przez Platona grupy i klasy społeczne. Pytanie będzie brzmieć teraz: czy w szczęściu państwa jako całości musi zawierać się szczęście na przykład grupy kowali, bądź w ogóle klasy wytwórców, czy też uznamy je za szczęśliwe mimo braku satysfakcji życiowej określonej grupy społecznej. Otwierają się dwie opcje: większościowa oraz solidarnościowa z wymogiem uczestniczenia w szczęściu wszystkich bez wyjątku obywateli i grup społecznych, jako że trzecia, kiedy mimo niezadowolenia wszystkich bądź przeważającej grupy obywateli państwo uznamy za szczęśliwe, spotka się z apriorycznym sprzeciwem. Jak widać, nie

⁸⁴ Pl. R. 420b5–8: οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις (tłum. W. Witwicki).

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, 421c3–6: καὶ οὕτω συμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλῶς οἰκίζομένης ἑατέον ὅπως ἕκαστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας (tłum. W. Witwicki).

uległa zmianie istota problemu, a skomplikowała się tylko konfiguracja jego możliwych rozwiązań.

Wychodząc naprzeciw problemowi można przyjąć descendentne i zarazem płynne ujęcie owej relacji między szczęściem państwa i obywateli, kiedy to w miarę zawężania się liczebności każdej z wyróżnianych zbiorowości owa zależność będzie konsekwentnie słabnąć. Można więc dopuścić, że znajdziemy w szczęśliwym państwie nie mające poczucia szczęścia jednostki, rodziny, jakieś wąskie grupy wytwórców, lecz w miarę wzrostu liczebności i prestiżu społecznego owych zbiorowości relacja ta musi zmierzać do pełnego konsensusu. Daje to jakiś kompromis między wersją „holistyczną” a „indywidualistyczną”, z koniecznym – jak sądzę – przyjęciem rozstrzygnięcia większościowego. O szczęściu państwa zadecyduje odpowiedni poziom satysfakcji życiowej wszystkich reprezentatywnych grup obywateli.

Co stanie się źródłem owego szczęścia członków wspólnoty państwowej? W oparciu o ustalenia badaczy przedmiotu mogę przyjąć, że będzie ono uwarunkowane konsekwentnym wcielaniem w życie dwóch zasad, które zadecydują zarazem o satysfakcjonującym funkcjonowaniu organizmu państwowego. Będą to (1) zasada równoważenia się świadczeń państwa wobec obywateli, a z drugiej strony wymogów, jakie stawia ono przed nimi, a także (2) idea pewnej „akkommodacji” owych świadczeń oraz wymogów do naturalnych inklinacji każdego członka obywatelskiej wspólnoty. Państwo, by wymagało od obywatela określonej aktywności, winno go przedtem wyposażyć – na co zwraca uwagę R. Kamtekar – w określone dobra, stanowiące wartość samą w sobie. Dobrem takim będzie już wykształcenie wzbogacające tego, komu jest ofiarowane, lecz i umożliwiające mu właściwe pełnienie obowiązków, jakie państwo nakłada na niego⁸⁶. Owe zadania życiowe – w myśl drugiej zasady – winny być przydzielone po uprzednim rozpoznaniu indywidualnych zdolności każdego osobnika i jego w związku z tym aspiracji życiowych⁸⁷: możliwość wytwarzania dóbr i ich posiadania naturom konsumpcjonistycznym, samodoskonalenie cielesno-duchowe typom ambicjonalnym, natomiast droga rozwoju intelektualnego wszystkim żądnym wiedzy i obojętnym na inne wartości. Tym sposobem wspólnota państwowa nie stanie się zbiorowością ludzi nieszczęśliwych – postępujących wbrew sobie i rozlokowanych w miejscach nie dla siebie stworzonych. Szczytny ideał ἀρετή ze wszystkimi komponentami owej doskonałości etycznej, jaki państwo zasobne, bezpieczne męstwem swych obrońców i mądrze urządzone spełniać będzie niejako kompleksowo, rozłoży się na swe wartości składowe, reprezentowane przez poszczególne grupy społeczne.

Zamykając rozważania skupione na afiliacyjnych uwarunkowaniach naszego szczęścia życiowego, wypada przyjąć w układzie ascendentnym trzy czynniki umożliwia-

⁸⁶ Por. Kamtekar (2001: 200): „Functional reciprocity treats these goods as instruments for work, which is itself an instrument”; por. Kamtekar (2001: 220): „Plato regards work as only instrumentally valuable, and education as intrinsically good”.

⁸⁷ Por. Brown (1998: 24): „On this reading, true *eudaimonia* for a member of any class is to live a life in which they contribute the most their nature allows to the *polis*”.

jące każdemu z nas osiągnięcie pełnej życiowej satysfakcji. A zatem podstawowym warunkiem osiągnięcia tego stanu wewnętrznego staje się przynależność do wspólnoty obywatelskiej dobrze zorganizowanej i zgodna z wrodzonymi dyspozycjami aktywizacja jednostki w przyjaznej kooperacji z innymi członkami wspólnoty, dalszym wymogiem – przyjazne współlistnienie nie tylko z lokalną społecznością, lecz także przyjacielskie relacje wzajemne z osobami bliskimi i najbliższymi, natomiast czynnikiem wznoszącym już na poziom szczęścia transcendentego – szlachetny związek miłosny łączący jednostki o aspiracjach ponadprzeciętnych. To szczęście będące już przeżyciem w swej istocie gnostycznym dane jest tylko nielicznym – inspirowanym siłą Erosa adeptom filozofii, którzy jednak powracają ostatecznie do ludzkiej społeczności, by i oni pełnili tam określone zadania. Czy stają się wówczas nieszczęśliwi? Taki akcent nie wybrzmi w Platońskiej *Politei*, przeciwnie dowiemy się z niej, że filozof włączony w społeczną kooperację zaczyna żyć szczęściem innego rodzaju – szczęściem polegającym na tym, że jak inni czuje się dobrze sprawującym się trybem pięknie funkcjonującej maszyny⁸⁸.

6. Uwagi końcowe

Postawiwszy autora *Politei* wobec trudnych – i ponadczasowych, jak się okazuje – pytań o to, czym uwarunkowana jest nasza satysfakcja życiowa, wypada ocenić, jak zdał on ten egzamin. Otóż większość wyszczególnionych na wstępie kwestii wytyczających rozległą topikę zagadnienia, znajduje niewątpliwie swój oddźwięk w tym oraz innych pismach Platona, a rozstrzygnięcia zaistniałych dylematów, jakie tam znajdujemy, pozwalają na syntetyczne ujęcie pajdeutycznego przesłania kierowanego przez niego do bliższych i dalszych odbiorców, będącego czymś w rodzaju Platońskiej recepty na szczęście.

Nie jest to z pewnością ideał zmierzającego do stanu „ataraksji” spokoju. Autor *Politei* aktywizuje bohaterów relacjonowanej akcji dyskursywnej, bez względu na to, czy ich poczucie satysfakcji życiowej wiąże się z aktywnością wytwórczą, czy samodoskonaleniem w duchu „kalokagathii”, czy też najwyższym stawianym wysiłkiem umysłu, owocującym kontemplacją bytu doskonałego. Jednak i ten kontakt z Absolutem, wydawałoby się, statyczny oznacza u Platona maksymalne natężenie władz umysłowych, a zarazem oddziałuje w jakiś sposób energetyzująco na filozofa, który owej wizji dostępuje, skoro motywuje go do szerzenia dobra wśród ludzi, między których zstępuje. Owa, dająca poczucie szczęścia, aktywność nie będzie następnie aktywnością typu spontanicznego. Szczęście, którego obraz dają pisma Platona, nie ma charakteru przeżycia emocjonalnego, ani też doznania ulotnego. Jest to droga konsekwentnego realizowania wartości etycznych składających się na ideał ludzkiej ἀρετή, czyli doskonałości, której osiągnięcie stanowi dopiero o pełni szczęścia życiowego. Nie może czuć się naprawdę szczęśliwy

⁸⁸ Por. Brown (1998: 25): „I am more convinced by Popper that the only *eudaimonia* conceivable for members of this class would be, in effect, their playing their part like good cogs in the great machine”.

człowiek we własnym przekonaniu etycznie bezwartościowy, podobnie jak nie mający tego poczucia człowiek występny, którego przekonanie o osiągniętym przez siebie szczęściu życiowym zostaje już w *Gorgiaszu* skutecznie podważone. Tak jednostka, jak i wspólnota państwowa gruntują swoje szczęście na wartościach etycznych, które konsolidują zarówno jeden, jak i drugi organizm.

Ostatnie stwierdzenie włącza już jednostkę ludzką w kontekst społeczny, w którym realizuje się jej aktywność. Dialogi Platona jako nieustanny zapis interpersonalnej aktywności umysłowej nie pozwalają w zasadzie na wyłączenie jednostki poza ów kontekst, w którym tak mocno ją osadzają założenia Platońskiej *Politei*. W tych realiach warunkiem szczęśliwego życia jest konstruktywne współlistnienie jednostek w obrębie wspólnoty państwowej, którą też nazwiemy szczęśliwą, szczęściem nie mieszczącym się już w sferze doznawania, a jednak opartym na wartościach stanowiących komponenty ludzkiej $\alpha\pi\epsilon\tau\eta$. Owo szczęście przyjaznej koegzystencji z innymi członkami wspólnoty intensyfikują przyjazne relacje z osobami z najbliższego otoczenia, a na poziom już ponadludzki wynosi przeżycie gnostyczne, którego dostępują połączeni siłą Erosa wybrańcy – jednostki o aspiracjach nieprzeciętnych. Szczęście przyjaznej koegzystencji ze światem natury ożywionej i nieożywionej nie jest szczęściem znajdującym zrozumienie u Platona. W wymiarze doczesnym jest nim szczęście aktywizacji jednostki w obrębie dobrze funkcjonującego mechanizmu ustrojowego, a na drodze ku bytowi najszcześniejszemu, jakim jest Absolut, szczęście dającego satysfakcję wysiłku umysłowego.

W jakim kierunku rozwija się Platońska refleksja nad życiem szczęśliwym? Jeżeli porównamy trzy znaczące w tej kwestii testimonia, *Gorgiasza*, *Politeję* oraz *Prawa*, punkt, który można nazwać przełomowym, znajdziemy – jak sądzę – w *Politei*. Tu bowiem filozof, dążąc ku szczęściu najwyższemu, oddala się od życia wspólnoty państwowej ekstremalnie, po czym jednak do społeczności ludzkiej powraca, by swe szczęście znajdować w czynieniu dobra w tej niedoskonałej rzeczywistości. Można przyjąć, że w *Politei* zarzuca Platon Sokratejski model szczęścia czysto intelektualnego i doskonałości opartej na indywidualnym mierzeniu się z ideałem „kalokagathii”; Sokrates – mimo iż spełniał swoje obywatelskie obowiązki – w politykę państwową, o której miał jak najgorsze zdanie, z zasady się nie włączał. Platon, mający ambicję dokonywania znaczących rzeczy również na tej niwie, daje upust tej swojej skłonności już w programie reformatorskim *Politei*, by ową koncepcję dobrze zarządzanego państwa rozwinąć i uszczegółowić w *Prawach*, których akcja rozwija się już bez udziału Sokratesa. Tu też zdradza Platon pewną skłonność do rozwiązań kompromisowych⁸⁹, od których uprzednio stronił wręcz programowo⁹⁰, a zarazem skłonność do nieco łagodniejszego ujęcia wymogów dotyczących szczęścia poszczególnych członków wspólnoty państwowej, którzy poza satysfakcją płynącą z dobrego pełnienia swych funkcji społecznych cieszyć

⁸⁹ Np. Pl. *Lg.* 756e9–10, 792c8–d4, 793a2–4.

⁹⁰ Czego reprezentatywnym przykładem staje się znana z dialogu *Eutydem* sytuacja, w której Sokrates odżegnaje się od wstąpienia w „pogranicza” ($\mu\epsilon\theta\acute{o}\rho\iota\alpha$) filozofii i polityki uznając, iż deprecjonuje to zarówno jedną, jak i drugą domenę ludzkiej intelektualno-pajdeutycznej aktywności (*Euthd.* 305c5–e2).

się już mogą wieloma przyjemnościami, jakie umilają życie człowieka i wzbogacają jego osobowość⁹¹.

⁹¹ Znajdziemy tu akceptację dla korzystania w sposób rozumny z przyjemności życia (*Lg.* 636d4–e3), czy dla tego, by bogacić się unikając niesprawiedliwości (*Lg.* 870b6–c1), znajdziemy słowa uznania dla człowieka, który zyskuje poczucie szczęścia dobrze zarządzając nie tylko sprawami państwa, lecz i własnym domem (εὖ τῆν τε οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν ἅμα τῆν αὐτοῦ διοικῶν, εὐδαιμονοῖ – *Lg.* 790b5–6), znajdziemy wreszcie swoistą afirmację doznań natury estetycznej (*Lg.* 653e5–654a3, 665c5–7, 667c5–8).

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Plato’s *eudaimonia*. The Author of the *Republic* on the Happy Life

The article deals with several issues related to the concept of happiness that emerge from Plato’s triptych: the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Laws*. The focus is on (1) the question of the alleged overcoming of the eudaimonistic imperative, i.e., natural human pursuit of happiness, in the didactic message of the *Republic*; (2) the question of to what extent the path of cognition ending in the contemplation of the perfect being is at the same time a strive for the supreme happiness; (3) the dilemma of choosing between a reductive and a cumulative model of complete satisfaction in human life; and finally (4) the problem of affiliative conditions of full life satisfaction.

KEY WORDS

Plato, dialogues, sense of happiness, eudaimonism, ethical goods, human community

The Figure of Socrates in Numenius of Apamea: Theology, Platonism, and Pythagoreanism (fr. 24 des Places)*

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Socrates undoubtedly represents one of the most fascinating, mysterious as well as controversial figures of the entire ancient philosophical gamut and in the history of Western thought. Even comparing the testimonies of authors from the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., a multifaceted, even contradictory image of Socrates emerges, which is therefore difficult to trace back to a unitary profile.¹ The philosophical and historical relevance of the Socratic character has also decisively influenced modern historiographical categories, going so far as to define archaic philosophers as Presocratics precisely in order to empha-

* I am grateful to Catherine Fullarton who corrected the text in English and to Angela Ulacco for the precious suggestions.

¹ For a general overview of how several ancient authors like Antiphon, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle present the figure of Socrates see pages 11–21 of the introduction of Ferrari (2007). See, too, Vlastos (1998).

size Socrates's enormous Influence on the Western thought.² Although Socrates did not write anything, his profile has nevertheless been linked (albeit in very different ways and forms) to the pivotal role his character plays in Plato's dialogues. This is especially the case in the early Platonic dialogues – those called “Socratic,” by scholars, because of the paramount importance of the character Socrates, who is also more faithful to the image of the “refuting” Socrates, typical of dialogues like the *Apology*, *Eutyphro* and *Ion*. The image of Socrates we find in the first Platonic dialogues seems to differ substantially from the one we find in later works such as the *Sophist*, the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus*, until, finally, the character of Socrates disappears altogether by the *Laws*.³

The great relevance that the character of Socrates had in antiquity (and beyond) is, however, undoubtedly associated with the central role this character played within the Platonic tradition. Plato's fundamental place in Western thought has in fact contributed to making his teacher Socrates an equally venerable figure.⁴ The link between Socrates and Plato is a functional aspect in corroborating the thesis of the unity of Platonism.⁵ Particularly in the Imperial Age, there were many cases in which Socrates was interpreted not as “the philosopher of aporias” but rather as a sapiential figure whose peculiar philosophical aspect was demonology, as in the cases of Plutarch and Apuleius.⁶ Furthermore, the figure of Socrates influenced the different ancient philosophical currents in different ways, which has led to different interpretative outcomes.⁷ As I said before, this is particularly evident within the Imperial Age, in which Platonic thought returns to the centre of philosophical debate to the extent that some ancient thinkers interpret Plato's doctrines as a systematicity.⁸ This Platonic centrality contributed in some cases to make

² On the origin of the term *presocratics* in philosophical historiography see Curd (2020).

³ This aspect was accepted by Arcesilaus who followed the Socratic pattern of abstaining from writing anything down to prevent any possible dogmatism. On Arcesilaus, see Cic. *De Or.*, 3, 17. As Bonazzi conveniently notes, scholars agree in attributing to Arcesilaus a recovery of the “Socratic” Platonic dialogues to underline that Plato's true “spirit” was aporetic and sceptical, and that the most important spokesman of this approach was the Socrates presented in Plato's early dialogues. This perspective was intended to provide an image of Socrates opposing to the Stoics' and Cynics' views of a “dogmatic Socrates”. For more about this aspect, see Bonazzi (2015: 98) who refers in turn to Long (1997⁴: 118–125). See also Ioppolo (1995).

⁴ This view has been criticized by Rossetti (2022), who affirms that the figure of Socrates must not be interpreted as too close to the Platonic philosophy “through the categories” of the 5th century B. C.

⁵ Donini (2013: 440) underlines how, for Plutarch in the *Adversus Colotem*, the figure of Socrates is strictly connected with Plato, to underline an ideal philosophical continuity, in the same way Plutarch does with Plato and Parmenides. In Plutarch's work, Plato's thought is discussed in a sort of group, together with Parmenides and Socrates, who are two authors considered by Plutarch as highly influential on Plato.

⁶ Donini (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the figure of Socrates in Middle Platonism, concentrating particularly on the thought of Plutarch and Apuleius. The scholar demonstrates how, during the 1st and 2nd century AD, detachment from the sceptic drift of the Academy was accompanied by a “pythagorization” of the figure of Socrates, in particular by Numenius.

⁷ For a well-structured discussion about the reception of the figure of Plato among ancient Platonists, see Palumbo (2012).

⁸ For a complete analysis of the strategies, styles, and purposes of the exegesis of Plato in the imperial age, see Donini (1994), which is, in my view, the most complete and exhaustive contribution available today on this topic.

his master Socrates a highly incisive character among Platonists.⁹ Authors who read Plato systematically interpret the character of Socrates as a philosopher who developed his own doctrine – a doctrine which Plato inherited and, in turn, further developed. From this perspective, Socrates can be understood as a sort of pioneer of the Platonic doctrines, an authoritative source for Plato himself who inherited and developed some crucial aspects of his master’s thought.

My aim in this essay is to analyse the way in which the figure of Socrates was interpreted by the Neopythagorean Numenius of Apamea in the context of criticism of the Platonic tradition. Indeed, Numenius is undoubtably Platonic in his spirit, even though Pythagorean philosophy also plays a central role in the development of his thought. In Numenius, as we shall see, the personality of Pythagoras represents the most important authority, so that even his references to Socrates and Plato are inevitably influenced by this philosophical genealogy, and they are described as Pythagorean thinkers.¹⁰

In recent years, there has been a revival of studies on the Pythagorean tradition in the Imperial Age, but very little has yet been said about Numenius’s portrayal of Socrates. Aside from Donini’s aforementioned studies on the presence of Pythagoreanism and its genealogies in Imperial Age Platonism, and Michalewski’s recent contribution on philosophical authority in Numenius, there are, to my knowledge, no studies that systematically analyse the role and presence of Socrates in the Numenian fragments.¹¹

As I said before, in Numenius’s view, Socrates represents a philosophical authority within a theological perspective encompassing both Pythagoras and Plato. As Michalewski observes, the association of Socrates with a metaphysical dogmatism represents an original element within the Platonic tradition, in virtue of the fact that Socrates was a sort of “symbol,” we might say, of the sceptical phase of the Academy.¹² For this reason I think that the link between Pythagoras and Socrates is worth further deepening, to understand a more general tendency in Imperial Platonism.¹³ However, before delving fully into the matter, it would be appropriate to understand the main sources of philosophical authority for Numenius, and to try to distinguish the different meaning that Socrates and Plato have within Pythagorean genealogy.

Numenius belongs to the group of thinkers who were strongly critical of a unitary view of the Academic tradition.¹⁴ As I will try to demonstrate in this paper, Numenius’s

⁹ See again Donini (2003).

¹⁰ According to Donini (2013: 450 ff.) the first hints of interest in Pythagoras among the Platonists are present even before Antiochus, but this tendency became “usual” with Eudorus of Alexandria and the circulation of the *Pseudopythagorica* among the intellectual circles of the Imperial Age. On the alleged date of composition of the *Pseudopythagorica*, see Ulacco’s introduction (2017: 1–16).

¹¹ Donini (2003; 2013); Michalewski (2021).

¹² See, Michalewski (2021: n. 3).

¹³ Michalewski (2021: 133).

¹⁴ On this aspect Numenius opposes Plutarch, who in his unfortunately lost work *Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδημειαν* probably sustained the thesis that there is a unity in the Academic tradition, from Plato onwards, without any “sceptical detachment”. On this topic and the “rebirth of dogmatism” of Antiochus of Ascalona, see Ferrari (2013) and Dillon (1996²: 52–106).

criticism is directed against those who did not follow the Platonic-Pythagorean teaching, i.e., both the old Academics and, especially, the sceptics. According to Numenius, as we will see in more detail in this paper, the sceptical phase of the Academy produced a deep break within the Platonic tradition, in which the Academics arguably betrayed the original “dogmatic” Platonic message, which for Numenius consists in a philosophical link with Pythagoreanism, and which carries within it metaphysical and theological aspects that are closely connected to each other.

However, the theological perspective that Numenius attributes to Pythagoras, and then to Socrates and Plato, is wholly incompatible with scepticism.¹⁵ Therefore, the starting point of our investigation is to establish which figures or traditions Numenius considered to be sources of philosophical and sapiential authority.

Numenius has been understood by many scholars as an author strongly influenced by Eastern cultures. These investigations have led, as in the case of Norden’s and Puech’s studies, to the establishment of Numenius’s direct dependence on Eastern religious traditions such as Hebraism and Gnosticism. Norden’s and Puech’s radical theses have been criticised by Festugière, Dodds, Whittaker, Athanassiadi, and in a recent essay by Bonazzi.¹⁶ In fact, the thesis of Numenius’s dependence on Oriental traditions appears to its critics to be a thesis with a strongly conjectural basis, not sufficiently supported by textual elements capable of demonstrating the existence of a relationship with the philosophical-religious traditions of the ancient East.

Nevertheless, Numenius’s fragments do not lack references to Oriental cultures, a fact which has proved to be one of the workhorses of those scholars who argue in favour of a philosophical-cultural connection between Numenius and the East. For instance, in fr. 8, in which Eusebius of Caesarea explicitly mentions Numenius’s *Περὶ τὰ γαθῶν* in his *Praeparatio Evangelica*, we read that Numenius described Plato as a “Moses speaking in the Attic language” (Μωσῆς ἄττικίζων).¹⁷ This comparison between Moses and Plato has led scholars to reflect more broadly on whether Numenius may have adhered to Hebrew

¹⁵ See Bonazzi (2006: 232; 236 ff.).

¹⁶ See Norden (2002²); while, according to Puech (1985: 35–84), some passages of the *Περὶ τὰ γαθῶν* demonstrate that Numenius adhered to the Hebraism. To strengthen his thesis, Puech also affirms that at that time the city of Apamea was the crossroad of Oriental cultures such as Gnosticism and Hebraism, and that Numenius was influenced from these cultural phenomena. From a philosophical point of view this influence is attested by the monad-dyad dualism which can be found in some Oriental theological systems. Puech posits that it is impossible to conceive of a “pure Platonism” in Numenius without considering his knowledge of Oriental cultures. A criticism against Puech has been voiced by Bonazzi (2015b), who assumes that the so-called Orientalism of Numenius can be reduced to a single interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of the principles, which lead to a justification of the transcendence of the first principle without implying an adhesion to Gnosticism and other eastern cultures existing in the cultural context of the II century AD. See Dodds (1960: 7); Festugière (1953: 131–132); Whittaker (1967). In particular, Festugière critiques Norden’s thesis, who affirms that Numenius’s gnosticism is founded on the unknowability of the first principle. Festugière claims that Norden’s thesis is extremely radical and that not one of the Numenian fragments provides convincing hints in this direction. Also critical of Numenius’s supposed Orientalism is Athanassiadi (2006: 76–81), who underlines the fact that Numenius’s interest in Eastern doctrines can be reduced to intellectual curiosity (fr. 55: *occultorum curiosiori numidium*). On this topic see also Domaradzki (2020: 143 n. 13).

¹⁷ Numen. fr. 8, 14.

culture or, at the very least, may have been strongly influenced by Hebrew circles.¹⁸ This thesis has been strongly criticised by Mark Edwards, who believes that the knowledge of Jewish culture by a second-century intellectual like Numenius can be considered nothing more than a tacit cultural element, and thus not sufficient to legitimise an adherence to Hebrew culture by Numenius, who, more likely, would have limited himself to the study of philosophical-religious doctrines of the time.¹⁹

The text from which we begin our discussion, which is fundamental for understanding Numenius's position toward the Academic tradition and Pythagoras's authority, is fr. 24 of des Places' edition. The fragment's source is, once again, Eusebius of Caesarea, who mentions Numenius as representative of Platonic philosophy. In fact, in Eusebius's perspective, Plato, as well as the later Platonists, are considered to be those thinkers who are closest to the Hebrew tradition, which is the forerunner of the Christian one. As Karamanolis has demonstrated, Eusebius mentions Numenius within his discussion of the role of Plato's philosophy.²⁰ In this long excerpt from this somewhat "historiographical" work, entitled *On the Infidelity (or Detachment) of the Academics towards Plato* (*Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως*), Numenius takes a stand against the sceptical drift of the Academy, blaming the Academics (in particular, the exponents of scepticism) for having somehow misrepresented Plato's doctrine. Numenius's aim is to retrieve a theological Platonism; the reference to Pythagoreanism thus becomes an almost inevitable point of reference to re-establish a claim of authority. In order to denounce the Academics' drift, Numenius considers first and foremost the theories of Plato's first followers:

Now during the time of Speusippus, the nephew of Plato, Xenocrates, the successor of Speusippus, and Polemon, who received the school from Xenocrates, the character of the teachings always remained nearly the same, due to the fact that this famous "suspension" had not yet appeared, nor indeed had other doctrines of that kind.²¹

¹⁸ According to Burnyeat (2005: 148–151), Moses plays a central role in Numenius's philosophy – in particular concerning Numenius's perspective on eternity.

¹⁹ See Edwards (1990).

²⁰ Karamanolis has provided an important suggestion about the fact that Eusebius quotes Numenius. According to Karamanolis, Plato is, in Eusebius's view, an important reference point, even though the primary authority is the Scripture; in other words, Plato is not infallible. In this perspective, the quotation of Numenius is strategic for Eusebius. Karamanolis (2014: 179) states that: "Numenius did not hesitate to claim that Plato had been partly responsible for the derailment of the Academics from Arcesilaus to Philo, because, he suggested, Plato had not made sufficiently clear his dependency on, and commitment to, the doctrines of Pythagoras, as he should have done especially given Plato's dependence on Pythagorean philosophy." To sum up, Eusebius's quotation of Numenius is designed to underline the character of Plato's philosophy of Plato, which is close to the truth, albeit not identical with it. See Karamanolis (2014: 171–180). However, I am not convinced that Numenius considers Plato to be a philosopher who did not grasp the "Pythagorean truth;" rather, it seems to me that Numenius's goal is to stress the continuity between Pythagoras and Plato.

²¹ Numen. fr. 24, 5–12: Ἐπὶ μὲν τοίνυν Σπεύσιππον τὸν Πλάτωνος μὲν ἀδελφιδούν, Ξενοκράτη δὲ τὸν διάδοχον τὸν Σπευσίππου, Πολέμωνα δὲ τὸν ἐκδεξάμενον τὴν σχολὴν παρὰ Ξενοκράτους αἰεὶ τὸ ἦθος διετείνετο τῶν δογματῶν σχεδὸν δὴ ταυτὸν, ἕνεκά γε τῆς μέπω ἐποχῆς ταυτησὶ τῆς πολυθρυλῆτου τε καὶ εἰ δὴ

Numenius's criticism of Academic scepticism thus assumes a political sense.²² The sceptical current Numenius criticises is the one represented by Arcesilaus of Pythane, whose theses are incompatible with a systematic conception of reality and the theology that Numenius wants to justify instead.²³ What emerges from the very first lines of the fragment is that Numenius does not fully accept the thought of Plato's followers, Xenocrates, Polemon, and Speusippus, because their doctrines would not have been entirely traceable to Plato's teaching. Nevertheless, from Numenius's point of view, none of their interpretations directly contradict Plato's doctrines, and so neither are they in conflict with Plato.²⁴ According to Numenius, the real break from the Academics therefore occurs with scepticism.

The Academics' decisive separation from Plato consists in the *ἐποχή*, i.e., the suspension of judgement that would lead to the distortion of Plato's original theological message by the Academy's sceptical current.²⁵ In other words, the early Academics remained anchored to a dogmatic conception of reality, failing to elaborate on the suspension of judgement that represents the real breaking point in the Academic tradition. In fact, the *ἐποχή* represents the heart of that sceptical approach that does not allow knowledge of principles and first causes. As Numenius moves within a theological perspective, the suspension of judgement of the *ἐποχή* is completely incompatible with a theological and hierarchical conception of reality.

What clearly emerges is Numenius's rejection of sceptical Platonism, which is accused of radically distorting Plato's doctrine by eliminating the possibility of knowing the highest realities. As examples of (in)fidelity to the school's progenitor, Numenius examines the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Socratics. Numenius considers the Epicureans to be those who, with due differences in style and argumentation, remain most faithful to the original doctrine of Epicurus. While Numenius says that Xenocrates and the other followers of Plato have, to some extent, misconstrued Plato's original doctrine, in the Epicurean tradition there is a sort of coherence with Epicurus's original teaching.²⁶ The reason underlying the Epicureans' "faith" to their teacher consists in the fact that they did not question the latter's original doctrine. By virtue of this description of the Epicurean "spirit," it can be inferred that Numenius interprets the sceptical drift of the Academy

τινων τοιοῦτων ἄλλων. Ἐπει εἷς γε τᾶλλα πολλαχῆ παραλύοντες, τὰ δὲ στρεβλοῦντες, οὐκ ἐνεμέϊαν τῇ πρώτῃ διαδοχῇ. Transl. Petty (2012: 37).

²² This definition is by O'Meara (1989: 10).

²³ See Opsomer (1998: 129; 171–172).

²⁴ This seems to be confirmed by Numenius himself, who affirms that he was more interested in defending Plato rather than in blaming Xenocrates. See Numen. fr. 24, 14–16.

²⁵ On the role of the *ἐποχή* in the Academy, see Bonazzi (2015: 79 ff.).

²⁶ See Numen. fr. 24, 23–35.

as a deep betrayal of Plato's thought, a radical detachment that has produced a genuine lacuna within the tradition.²⁷

The most relevant element for the purposes of our study, however, concerns a certain parallelism that Numenius draws between the Stoics and the representatives of the Socratic schools, each of whom emphasised one peculiar aspect of Socrates's thought, *de facto* forming a multitude of unique Socratic doctrines. Similarly, Numenius finds in Stoicism a tendency to emphasise one point or philosophical aspect more than others, thus constituting autonomous orientations such as to imply real and distinct currents within Stoicism, whereby some authors were more Stoic (στωϊκώτεροι) than others. Through this approach, Stoics end up quibbling about unintelligent disputes.²⁸ It seems to me evident that a perspective according to which an "autonomous" current of thought is formed from certain interpretations, as with the Stoics and Socratics, is completely at odds with the Numenian need to establish a genealogical unity between Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato. The aim is therefore to rehabilitate the figure of Socrates as an exponent of that Academic unity that was subsequently lost.

Numenius presents Socrates as a sapiential philosopher, aporetic and inquiring, far from the philosopher of "I know that I do not know," but a true master whose theological doctrine was expounded to his pupils through enigmatic formulas, and evidently not fully grasped by his followers:

The reason is that while Socrates was setting forth three Gods and philosophizing about them? in the rhythms appropriate to each other, his auditors were unaware if this and believed that he was saying everything at random and always opportunistically from the dictates of change – sometimes one thing, sometimes another, whichever way the wind blew.²⁹

The central thesis of this passage consists in affirming, in a rather ambiguous and mysterious way, that Socrates "posited three Gods," a concept so mysterious and complex that none of his followers seems to have fully understood the meaning of this message.³⁰

Numenius makes this reference to a sort of *diaphonia* between the various Socratic schools to underline the alleged doctrinal drifts that some of Socrates's followers had

²⁷ In a recent article, Boys-Stones discusses the question by recalling Sedley's thesis. Sedley sustained that the role Plato plays among Platonists was not so different from the one that Epicurus and Zeno played for the respective followers. On the contrary, Boys-Stones says that Plato's role cannot be compared with Zeno's and Epicurus's because Platonists saw in Plato a sapiential figure rather than the founder of a philosophical school. See Sedley (1997) and Boys-Stones (2018: 184–188). A discussion of Boys-Stones's thesis is presented in Michalewski (2021: 130–131).

²⁸ Numenius's anti-stoic attitude is clearly revealed in fr.52 regarding the ontological status of matter.

²⁹ Numen. fr. 24, 51–56: Αἴτιον δε, ὅτι τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους καὶ φιλοσοφούντος αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς προσηκτοῦν ἐκαστῷ ῥυθμοῖς, οἱ διακούοντες τοῦτο μὲν ἠγνόουν, ὦνοντο δὲ λέγειν πάντα αὐτὸν εἰκῆ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς νικώσης αἰεὶ προστυχῶς ἄλλοτε ἄλλης τύχης ὅπως πνέοι (transl. Petty 2012: 39).

³⁰ Michalewski (2021: 135) proposes to extend Numenius's criticism to fr. 23, in which he substantially criticises the theology of the Athenians, who condemned Socrates in the process. In this case it seems clear that the Athenians' theology is in open contradiction with the Socratic one; indeed, Socrates's condemnation

autonomously contributed, evidently not understanding his original teaching. This allows Numenius to overturn the sceptical image of Socrates, rehabilitating it as that of a true theologian. The pseudo-aporetic aspect with which Numenius presents Socrates's thesis is, in my view, justified by the impossibility of communicating the doctrine of the three Gods to those interlocutors who are not naturally predisposed to grasp the essential features of theology.³¹

This allusion seems to be a reference to the dynamics of the Academy, underlining the fact that autonomous stances, such as those of the Socratics, first, and later, the Sceptics, risk distorting the original meaning of Socratic theology. According to Numenius, thinkers like Antisthenes, Aristippus, and the Megarics failed to grasp the true meaning of the Socratic doctrine of the three Gods and thus somehow betrayed the philosophical message of their teacher – a message that was nevertheless fully understood by Plato, who inserted himself, through Socrates, within a Pythagorean theological tradition.

The three Gods ascribed to Socrates are evidently those of Numenius's onto-theological hierarchy set forth in the *Περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ*.³² We know from various testimonies that Numenius conceives of reality hierarchically, distinguishing three divine levels of reality: the good, the demiurge, and the rational-ordering principle immanent to the cosmos, a sort of *Anima Mundi ante litteram*.³³ Most probably, as we shall see better shortly, regarding the role of Socrates, the three Gods Numenius attributes to Socrates derive from the exegesis of a famous passage of Plato's second epistle, as many scholars have pointed out.³⁴

Before delving into an examination of the Numenian doctrine of the three Gods, it is worth emphasising how he places Socrates together with Plato and Pythagoras in a unified philosophical tradition. We learn from fr. 24:

Plato was a Pythagorean (he knew that Socrates dispensed these same teachings from no other source than that, and that he had spoken in full awareness of this); in this way therefore, he too bound things together, yet neither in a customary nor an obvious manner [...] Therefore, as a man assuming an intermediate position between Pythagoras and Socrates, he eased

is, according to Numenius, founded on the fact that his theological message was not adequately understood by most of his followers.

³¹ This aspect has both an historical and philosophical meaning. It is philosophical as far as some of the Socratics were not able to get the kern of the Socratic teaching, but also historical concerning Socrates's role towards the traditional theological knowledge Numenius mentions in fr. 23 as a critical aspect of the society that led Socrates to receive the death sentence.

³² It is Proclus who refers to Numenius talking about three Gods (see fr. 21; 22 des Places). However, the issue of whether the second and the third God must be considered two separate entities or rather two aspects of the same reality is a crucial argument in Numenius's philosophy that scholars continue to debate.

³³ A general introduction to Numenius with a wide analysis of the most important aspects of his metaphysics can be found in Frede (1987). On the possibility that Numenius's third God can be identified with a World Soul, see Krämer (1964: 71–81) and Frede (1987); some reservations are expressed by Opsomer (2005: 65) and Ferrari (2014: 61), while Jourdan (2021) is critically opposed to this view.

³⁴ See Tarrant (2017).

the gravity of the one down to the level of benevolence, and led the familiar cleverness and playfulness of the other away from irony up to the level of dignity and majesty. And in this respect, blending Pythagoras with Socrates, he appeared more human than the one and more serious than the other.³⁵

Here, a continuous line emerges from Pythagoras to Plato. From Numenius's point of view, Pythagoras represents the highest philosophical authority³⁶ – one to which Plato himself is also traced.³⁷ Moreover, Numenius's Pythagoreanism is in line with his critique of the scepticism of the Hellenistic age, as it represents a purely metaphysical aspect of Plato's doctrine that stands in contrast to Scepticism itself. In the Imperial age there is, therefore, corresponding to a recovery of Platonic dogmatism, a revisitiation of the figure of Socrates who – almost naturally, we might say – is brought back to the ancient Pythagorean tradition like Plato himself.³⁸

For Numenius, Pythagoras represents the original philosophical authority, even though Plato obviously also played a central role.³⁹

The main issue now is to establish Socrates's role within this pythagorizing genealogy considering the doctrine of the three Gods. As I said earlier, it is Numenius who proposes a metaphysical-theological hierarchy in which there are three divine levels, in continuity with the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition. However, I consider it plausible that Numenius is in this case not presenting his original doctrine, but merely explicating what some authors, whom he considers the highest philosophical authorities, have said before him. It therefore makes sense to attribute to Socrates the delineation of a doctrine of the three Gods, which evidently had not yet been explicated in these terms by Pythagoras and later taken up by Plato, so it is possible to imagine that Socrates may have been the *trait d'union* introducing Plato himself to the Pythagorean doctrine.⁴⁰ Although such elements of Numenian metaphysics are traceable in Plato's dialogues, Numenius is explicit in saying that Plato, in expounding his doctrines, *pythagorized*, i.e., drew on a store of knowledge and doctrines already present in ancient Pythagoreanism that he developed. Plato is thus presented as a somewhat enlightened man, the last exponent of a trinomi-

³⁵ Numen. fr. 24, 57–59; 73–78: 'Ο δὲ Πλάτων πυθαγορίσας (ἦδει δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην μηδαμῶθεν ἢ ἐκεῖθεν δὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν καὶ γνόντα εἰρηκέναι), ὧδε οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς συνεδήσατο τὰ πράγματα, οὐτ' εἰωθότως οὔτε δὴ εἰς τὸ φανερόν· [...] 'Ὅπως οὖν ἀνὴρ μεσεύων Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους, τοῦ μὲν τὸ σεμνὸν ὑπαγαγὼν μέχρι τοῦ φιλανθρώπου, τοῦ δὲ τὸ κομψὸν τοῦτο καὶ παιγνίημον ἀναγαγὼν ἀπὸ τῆς εἰρωνείας εἰς ἀξίωμα λαί ὄγκον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο κεράσας Σωκράτει Πυθαγόραν, τοῦ μὲν δημοτικώτερος, τοῦ δὲ σεμνότερος ὤφθη (transl. Petty 2012: 41).

³⁶ See O'Meara (1989: 12–13).

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ See Bonazzi (2006: 236): "Au désintéret de l'Académie pour Pythagore correspond la tentative progressive de "pythagoriser" Socrate chez les platoniciens de l'époque impériale [...]"

³⁹ See Numen. fr. 24, 22.

⁴⁰ Karamanolis (2006: 129).

al, along with Pythagoras and Socrates, which nevertheless holds together the peculiar characteristics of the previous authorities.

The doctrine of the three Gods can be traced in the famous passage of the second Platonic epistle in which we find a mysterious division of reality into different levels.⁴¹ According to Karamanolis and Tarrant, the reference to the second letter is crucial to understand the doctrine of three Gods⁴² Platonic epistles were considered authentic in antiquity;⁴³ indeed even Plotinus makes mention of this passage in the *Enneads*.⁴⁴ Even on a first reading of the passage, it is easy to understand how a text such as 312e1–4 of Epistle II, with its schematic and simple structure, lends itself almost naturally to ontological-hierarchically oriented interpretations.

Firstly, the author refers to a king of all, whose identification with a first principle is in this context taken for granted by Numenius. In fact, the allusive language of the pseudo-Platonic text could have been traced by Numenius to a reference to three divine orders of reality into which his metaphysics is divided. This would justify, on the one hand, the enigmatic language attributed to Socrates, which would have entailed a difficult reception within the various Socratic currents, as a teaching evidently not accessible to (hence not understandable by) all. For Numenius, Plato was the only one who managed to properly understand the doctrine concealed behind the Socratic allusions.

Nevertheless, it must be specified that, as Socrates left no writings, Numenius stresses emphasizes what he finds in the second letter, where Plato attributes the authorship of the doctrine of the three Gods to the young Socrates.⁴⁵ What we read in the text is indeed a thought linked to Plato, but Numenius attributes its first formulation to Socrates.⁴⁶ In other words, from Numenius's point of view, what Plato writes in the second epistle can be considered a sort of explanation (or development) of the doctrine of three Gods that Socrates expressed orally.

Numenius's exegetical strategy cannot therefore be defined a *stricto sensu* historical reconstruction of the Socratic figure, but a theological reading of his doctrine. Numenius's exegesis of Socrates's thought turns out to be an argumentative strategy aimed at justifying a Pythagorean reading of Socrates, making the ancient Athenian teacher the

⁴¹ Pl. *Ep.* II, 312e1–4.

⁴² See Karamanolis (2006: 129); Tarrant (2017: 92–93). The reference to the second epistle has been taken for granted by all scholars; to my knowledge, there are no studies that deny an influence of the second epistle on Numenius's development of his theology.

⁴³ A short account of the transmission of the second Platonic epistle is Rist (1965), who traces the origin of the letter back to ancient Pythagorean settings.

⁴⁴ See e.g., Plot. *Enn.* I 8, [51]2; V 1 [10], 8.

⁴⁵ See Pl. *Ep.* II, 314c5.

⁴⁶ As stated above, the Platonic epistles were considered authentic in antiquity. Although several studies have demonstrated the inauthenticity of the Platonic epistles (with the partial exception of the seventh epistle, on whose authenticity the views of several scholars converge), we must also consider that the ancients considered the other letters to be original. Considering this, we must trace the epistles, at least intentionally, to genuine Platonic sources as far as Numenius and other ancient authors are concerned. On the inauthenticity of the second epistle, the study by Bluck (1960) is decisive, as well as the reply from Rist (1965).

spokesman of the Pythagorean theology matrix, which has been understood by Plato and then lost again in the history of the Academy. To justify his reconstruction, Numenius's thesis relies on Socrates's formulation of the doctrine of the three Gods that is one of the cornerstones of his own (i.e., the Numenian) doctrine. The assertion that the division of the real into three divine orders was already the work of the "Pythagorean Socrates," later taken up by Plato, is useful to Numenius for justifying his own metaphysical reading of reality and provides it with a philosophical *auctoritas* that is free from what would have been the sceptical drift of the Academy – a perspective that is decidedly far from a systematic theological one.

Conclusions

Our investigation of Numenius's reception of Socrates began with fr. 24 des Places, in which he outlines his view of the Platonic Academy and emphasises how the Academic scepticism constituted a *de facto* true distancing from Plato's original theological message.

From Numenius's point of view, Plato is part of a metaphysical-dogmatic tradition that harks back to ancient Pythagoreanism, which has Socrates as one of its most prominent exponents, but which also has been gradually dissipating from Speusippus and Xenocrates onwards. In accordance with Numenius's anti-sceptical spirit, Socrates is no longer considered the aporetic philosopher of Plato's early dialogues, but a theologian whose personality fits within a genealogy that reaches back to Pythagoras. The doctrine of the three Gods is presented to us by Numenius as Socrates's main thesis, one which the latter only sketches to his followers and which only Plato has completely understood and developed. In this sense, the link between Socrates and Plato consists in the attribution of the doctrine of the three Gods to Socrates and its explication in the second Platonic epistle; and this is why Numenius can find a continuity between Socrates and Plato. However, both Socrates and Plato are considered to be linked with the ancient Pythagorean tradition, so, in Numenius's view, their thought must be in continuity with Pythagoras's original doctrine.

Thus, in Numenius, the figure of Socrates takes on a new guise within Imperial Platonism, i.e., as a theologian. Socrates's role, in Numenius, takes on pythagorizing theological characteristics and is functional in investing Plato's doctrines with a chrism of authority according to a paradigm that, compared to the Sceptical tradition, is overturned. Numenius proposes a new image of Socrates, as a dogmatic theologian and the *trait d'union* that ideally unites Plato with Pythagoras. In Numenius, there is not the denial of Socrates's maieutic character that we find in the early Platonic dialogues; however, this character is not a symptom of a gnoseological scepticism. Nevertheless, for Numenius, this aspect does not invalidate the fact that the kern of Socratic thought consists in a sort of Pythagorean theology.

Socrates is therefore rehabilitated by Numenius as a dogmatic figure in an anti-sceptical key, to corroborate the thesis of a Pythagorean genealogy within the Platonic tradi-

tion. For this reason, Numenius is fundamentally an author who presents us a new image of Socrates: a theologian with Pythagorean background who inspired (and to some extent founded) the philosophy of Plato.

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**The Figure of Socrates in Numenius of Apamea:
Theology, Platonism, and Pythagoreanism (fr. 24 des Places)**

Numenius is one of the most important authors who, in the Imperial Age, deal with the figure of Socrates. Socrates is important in the Platonic tradition, in particular in the sceptical tradition, when the Socratic dubitative “spirit” of the first Platonic dialogues became important to justify the “suspension of judgement.” Numenius criticises the whole Academic tradition by saying that the Academics (particularly the sceptics) betrayed the original doctrine of Plato and formulated a new image of Socrates. For Numenius, Socrates plays a central role because Plato would have inherited his doctrine. What does Socrates’s doctrine consist in? According to Numenius, Socrates theorised a “doctrine of three Gods” (which can be likely found in the second Platonic epistle) which is strictly bound up with the main aspect of Plato’s thought. In fact, in Numenius’s view, Plato belongs to a genealogy which can be linked to Pythagoras himself. From this perspective, Numenius says that Socrates’s original thought is a theology which also belongs to the Pythagorean tradition and which Plato further developed. For Numenius, Socrates is not the philosopher of doubt, but a theologian who first theorised the existence of three levels of reality (Gods), which is also the kernel of Numenius’s metaphysical system. For this reason, Numenius puts Socrates within a theological genealogy that begins with Pythagoras and continues with Socrates and Plato, and that the Academics and the Socratics failed to understand.

KEY WORDS

Numenius, Socrates, Pythagoras, Plato, Platonic Academy.

Unwritten Doctrine of Pythagoras in Hermias of Alexandria

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Among Plato scholars, the critique of writing and the question of unwritten doctrines may have been one of the most debated topics of the 20th century (Cherniss 1944, 1977; Ross 1951; Krämer 1986, 1989; Gaiser 1991, Reale 1997; Szlezák 2005; Rosetti 1992; Hösl 2004).¹ The interpretation of the Tübingen-Milan School, which considers the unwritten doctrines to be the fundamental beginning in the comprehension of the written works of Plato, is founded principally on the *Phaedrus* (*Phdr.* 274b–278e), the *Seventh Letter* (*Ep.* 340–345) and on Aristoteles' *Physics* (*Ph.* IV 2, 209b14–15), among other important documents. Over time, moderate positions also arose, such as that of Trabattoni (1994, 2005), which proposes an interpretation of the written work augmented by some hermeneutic tools originating in unwritten doctrines.²

Our investigation is not at all concerned with referencing, or even touching upon the subject of unwritten doctrines; on the contrary, it was only a survey regarding the presence of Pythagoras in Hermias of Alexandria. But Hermias presents in his interpretation – besides that of an unwritten Pythagoras, which is the principal focus of this study

¹ I am immensely grateful to Professor Galen Barry who kindly reviewed this article.

² See also Ferrari (2012).

– a Plato who writes without omitting the consideration of oral transmission. Contrary to the reading of Tübingen-Milan, which emphasizes the condemnation of the written word, the Plato of Hermias does not reverberate with such conflict, indicating a more accommodating picture.

Hermias shows a Plato who does not refuse the written word and reconciles in a harmonious manner the superiority of the oral tradition in his philosophy with his activity as a writer. Not that this interpretation is something new, as we consider that such an interpretation is exactly what we read in the *Phaedrus*, that is, the oral tradition is superior as it is living and capable of “impressing upon the soul” of disciples, while writing is fixed and dead, able to serve merely, in the best of circumstances, as a record of that which once was learned and passed on via the oral tradition.

This brief contextualization permits us to enter the environment of Hermias, who in his commentary in the *Phaedrus*, presents Pythagoras as gifted with surprising abilities, although for the most part such attributes are already known. We will examine, from this point onward, the passages in which Hermias explains Pythagoras’ connections, some of them incomprehensible, such as between Pythagoras and the *Phaedrus*. We present all the passages which follow in our own translation, especially because the version available in English of the text of Hermias, which translation was made by Baltzly and Share (2018: 47–171), does not reach this point in the commentary.³

Logographers vs. The Unwritten

At one point in Plato’s dialogue (*Phdr.* 257c–258a), logography, or the use of writing, is described by Phaedrus as an activity of great men whose importance could not be attacked. However, Socrates refuses to write and defends orality as the most effective resource of philosophical expression. Plato himself would have agreed, despite having written so much and so well, affirming that the main part of his philosophy would have to be transmitted orally (*Ep.* 7; *Phdr.* 276d–278a).

In Hermias of Alexandria, on the other hand, we find two references to the unwritten character of Pythagorean and Socratic philosophy, in which two distinct attitudes are emphasized in relation to writing: one that accepts it and the other that rejects it. Hermias, when commenting on Plato’s passage, emphasizes this aspect of unwritten philosophy and classifies it as Pythagorean, so that Pythagoras and Socrates are for Hermias illustrious representatives of unwritten philosophy, along with Themistocles and Pericles.

The commentary of Hermias conforms to passage 257c–e of the *Phaedrus*, where the value of logography is questioned, because according to Phaedrus “one of the politicians insulted and censured Lysias, and among the insults uttered he called him logographer (*logográphon*)” (*Phdr.* 257c), with logography being clearly reviled, even when linked

³ We did not have access to the German translation by Hildegund Bernard (1997).

to great and valuable public figures. At this point of transition between the recantation (palinode) and the second part of the dialogue, the moment at which questions of writing and rhetoric are presented, logography, or the fact of speech being written down, is described as something that could harm the reputation (*doxan*) of those writers with the passage of time.

According to Phaedrus, this was the reason by which those authors could be eventually designated not only as logographers, but also as sophists (*Phdr.* 257d). Socrates refutes this statement, remembering that many of those who have left behind written compositions “are the greatest and most notable politicians” (*oi megiston phronountes ton politikon* – *Phdr.* 257e), rejecting the generalization and showing that not all the ancient writers could be censured simply for having left behind their writings.

Hermias presents the first distinction between unwritten and written traditions through some illustrious examples:

< and you know how 257d >

Phaedrus wishes to draw from *éndoxos*, and this *éndoxos* is a rhetorical tool, of multiple origins. Subsequently, men censure the practice of writing down discourse, stating that practical knowledge, by which he also says that the greatest and most able abstained from logography, such as Themistocles and Pericles, finding it sufficient to speak, as well as other civilized men, like Pythagoras and Socrates himself. For that reason, Plato also contrasts the argumentative use of *éndoxos* and written discourse (*Herm. in Phdr.* 210, 19–22 Lucarini & Moreschini [*further* = LM] = [176] Couvreur).⁴

<Καὶ ξύνοισθά που καί 257d >

Ὁ Φαῖδρος ἐνδόξως βούλεται ἐπιχειρῆσαι· ἐνδοξος δὲ ἐστὶν ἐπιχείρησις ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν· ἐπειδὴ οὖν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐλοιδοροῦντο τὸ λογογραφεῖν ὡς ἐκ τῆς κατεχούσης συνηθείας, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸς φησὶν ὅτι οἱ μέγα 210.20 <δυνάμενοι> ἀπέσχοντο τὸ λογογραφεῖν οἷον Θεμιστοκλῆς, Περικλῆς, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες λέγειν, καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τῶν ἀστέων ἀνθρώπων οἷον ὁ Πυθαγόρας, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης. Διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐνδόξως ἐπιχειρῶν ἀντιτίθει τοὺς συγγραμμένους.

Pythagoras, who was at no point explicitly mentioned in the *Phaedrus*, finds a special place in the interpretation of Hermias. He is counted among those who did not write and, above all, were important to the *polis*. This group includes Themistocles, who was also not cited in the dialogue, and Pericles, who will be cited further on, but in another context.

The term *endoxon* in this neoplatonic environment carries the Aristotelian dialectic lexicon without, however, limiting itself to the Aristotelian concept as we know it today. In the work of Aristotle, the *endoxa*, or the opinion of specialists, belong to dialectic

⁴ Our translation.

opposition (*Top.* I 100a18–103b). However, Hermias does not use the term within the same parameters, but only in the sense of *doxa*, or common opinion.⁵

This mix of Aristotelian and Stoic elements and vocabulary in texts of the neoplatonists is quite common, such that, in a certain passage, Hermias utilizes the Aristotelian categories of potency and act to refer to different relations of love, which, for obvious reasons, could never have been developed by Plato in these terms:

Evidently this is not at the forefront of this scope [regarding love], because [Plato] neither presents a dialogue about its essence (*ousía*) nor its potential (*dynamis*), but only about the act (*energeía*) in the cosmos and in souls, especially as all are led as lovers toward the beautiful. If Plato had offered, in some given speech, a circumscription, we would have these three aspects in dialogue, *about essence (ousía), about potential (dynamis), and about act (energeía)*. (Our translation. Herm. in *Phdr.* 12, 17–22 LM = [64–65] 12.11–22 Couvreur)

“Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναυθα ὁ προηγούμενος σκοπὸς [περιἔρωτος] δῆλον· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αὐτοῦ οὔτε περὶ δυνάμεως παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ τῆς εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς διαλέγεται, ὅτι δὴ πάντα ἀνάγει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐραστὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν· εἰ δέ που ὁ Πλάτων προηγούμενον <περί> τινος λόγον ποιεῖται, περὶ τριῶν τούτων διαλέγεται, περὶ οὐσίας, περὶ δυνάμεως, περὶ ἐνεργείας·

As for the Stoic terms that are modified by Hermias, we highlight *pneuma* as an important example in the double characterization of Eros (*in Phdr.* 34, 2–9 LM) also attributed to the Stoics. In addition to the specific Neoplatonic sense of vehicle of the soul (*pneuma* – *in Phdr.* 67, 14; *pneumatic* – *in Phdr.* 69, 24 LM), it also connotes the intellectual purification (*mollusmòs*) through which *pneuma* passes (*in Phdr.* 73, 26–30 LM). The term “familiar” (*oikeioun*) also appears as a Neoplatonic appropriation of the Stoic terms in two passages by Hermias (*in Phdr.* 54, 26; 81, 17 LM).

The second mention of this unwritten Pythagoras in Hermias is also associated with Socrates. This time, the powerful duo of unwritten philosophers appears opposed to the masters of writing, Orpheus, and Hermes. The passage comments upon *Phaedrus* 275c:

It must be known that **Plato did not reject writing**, being that many of the ancient and most respected wrote, such as Orpheus and Hermes, as opposed to **Pythagoras and Socrates, who did not**. These definitions were given by Socrates in this written composition [by Plato]: to have knowledge (*episteme*) of questions and to have observed the truth through the remembrances of what was lost in ancient times for the benefit of those who learn without effort, but enjoy their childhood training, writing, then, with beauty and correctness; while those without knowledge

⁵ See Longo (2015: 63) on the different uses of the term dialectic in Syrianus and Hermias.

and who make much effort are given to the benefit of opinion (*doxes*), and move toward this inadequacy of the activity of writing, as he says.

In this there is a narrative of not needing to avail oneself of written discourse in order to be exposed to thinking, as a disciple of Plato omits from written records all that was said to him, and so remains apart, drifting, eliminating all, and returning only to the master, because the thoughts resulting from the effort do not need to be revealed in books, but only in the soul (Herm. in *Phdr.* 258, 10–23 LM = [201] Couvreur; our translation).

Εἰδέναι δὲ δεῖ ὅτι *οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ γράφειν ὁ Πλάτων*. πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτων συνέγραψαν, ὡς Ὀρφεὺς, Ἑρμῆς· **Πυθαγόρας δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης οὐ συνέγραψαν**. Τοιούτους οὖν ὄρους παραδίδωσιν ὁ Σωκράτης τοῦ συγγράφειν ἐνταῦθα, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰδότας ἐπὶ ὑπομνήσει τῆς εἰς γῆρας λήθης καὶ ὠφελείας τῶν μανθανόντων μὴ σπουδάζοντας, ἀλλὰ παιδιᾷ χρωμένους, τότε καλῶς καὶ εὐπρεπῶς συγγράφειν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιστήμονας καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ περισπούδαστον καὶ δόξης χάριν ἐρχομένους εἰς τοῦτο ἀπρεπῶς συγγράφειν φησί.

Φέρεται δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι διήγημα πρὸς τὸ μὴ δεῖν συγγράμμασιν ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰ νοήματα, ὅτι **μαθητῆς τις τοῦ Πλάτωνος πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀπογραψάμενος ἀπέπλευσε, καὶ ναυαγίᾳ περιπεσὼν ἅπαντα ἀπόλεσε καὶ ὑπέστρεψε πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἔργῳ πειραθεὶς ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἐν βιβλίοις ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰ νοήματα, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ**.

Hermias highlights the question of the possibility of anamnesis associated with the work of philosophical formation in the Platonic environment, a school in which, as we know, writing is rejected as a principal means of the storage and transmission of knowledge. Contrary to what we have often come to understand, the passage makes it clear that, despite this unwritten perspective, Plato does not disparage writing (*Plato did not reject writing*), but merely practiced a teaching method in his school in which books did not play a central role in the transmission nor in the storage of knowledge. It is clear, on one hand, that criticism of writing, even for Hermias, is not absolute, neither as for a thing to be forbidden nor as a practice without importance.

It is evident, however, that the mnemonic work of the Platonic dialectic in capturing learned knowledge was an important step toward anamnesis. In this context, any of the ancient records engraved on souls are more valuable than any effort, regardless of the external written registries that may have been produced, whose value is also not excluded. All navigation of the process of learning has the master as reference, who is requested to come to the aid of the disciple whenever necessary, as no text could ever replace him.⁶

The passage also recalls the feeding of opinion (*doxa*), foodstuff of those souls unable to contemplate the beings on the plane of truth. As Socrates says: “after much

⁶ Cf. Pl. *Tht.* 143b5–c6, when Euclid tells of how he created and corrected the report of a conversation which he had witnessed between Socrates and Theaetetus, consulting personally with Socrates several times regarding the content. Besides the indication of how Plato himself may have created dialogues; the passage also demonstrates the necessity of the master as the personal original source around which such texts must revolve.

toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion” (*trophei doxastei khrontai* – *Phdr.* 248b, trad. Fowler 2005: 479). Whoever does not have the aid of this master is doomed, obviously, to feed upon opinion, whether obtained apart from the master himself or collected from written material, neither being of any real use.

Unlike many interpreters in the twentieth century who favored an interpretation based on unwritten doctrines, the passage shows orality harmoniously combined with writing. The disciple navigates around the master as an unequivocal reference but without either ceasing to use the writings or overestimating their power or scope. What is learned through orality does not lend itself to the fixity of writings, while what is learned in books does not achieve what only oral transmission provides, namely the writing on the soul. Here there is nothing beyond what we already know from the *Phaedrus*, except the metaphor of navigation, imported from the *Phaedo*. There is, therefore, neither denial of writings, nor exclusivity of oral transmission, but on the contrary, a combination of diverse and naturally complementary spheres.⁷

Dialogues and personages

The third passage in which Pythagoras appears in Hermias discusses the relationship between the dialogues of Plato and great personages, such as Zamolxis in the *Charmides* and Pythagoras in the *Phaedrus*. Even having no explicit mention of Pythagoras in the *Phaedrus*, as we said, Hermias establishes the relationship:

<Listen to what I have to say 274c>

Socrates, having asked Phaedrus, “Do you know the means by which, in the matter of discourse, we should please the gods in our actions?” To which he responds, “Not at all. If you know, tell me.”⁸ Then the philosopher says that “hear what I have to say,” as Socrates had become accustomed to being regarded as an intermediary of the gods, as the bearer of something divine, or above the human assistants of the gods. The divine man does not demean those gods in the *Sophist* dialogue. There is the habit of often offering their own writings to divine men, as it happens with *Pythagoras in *Phaedrus*⁹, with Zamolxis¹⁰, a sort of sage, in the *Charmides*, as well as in the *Timaeus*, where the speech of the Atlantes is attributed to the Egyptians. On this point they are opposed to the invention regarding the speeches of the sovereign Hermes, as it would not be for the sages, but only for the gods, and says that the sovereign Hermes brought

⁷ See Cerri (1992) about the positive role of writing in the *Phaedrus*.

⁸ In this case the transmission of Hermias is a little different from Plato, without affecting interpretation (οὐδαμῶς· οὐδέ);).

⁹ Lucarini and Moreschini (2012: 266) mark this passage as corrupt.

¹⁰ See Hdt, IV, 95-96, PPorph. *VP*, 14; Iamblichus, *lamb. VP*, 173.

the art of writing to many, among other things (Herm. in *Phdr.* 253, 15–28 LM = [198–199] Couvreur; our translation).

<Ἀκοήν γ' ἔχω λέγειν 274c>

Ἐρωτήσαντος τοῦ Σωκράτους τὸν Φαῖδρον ὅτι <«οἶσθα» πῶς λέγων θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα πράξεις;> φησὶν ὅτι <«οὐδαμῶς»· εἰ δὲ σύ γ' οἶδας, εἰπέ.» Ἔπειτα ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι <«ἀκοήν ἔχω» εἰπεῖν·> εἴωθε γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης τὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενα πάνυ εὐγνωμόνως εἰς θεοὺς ἀναφέρειν ἢ εἰς ὅπαδους θεῶν ἄνδρας· καὶ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄνδρας οὐκ ἀπηξίωσεν ἐν τῷ <Σοφιστῇ> θεοὺς καλέσαι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ θεῖοι ἄνδρες θεοὶ εἰσιν ὡς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους· εἴωθεν οὖν θεοὶ ἀνδράσι πολλάκις ἀνατιθέναι τὰ συγγράμματα ἑαυτοῦ· ἐν μὲν τῷ *<Φαίδρω> τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ*, ἐν δὲ τῷ <Χαρμίδῃ> Ζαμόλξιδι σοφῶ τι, ἐν δὲ τῷ <Τιμαίῳ> τὸν Ἀτλαντικὸν λόγον ἀνατίθησι 253.25 τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις· καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ περὶ τῶν λόγων εὔρεμα τῷ δεσπότῃ Ἑρμῇ ἀνατίθησιν, οὐκέτι εἰς σοφοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς, καὶ φησὶν ὅτι ὁ δεσπότης Ἑρμῆς πρὸς πολλοῖς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων τέχνην κατέδειξεν.

The relationship that Hermes establishes between the dialogue and Pythagoras is in the use of writing and in the relationship between the sages and the gods. Outside of this relationship, except for the final saying that “friends have all things in common” (*Phdr.* 279c), a maxim considered Pythagorean, and the content of the dialogue itself, which deals with the immortal nature of the soul and its cycles, there would be nothing effectively “Pythagorean” in the *Phaedrus*.¹¹ But Hermias remarks, in a comparison between sages, that Socrates and Pythagoras would have been wiser than others, since they did not avail themselves of writing and, by the same token, maintained an intimate relationship with the gods. Pythagoras, therefore, would be a philosopher of great importance in the scenario established in the *Phaedrus*.

Zamolxis, the Thracian physician and disciple of Pythagoras, is related in an analogous way to the *Charmides* dialogue, where the Thracian knew that the body should be healed with a holistic approach, without forgetting either its connection with the soul or the power of the *logos* as a necessary enchantment for healing (*Chrm.* 156d–157c; 158b–c). In the case of the *Timaeus*, Hermes uses the same analogy between those who used writing and those who did not, to highlight the Egyptians as bearers of records of past events, including those already completely forgotten even by the Greeks, especially the disappearance of Atlantis, an island of which there would be no record except in Egyptian priestly writings.

In Hermias there is a coalescence between Hermes and Theuth, as well as other authors of the Hellenistic period offer the same opinion, such as Plutarch, Cicero and Diodorus Siculus (Fowder 1993: 18–26; Bull 2018: 38–96; Domaradzki 2021: 371).

¹¹ See Couvreur (1901:199): “nihil de Pythagora in *Phaedro*”. And Lucarini and Moreschini (2012: 266): “In *Phaedro* nihil de Pythagora”.

The identification of Hermes with Theuth, the creator of writing and the disseminator deity of this technical resource, would be exclusively linked to the transmission of knowledge from the deities to men, at least in their application in the human sphere even if not in their communication with the gods:

<If we ourselves should find out 274c>

How would one need to write to please the gods, and <would we still concern ourselves> about men? He disdains the pleasing and conduct of all mankind toward the gods. That said, he then [disdains] many of those who wrote to amaze, or to be praised, or that they might be graced by some pleasure arising from the writings, or even by the memory of themselves that they would leave by doing so, but not desirous of pleasing the gods (Herm. *in Phdr.* 254, 1–7 LM; our translation).

σνε' <Εἰ δὲ τοῦθ' εὔρομεν αὐτοί 274c>

Πῶς, ἂν δέη θεοῖς ἀρέσκοντα γράφειν, <μέλοι ἂν ἡμῖν ἔτι> τῶν ἀνθρώπων; ὁ γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀρέσκων καὶ ἀνηγμένος πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως καταφρονεῖ. Τοῦτο εἶπεν ἐπειδὴ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν συγγραφέων ἴνα θαυμάζωνται, ἢ ἐπαιῶνται, ἢ ἴνα τισὶ χαρίζωνται τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν γράφοντες, ἢ ἴνα μνήμην ἑαυτῶν καταλιμπάνωσι ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐχὶ θεοῖς ἀρέσκειν βουλόμενοι.

In this passage, writing, although granted by a deity, in this case Hermes, would have no effective application in communication between men and gods, being effective only among humans. So that communication of men with the gods obviates the craft of writing, which is why sages like Socrates and Pythagoras are presented as non-writers, thus maintaining, once again, their special connection with the divine.¹²

The first mention of Hermes-Theuth is at the beginning of the book of Hermias, when in interpreting Plato's allegory he distinguishes between the visions of Hermes-Theuth and Thamous-Ammon (*in Phdr.* 8, 5–15). The second mention of Hermes bears the epithet of Trismegistus and refers to his prophetic capacity (*in Phdr.* 94, 5–10). The third mention is the predominant and divine capacity of the tripartite soul, as well as its symbolism, at which time Eros, Victory (Nike) and Hermes are designated as winged (*pterôtous* – *in Phdr.* 127, 25–26). The fourth mention of Hermes also bears the epithet of Trismegistus and precedes a quote from Pindar (*in Phdr.* 168, 14–19). The fifth mention of Hermes, perhaps the most important for our study, now towards the end of the book of Hermias, deals with the allegory between Theuth and Thamous, but oscillates between designating him as a god (*in Phdr.* 253, 15–22) and as a *daimon* (*in Phdr.* 255, 1–9).

¹² See Bernabé (1990, 2003), Casadio (1991) and Colli (1975) about orphic poetry and its relation to Pythagoreanism and Platonism.

Regarding the *daimon* Hermes, Hermias explains:

They worship the sovereign Hermes for the invention of speechmaking among the Egyptians as well. Everywhere, including in the *Timaeus*, [Plato] deifies the Egyptians as the most ancient, which is why neither the flood nor destruction by fire were unknown to the Egyptians, although they were unknown to other peoples. Therefore, these inventions were immortal for the Egyptians, which for the Greeks were brought by Palamedes or Prometheus, while the philosopher brings from Egypt that guardian of discourses, the *god* Hermes (Herm. in *Phdr.* 253, 15–22 LM; our translation).

Εἰς τὸν δεσπότην οὖν Ἑρμῆν ἀνατίθησι τὴν τῶν λόγων εὕρεσιν καὶ εἰς Αἰγυπτίους· πανταχοῦ γάρ, καὶ ἐν τῷ <Τιμαίῳ> δὲ, ἐκθειάζει τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους ὡς ἀρχαίους, διὰ τὸ μῆτε κατακλυσμῶ μῆτε ἐκπυρώσει ἀφανίζεσθαι τὴν Αἴγυπτον, τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων οὕτως ἀφανιζομένων· διὸ τὰ παρ' Αἰγυπτίους εὐρέματα ἀθανατώτερα ἔστι· καὶ ἅπερ οἱ Ἕλληνες εἰς Παλαμήδην ἢ Προμηθεᾶ ἀναφέρουσιν, ὁ φιλόσοφος εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀναφέρει καὶ τὸν ἔφορον τῶν λόγων θεὸν Ἑρμῆν.

Although Hermias himself presents Hermes-Theuth as a god, his exposition immediately discerns Theuth's capacity as an intermediary (*mesothetes*, *metaxù* – in *Phdr.* 255, 4–6) so that he is also called “*daimon* Theuth”, seeking to justify the Plato's expression in 274c, in addition to his epithet Hermes: “Theuth therefore is called Hermes” (in *Phdr.* 255, 8).¹³

Sages and philosophers

In the next passage, in which Hermias will once again undertake to exalt the wisdom of Pythagoras, we will highlight the dichotomy between sages and philosophers. The dichotomy in the *Phaedrus* is marked by the difference between gods and men, an abyss in which, although there had been some transcendence, the designation of “sage” would only be appropriate for gods. For men, to the extent that it's possible, the best designation would be “philosopher” (friend of knowledge). Despite his proximity to the divine, Pythagoras does not distance himself from human knowledge.

Even having no mention of any philosopher in Plato's passage, Hermias extols Pythagoras as the first to reach extraordinary dignity:

“Say wise” exceeds human compass, but of all those who have been called wise in some science, Pythagoras was the first, since Pythagoras was the only one to reach the divine and to be called sage. So also, in the *Symposium* Socrates called Eros a sage, not a philosopher: “Among

¹³ See Pl. *Phlb.* 18b–d in which Theuth appears as the inventor of grammar.

the gods,” he says, “none is a philosopher.” So, who are the philosophers? Only those who seek wisdom (Herm. in *Phdr.* 264, 1–7 LM; our translation).¹⁴

Τὸ γὰρ <σοφὸν καλεῖν> ὑπερβαίνει τὰ ἀνθρώπινα μέτρα· πάντων δὲ τῶν πρὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ περὶ τι ἐπιστημόνων σοφῶν καλουμένων, ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐλθὼν τὸ θεῖον μόνον σοφὸν ἐκάλεσεν, ὡς ἐξαίρετον τὸ ὄνομα τῶ θεῶ ἀπονείμας, τοὺς δὲ ὀρεγομένους σοφίας φιλοσόφους ἐκάλεσεν. Οὕτως καὶ ἐν τῶ <Συμποσίῳ> σοφὸν ἐκάλεσε τὸν Ἔρωτα ὁ Σωκράτης, φιλόσοφον δὲ οὐ· <θεῶν> γὰρ, φησὶν, <οὐδεὶς φιλόσοφος·>> τίνες οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι; οἱ ὀρεγόμενοι τῆς σοφίας.

Hermias includes Pythagoras when commenting on Plato’s passage, because Pythagoras would have been the one who achieved this divine and extraordinary condition. To justify this interpretation, Hermias mentions the *Symposium* without much precision, since in that dialogue Eros will be interpreted by Diotima as an intermediary *daimon* whose nature would approach that of philosopher. Hermias offers a loose reading of the *Symposium* to exemplify what he intends, disregarding that Eros is defined as an intermediary *daimon* by Diotima, no longer as a god (*Smp.* 202d). However, setting aside this inaccuracy, it is important to note that his focus is on the fact that only gods can be sages. Except for Pythagoras – the only one to surpass the boundaries laid out for me – the most that men can become are philosophers.

Final thoughts

We highlight, in this brief journey, how Hermias characterizes Pythagoras as an unwritten philosopher, and the special connection of this condition with the deities and the Muses. The connection is only implicit in Plato in the dialogue *Phaedrus*, revealed mainly by the supposed affinity between Socrates and Pythagoras. However, the information coming from Hermias suggests a reflection of the unwritten doctrines. Hermias indicates an unwritten tradition not restricted to Pythagoreanism, creating a somewhat different picture, because from this scenario it is possible to consider Plato as a writer who evidently did not reject writing with the vehemence that the interpretation based on the unwritten doctrines sometimes suggests. However, Plato would have indicated elements of his philosophy that were not intended for the written medium, having combined, therefore, unwritten elements to his written philosophy, whose portrayal is apparently more credible.

The disciple navigates around the master, without condemning the writings, nor confusing them in their limited scope. What is learned through orality, as we have seen, does not lend itself to the fixity of writing, to the dead letters of writing, just as what is

¹⁴ See Pl. *Smp.* 204a1.

learned in books never reaches the special places that only oral transmission allows and provides. Writing is not able to accomplish imprinting upon the soul. In Hermias we see that Plato does not deny or dislike the use of writing, nor does he advocate any exclusivity of oral transmission, even though it is admittedly superior. There is, therefore, no strong opposition between orality and writing, but a combination of different spheres of language application.

Hermias makes the scenario less contentious between those who emphatically defended the unwritten doctrines as a fundamental interpretation of Platonism, even if such elements were never fully revealed. They are unwritten, and those who completely, categorically belittled them, diminish their relevance in interpreting Plato's written work.

Even if the dispute over the weight of the unwritten doctrines today has fewer repercussions than in the last decades, Hermias helps us to think of alternatives for the continuity of these assessments of the reception of Plato's written and unwritten work.

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Unwritten Doctrine of Pythagoras in Hermias of Alexandria

In Hermias' commentary on *Phaedrus* (*In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*), it is possible to identify several direct references to the philosophers and pre-Socratic doctrines, including Pythagoras. We point out to three references to Pythagoras in Hermias: (1) Pythagoras is characterized as an unwritten philosopher, (2) there is a special connection with the divinities and Muses, and (3) there is a special connection with the *Phaedrus* dialogue, revealed by the affinity between Pythagoras and Socrates. We show how the explicit references to Pythagoras in Hermias constitute a certain method of interpreting Platonism: as a philosophy manifested in writing, but which, at the same time, values the unwritten tradition, represented especially by Pythagoras and Socrates. We also demonstrate how the references translated and examined here reveal the image of this Neoplatonic Pythagoras of Hermias, an image which is not necessarily in tune with the oldest doxography, and which permits the reevaluation of Plato's position as a philosopher who sought to combine unwritten doctrines with his explicit activity as a writer.

KEY WORDS

Hermias, unwritten philosophy, written philosophy, Pythagoreanism, Neoplatonism.

DYSKUSJE

André Motte (1936– 2021) ami belge des philologues classiques et des spécialistes de la philosophie antique à Poznań

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IGNACY LEWANDOWSKI

/ Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu /

Tout a commencé voici quarante ans. Le 6 avril 1981, à l'aéroport de Poznań, en agissant au nom de l'Institut de Philologie Classique à l'Université Adam Mickiewicz de Poznań, j'ai eu le plaisir d'accueillir André Motte, professeur belge à l'Université de Liège, ville capitale de la région nommée en latin Leodium, là où, au bord de la Meuse, résidait jadis la légion romaine. Le Professeur Motte avait à peu près le même âge que moi ; je ne le connaissais que grâce à un bref échange de lettres officielles. En tant que philologue classique de formation, il arrivait chez les philologues classiques de Poznań dans le cadre d'une coopération interuniversitaire, pour le séjour d'une semaine, afin de prendre connaissance de l'état de nos recherches sur l'antiquité et pour donner deux conférences. C'était sa première visite en Pologne. J'ai préparé donc à son intention un

programme de séjour comprenant non seulement des rencontres scientifiques, mais aussi d'autres activités ; on sait qu'il n'y a pas que la science qui compte dans la vie, et les premières impressions sont très importantes. Je tenais à ce qu'elles fussent entièrement positives. Il faut savoir que c'était en Pologne l'époque de Solidarité, le temps des transformations profondes que notre hôte observait et qu'il vivait joyeusement avec nous. Pour nous entendre, nous parlions français, sa langue maternelle. En me remerciant plus tard pour ce premier séjour sur la terre polonaise, il écrivait sur un ton à la fois soutenu et plaisant : « Me souvenant de l'excellent séjour que je viens de faire dans votre pays, je voudrais être huit jours plus jeune »... André, cher André, « aucun miracle, te répondrait notre poète Adam Asnyk, ne saurait ramener à la vie des formes vécues ».

Tel était le commencement de notre connaissance qui a duré longtemps, et ce, comme semble le confirmer le temps écoulé, avec profit pour nos universités, plus particulièrement pour notre philologie et philosophie de l'antiquité. La mort mit fin à nos relations le 28 novembre 2021 ; à la clinique de Waremmes, près de Liège, Moira Atropos a coupé le fil de la laborieuse vie d'André, jusqu'à la fin occupé par ses recherches sur la religion des Grecs anciens.

André Motte naquit le 28 septembre 1936 à Pâturage, village wallon au nom parlant. Sa famille a vite déménagé dans la ville de Huy, située à l'ouest de Liège. André avait deux frères et deux sœurs, il a très tôt perdu son père dans un accident. Il a fait ses études secondaires au Petit Séminaire de Floreffe ; c'est là que c'était déjà révélé et approfondi son goût du travail et son intérêt pour les auteurs anciens. Rien d'étonnant à ce qu'il ait décidé après le bac de faire des études en philologie classique à l'Université de Liège (fondée en 1817). C'est là qu'il a obtenu en 1958 le diplôme de licencié et, après une brève période du travail au lycée et son service militaire, il s'est vu proposer en 1960 par son maître, le professeur Marcel de Corte, philosophe catholique, néothomiste et historien de la philosophie antique, le poste d'assistant à la Faculté de philosophie et lettres. Il a soutenu sous sa direction la thèse pour le doctorat consacrée à la religion et à la philosophie de la Grèce ancienne (1967), suite à quoi il fut nommé chargé de cours (1977), et en 1983 professeur ordinaire. On lui confia en même temps la direction de la Chair d'Histoire de la Philosophie Ancienne et de la Philosophie Morale. Il y donnait des cours de philosophie antique, de la pensée religieuse des Grecs anciens et de la philosophie morale contemporaine, tout en dirigeant la lecture analytique des textes de philosophie antique, etc.

Dans les années 1990–1994, il exerçait la fonction de doyen de sa Faculté ; il remplissait également à l'Université les différentes fonctions au sein de plusieurs commissions académiques. Dans son pays comme à l'étranger, il fut membre ou collaborateur de nombreux conseils, commissions et organismes scientifiques, expert dans toutes sortes de procédures d'avancement et concours. Il a participé à de nombreuses conférences internationales, séminaires et rencontres scientifiques. Ses multiples activités, à l'Université comme en dehors d'elle, lui ont valu de nombreux prix et distinctions honorifiques. Au moment de son passage à la retraite, à l'âge de 65 ans, après 41 ans de travail universitaire, un cercle d'amis (dont moi-même) lui a offert le volume intitulé *Κήποι*

– *Jardins* (2021), car il s’occupait de jardins et pâturages de l’antiquité. On y soulignait fort qu’il avait scrupuleusement rempli sa triple mission que l’on confie aujourd’hui aux membres de la communauté académique, à savoir l’enseignement, la recherche et la citoyenneté. J’attire l’attention sur l’exigence de citoyenneté chez le corps académique, inconnue chez nous.

En sa qualité de chercheur engagé dans la recherche sur la pensée religieuse des Grecs, André Motte a publié toute une série de dissertations sur ce sujet qui comptent dans le monde international de la science, comme p. ex. *Prairies et Jardins de la Grèce Antique. De la Religion à la Philosophie* (1973). Il y démontre, en conformité avec son sous-titre, l’existence des rapports entre la religion et la philosophie. Dans bien d’autres publications, articles dans des périodiques ou dictionnaires (p. ex. *Dictionnaire des religions*), il développera et approfondira un certain nombre de questions traitées dans ce livre. Il s’occupera de notions grecques concernant la religion et le domaine du sacré en général, la relation des dieux grecs avec la nature vivante et la nature morte. Ses réflexions, comme en témoigne la liste bibliographique de ses travaux, embrassent les mystères grecs, imaginaire relatif aux anges et aux démons, le rôle des mythes en politique. Il écrira sur les oracles et les divinations, le sort et le destin, les pèlerinages, les prières et les fêtes. Il présentera les rapports entre la religion et la rhétorique, la religion et la poésie, l’espérance et la divinité etc. Il se penchera sur deux sortes d’introduction à la philosophie dans les dialogues de Platon (*L’Alcibiade et le Phèdre de Platon: deux initiations à la philosophie opérées par un divin amour*, 2014), il traduira et expliquera la *Rhétorique* d’Aristote (*Art rhétorique d’Aristote*, 2014). Son dernier livre sera consacré à Démocrite (*Démocrite d’Abdère et les origines de la pensée éthique*, 2021). Son contact direct avec les sources, sa vaste et profonde analyse de toutes les informations concernant la religion, la philosophie et la rhétorique grecques présentes dans la poésie et dans la prose font la valeur de ses travaux scientifiques. On dirait qu’il n’y a pas un seul ouvrage ancien qu’il n’ait consulté et cité. On peut admirer sa grande érudition.

A Liège, il a créé autour de lui, je n’hésite pas à le répéter après ses collègues, une école de chercheurs sur la religion de la Grèce ancienne, école qui attirait les spécialistes venant de différents pays du monde. Il organisait des conférences et visitait lui même, avec des leçons et des communications, de nombreux pays, dont les préférés étaient la France, l’Espagne, la Suisse, l’Italie, La Grèce, le Canada et, depuis son premier séjour en 1981, notre Pologne. Il a acquis, tout comme son cercle de collaborateurs, une renommée grâce à la revue « Kernos. Revue internationale et pluridisciplinaire de religion grecque antique », fondée par lui en 1988. S’y joignit plus tard la revue « Mentor », guide bibliographique critique à travers les écrits du monde entier relatifs à la religion de la Grèce ancienne.

A la retraite après l’année 2001, Motte continuait ses lignes de recherche, sans renoncer donc à l’activité scientifique ; il a considérablement augmenté ainsi le nombre de ses publications. Il continuait à visiter les différents centres scientifiques, à prononcer des communications lors des conférences. Il remplissait pendant longtemps la fonction de vice-président du Centre International d’Étude de la Religion Grecque Antique – CIER-

GA), dont il était le cofondateur et qui avait son siège à Liège. Il a accepté la charge de gérer le secrétariat et de présider la Société belgo-luxembourgeoise d'histoire des religions (1996–2011), qui publiait sous sa direction le bulletin « Hieros. Bulletin annuel de la Société belgo-luxembourgeoise d'histoire des religions ».

En passant aux souvenirs poznaïens et, plus généralement, aux relations polonaises du professeur wallon, je présente tout d'abord mes excuses pour leur caractère personnel. Cela s'explique par les liens cordiaux et amicaux que j'entretenais avec André Motte jusqu'à la fin de ses jours. Il m'invitait régulièrement à Liège et répétait qu'une chambre d'amis m'attend toujours dans sa maison. Elle m'attendait en effet, mais ma situation personnelle ne m'a pas permis d'en profiter comme il l'aurait souhaité. Il aimait notre pays, son esprit et l'attitude de ses habitants. Il y venait volontiers et faisait entrer dans la collaboration tant les philologues classiques de Poznań que les philosophes. Il a donné un certain nombre de cours dans le domaine de ses recherches signalé plus haut. Il avait un talent didactique ; sa personnalité sereine, sa facilité à nouer des contacts, sa disposition à comprendre l'autre, à se monter sensible à ses besoins, attiraient. A l'occasion de ses missions scientifiques, il visitait autant que possible nos villes et campagnes, observait les paysages. Il a visité trois villes capitales: Gniezno, Cracovie et Varsovie, admiré la magnifique architecture de la ville de Copernic. A l'Université Jagellonne, il a noué contact avec le milieu de ses philosophes et donné une conférence à l'initiative du professeur Jerzy Ochman (1987), se disant fier de pouvoir le faire à une université aussi prestigieuse. Lors d'un de ses séjours à Poznań, venu avec son épouse Reine, catéchiste de l'Église catholique et mère de cinq enfants, il a formulé le désir de se rendre au sanctuaire de Jasna Góra à Częstochowa, ainsi qu'au sanctuaire de la Miséricorde Divine à Cracovie-Łagiewniki, dédié à Sainte-Sœur-Faustine ; mais aussi celui de voir de ses propres yeux le terrible enfer allemand d'Auschwitz (2001). En l'accompagnant dans tous ces déplacements je ne serais pas moi-même si je négligeais de lui faire admirer les charmes de ma campagne natale dans la région des Pałuki, de visiter les célèbres fouilles archéologiques dans les prairies de Biskupin (mon hôte s'occupait des prairies dans les religions de l'antiquité !). Pour tout cela, il m'a maintes fois témoigné sa reconnaissance, m'invitant plusieurs fois à donner des cours à Liège, me faisant parcourir la Belgique de long en large, visiter non seulement les grandes villes, mais aussi les moindres localités avec leurs cloîtres ou leurs petites églises romanes, car il s'intéressait lui-même à l'art roman. Ce qui était pour moi particulièrement important, c'est qu'il m'a fait connaître tous ses collègues, spécialistes de l'antiquité, tels Étienne Évrard, Paul Wathelet, Joseph Denooz ou Michel Dubuisson qui, plus tard (dans les années 1986–2002), visitaient à mon invitation notre Institut et partageaient avec nous, dans leurs cours et séminaires, les résultats de leurs recherches, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'exégèse des odes d'Horace, les personnages de Troyens dans l'*Iliade*, le rôle de l'informatique dans l'étude des langues anciennes etc.

Durant l'un de mes séjours belges (1990) André a organisé pour moi la rencontre avec les philologues classiques à l'Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve. Malheureusement, dans ce cas précis tout s'était terminé par quelques sympathiques conversations animées par le doyen de la Faculté, le professeur Daniel Donnet et par... un petit banquet.

Cette tentative de nouer des contacts n'a pas réussi. Les professeurs de cette Université présents dans la salle, Jacques Poucet et Jean-Marie Hannik, m'ont offert alors le manuel d'*Introduction aux études classiques. Guide bibliographique* (1989). Mais en nommant les revues de différents pays (entre autres russe, roumaine, hongroise) ils n'ont pas mentionné la revue polonaise « Eos », jouissant pourtant d'une renommée internationale, ce qui m'a surpris.

Le professeur Motte invitait aussi à Liège mes collègues et disciples. La dr Teodozja Wikarjak et le professeur Wojciech Mikołajczak ont pu faire la connaissance du seul laboratoire au monde, me semble-t-il, disposant à cette époque d'un énorme ordinateur permettant de faire les analyses statistiques des textes en langues anciennes (LASLA – Laboratoire d'Analyse Statistique de Langues Anciennes). Durant deux semaines, ils ont pu analyser à leur usage les épigrammes de Maciej Sarbiewski. J'ajouterais ici que j'avais l'occasion de voir déjà avant eux cette merveille de technique et le directeur du Laboratoire, le professeur Joseph Denooz, ayant entendu mon cours sur Klemens Janicki, poète polonais de la région de Żnin, a procédé pour moi à l'analyse statistique de son *Tristium liber*. On peut espérer que les philologues belges ne supprimeront pas de leurs ordinateurs les poèmes de ces deux poètes écrivant en latin, distingués par le titre de *poeta laureatus*, le plus haut dans toute l'Europe à cette époque. Naturellement, ce n'est pas le seul exemple de notre collaboration. Le professeur Motte nous a invité à collectionner les ouvrages polonais portant sur la religion de la Grèce antique, objet de ses propres recherches, et à préparer des notes pour une bibliographie critique de la revue « Mentor », déjà mentionnée. La professeur Krystyna Tuszynska et moi-même avons rédigé chacun un certain nombre de ces notes ; c'est la raison pour laquelle nos noms figurent sur la liste des collaborateurs (« Kernos », suppl. 2, « Mentor » 1992 : 8–9). A part cela, il organisait pour nous dans sa Chair des séminaires avec des communications dont plusieurs ont été publiées dans les revues philologiques belges (« Kernos », « Les Etudes

Classiques »). Il nous facilitait aussi l'accès aux riches ressources des bibliothèques belges.

Durant son séjour à l'Institut de Philologie Classique à Poznań, le professeur Motte a noué aussi de vifs et fructueux contacts avec des chercheurs poznanien dans le domaine de la philosophie antique, plus particulièrement avec le professeur Marian Wesoły, philologue classique de formation, enseignant-chercheur à la Chair



d'Histoire de la philosophie. Il a donné là-bas deux leçons sur la religion de Socrate et l'éthique de Démocrite et participé à une conférence internationale *Socrate et son héritage*, accordant à l'occasion une interview à la radio poznanienne au sujet de l'héritage

qu'a laissé ce grand philosophe et pédagogue. Le professeur Motte a publié trois articles dans la revue « Peitho. Examina antiqua », fondée par le professeur Wesoły. Il a organisé à son tour des rencontres scientifiques du collègue poznanien à l'Université de Liège, qui a pu donner, durant deux séjours, des conférences du domaine de la philosophie antique. En sa qualité de membre du Conseil Scientifique de la revue « Peitho. Examina antiqua », le professeur Motte collaborait également avec le professeur Mikolaj Domaradzki, secrétaire et actuellement rédacteur en chef de cette revue, en vue de la publication des articles dans nos deux pays.



En somme, il convient de noter que grâce au professeur André Motte les philologues classiques et les philosophes de Poznań ont pu s'ouvrir davantage au monde scientifique occidental. Les visites réciproques des chercheurs et l'échanges des publications ont permis de mieux connaître les directions et les méthodes de travail au sein des recherches sur l'antiquité. Les ressources bibliothécaires, grâce aux dons, se sont quelque peu enrichies. J'ai eu l'occasion de connaître, parmi les spécialistes de l'antiquité, bien des collègues étrangers ; jamais je n'ai rencontré un homme qui nous soit plus dévoué et plus bienveillant qu'André Motte, professeur wallon de Leodium. Savant érudit aux connaissances très étendues, modèle de l'humaniste attaché aux valeurs chrétiennes, homme de politesse exquise, serviable et sensible, enseignant véritablement académique, il mérite de rester gravé dans nos mémoires. Aujourd'hui, peu de temps après son décès, en procédant à ce bilan rapide des quarante années de nos contacts, je me fais reproche de n'avoir pas pensé à poser sa candidature à la dignité de docteur honoris causa de l'Université Adam Mickiewicz à Poznań. Il m'est d'autant plus impossible d'écrire ces mots sans le sentiment d'une profonde tristesse causée par ma séparation à jamais d'avec lui ; il évoque pour moi les souvenirs des temps, clairs ou sombres, vécus ensemble, d'un échange combien amical d'informations relatives non seulement à la vie universitaire, mais aussi familiale et politique, de nos dernières conversations, uniquement téléphoniques déjà. Tu étais, André, l'homme de paix. *Requiescas in pace!*

(Traduit par Wiesław Mateusz Malinowski)

SOURCES

Souvenirs personnels, notes et correspondance de l'auteur.

Le curriculum vitae autobiographique (communiqué par Madame Reine Motte, épouse d'André Motte).

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Informations fournies par le professeur Marian Wesoly.

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